Files
rustfs/crates/rio/src/encrypt_reader.rs
T
Zhengchao An e3a8234bc9 fix: 12 P1 reliability/security defects from the full-repo audit (backlog#806) (#4256)
* fix(rio): reject corrupted short compressed/encrypted blocks instead of panicking

DecompressReader::poll_read and DecryptReader::poll_read sliced the block
body with a fixed `[0..16]` index to read the length varint. The body length
comes from an untrusted 24-bit header field, so a corrupted/truncated block
shorter than 16 bytes made the slice panic and crash the request task — a
read-path DoS on GET of tiered/corrupted data.

Pass the whole (arbitrary-length-safe) slice to uvarint and reject a
non-positive or out-of-range length prefix with InvalidData. Adds a repro
test for each reader; all existing round-trip tests still pass.

Refs rustfs/backlog#812

* fix(utils): close SSRF bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses

validate_outbound_ip branched on the IpAddr variant, and the V6 branch's
is_loopback/is_unicast_link_local/is_unique_local checks never inspect the
embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped address (::ffff:a.b.c.d). The metadata guard
also only matched the plain V4 169.254.169.254. So ::ffff:127.0.0.1,
::ffff:10.0.0.5 and ::ffff:169.254.169.254 all passed the outbound guard,
letting an attacker reach loopback/private/metadata endpoints.

Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 to its embedded IPv4 (via to_ipv4_mapped, which
matches only the true mapped form) before classification. Adds reject tests
for mapped loopback/private/metadata and an allow test for public IPv6.

Refs rustfs/backlog#813

* fix(ecstore): streaming last-part loss, GCS tier Range/remove, stat_all_dirs alignment

Four confirmed data-reliability defects:

- put_object_multipart_stream: the CompleteMultipartUpload part-collection loop
  used exclusive `1..total_parts_count`, dropping the final part (and collecting
  zero parts for a single-part object) — silently truncating the completed object.
  Extracted collect_complete_parts (1..=total_parts_count) with unit tests.
- GCS warm backend get() ignored the requested byte range, returning the whole
  object for a Range GET; now applies ReadRange::segment like the other backends.
- GCS warm backend remove() was an empty stub, so deleting a tiered object left
  it on GCS forever; now deletes via StorageControl (added a control-plane client),
  and in_use() actually lists (prefix-scoped) instead of always returning false.
- stat_all_dirs skipped None disk slots and dropped JoinErrors, returning a
  compressed, misaligned error vector; heal_object_dir then zipped it against the
  full disks array and could make_volume on the WRONG disk. Now returns one
  index-aligned entry per slot (None -> DiskNotFound), and heal no longer
  pre-fills the drive report (which would double it). Added an alignment test.

Refs rustfs/backlog#807

* fix(kms): stop Vault backend from destroying/reviving keys on failure

Two confirmed key-safety defects in the Vault KV2 backend:

- get_key_material() 'self-healed' a decrypt or wrong-length failure by minting a
  fresh random master key and overwriting the stored value. That destroys the
  original key material, making every DEK ever wrapped by it permanently
  undecryptable. Decryption must never mutate the stored key: both branches now
  return a cryptographic_error instead. (The empty-material bootstrap path, which
  only fills a never-initialized key, is intentionally left intact.)
- cancel_key_deletion() reset key_state to Enabled only in the returned response
  and never persisted it, so the key stayed PendingDeletion in storage and would
  still be reaped. It now writes the state back via update_key_metadata_in_storage
  and fails the request if the write fails.

Adds ignored (Vault-requiring) integration tests documenting both behaviours.

The third item (VaultTransit key state only in memory -> revived as Enabled after
restart) is deferred: a fail-closed guard would break restart availability for all
transit keys; the correct fix needs a persistent metadata store + Vault integration
testing. Tracked in rustfs/backlog#808.

