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* fix(ecstore): stop pruning at nonempty directories (#7616) * fix(ecstore): stop pruning at nonempty directories * test(ecstore): release pruning fixtures before temp cleanup (cherry picked from commit8f150d1d8e) * fix(heal): preserve retryable batch failures during recovery (#7642) * fix(heal): preserve retryable batch failures during recovery * test(heal): pin prebuilt hooks binaries in ci (cherry picked from commit5cd58319ed) * fix(s3): reject oversize single PUT early and map body errors to 4xx (#7635) * fix(s3): reject oversize single PUT early and map body errors to 4xx A single PutObject above the 5 GiB single-request ceiling was only rejected after the client had streamed 5 GiB into s3s's read-time body budget, and the resulting BodySizeLimitExceeded surfaced from the erasure writer as 500 InternalError. A body whose connection hit EOF before Content-Length bytes arrived (hyper's IncompleteBody) was also a 500. SDKs retry 500s, so one oversize upload was resent from offset 0 five times. - PutObject and UploadPart reject a declared length above MAX_SINGLE_PUT_OBJECT_SIZE with 400 EntityTooLarge before reading the body; the constant moves to rustfs_config so the s3s limit and the admission check share one value. - ApiError maps BodySizeLimitExceeded to EntityTooLarge and a hyper body EOF to IncompleteBody across both io::Error conversions. Fixes #7596. * test(s3): cover UploadPart admission, aws-chunked length, real s3s limit - Poll-counting test body proves PutObject and UploadPart reject a declared size above the ceiling with zero body polls; exact-cap and zero-length parts pass admission. - A STREAMING-* aws-chunked PUT whose framed Content-Length exceeds the cap is admitted when the decoded length is within it and rejected when the decoded length is over it. - The display-based BodySizeLimitExceeded matcher is checked against the real error produced by the pinned s3s Body budget. (cherry picked from commit50b31bc75b) * fix(ecstore): make directory mtime fixture portable (#7623) * fix(ecstore): make directory mtime fixture portable * style(ecstore): format mtime fixture assertion --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commitb1cc286cac) * fix(storage): prevent readiness after native migration failures (#7652) * fix(storage): prevent readiness after native migration failures * fix(storage): skip unsupported IAM records before reading * fix(storage): use stable typed migration metadata errors * fix(storage): include migration record in startup errors * test(storage): cover native migration startup failures * test(storage): use array chunks in migration fixture --------- Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <214054+rjregenold@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit0cbc3ffe61) * fix(admin): expose OIDC account display fields (#7654) Expose verified OIDC username and email claims as display-only metadata on self-account responses while preserving the virtual parent as the authorization identity.\n\nKeep rustfs-madmin public response structs unchanged by adding the optional wire fields through private handler response wrappers. (cherry picked from commitf02bc947cd) * fix(replication): correct peer joins and remote-state reporting (#7650) * fix(replication): propagate verified peer deployment identities * fix(replication): report actual remote peer state * fix(replication): defer initial sync until all peers join * test(replication): shut down TLS fixtures cleanly --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit853ae63b6a) * fix(s3): bound stalled UploadPart request bodies (#7659) * fix(s3): bound stalled UploadPart request bodies * fix(ci): preserve the S3S footprint ratchet (cherry picked from commit666dfd9f9f) * fix(tables): reject reserved warehouse locations (#7671) Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit414176c47f) * fix(ci): bind nightly lanes to one resolved source (#7688) (cherry picked from commit01d8e4347f) * fix(replication): close the pre-stable convergence gaps from backlog#2367 (#7626) * fix(replication): total-order rule sort and honor V1 top-level Prefix Rule matching had two defects from the pre-GA replication audit (rustfs/backlog#2367 C-1 and C-2): - The actionable-rule sort compared same-destination rules by priority but answered Equal for any other pair, which is not a total order; the standard library sort panics on such comparators once a slice exceeds the insertion-sort threshold, so an object matching more than 20 enabled rules across two or more targets could panic the PUT or DELETE task. Rules now sort by priority descending with destination and id as tie-breakers, and filter_target_arns preserves that order instead of draining a HashSet. - A V1 rule written without a <Filter> carries its prefix at the top level; that field was never read, so <Prefix>logs/</Prefix> matched every object. ReplicationRuleExt::prefix now falls back to it, with a <Filter> keeping precedence. The existing prefix fixtures were built this way and had been asserting nothing. * fix(admin): advertise data-usage and listen capabilities to rc The rc client gated `rc du` and `rc watch` on a pinned contract that matched server versions by the string prefix `1.0.0-rc.