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* chore(experiments): import io_uring cancel-safety spike as audit baseline (backlog#894) Import the Spike 0 io_uring cancel-safety prototype from the closed PR #4381 branch (houseme/p2-spike0-uring-cancel-safety) as the baseline for the backlog#1051 audit remediation. This crate is a standalone workspace and is deliberately kept out of the main Cargo.lock/build graph (NOT production code). Subsequent commits apply the fixes tracked in backlog#1051 sub-issues, one commit per issue. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): drain probe SQE to its CQE before releasing buffer (rustfs/backlog#1053) The probe path had no pending-table backstop: after pushing the read SQE, any early return (`submit_and_wait` error, missing CQE) dropped the probe buffer and file while the read could still be in flight in io-wq, and the caller dropped/unmapped the ring on the error path. If the kernel then wrote the 512-byte result into that freed heap block, it was a use-after-free — the exact bug class this spike exists to prevent, living in its own probe path. Fix: once the SQE is pushed, drain to its CQE via `drain_probe_cqe`, retrying the WAIT on EINTR without re-pushing (the kernel consumed the SQE atomically before the wait). A bounded attempt count prevents a probe against a hung device from blocking forever; on any drain failure the buffer (and file) are `mem::forget`-ed ("leak over UAF") so the kernel can never write into freed memory. Unmapping the ring on its own is safe; only the user buffer must survive. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): split probe/runtime/transient errno classes, guard offset (rustfs/backlog#1059) `is_expected_restriction` folded EINVAL into the "environment restricted" class, but at runtime EINVAL is triple-meaning — offset > i64::MAX (signed loff_t), O_DIRECT misalignment, and setup entries over the cap. Implementing the rustfs/backlog#1048 permanent-degradation latch literally against this class would fault a healthy disk off io_uring on one alignment retry or offset-arithmetic bug. Document that the class is probe-time ONLY and that P2 must split errnos into probe-restriction / runtime-parameter-error / transient (EINTR/EAGAIN). Add a concrete guard: `submit` rejects offset > i64::MAX with an InvalidInput error instead of letting it reach the kernel as a runtime EINVAL. The probe EINTR half of this issue is already handled by the drain loop from rustfs/backlog#1053 (retry the wait, never re-push). Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): abort on driver-thread panic instead of freeing in-flight buffers (rustfs/backlog#1054) The ownership model's "CQE is the only reclamation point" invariant held only while the driver thread never unwound. On a panic inside drive(), Rust drop order freed the `pending` table (every in-flight buffer) before the ring, while the kernel could still be writing into those buffers → mass UAF. `catch_unwind` cannot fix this: the destructors run during the unwind, before the catch boundary. Move ring + pending + backlog into a `DriverState` whose `Drop` checks `thread::panicking()` and calls `process::abort()` BEFORE any field destructor runs — leaving the ring mapped and the buffers allocated (leak over UAF). The capacity-overflow panic that made this reachable (caller-controlled `len`) is closed at the source in the len-guard commit (rustfs/backlog#1057). Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): reject reads above MAX_RW_COUNT to stop u32 truncation (rustfs/backlog#1057) The SQE length field is `len as u32`, so len == 4 GiB became a 0-byte read the kernel answered with res=0 → an Ok(empty) the caller decodes as a false EOF (and len > 4 GiB read only the low 32 bits). Silent truncation (CWE-197), forbidden by the repo's rust-code-quality rules. `submit` now rejects len > MAX_RW_COUNT (2 GiB - 4 KiB) with InvalidInput; the `len as u32` cast in the driver is consequently lossless. This also closes the caller-controlled capacity-overflow panic feeding rustfs/backlog#1054. P2 must chunk reads larger than the cap. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): resubmit short reads to satisfy the whole-range contract (rustfs/backlog#1058) CQE res >= 0 was truncated and delivered as final with no resubmit loop, and Pending did not even store the requested length. io_uring can legally short-read a regular file (io-wq signal interruption, NOWAIT partial page cache, O_DIRECT tail blocks), while LocalIoBackend::pread_bytes is a whole- range contract — a short shard fed to EC bitrot verification surfaces as intermittent, hard-to-attribute integrity/quorum errors. Track offset/nread in Pending and drive a resubmit loop: a short non-EOF read re-queues the remainder into buf[nread..], keeping the entry (and its buffer, and in_flight) until the FINAL CQE of the logical read; res == 0 is treated as a real EOF. The resubmitted SQE reuses the op's user_data, so a late ASYNC_CANCEL from a dropped future still cancels the logical read cleanly. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): bound the shutdown drain and record cancel outcomes (rustfs/backlog#1055) Shutdown made "drain to in_flight == 0" a hard precondition for unmapping the ring, but ASYNC_CANCEL is best-effort: it cannot interrupt a regular-file read already executing in io-wq, so on a D-state/NFS-hung disk the CQE may never arrive and drain-to-zero never terminates — the driver loops forever and shutdown()/Drop join blocks the caller (and any tokio worker) permanently. This is an internal contradiction (safe unmap needs drain; a bad disk makes drain unbounded) in the very environment io_uring exists to handle. Add a bounded-drain escape hatch: after DRAIN_TIMEOUT with ops still in flight, leak the whole DriverState (ring stays mapped, buffers stay allocated — leak over UAF) and exit so shutdown() returns. Soften shutdown()'s hard assert to a warning for that degraded path; clean-drain tests still assert in_flight == 0 themselves. Also record the ASYNC_CANCEL three-state result (succeeded/not-found/already-executing) so the hung-disk signal is observable instead of discarded. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): assert NODROP, monitor CQ overflow, handle EBUSY (rustfs/backlog#1056) In-flight had no upper bound and could exceed CQ capacity (entries=64 → CQ=128) with zero overflow handling: no NODROP check, no overflow read, no EBUSY handling. A lost CQE means its pending entry is never reclaimed, drain never completes and shutdown hangs — and the spike only avoided this by accidental reliance on the io-uring crate's auto-flush + NODROP kernel + poll cadence, all of which P2's eventfd/AsyncFd reaping removes. Assert the NODROP feature at probe (degrade via ENOSYS otherwise), monitor the kernel CQ-overflow counter each turn and surface a non-zero value as fatal, and handle submit() EBUSY as CQ-overflow backpressure (keep the backlog, reap this turn) instead of swallowing it. The hard in-flight bound (permits ≤ CQ capacity) lands with the backpressure work in rustfs/backlog#1060. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): add backpressure with permits released at the CQE (rustfs/backlog#1060) Submission was unbounded (unbounded mpsc + uncapped pending/backlog), so a concurrent large-object read storm had no memory ceiling. The subtler trap: the planned SQ-depth semaphore, implemented the natural RAII way (permit held by the ReadHandle/future), would release permits at future drop while orphan buffers stay resident in the pending table awaiting slow-disk CQEs — decoupling the permit count from resident memory and reopening the DoS surface exactly in the EC quorum-drop hot path. Add a `Backpressure` semaphore sized to the SQ depth (entries < CQ capacity, so CQ overflow is structurally unreachable). `submit` acquires before handing the op to the driver; the driver releases the permit at the CQE (pending-table removal), NOT at future drop, tying the in-flight/memory bound to actual kernel residency. Permits are balanced on the shutting-down reject and send-failure paths, and the driver wakes all waiters on exit. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * fix(experiments/uring): open the probe file via O_TMPFILE instead of a predictable path (rustfs/backlog#1061) The probe wrote a predictable temp path (uring-spike-probe-{pid}-{seq}) with std::fs::write (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, no O_EXCL/O_NOFOLLOW): a local attacker could pre-plant a symlink there and have the process — often root — truncate and overwrite an arbitrary target (CWE-59/377), with a TOCTOU window between write and open (CWE-367). This probe is the direct blueprint for P2's per-disk startup probe, so copied verbatim it becomes a production vulnerability. Open via O_TMPFILE (anonymous inode, no name → nothing to plant a symlink at, no TOCTOU, no leftover), falling back to O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW + 0600 + per-process nonce + immediate unlink on filesystems without O_TMPFILE. P2's per-disk probe should create inside the tested data-disk directory the same way, which also validates that disk's filesystem + io_uring combination. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * docs(experiments/uring): correct invariant 2 mechanism, add invariants 6/7/8 (rustfs/backlog#1063) Invariant 2 (the spike's flagship finding) mis-described the fd-reuse hazard: it claimed the danger window is submission→CQE and that the kernel would "write into someone else's file". Both are wrong — a submitted op holds a struct file reference and is immune to fd close/reuse; the real window is SQE construction (as_raw_fd) → io_uring_enter (backlog residency), and for a READ the consequence is reading the WRONG file, not writing. A P2 optimization reasoning from the false premise (drop Arc<File> after submit / registered-file table) would step straight into it. Correct the mechanism and add the invariants this audit hardened: driver-thread unwind safety (6), backpressure permit released at the CQE (7), reused-buffer content hygiene (8, detailed in rustfs/backlog#1062), plus the errno three-class contract, bounded-drain escape hatch, and short-read resubmit responsibility. Mark the now-remediated items in the leftover list. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * docs(experiments/uring): pin the reused-buffer content-hygiene invariant for P3 (rustfs/backlog#1062) The spike leaks nothing today (fresh zeroed buffer per op + truncate to res), but rustfs/backlog#1048's P3 constraint mandates a driver-owned aligned slab whose buffers are reused across requests as dirty memory. Both the SPIKE invariants and the #1048 constraint address only buffer LIFETIME (UAF), not content hygiene: once buffers are reused, any path that forgets to bound the caller-visible bytes to cqe.res (O_DIRECT full-block read sliced upstream, error path returning the whole buffer) discloses a previous tenant's object data (CWE-226) in an S3 store. Pin invariant 8: reused-buffer bytes visible to the caller must be strictly ⊆ [0, cqe.res). Documented in SPIKE.md and marked at the delivery point in the driver so P3 preserves it; needs a dirty-buffer + short-read regression test. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * test(experiments/uring): pin fd ownership and orphan-integrity directly (rustfs/backlog#1064) The memory-safety assertions were all counter proxies, and invariant 2 (fd owned by the pending table) had zero coverage — deleting Pending.file compiled and left every test green because each test kept its own Arc<File> alive. Add two direct observations: pending_table_owns_fd_after_caller_drop drops the caller's Arc while the op is in flight and asserts F_GETFD still succeeds (only the pending table's clone keeps the fd open; removing that field would close it → EBADF). orphan_in_flight_does_not_corrupt_delivered_reads keeps an orphaned buffer in flight while 64 delivered reads must return byte-exact, asserting the orphan buffer is not reclaimed early and its kernel writes corrupt nothing. A driver-level poison/canary leg is noted as a P2 acceptance-matrix item (ASAN cannot see a kernel write into a freed buffer). Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * test(experiments/uring): cover CQ-overflow safety and read boundaries (rustfs/backlog#1065) The suite never approached CQ capacity and never touched EOF/len boundaries. Add no_cq_overflow_under_load (300 ops through a CQ of 128 with backpressure capping in-flight at 64, asserting cq_overflow stays 0 and all deliver), boundary_reads (len==0, read at EOF, a cross-EOF short read delivered to a live receiver exercising the positioned resubmit path, and the rejected huge-len/huge-offset guards), and pipe_half_close_reads_eof (a closed write end surfaces res==0 EOF). Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * test(experiments/uring): cover Drop-without-shutdown and de-flake cancel_stress (rustfs/backlog#1066) All tests ended via explicit shutdown(), so the UringDriver Drop impl's live-thread branch (send Shutdown before join) was never exercised; add drop_without_shutdown_drains_and_cancels which drops the driver with ops in flight and asserts the held futures resolve to ECANCELED (a join-first regression or unbounded hang makes it hang). Also de-flake cancel_stress: the exact assert delivered == OPS/2 raced the driver — an even-i read can complete between read_at returning and drop(handle), delivering to the still-live receiver and flipping the split. Relax to the deterministic conservation identity plus delivered >= OPS/2. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * test(experiments/uring): make run-docker.sh assert each leg's real path (rustfs/backlog#1067) Both legs ran the identical cargo test and checked only the exit code, and a skip is indistinguishable from a real pass at that level: leg 1 depended on the host Docker's default seccomp "usually" blocking io_uring, and leg 2 printed "both legs passed" even if every test skipped (vacuous pass — zero real io_uring coverage). Add an explicit seccomp profile (seccomp-block-uring.json) that returns EPERM for io_uring_setup/enter/register so leg 1 deterministically hits the graceful-degradation path regardless of host defaults, and assert leg 1 actually degraded (SKIP lines present) while leg 2 did NOT skip a single test (io_uring really ran). Either violation now fails the harness. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> * style(experiments/uring): apply repo rustfmt (max_width=130) to the audit changes Normalize the formatting of the remediation code to the repo rustfmt.toml. Pure formatting; no behavior change. clippy --all-targets -D warnings is clean. Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
473 lines
18 KiB
Rust
473 lines
18 KiB
Rust
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//! Cancel-safety acceptance tests for backlog#894 Spike 0.
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//!
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//! In a restricted environment (Docker default seccomp, gVisor) the probe
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//! fails with an expected-restriction errno and every test degrades to a
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//! skip — the same contract P2's production probe must honor. Run under
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//! `--security-opt seccomp=unconfined` (see run-docker.sh) to exercise the
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//! real io_uring paths.