Refs rustfs/backlog#808

* fix(admin): clamp STS AssumeRole duration; persist ImportBucketMetadata to disk

Two confirmed admin-API defects:

- Standard AssumeRole used the raw client-supplied DurationSeconds with no upper
  bound, so a caller could mint near-permanent temporary credentials. Clamp it to
  the AWS/MinIO STS window [900, 43200] (with 0 -> default 3600) via a shared
  clamp_assume_role_duration helper, and build the exp claim with saturating_add.
  This matches the existing AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity path.
- ImportBucketMetadata only mutated an in-memory map and returned 200, silently
  dropping every imported config. It now persists each non-empty config via
  metadata_sys::update (which merges onto existing on-disk metadata) and returns
  InternalError if a write fails. Mapping extracted to imported_configs_to_persist
  with unit tests.

Refs rustfs/backlog#809

* fix(heal): enqueue displacing request in release builds

push_displacing_lower_priority folded the real enqueue call into
debug_assert_eq!(self.push(request), Accepted). In release builds
(debug_assertions off) the whole macro — including its argument — is compiled
out, so after evicting a lower-priority queued item the new high-priority
request was silently dropped and never healed. Hoist self.push(request) out of
the assertion so the side effect runs in all builds. Adds a --release regression
test.

Refs rustfs/backlog#811

* fix(iam): propagate real delete_policy backend errors instead of swallowing them

delete_policy's is_from_notify path had its error handling inverted: a real
backend failure (disk IO / insufficient quorum) evicted the cache and returned
Ok(()), reporting a phantom success while policy.json survived on disk (to be
reloaded on the next full IAM reload); NoSuchPolicy — which should be idempotent
success — returned Err. Propagate real errors and let NoSuchPolicy fall through
to the idempotent cache-evict + Ok, matching delete_user / the notification
handler in the same file. Adds a backend-error-injection regression test.

Refs rustfs/backlog#810

* fix(utils): also normalize IPv4-compatible IPv6 in the SSRF guard

The initial fix only unwrapped IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) addresses; the
deprecated IPv4-compatible form (::a.b.c.d, e.g. ::127.0.0.1 / ::169.254.169.254)
still bypassed the guard. Reject pure-IPv6 specials (::, ::1, fe80::, fc00::)
first, then normalize BOTH embedded-IPv4 forms before the IPv4 rules. Adds tests
for compatible-form loopback/metadata and confirms ::1 / :: stay rejected.

Found by adversarial review of the initial fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#813

* fix(ecstore): fix the same last-part loss in the parallel streaming path

put_object_multipart_stream_parallel had the identical off-by-one
(1..total_parts_count) that truncated the last part / produced zero parts for a
single-part upload — reachable when concurrent stream parts are enabled. Reuse
collect_complete_parts, which now returns an error instead of panicking on a gap
in the parts map. Adds a missing-part error test.

Found by adversarial review of the initial fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#807

* fix(kms): local backend must preserve key material on status change

LocalKmsClient (the default KMS backend) regenerated the master key material on
enable_key/disable_key/schedule_key_deletion/cancel_key_deletion — a pure status
change. A single disable+enable cycle therefore destroyed the original key,
making every DEK ever wrapped by it permanently undecryptable (silent data loss,
no network needed). Preserve the existing material via get_key_material and
re-save with only the status changed. Adds a hermetic regression test that wraps
a DEK, cycles all four status methods, and asserts the DEK still decrypts.

Found by adversarial review of the Vault fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#808

* test(rio): cover the length-prefix guard; correct its comment

Add a DecompressReader test that feeds an unterminated length varint so uvarint
returns 0 and the new guard (not the downstream codec) produces the InvalidData
error, and reword the guard comment which overclaimed that the > len bound
prevents a reachable panic (it is belt-and-suspenders). No behavior change.

Found by adversarial review. Refs rustfs/backlog#812

* test(rio): build test block headers via vec! to satisfy clippy

The new corrupted-block tests built the header with Vec::new() + repeated push,
tripping clippy::vec_init_then_push (-D warnings in CI). Construct the fixed
header bytes with vec![] instead. No behavior change.