`; a server that reports `1.0.0` no longer matches, and the dynamic `advertised` list did not carry either name, so `rc du` against a GA server fails with an unsupported-capability error (rustfs/backlog#2367 E-2). Advertise `admin.data-usage` from the admin route inventory like the IAM entries, and `listen_notification` for the bucket `?events=` extension route the admin router dispatches. The client merges advertised entries ahead of its pinned contract, so no version sniffing is needed. * fix(site-replication): stop notifying the local site on remove and rotate The pending-remove and pending-rotation notification loops skipped the local site by endpoint only, while finalization identifies it by deployment id or endpoint. The reconcile tick resolves the local peer from the node's own listen address (and a handler from the request Host), so `remove --all` dialed the site's registered endpoint, waited out the request timeout against the lifecycle lock it was holding, and answered `Partial: failed to notify 1 peer(s)` for a removal that had succeeded (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-4, backlog#2195 item 3). Both loops now iterate the peers still awaiting notification through one helper that applies the finalization identity. * fix(site-replication): promote and settle IAM retries without a tick of slack Two retry-queue behaviours kept an IAM change from converging for ten to twenty minutes after a peer came back (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-1 and A-3, backlog#2305): - The lightweight 30-second pass filtered its reachability probe to bucket ops, so a backed-off IAM or bucket-metadata snapshot waited for the 600-second tick to notice the peer. It now probes every backed-off class and still replays only bounded bucket ops; promotion is a state flip the heavyweight tick acts on. - Backoffs are multiples of the tick interval, so a failure stamped δ seconds after a tick was 600 − δ old at the next tick and slipped a whole extra interval. The heavyweight drain now evaluates backoff halfway to its next tick. - An IAM entry first created by a non-deletion failure (the add bootstrap's snapshot send, the drain's own replay, an import-iam schedule) was never stamped `deletions_recorded`, so a later recorded deletion could not settle it and it escalated to the marker only `replicate repair` clears. Entries created by this binary now start recorded; a row persisted by an older binary keeps the escalation semantics. * fix(site-replication): reload peer node caches after bucket wiring writes Every S3 bucket-config write ends by asking the other nodes of the cluster to reload the bucket's metadata; the site-replication writers never did. On a multi-node site the node that ran the pairing (or applied a peer's bucket-meta item) rewrote the bucket targets and the derived replication rules on disk, while every other node kept serving its cached copy for up to the 15-minute refresh. A `resync start` routed to such a node reported every freshly wired bucket as `Config not found` and a bucket whose operator target the pairing had replaced as `recorded remote target no longer exists` (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-5, backlog#2195 item 2; functional SITE-105). Add one best-effort reload helper in the site-replication hooks and call it after the bucket setup, versioning, peer bucket-meta apply, removed-peer cleanup, make-with-versioning, and endpoint-refresh writes; the ensure helpers now report whether they wrote so unchanged passes stay silent. The resync manifest and start now read the persisted wiring instead of the node-local cache, matching the target read the start path already did. The new four-node e2e pairs two clusters and starts a resync through a non-coordinator node right after pairing; it also covers an IAM user created on a non-coordinator node converging to the peer site. * test(e2e): cover delete-marker replication from a multi-node source The functional suite reported delete markers created on a 3-node source never reaching the target (rustfs/backlog#2195 item 4, REP-105). The report was a probe defect, but the shape had no coverage: the existing delete-marker e2e runs a single-node source. Pin it against a four-node source replicating to a four-node peer and to a single-node target, with the write and the delete issued through different nodes. * ci(e2e): refresh the distributed selection for the new replication cases Four distributed cases were added (two site-replication, two delete-marker replication). The linux digest is derived from the last CI listing of the lane (34 cases, matching the previous pin) plus the four new names; the darwin digest is the local listing, which selects the same 38 cases. (cherry picked from commitaeaba86d73) * fix(e2e): require a verified server binary for every e2e run (#7687) * fix(ci): share quick checks and lint workflows * fix(ci): install actionlint from its verified release * fix(ci): reject dependencies on required quick checks * feat(test): verify the E2E server build and source identity * test(e2e): register verified Darwin test membership * test(e2e): record verified Linux receipt test membership * test(e2e): record compiled Darwin receipt test membership * test(e2e): record compiled Linux receipt test membership * test(e2e): record Darwin e2e-full membership after merging main * fix(test): route scanner/heal evidence E2E runs through the verified server binary The evidence runners built rustfs with plain cargo and then ran e2e_test directly, which