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#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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use std::fs::File;
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use std::io::Write;
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use std::os::fd::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd};
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
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use io_uring_cancel_spike::UringDriver;
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fn driver_or_skip(name: &str) -> Option<UringDriver> {
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match UringDriver::probe_and_start(64) {
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Ok(d) => Some(d),
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Err(e) => {
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assert!(
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e.is_expected_restriction(),
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"probe failed OUTSIDE the expected restriction errno class \
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(EACCES/EPERM/ENOSYS/EINVAL/EOPNOTSUPP): {e:?}"
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);
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eprintln!("SKIP {name}: restricted environment, graceful degradation path taken ({e:?})");
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None
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}
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}
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}
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/// Deterministic pseudo-random content so reads are verifiable.
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fn make_content(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut state: u64 = 0x2545F4914F6CDD1D;
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(0..len)
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.map(|_| {
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state ^= state << 13;
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state ^= state >> 7;
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state ^= state << 17;
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state as u8
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})
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.collect()
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}
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fn temp_file_with(content: &[u8], tag: &str) -> (std::path::PathBuf, Arc<File>) {
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let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("uring-spike-{tag}-{}", std::process::id()));
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std::fs::write(&path, content).expect("write temp file");
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let file = Arc::new(File::open(&path).expect("open temp file"));
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(path, file)
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}
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/// An OS pipe whose read side never completes until we write — the only
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/// deterministic way to hold an op in flight across a future drop.
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fn os_pipe() -> (Arc<File>, File) {
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let mut fds = [0i32; 2];
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// SAFETY: fds is a valid out-array; on success both fds are owned here
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// and immediately wrapped in File which takes over closing them.
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let rc = unsafe { libc::pipe(fds.as_mut_ptr()) };
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assert_eq!(rc, 0, "pipe(2) failed");
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let read = unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(fds[0]) };
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let write = unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(fds[1]) };
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(Arc::new(read), write)
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}
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async fn wait_until(deadline: Duration, mut cond: impl FnMut() -> bool) -> bool {
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let start = Instant::now();
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while start.elapsed() < deadline {
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if cond() {
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return true;
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}
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tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(5)).await;
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}
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cond()
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}
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/// Baseline: completed reads return exactly what pread would.