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-07-04 14:24:02 +08:00

1049 lines
40 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::compress_index::{Index, TryGetIndex};
use aes_gcm::aead::Aead;
use aes_gcm::{Aes256Gcm, KeyInit, Nonce};
use pin_project_lite::pin_project;
use rustfs_utils::{put_uvarint, put_uvarint_len};
use std::io::Error;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::task::{Context, Poll};
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, ReadBuf};
use tracing::debug;
const ENCRYPTION_BLOCK_SIZE: usize = 8 * 1024;
pin_project! {
/// A reader wrapper that encrypts data on the fly using AES-256-GCM.
/// This is a demonstration. For production, use a secure and audited crypto library.
pub struct EncryptReader<R> {
#[pin]
pub inner: R,
cipher: Aes256Gcm,
base_nonce: [u8; 12], // 96-bit base nonce for GCM
buffer: Vec<u8>,
buffer_pos: usize,
read_buffer: Vec<u8>,
block_index: usize,
finished: bool,
}
}
impl<R> EncryptReader<R>
where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + Sync,
{
pub fn new(inner: R, key: [u8; 32], nonce: [u8; 12]) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
cipher: Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&key).expect("key"),
base_nonce: nonce,
buffer: Vec::new(),
buffer_pos: 0,
read_buffer: vec![0u8; ENCRYPTION_BLOCK_SIZE],
block_index: 0,
finished: false,
}
}
pub fn new_multipart(inner: R, key: [u8; 32], base_nonce: [u8; 12], part_number: usize) -> Self {
Self::new(inner, key, multipart_part_nonce(base_nonce, part_number))
}
}
impl<R> AsyncRead for EncryptReader<R>
where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + Sync,
{
fn poll_read(self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, buf: &mut ReadBuf<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
let mut this = self.project();
// Serve from buffer if any
if *this.buffer_pos < this.buffer.len() {
let to_copy = std::cmp::min(buf.remaining(), this.buffer.len() - *this.buffer_pos);
buf.put_slice(&this.buffer[*this.buffer_pos..*this.buffer_pos + to_copy]);
*this.buffer_pos += to_copy;
if *this.buffer_pos == this.buffer.len() {
this.buffer.clear();
*this.buffer_pos = 0;
}
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
if *this.finished {
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
// Read a fixed block size from inner.
let mut temp_buf = ReadBuf::new(&mut this.read_buffer[..]);
match this.inner.as_mut().poll_read(cx, &mut temp_buf) {
Poll::Pending => Poll::Pending,
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
let n = temp_buf.filled().len();
if n == 0 {
// EOF, write end header
let mut header = [0u8; 8];
header[0] = 0xFF; // type: end
*this.buffer = header.to_vec();
*this.buffer_pos = 0;
*this.finished = true;
let to_copy = std::cmp::min(buf.remaining(), this.buffer.len());
buf.put_slice(&this.buffer[..to_copy]);
*this.buffer_pos += to_copy;
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
} else {
// Encrypt the chunk
let block_nonce = derive_block_nonce(this.base_nonce, *this.block_index);
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(block_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid nonce length"))?;
let plaintext = &this.read_buffer[..n];
let plaintext_len = plaintext.len();
let crc = {
let mut hasher = crc_fast::Digest::new(crc_fast::CrcAlgorithm::Crc32IsoHdlc);
hasher.update(plaintext);
hasher.finalize() as u32
};
let ciphertext = this
.cipher
.encrypt(&nonce, plaintext)
.map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("encrypt error: {e}")))?;
let int_len = put_uvarint_len(plaintext_len as u64);
let clen = int_len + ciphertext.len() + 4;
// Header: 8 bytes
// 0: type (0 = encrypted, 0xFF = end)
// 1-3: length (little endian u24, ciphertext length)
// 4-7: CRC32 of plaintext (little endian u32)
let mut header = [0u8; 8];
header[0] = 0x00; // 0 = encrypted
header[1] = (clen & 0xFF) as u8;
header[2] = ((clen >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
header[3] = ((clen >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8;