now fails without a run receipt. They build through scripts/e2e_binary.py and run the e2e_test invocations under e2e_binary.py run; the obsolete rustfs.features stamp is removed. * docs(e2e): run server-backed e2e commands through the verified binary wrapper * test(e2e): record Linux e2e-full membership from the branch CI listing (cherry picked from commit2909b1bfe1) * fix(kms): classify KMS/SSE error contracts and SSE-S3 headers (#7697) * fix(sse): classify bare SSE-KMS writes when no KMS is available A `aws:kms` request without a key id, on a bucket without a default key, returned `500 InternalError` whenever no KMS service was running: the "no KMS key available" branch exited with an untyped storage error before the availability classification that the keyed form already received. Route that branch through the same split: `503 ServiceUnavailable` while a configured KMS is stopped, `400 InvalidRequest` when KMS was never configured, and `400 InvalidRequest` naming the missing key id when a running KMS has no default key. `CreateMultipartUpload` shares the path. Adds a unit test for the bare form and an e2e module that stops KMS through the admin API, runs a master-key-only node, and runs a Local KMS without a default key; refreshes the e2e-full selection digests. (cherry picked from commit c3259dadc3d603a9185a5b0ad9f83dfb884e61c8) * fix(sse): keep KMS error classes on the encrypted read path GetObject, CopyObject and UploadPartCopy on an SSE-KMS object whose key no longer exists answered `500 InternalError` ("KMS key not found") while PutObject under the same key already answered `400 KMS.NotFoundException`. The read path carries its classification through ecstore's `EncryptionResolutionErrorKind`, which had no kind for a missing key, a denied KMS grant or a missing backend capability, so all three folded onto `DecryptionFailed` and the S3 layer reported an internal fault. Add `KeyNotFound`, `AccessDenied` and `NotImplemented` kinds, map them on both sides of the boundary, and give an envelope the configured backend cannot unwrap a diagnosable message while keeping its `500`. Unit tests cover the kind round trip and the reader wrapping; a new e2e test deletes a key immediately and checks GET/Copy return 400 with `KMS.NotFoundException` while HEAD stays 200. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing (the previous digests predated the delete-authorization tests) and the e2e `create_default_key` helper is updated to the accepted `EncryptDecrypt` spelling. (cherry picked from commit 2523a9814e97caea318d4ff1a51bef3a4d4445b2) * fix(kms): classify key-management errors on the admin routes `POST /kms/keys`, the legacy `create-key` alias and `generate-data-key` reported every backend refusal as `500`: a blank key name (which each backend failed on differently, the Local backend by writing a key file with an empty stem), a name already taken, an unknown key, a disabled key and a capability the backend lacks. `delete` and the lifecycle routes already classified the same errors. Refuse a blank or whitespace name in `KmsManager::create_key` before any backend sees it, and share one `KmsError` to status mapping across create, delete and generate-data-key (400 for validation and key state, 404 for an unknown key, 409 for a taken name, 501 for a missing capability, 500 only for damaged material). The XML-error routes carry the same status explicitly since s3s derives none for a custom code. The read-only Static backend now reports create, delete and cancel-deletion as `UnsupportedCapability`, matching its rotate and enable/disable answers, so the admin API returns 501 for all of them. (cherry picked from commit e33cac5493c4d9d6662e0d2980b58ba2b24a6d1b) * fix(sse): stop SSE-S3 responses from naming the wrapping KMS key `x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id` is defined for `aws:kms` objects only, but PutObject, CopyObject, CreateMultipartUpload and GetObject returned it for `AES256` objects too, carrying the KMS key that wraps the SSE-S3 data key (the service default, or the literal `default` on a node without KMS). The write paths copied `kms_key_id` from the encryption material unconditionally, and the single-decrypt GET classification did the same after resolving the key for authorization. Add `EncryptionMaterial::response_kms_key_id`, which yields the id only for SSE-KMS, use it at the four write-response sites, and gate the GET classification the same way. CompleteMultipartUpload and HeadObject already omitted the header. Unit tests pin both directions; a new e2e test covers Put/Get/Head/Copy and CreateMultipartUpload for AES256 with an aws:kms control. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing. (cherry picked from commit 29d793a63352b0b60fd53c565e80fdbede8964bb) * fix(s3): validate PutBucketEncryption rules before storing them A default-encryption rule naming an unknown `SSEAlgorithm` (for example `AES128`), a rule without `ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault`, an empty rule list, or a `KMSMasterKeyID` on an `AES256` rule was stored as written: the only algorithm check on the route decided whether to fill in the default KMS key. `GetBucketEncryption` then advertised that configuration while the write path encrypted header-less writes under its `AES256` fallback, so the bucket's declared and actual schemes disagreed. Two comments claimed the route already refused unknown algorithms. Validate the configuration before any of it is applied: `MalformedXML` for a malformed rule set or unknown algorithm, `InvalidArgument` for a key id on a non-KMS rule, and nothing stored on refusal. Correct the two comments to describe when the AES256 fallback is still reachable. Unit tests cover every refusal and the accepted shapes; an e2e test checks the refusals leave the previous configuration in place. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing. (cherry picked from commit 29e4486dce41197ed93f5253cdbabc57d27a4ddb) * test(e2e): refresh e2e-full selection for the combined KMS/SSE fixes * test: align two unit tests with the new KMS and bucket-encryption contracts `scheduled_deletion_carries_a_deadline_and_can_be_cancelled` still expects the state error (`InvalidOperation`) for cancelling a key that is not pending deletion; only the Static backend's mutations moved to `UnsupportedCapability`. The uninitialized-store PutBucketEncryption test now sends a well-formed AES256 rule so it reaches the store lookup instead of the new configuration validation. (cherry picked from commite2e6a2535a) * fix(site-replication): keep an operator's bucket-level target to a peer instead of taking it over (#7709) * fix(site-replication): keep an operator's bucket-level target to a peer instead of taking it over Site replication wired each bucket by looking for an existing replication target "to the same peer" and rewriting the first match in place as its own same-name target. An operator's bucket-level target that happened to point at that site (different target bucket, operator credentials) was the first match whenever it pre-dated the join, and the reconciler repeats the pass every 600s, so the takeover also depended on target order afterwards. The operator's rule then named an ARN no target backed and their bucket replication stopped silently, while the inherited bucket-level reset id made every site resync report the bucket as owned by another resync (rustfs/backlog#2479, rustfs/backlog#2489). Follow MinIO's `getRemoteARN` / `getRemoteARNForPeer` shape instead: - Wiring updates a target in place only under the same ARN, or when it is recognisably the site's own under an older ARN shape (same peer, same-name target bucket, site replication service account). Anything else gets the site target added next to it. - The site resync manifest takes the target the derived `site-repl-<deployment id>` rule names (same-name shape as fallback), so an operator target to the peer neither aborts the bucket as "multiple remote targets matched peer" nor gets resynced into. - Peer removal prunes only targets a pruned derived rule names or the same-name target bucket; operator targets stamped with the peer's deployment id survive together with their rules. Unit tests cover the three predicates. e2e `test_site_replication_keeps_operator_bucket_target_to_peer` runs a bucket-level replication plus `replication-reset` to the future peer, joins the sites, and requires the operator target untouched, both paths delivering, the site resync completing against the site target, and the operator target and rule surviving `replicate remove --all`; without the fix it fails at the join with the operator target gone. The repl-nightly selection digest is refreshed for the new case. * test(site-replication): drop a redundant clone flagged by clippy The reconcile unit test cloned the remote peer into the state map although the binding is not used afterwards; workspace clippy (-D warnings) rejects that as redundant_clone. (cherry picked from commitecdc55fa4b) * fix: enforce S3 permissions for recursive force deletion (#7661) * fix: enforce S3 authorization for recursive deletion * fix: satisfy the s3s footprint guard * fix: restore list versions policy compatibility (#7686) (cherry picked from commit3fd1ce414d) * fix(ci): repair functional defaults and chain regression checks (#7664) * fix(ci): default functional suites to nightly packages * test(ci): follow the fault-tolerance chain handoff (cherry picked from commit509a0fa90c) * fix(ci): align security workflow tests with chain (#7679) (cherry picked from commitd9e47d2813) * test(ecstore): keep tier cleanup tests stable after immediate receipt queueing Release PR #7766 made PUT/CopyObject overwrites queue the tier free-version cleanup receipt immediately, which broke two ecstore tests on release CI. In tier_overwrite_put_and_self_copy_recover_persisted_cleanup_owners the restarted store already runs expiry workers from the second iteration on, so they deleted the remote bytes before the test could assert that the commit leaves them in place; the test now fails the first remote DELETE via set_remove_failure(true) so the cleanup owner stays durable and the later restart still has to rediscover it from xl.meta (the failed remove does not bump remove_count, and the test re-enables removes before the recovery wait). In batch_transitioned_delete_post_commit_failures_roll_back_without_free_version_receipt the convergence loop now treats a transient InsufficientReadQuorum as "not yet converged", because cleanup rewrites xl.meta disk by disk and a racing read can briefly miss quorum (seen in the rio-v2 lane); any other error still panics. * Revert "fix(ci): align security workflow tests with chain (#7679)" This reverts commit4544359f6d. * Revert "fix(ci): repair functional defaults and chain regression checks (#7664)" This reverts commit5ba7ec0291. * fix(ecstore): pass shard integrity to backported ingest-mode test The stalled-reader test backported with #7659 used main's four-argument encode_with_ingest_mode, but release's signature takes an optional IntegrityBuilder, so pass None to keep the test focused on ingest-mode cleanup. --------- Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com> Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <rregenold@teamraft.com> Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <214054+rjregenold@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: GatewayJ <835269233@qq.com> Co-authored-by: Jason Kossis <jkossis@gmail.com>