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#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
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async fn read_matches_std() {
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let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("read_matches_std") else {
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return;
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};
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const LEN: usize = 8 << 20;
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let content = make_content(LEN);
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let (path, file) = temp_file_with(&content, "correctness");
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for i in 0..64usize {
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let offset = (i * 131_071) % (LEN - 70_000);
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let len = 1 + (i * 8_191) % 65_536;
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let got = driver
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.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), offset as u64, len)
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.await
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.expect("read failed");
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assert_eq!(got, &content[offset..offset + len], "mismatch at offset {offset} len {len}");
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}
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let snap = driver.shutdown();
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assert_eq!(snap.delivered, 64);
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assert_eq!(snap.orphan_reclaimed, 0);
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let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
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}
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/// THE core spike assertion: drop the future while the op is provably still
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/// in flight (blocked pipe read, no cancel submitted) and verify the buffer
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/// stays owned by the driver until the CQE finally arrives.
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#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
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async fn dropped_future_buffer_lives_until_cqe() {
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let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("dropped_future_buffer_lives_until_cqe") else {
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return;
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};
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let (pipe_read, mut pipe_write) = os_pipe();
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let handle = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 4096).without_cancel_on_drop();
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assert!(
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wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || driver.stats().in_flight == 1).await,
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"read never reached in-flight state"
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);
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drop(handle);
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// No cancel was submitted and the pipe is empty: the op MUST stay in
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// flight and the buffer MUST NOT be reclaimed, no matter how long the
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// future has been gone.
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tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
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let snap = driver.stats();
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assert_eq!(snap.in_flight, 1, "op vanished without a CQE");
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assert_eq!(snap.orphan_reclaimed, 0, "buffer reclaimed before CQE — UAF window!");
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// Now let the kernel complete the read; the CQE both writes into the
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// driver-owned buffer (safely) and triggers reclamation.
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pipe_write.write_all(&[0xAB; 512]).expect("pipe write");
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assert!(
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wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || {
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let s = driver.stats();
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s.in_flight == 0 && s.orphan_reclaimed == 1
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})
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.await,
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"orphaned op was not reclaimed at CQE: {:?}",
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driver.stats()
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);
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driver.shutdown();
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}
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/// Default drop path: ASYNC_CANCEL accelerates the CQE so the orphaned
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/// buffer is reclaimed promptly without any data ever arriving.
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#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
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async fn async_cancel_accelerates_reclaim() {
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let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("async_cancel_accelerates_reclaim") else {
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return;
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};
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let (pipe_read, pipe_write) = os_pipe();
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let handle = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 4096);
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assert!(
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wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || driver.stats().in_flight == 1).await,
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"read never reached in-flight state"
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);
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drop(handle); // submits IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL
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assert!(
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wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || {
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let s = driver.stats();
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s.in_flight == 0 && s.orphan_reclaimed == 1
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})
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.await,
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"cancel did not reclaim the orphan: {:?}",
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driver.stats()
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);
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drop(pipe_write);
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driver.shutdown();
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}
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/// Volume test modeling the EC quorum pattern: many concurrent reads, half
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/// the futures dropped immediately. Every op must be accounted for as either
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/// delivered or orphan-reclaimed, and survivors must return correct bytes.