header[4] = (crc & 0xFF) as u8;
header[5] = ((crc >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
header[6] = ((crc >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8;
header[7] = ((crc >> 24) & 0xFF) as u8;
debug!(
"encrypt block header typ=0 len={} header={:?} plaintext_len={} ciphertext_len={}",
clen,
header,
plaintext_len,
ciphertext.len()
);
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + int_len + ciphertext.len());
out.extend_from_slice(&header);
let mut plaintext_len_buf = [0u8; 10];
let encoded_len = put_uvarint(&mut plaintext_len_buf, plaintext_len as u64);
out.extend_from_slice(&plaintext_len_buf[..encoded_len]);
out.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
*this.buffer = out;
*this.buffer_pos = 0;
*this.block_index += 1;
let to_copy = std::cmp::min(buf.remaining(), this.buffer.len());
buf.put_slice(&this.buffer[..to_copy]);
*this.buffer_pos += to_copy;
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
}
Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => Poll::Ready(Err(e)),
}
}
}
delegate_reader_capabilities_generic_no_index!(EncryptReader<R>, inner);
impl<R> TryGetIndex for EncryptReader<R>
where
R: TryGetIndex,
{
fn try_get_index(&self) -> Option<&Index> {
self.inner.try_get_index()
}
}
pin_project! {
/// A reader wrapper that decrypts data on the fly using AES-256-GCM.
/// This is a demonstration. For production, use a secure and audited crypto library.
pub struct DecryptReader<R> {
#[pin]
pub inner: R,
cipher: Aes256Gcm,
base_nonce: [u8; 12], // Base nonce recorded in object metadata
current_nonce_base: [u8; 12], // Active base nonce for the current encrypted segment
multipart_mode: bool,
multipart_parts: Vec<usize>,
current_part_index: usize,
current_part: usize,
block_index: usize,
buffer: Vec<u8>,
buffer_pos: usize,
finished: bool,
// For block framing
header_buf: [u8; 8],
header_read: usize,
header_done: bool,
ciphertext_buf: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext_read: usize,
ciphertext_len: usize,
}
}
impl<R> DecryptReader<R>
where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + Sync,
{
pub fn new(inner: R, key: [u8; 32], nonce: [u8; 12]) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
cipher: Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&key).expect("key"),
base_nonce: nonce,
current_nonce_base: nonce,
multipart_mode: false,
multipart_parts: Vec::new(),
current_part_index: 0,
current_part: 0,
block_index: 0,
buffer: Vec::new(),
buffer_pos: 0,
finished: false,
header_buf: [0u8; 8],
header_read: 0,
header_done: false,
ciphertext_buf: Vec::new(),
ciphertext_read: 0,
ciphertext_len: 0,
}
}
pub fn new_multipart(inner: R, key: [u8; 32], base_nonce: [u8; 12], multipart_parts: Vec<usize>) -> Self {
let first_part = multipart_parts.first().copied().unwrap_or(1);
let initial_nonce = derive_part_nonce(&base_nonce, first_part);
debug!("decrypt_reader: initialized multipart mode");
Self {
inner,
cipher: Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&key).expect("key"),
base_nonce,
current_nonce_base: initial_nonce,
multipart_mode: true,
multipart_parts,
current_part_index: 0,
current_part: first_part,
block_index: 0,
buffer: Vec::new(),
buffer_pos: 0,
finished: false,
header_buf: [0u8; 8],
header_read: 0,
header_done: false,
ciphertext_buf: Vec::new(),
ciphertext_read: 0,
ciphertext_len: 0,
}
}
}
impl<R> AsyncRead for DecryptReader<R>
where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + Sync,
{
fn poll_read(self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, buf: &mut ReadBuf<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
let mut this = self.project();
loop {
// Serve buffered plaintext first
if *this.buffer_pos < this.buffer.len() {
let to_copy = std::cmp::min(buf.remaining(), this.buffer.len() - *this.buffer_pos);
buf.put_slice(&this.buffer[*this.buffer_pos..*this.buffer_pos + to_copy]);
*this.buffer_pos += to_copy;
if *this.buffer_pos == this.buffer.len() {
this.buffer.clear();
*this.buffer_pos = 0;
}
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