400 lines
11 KiB
Rust
400 lines
11 KiB
Rust
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod storage_metric_ownership_test;
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mod reliant;
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mod storage_api;
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// Common utilities for all E2E tests
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub mod common;
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// In-process fault-injection primitives (disk offline/replacement, shard corruption)
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub mod chaos;
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// Programmable S3 target for replication failure-path tests (backlog#1147 repl-8)
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// and on-demand-migration source scenarios (backlog#2151).
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub mod fake_s3_target;
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// On-demand migration (backlog#2147): shared two-server environment, admin
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// wrappers, and the harness self-test (backlog#2151). Behavior scenarios are
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// added by later ODM tasks.
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub mod on_demand_migration;
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// Socket-level network fault-injection proxy for black-box cluster tests
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// (backlog#1325 network fault-injection block): latency / blackhole / one-way
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// partition on the wire between nodes. Serves #1312/#1319 (lock-plane one-way
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// partition, accept-then-blackhole peer) and #1327 (cross-process replay/tamper
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// seam); cluster-harness wiring is a follow-up (rustfs#4937).
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub mod fault_proxy;
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// Reliability tests built on the fault-injection harness
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod reliability_disk_fault_test;
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// Privileged Linux-only 3x4 replacement rebuild proof for rustfs#5869/#1791.
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#[cfg(all(test, target_os = "linux"))]
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mod replacement_privileged_e2e_test;
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// dist-13 (backlog#1150/#1155): e2e regression net proving a large-object
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// degraded EC read never returns a silently truncated body (rustfs#4594/#4560/#4585).
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod degraded_read_eof_regression_test;
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// rustfs#4784: a mid-stream GET failure must be reportable from the source
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// server's log alone — naming the object, at the default log level.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod get_stream_failure_observability_test;
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// backlog#1183: GET codec-streaming fast path must be byte/header identical to
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// the legacy duplex path before its rollout gates can be flipped on by default.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod get_codec_streaming_compat_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod version_id_regression_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod select_request_root_alias_test;
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// Pinned previous-release -> current-build on-disk compatibility.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod upgrade_compatibility_test;
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// Receiver-side replication LWW (rustfs/backlog#1953): stale inbound
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// replication metadata must not overwrite a newer local category state.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod replication_lww_receiver_test;
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// Outbound target matrix: every object shape against every remote-target
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// failure mode the fake target models (SOP:
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// docs/postmortems/2026-09-03-replication-checksum-default-regression.md).