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#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
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async fn cancel_stress_accounts_for_every_buffer() {
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let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("cancel_stress_accounts_for_every_buffer") else {
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return;
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};
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const LEN: usize = 8 << 20;
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const OPS: usize = 256;
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const READ_LEN: usize = 64 << 10;
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let content = make_content(LEN);
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let (path, file) = temp_file_with(&content, "stress");
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let mut kept = Vec::new();
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for i in 0..OPS {
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let offset = (i * 97_611) % (LEN - READ_LEN);
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let handle = driver.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), offset as u64, READ_LEN);
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if i % 2 == 0 {
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drop(handle); // dropped mid-flight or post-completion — both must be safe
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} else {
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kept.push((offset, handle));
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}
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}
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for (offset, handle) in kept {
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let got = handle.await.expect("kept read failed");
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assert_eq!(got, &content[offset..offset + READ_LEN], "mismatch at offset {offset}");
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}
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let snap = driver.shutdown();
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assert_eq!(snap.submitted, OPS as u64);
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// The exact split delivered == OPS/2 was flaky (C18, rustfs/backlog#1066):
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// an even-i read can finish between read_at returning and drop(handle),
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// delivering to the still-live receiver and flipping the split — all while
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// the ownership model behaves correctly. Only the conservation identity is
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// deterministic; the kept half guarantees delivered >= OPS/2.
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assert!(snap.delivered >= (OPS / 2) as u64, "kept half not all delivered: {snap:?}");
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assert_eq!(
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snap.delivered + snap.orphan_reclaimed,
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OPS as u64,
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"some buffers are unaccounted for: {snap:?}"
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);
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let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Shutdown with ops still blocked in flight must cancel + drain them before
|
|
/// the driver thread exits (and the ring is unmapped).
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
|
|
async fn shutdown_drains_in_flight_ops() {
|
|
let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("shutdown_drains_in_flight_ops") else {
|
|
return;
|
|
};
|
|
let (pipe_read, pipe_write) = os_pipe();
|
|
|
|
let h1 = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 1024);
|
|
let h2 = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 1024);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || driver.stats().in_flight == 2).await,
|
|
"reads never reached in-flight state"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// shutdown() cancels both, drains to in_flight == 0 (asserted inside),
|
|
// and joins the thread. The held futures then resolve with ECANCELED.
|
|
let snap = driver.shutdown();
|
|
assert_eq!(snap.in_flight, 0);
|
|
assert_eq!(snap.delivered + snap.orphan_reclaimed, snap.submitted);
|
|
|
|
for h in [h1, h2] {
|
|
let err = h.await.expect_err("blocked pipe read cannot have succeeded");
|
|
assert_eq!(err.raw_os_error(), Some(libc::ECANCELED), "unexpected error: {err:?}");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
drop(pipe_write);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Invariant 2 regression (C20, rustfs/backlog#1064): the pending table — not
|
|
/// the caller — owns the fd. Deleting `Pending.file` used to leave every test
|
|
/// green because each test kept its own Arc<File> alive; this pins it. Drop the
|
|
/// caller's Arc while the op is in flight (bare drop, no cancel) and assert the
|
|
/// fd is STILL open: only the pending table's clone keeps it alive. If that
|
|
/// field were removed, the File would close the fd and F_GETFD returns EBADF.
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
|
|
async fn pending_table_owns_fd_after_caller_drop() {
|
|
let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("pending_table_owns_fd_after_caller_drop") else {
|
|
return;
|
|
};
|
|
let (pipe_read, mut pipe_write) = os_pipe();
|
|
let raw_fd = pipe_read.as_raw_fd();
|
|
|
|
let handle = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 64).without_cancel_on_drop();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || driver.stats().in_flight == 1).await,
|
|
"read never reached in-flight state"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// The pending table is now the ONLY owner of the fd.
|
|
drop(handle);
|
|
drop(pipe_read);
|
|
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
|
|
|
|
// SAFETY: F_GETFD only queries the descriptor; it neither closes nor
|
|
// mutates it.
|
|
let rc = unsafe { libc::fcntl(raw_fd, libc::F_GETFD) };
|
|
assert_ne!(
|
|
rc,
|
|
-1,
|
|
"fd was closed while an op is in flight — the pending table does not own it \
|
|
(invariant 2 unprotected): {}",
|
|
std::io::Error::last_os_error()
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Complete the op so the driver reclaims cleanly.