if *this.finished {
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
if *this.ciphertext_len == 0 {
// Read header (8 bytes) only when there is no in-flight payload.
while !*this.header_done && *this.header_read < 8 {
let mut temp = [0u8; 8];
let mut temp_buf = ReadBuf::new(&mut temp[0..8 - *this.header_read]);
match this.inner.as_mut().poll_read(cx, &mut temp_buf) {
Poll::Pending => return Poll::Pending,
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
let n = temp_buf.filled().len();
if n == 0 {
if *this.header_read == 0 {
*this.finished = true;
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
return Poll::Ready(Err(Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
"unexpected EOF while reading encrypted block header",
)));
}
this.header_buf[*this.header_read..*this.header_read + n].copy_from_slice(&temp_buf.filled()[..n]);
*this.header_read += n;
}
Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => return Poll::Ready(Err(e)),
}
}
if !*this.header_done && *this.header_read == 8 {
*this.header_done = true;
}
if !*this.header_done {
return Poll::Pending;
}
let typ = this.header_buf[0];
let len =
(this.header_buf[1] as usize) | ((this.header_buf[2] as usize) << 8) | ((this.header_buf[3] as usize) << 16);
*this.header_read = 0;
*this.header_done = false;
if typ == 0xFF {
if *this.multipart_mode {
let next_part = if *this.current_part_index + 1 < this.multipart_parts.len() {
*this.current_part_index += 1;
this.multipart_parts[*this.current_part_index]
} else {
*this.current_part + 1
};
debug!(
next_part = next_part,
"decrypt_reader: reached segment terminator, advancing to next part"
);
*this.current_part = next_part;
*this.current_nonce_base = derive_part_nonce(this.base_nonce, *this.current_part);
*this.block_index = 0;
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
*this.ciphertext_len = 0;
continue;
}
*this.finished = true;
*this.block_index = 0;
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
*this.ciphertext_len = 0;
continue;
}
tracing::debug!(typ = typ, len = len, "decrypt block header");
if len == 0 {
tracing::warn!("encountered zero-length encrypted block, treating as end of stream");
*this.finished = true;
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
*this.ciphertext_len = 0;
continue;
}
let Some(payload_len) = len.checked_sub(4) else {
tracing::error!("invalid encrypted block length: typ={} len={} header={:?}", typ, len, this.header_buf);
return Poll::Ready(Err(Error::other("Invalid encrypted block length")));
};
if this.ciphertext_buf.len() < payload_len {
this.ciphertext_buf.resize(payload_len, 0);
}
*this.ciphertext_len = payload_len;
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
}
while *this.ciphertext_read < *this.ciphertext_len {
let mut temp_buf = ReadBuf::new(&mut this.ciphertext_buf[*this.ciphertext_read..*this.ciphertext_len]);
match this.inner.as_mut().poll_read(cx, &mut temp_buf) {
Poll::Pending => return Poll::Pending,
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
let n = temp_buf.filled().len();
if n == 0 {
return Poll::Ready(Err(Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
"unexpected EOF while reading encrypted block payload",
)));
}
*this.ciphertext_read += n;
}
Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => {
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
*this.ciphertext_len = 0;
return Poll::Ready(Err(e));
}
}
}
if *this.ciphertext_read < *this.ciphertext_len {
return Poll::Pending;
}
let ciphertext_buf = &this.ciphertext_buf[..*this.ciphertext_len];
// `ciphertext_buf`'s length derives from the untrusted 24-bit header length field, so
// it can be shorter than 16 bytes. `uvarint` is safe on any slice length, so pass the
// whole slice instead of a fixed `[0..16]` index that panics on corrupted/truncated
// blocks shorter than 16 bytes.
// `uvarint_len <= 0` means the length varint was empty/unterminated (0) or overflowed
// (negative — as usize it would index far past the buffer). The `> len` bound is
// belt-and-suspenders (a positive return is always <= buf.len()).