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod replication_target_matrix_test;
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// Data usage regression tests
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod data_usage_test;
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// KMS-specific test modules
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod kms;
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// Regression test for issue #1797
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod list_objects_duplicates_test;
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// Quota tests
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod quota_test;
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// Harness regression tests: console port isolation + fail-fast startup
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod server_startup_failfast_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod bucket_policy_check_test;
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// Security boundary tests: DoS limits, SSRF prevention, concurrent-write integrity
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod security_boundary_test;
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// Cross-process replay/tamper acceptance for the internode NodeService v2 RPC
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// signature (backlog#1327): method-path transplant, nonce replay, body tampering
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// and the two strict rollout flips, all against a real spawned server.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod internode_rpc_signature_e2e_test;
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// Opt-in per-client S3 API rate limiting (backlog#1191)
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod api_rate_limit_test;
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// Opt-in global connection cap on the main listener (backlog#1191 follow-up)
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod connection_cap_test;
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// Admin authorization gate: non-admin denial + root-credential lifecycle (backlog#1151 sec-4)
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod admin_auth_test;
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/// IAM / bucket / STS session policy with `s3:ExistingObjectTag` conditions (E2E).
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod existing_object_tag_policy_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod sts_query_compat_test;
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// Regression tests for Issue #2036: anonymous access with PublicAccessBlock
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod anonymous_access_test;
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// Special characters in path test modules
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod special_chars_test;
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// Leading/duplicate slash key normalization tests (Issue #2427)
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod leading_slash_key_test;
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// Content-Encoding header preservation test
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod content_encoding_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod archive_download_integrity_test;
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// ListObjectsV2 pagination test (Issue #1596)
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod list_objects_v2_pagination_test;
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// Regression test for Issue #3107: mc mirror small-bucket listing must not time out.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod mc_mirror_small_bucket_test;
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// Policy variables tests
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod policy;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod compression_test;
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// Regression test for Issue #1878: DeleteMarkers not visible immediately after delete_objects
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod delete_objects_versioning_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod delete_authorization_test;
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// Regression test for signed DELETE Object?versionId requests without Content-Length.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod delete_object_no_content_length_test;
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// Regression test for signed empty PutObject requests without Content-Length.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod put_object_no_content_length_test;
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// Delete-marker visibility baseline for data-movement migration proof.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod delete_marker_migration_semantics_test;
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// Regression test for Issue #2252: ListObjectVersions misses newest version after put -> delete -> put
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod list_object_versions_regression_test;
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// versions&metadata=true extension regression test
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod list_object_versions_metadata_extension_test;
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// list-type=2&metadata=true extension regression test
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod list_objects_v2_metadata_extension_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod protocols;
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// Object Lock tests
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod object_lock;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod cluster_concurrency_test;
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// Multi-drive (drivesPerNode) and 2-pool cluster harness smoke tests
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod cluster_multidrive_pool_test;
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|
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// backlog#1433: real 4-node EC boundary gate for inline storage and GET paths.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod inline_fast_path_cluster_test;
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// backlog#2207: two-node gate for the cluster-authoritative tier stats contract.