|
|
pipe_write.write_all(&[0x5A; 64]).expect("pipe write");
|
|
assert!(
|
|
wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || driver.stats().in_flight == 0).await,
|
|
"op was not reclaimed at CQE"
|
|
);
|
|
driver.shutdown();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Memory-safety integrity (C14, rustfs/backlog#1064): while an orphaned
|
|
/// blocked-pipe read holds a driver-owned buffer in flight the whole time, many
|
|
/// delivered reads must still come back byte-exact — the kernel writing into
|
|
/// the orphan's still-owned buffer must not corrupt anything, and the orphan
|
|
/// buffer must NOT be reclaimed before its own CQE. This is a direct
|
|
/// data-integrity observation, not just a counter identity. (A driver-level
|
|
/// poison/canary leg is a P2 acceptance-matrix item; ASAN cannot see a kernel
|
|
/// write into a freed buffer, so it is not the mechanism.)
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
|
|
async fn orphan_in_flight_does_not_corrupt_delivered_reads() {
|
|
let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("orphan_in_flight_does_not_corrupt_delivered_reads") else {
|
|
return;
|
|
};
|
|
let (pipe_read, mut pipe_write) = os_pipe();
|
|
let orphan = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 4096).without_cancel_on_drop();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || driver.stats().in_flight == 1).await,
|
|
"orphan never reached in-flight state"
|
|
);
|
|
drop(orphan); // bare drop: buffer stays owned by the driver until its CQE
|
|
|
|
const LEN: usize = 1 << 20;
|
|
let content = make_content(LEN);
|
|
let (path, file) = temp_file_with(&content, "canary");
|
|
for i in 0..64usize {
|
|
let offset = (i * 9_973) % (LEN - 4096);
|
|
let got = driver
|
|
.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), offset as u64, 4096)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("read failed");
|
|
assert_eq!(got, &content[offset..offset + 4096], "delivered read corrupted at offset {offset}");
|
|
}
|
|
assert_eq!(driver.stats().orphan_reclaimed, 0, "orphan buffer reclaimed before its CQE");
|
|
|
|
pipe_write.write_all(&[0u8; 512]).expect("pipe write");
|
|
driver.shutdown();
|
|
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// CQ-overflow safety (C15, rustfs/backlog#1065). With backpressure capping
|
|
/// in-flight at the SQ depth (64) below CQ capacity (128), overflow is
|
|
/// structurally unreachable. Drive far more ops than CQ capacity through and
|
|
/// assert the kernel overflow counter stays 0 and every op is delivered.
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
|
|
async fn no_cq_overflow_under_load() {
|
|
let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("no_cq_overflow_under_load") else {
|
|
return;
|
|
};
|
|
const LEN: usize = 8 << 20;
|
|
const OPS: usize = 300; // > CQ capacity (128) many times over
|
|
const READ_LEN: usize = 4096;
|
|
let content = make_content(LEN);
|
|
let (path, file) = temp_file_with(&content, "overflow");
|
|
|
|
let mut kept = Vec::new();
|
|
for i in 0..OPS {
|
|
let offset = (i * 4_093) % (LEN - READ_LEN);
|
|
kept.push((offset, driver.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), offset as u64, READ_LEN)));
|
|
}
|
|
for (offset, handle) in kept {
|
|
let got = handle.await.expect("read failed");
|
|
assert_eq!(got, &content[offset..offset + READ_LEN], "mismatch at offset {offset}");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let snap = driver.shutdown();
|
|
assert_eq!(snap.cq_overflow, 0, "CQ overflowed under load: {snap:?}");
|
|
assert_eq!(snap.delivered, OPS as u64);
|
|
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Boundary reads on a regular file (C16, rustfs/backlog#1065): len==0, read at
|
|
/// EOF, a cross-EOF short read delivered to a live receiver (exercises the C9
|
|
/// resubmit loop), and the rejected huge-len / huge-offset guards (C6/C7).