let (plaintext_len, uvarint_len) = rustfs_utils::uvarint(ciphertext_buf);
if uvarint_len <= 0 || uvarint_len as usize > ciphertext_buf.len() {
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
*this.ciphertext_len = 0;
return Poll::Ready(Err(Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "Invalid encrypted block length prefix")));
}
let ciphertext = &ciphertext_buf[uvarint_len as usize..];
let block_nonce = derive_block_nonce(this.current_nonce_base, *this.block_index);
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(block_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid nonce length"))?;
let legacy_part_nonce = if *this.multipart_mode {
derive_legacy_part_nonce(this.base_nonce, *this.current_part)
} else {
*this.base_nonce
};
let legacy_block_nonce = derive_block_nonce(&legacy_part_nonce, *this.block_index);
let plaintext = match this.cipher.decrypt(&nonce, ciphertext) {
Ok(plaintext) => plaintext,
Err(primary_err) => {
let legacy_nonce =
Nonce::try_from(legacy_block_nonce.as_slice()).map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid nonce length"))?;
match this.cipher.decrypt(&legacy_nonce, ciphertext) {
Ok(plaintext) => plaintext,
Err(_) => {
// Accept previously written streams that reused the part nonce
// for every block inside a segment.
let legacy_part_nonce = Nonce::try_from(legacy_part_nonce.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid nonce length"))?;
this.cipher
.decrypt(&legacy_part_nonce, ciphertext)
.map_err(|_| Error::other(format!("decrypt error: {primary_err}")))?
}
}
}
};
debug!(
part = *this.current_part,
plaintext_len = plaintext.len(),
"decrypt_reader: decrypted chunk"
);
if plaintext.len() != plaintext_len as usize {
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
*this.ciphertext_len = 0;
return Poll::Ready(Err(Error::other("Plaintext length mismatch")));
}
let expected_crc = (this.header_buf[4] as u32)
| ((this.header_buf[5] as u32) << 8)
| ((this.header_buf[6] as u32) << 16)
| ((this.header_buf[7] as u32) << 24);
let actual_crc = {
let mut hasher = crc_fast::Digest::new(crc_fast::CrcAlgorithm::Crc32IsoHdlc);
hasher.update(&plaintext);
hasher.finalize() as u32
};
if actual_crc != expected_crc {
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
*this.ciphertext_len = 0;
return Poll::Ready(Err(Error::other("CRC32 mismatch")));
}
*this.buffer = plaintext;
*this.buffer_pos = 0;
*this.block_index += 1;
*this.ciphertext_read = 0;
*this.ciphertext_len = 0;
let to_copy = std::cmp::min(buf.remaining(), this.buffer.len());
buf.put_slice(&this.buffer[..to_copy]);
*this.buffer_pos += to_copy;
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
}
}
delegate_reader_capabilities_generic_no_index!(DecryptReader<R>, inner);
impl<R> TryGetIndex for DecryptReader<R>
where
R: TryGetIndex,
{
fn try_get_index(&self) -> Option<&Index> {
self.inner.try_get_index()
}
}
fn derive_block_nonce(base: &[u8; 12], block_index: usize) -> [u8; 12] {
derive_nonce_offset(base, 8, block_index)
}
pub fn multipart_part_nonce(base_nonce: [u8; 12], part_number: usize) -> [u8; 12] {
derive_part_nonce(&base_nonce, part_number)
}
fn derive_part_nonce(base: &[u8; 12], part_number: usize) -> [u8; 12] {
derive_nonce_offset(base, 4, part_number)
}
fn derive_legacy_part_nonce(base: &[u8; 12], part_number: usize) -> [u8; 12] {
derive_nonce_offset(base, 8, part_number)
}
fn derive_nonce_offset(base: &[u8; 12], start: usize, offset: usize) -> [u8; 12] {
let mut nonce = *base;
let mut suffix = [0u8; 4];
suffix.copy_from_slice(&nonce[start..start + 4]);
let current = u32::from_be_bytes(suffix);
let next = current.wrapping_add(offset as u32);
nonce[start..start + 4].copy_from_slice(&next.to_be_bytes());
nonce
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use aes_gcm::aead::Aead;
use aes_gcm::{Aes256Gcm, KeyInit, Nonce};
use std::io::Cursor;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::task::{Context, Poll};
use crate::HardLimitReader;
use super::*;
use futures::StreamExt;
use rand::{Rng, RngExt};