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tier_stats_cluster_test;
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|
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// PutObject / MultipartUpload with checksum (Content-MD5, x-amz-checksum-*)
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|
#[cfg(test)]
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|
mod checksum_upload_test;
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|
|
// Group deletion tests
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|
#[cfg(test)]
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|
mod group_delete_test;
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|
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#[cfg(test)]
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|
mod head_object_range_test;
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|
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod head_object_consistency_test;
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|
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#[cfg(test)]
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|
mod heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test;
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|
|
#[cfg(test)]
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|
mod copy_object_metadata_test;
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|
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#[cfg(test)]
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|
mod copy_object_tagging_test;
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|
|
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#[cfg(test)]
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|
mod copy_object_version_restore_test;
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|
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#[cfg(test)]
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|
mod copy_object_checksum_test;
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|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod multipart_copy_readiness_test;
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|
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#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod ssec_copy_test;
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|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod multipart_storage_class_test;
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|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod storage_class_capability_test;
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|
|
|
// S3 dummy-compat bucket API tests
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod bucket_logging_test;
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|
|
|
// Multipart control API auth regression tests
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod multipart_auth_test;
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|
|
|
// Negative presigned-URL (query-string SigV4) regression suite (backlog#1151
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|
// sec-2): expired, tampered signature, wrong secret, tampered target.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod presigned_negative_test;
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|
|
|
// Negative header-SigV4 regression suite (backlog#1151 sec-1): tampered
|
|
// signature, wrong secret, skewed date, malformed Authorization.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod negative_sigv4_test;
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|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster_test;
|
|
|
|
// Object lambda end-to-end regression tests
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod object_lambda_test;
|
|
|
|
// S3 event-notification webhook delivery end-to-end (backlog#1154 peri-1):
|
|
// configure webhook target -> PutBucketNotificationConfiguration -> object
|
|
// operation -> event delivered, plus filter negatives and store-queue redelivery.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod notification_webhook_test;
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|
|
|
// TLS certificate hot-reload live-listener e2e (backlog#1154 peri-5): swap
|
|
// certificates without a restart, existing sessions survive, bad material is
|
|
// fail-safe (old certificate keeps serving, failure is logged).
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tls_hot_reload_test;
|
|
|
|
// Console listener over-the-wire smoke (backlog#1154 peri-4): public console
|
|
// endpoints answer without credentials or leaks, the SPA prefix never falls
|
|
// through to the S3 API, and the protected surface stays authenticated.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod console_smoke_test;
|
|
|
|
// Admin IAM management CRUD e2e (backlog#1154 peri-2): user / canned-policy /
|
|
// service-account lifecycle over signed HTTP with data-plane effect assertions,
|
|
// plus non-admin 403 probes per endpoint (sec-4 pattern).
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod admin_iam_crud_test;
|
|
mod admin_mfa_test;
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod admin_pools_test;
|
|
|
|
// Replication extension end-to-end regression tests
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod replication_extension_test;
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod snowball_auto_extract_test;
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod namespace_lock_quorum_test;
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod admin_timeout_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod overwrite_cleanup_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
// Regression test for backlog#601: `GET //` ListBuckets browser compatibility.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod list_buckets_double_slash_test;
|
|
|
|
// Regression coverage for bucket-scoped ListBuckets authorization fallback.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod list_buckets_auth_test;
|
|
|
|
// ListBuckets visibility follows IAM authorization, not bucket policy.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod list_buckets_iam_filter_test;
|
|
|
|
// Regression test for backlog#629(b): region-aware CreateBucket SigV4.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod create_bucket_region_test;
|
|
|
|
// Regression coverage for backlog#618 item 8: copy-source invalid-date header.
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod copy_source_invalid_date_test;
|
|
|
|
// P0 regression: event notification startup race (rustfs#5387, #5681, #5401, #5183, #5115, #4796)
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod notification_startup_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
// P0 regression: lifecycle/ILM object expiration (rustfs#5407, #5167, #4963, #5615, #4879)
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod lifecycle_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
// P0 regression: delete operations consistency (rustfs#5375, #5349, #5339, #5029, #4978, #760)
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod delete_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
// P1 regression: listing/metacache completeness (rustfs#5166, #5156, #5051, #4810, #4648, #3191)
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod listing_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
// Cluster regression: objects committed at degraded write quorum must stay
|
|
// listable while a different drive is offline (CI run 33478999853).
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod degraded_listing_availability_test;
|
|
|
|
// P1 regression: bucket statistics accuracy (rustfs#5615, #5008, #5116, #5055, #3898, #1012)
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod bucket_stats_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
// P1 regression: distributed startup/quorum (rustfs#5416, #2945, #2794, #2601, #4040, #5655)
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod distributed_startup_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
// 4-node / 4-disk distributed Actions suite (S3, lock, versioning, replication,
|
|
// quota, observability, expand/decommission/rebalance, site replication, chaos).
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod distributed;
|
|
|
|
// P1 regression: tier/ILM transition (rustfs#5218, #5130, #5011, #4826, #5024)
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tier_transition_regression_test;
|
|
|
|
pub mod tls_gen;
|