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Zhengchao An
3921336b23
* feat(kms): add AppRole configuration surface for Vault auth Extend VaultAuthMethod::AppRole with secret_id_file (re-read on every login so external rotation is picked up), a configurable auth mount (default "approle"), and an optional fail-closed safety window. All new fields are serde(default) so previously persisted configurations keep deserializing, and the strict admin-configure deserializer accepts them as optional. Environment selection: setting RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID switches both Vault backends to AppRole; the secret_id comes from RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID_FILE (path stored, file wins) or RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET_ID, following the static secret-key file precedent. validate() rejects AppRole configs without a role_id, without any secret_id source, or with an empty mount. Also append the CredentialsUnavailable error variant used by the fail-closed credential gate. * feat(kms): implement AppRole login with background renewal and fail-closed expiry Implement the AppRoleLogin token source (vaultrs approle login + renew-self) and wire lease-bound credentials through the provider: - Each successful login/renewal installs a new client generation in the ArcSwap; in-flight requests finish on the generation they captured. - A background renewal task refreshes at half the lease TTL: renewable tokens are renewed in place, everything else (or a failed renewal) falls back to a fresh login. Auth exchanges run under the typed retry policy (OpClass::Auth) and failed cycles retry on a fixed cadence, so the provider recovers once Vault does. - Fail-closed: current() refuses to hand out a token inside the configured safety window of its expiry (default: one attempt timeout), returning CredentialsUnavailable instead of sending a request whose token may lapse mid-flight. - Refreshes are single-flight: concurrent triggers for the same generation coalesce into one login. - The renewal task's owner handle lives on the KMS service version: stop() shuts it down explicitly and reconfigure recycles it via cancel-on-drop when the old version is discarded. - The secret_id file is re-read on every login attempt; missing or empty files fail the attempt without contacting Vault. Crate-owned copies of tokens and secret_ids are zeroized on drop, and Debug output of every credential-carrying type stays redacted (leak regression tests). The renewal machinery is covered by paused-clock tests driving a scripted token source: renew-at-half-TTL timing, login fallback, fail-closed window entry and recovery, prompt task recycling, and coalesced concurrent refreshes. * feat(kms): add Vault Agent token file authentication Add the TokenFile source: the token is read from an agent-managed sink file (RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN_FILE or the TokenFile auth config) and re-read once per poll interval (default 30s) through the existing renewal loop, so a token rotated by the agent installs a new client generation within one poll of the atomic replace. Each successful read extends the token's observed validity to twice the poll interval; a file that disappears or turns empty keeps failing the refresh until the fail-closed window trips, and heals the provider as soon as it is restored. Reads are strict and never contact Vault on failure: the file must be non-empty after trimming, and on Unix group/other permission bits are a hard error (mirroring the SFTP host-key rule). Rotation detection uses a content digest; the token itself is never stored on the source and the crate-owned copy is zeroized. Configuring the token file together with AppRole or an explicit static token is rejected as a configuration error. All new config fields are serde(default) and the strict admin-configure deserializer accepts the new variant. Covered by paused-clock tests (atomic replacement installs a new generation next cycle, deletion fails closed and recovers, prompt task recycling) plus negatives for missing/empty/over-permissive files and a Debug leak regression. * docs(kms): add Vault authentication and credential lifecycle runbook Cover choosing between static token, AppRole, and Vault Agent token file auth; AppRole role setup with SecretID delivery and rotation; Agent sink deployment with the permission requirements; and the fail-closed window semantics with a troubleshooting table keyed on the renewal task's log lines.