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
|
|
async fn boundary_reads() {
|
|
let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("boundary_reads") else {
|
|
return;
|
|
};
|
|
const LEN: usize = 4096;
|
|
let content = make_content(LEN);
|
|
let (path, file) = temp_file_with(&content, "boundary");
|
|
|
|
// len == 0 → empty Ok.
|
|
let got = driver.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), 0, 0).await.expect("len=0 read");
|
|
assert!(got.is_empty(), "len=0 should return empty, got {}", got.len());
|
|
|
|
// offset == file size → EOF → empty Ok.
|
|
let got = driver.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), LEN as u64, 128).await.expect("EOF read");
|
|
assert!(got.is_empty(), "read at EOF should be empty, got {}", got.len());
|
|
|
|
// Read spanning past EOF → the available tail bytes, delivered to a live
|
|
// receiver via the resubmit-then-EOF path.
|
|
let got = driver
|
|
.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), (LEN - 10) as u64, 100)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("cross-EOF read");
|
|
assert_eq!(got, &content[LEN - 10..LEN], "cross-EOF read should return the tail only");
|
|
|
|
// len > MAX_RW_COUNT → rejected (C6); offset > i64::MAX → rejected (C7).
|
|
let err = driver
|
|
.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), 0, (1usize << 32) + 1)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect_err("huge len must be rejected");
|
|
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "huge len error: {err:?}");
|
|
let err = driver
|
|
.read_at(Arc::clone(&file), (i64::MAX as u64) + 1, 16)
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect_err("huge offset must be rejected");
|
|
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "huge offset error: {err:?}");
|
|
|
|
driver.shutdown();
|
|
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Pipe half-close boundary (C16, rustfs/backlog#1065): an in-flight read whose
|
|
/// write end is closed observes EOF (res=0) and returns empty.
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
|
|
async fn pipe_half_close_reads_eof() {
|
|
let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("pipe_half_close_reads_eof") else {
|
|
return;
|
|
};
|
|
let (pipe_read, pipe_write) = os_pipe();
|
|
let handle = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 128);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || driver.stats().in_flight == 1).await,
|
|
"read never reached in-flight state"
|
|
);
|
|
drop(pipe_write); // close write end → blocked read observes EOF
|
|
let got = handle.await.expect("pipe EOF read");
|
|
assert!(got.is_empty(), "closed-pipe read should be empty EOF, got {}", got.len());
|
|
driver.shutdown();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Drop-without-shutdown path (C17, rustfs/backlog#1066): every other test ends
|
|
/// via explicit shutdown(), so the UringDriver `Drop` impl's live-thread branch
|
|
/// was never exercised. Drop the driver directly with ops still in flight; the
|
|
/// Drop must send Shutdown BEFORE joining (send-after-join would deadlock at
|
|
/// recv), cancel + drain the in-flight ops, and join — the held futures then
|
|
/// resolve to ECANCELED. A regression (join-first, or an unbounded hang) makes
|
|
/// this test hang.
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
|
|
async fn drop_without_shutdown_drains_and_cancels() {
|
|
let Some(driver) = driver_or_skip("drop_without_shutdown_drains_and_cancels") else {
|
|
return;
|
|
};
|
|
let (pipe_read, pipe_write) = os_pipe();
|
|
let h1 = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 1024);
|
|
let h2 = driver.read_current(Arc::clone(&pipe_read), 1024);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
wait_until(Duration::from_secs(2), || driver.stats().in_flight == 2).await,
|
|
"reads never reached in-flight state"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// No shutdown() — exercise Drop directly.
|
|
drop(driver);
|
|
|
|
for h in [h1, h2] {
|
|
let err = h.await.expect_err("blocked pipe read cannot have succeeded");
|
|
assert_eq!(err.raw_os_error(), Some(libc::ECANCELED), "unexpected error: {err:?}");
|
|
}
|
|
drop(pipe_write);
|
|
}
|