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncReadExt, BufReader, ReadBuf};
use tokio_util::io::ReaderStream;
struct ChunkedCursor {
inner: Cursor<Vec<u8>>,
max_chunk: usize,
}
impl ChunkedCursor {
fn new(data: Vec<u8>, max_chunk: usize) -> Self {
Self {
inner: Cursor::new(data),
max_chunk,
}
}
}
impl AsyncRead for ChunkedCursor {
fn poll_read(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, _cx: &mut Context<'_>, buf: &mut ReadBuf<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
if self.max_chunk == 0 || buf.remaining() == 0 {
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
let remaining = self.inner.get_ref().len() as u64 - self.inner.position();
if remaining == 0 {
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
let to_read = remaining.min(self.max_chunk as u64).min(buf.remaining() as u64) as usize;
let start = self.inner.position() as usize;
let end = start + to_read;
buf.put_slice(&self.inner.get_ref()[start..end]);
self.inner.set_position(end as u64);
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
}
struct PendingChunkedCursor {
inner: Cursor<Vec<u8>>,
max_chunk: usize,
should_pending: bool,
}
impl PendingChunkedCursor {
fn new(data: Vec<u8>, max_chunk: usize) -> Self {
Self {
inner: Cursor::new(data),
max_chunk,
should_pending: true,
}
}
}
impl AsyncRead for PendingChunkedCursor {
fn poll_read(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, buf: &mut ReadBuf<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
if self.should_pending {
self.should_pending = false;
cx.waker().wake_by_ref();
return Poll::Pending;
}
if self.max_chunk == 0 || buf.remaining() == 0 {
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
let remaining = self.inner.get_ref().len() as u64 - self.inner.position();
if remaining == 0 {
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
let to_read = remaining.min(self.max_chunk as u64).min(buf.remaining() as u64) as usize;
let start = self.inner.position() as usize;
let end = start + to_read;
buf.put_slice(&self.inner.get_ref()[start..end]);
self.inner.set_position(end as u64);
self.should_pending = true;
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
}
fn encrypt_with_legacy_nonce_reuse(data: &[u8], key: [u8; 32], nonce: [u8; 12]) -> Vec<u8> {
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&key).expect("valid key");
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(nonce.as_slice()).expect("valid nonce");
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
for chunk in data.chunks(ENCRYPTION_BLOCK_SIZE) {
let crc = {
let mut hasher = crc_fast::Digest::new(crc_fast::CrcAlgorithm::Crc32IsoHdlc);
hasher.update(chunk);
hasher.finalize() as u32
};
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(&nonce, chunk).expect("legacy encrypt");
let int_len = put_uvarint_len(chunk.len() as u64);
let clen = int_len + ciphertext.len() + 4;
let mut header = [0u8; 8];
header[1] = (clen & 0xFF) as u8;
header[2] = ((clen >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
header[3] = ((clen >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8;
header[4] = (crc & 0xFF) as u8;
header[5] = ((crc >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
header[6] = ((crc >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8;
header[7] = ((crc >> 24) & 0xFF) as u8;
encrypted.extend_from_slice(&header);
let mut plaintext_len_buf = [0u8; 10];
let encoded_len = put_uvarint(&mut plaintext_len_buf, chunk.len() as u64);
encrypted.extend_from_slice(&plaintext_len_buf[..encoded_len]);
encrypted.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
}
encrypted.extend_from_slice(&[0xFF, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
encrypted
}
async fn encrypt_part_with_legacy_nonce_layout(
data: &[u8],
key: [u8; 32],
base_nonce: [u8; 12],
part_number: usize,
) -> Vec<u8> {
let nonce = derive_legacy_part_nonce(&base_nonce, part_number);
let reader = BufReader::new(Cursor::new(data.to_vec()));
let mut encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
encrypted
}
fn extract_encrypted_payloads(encrypted: &[u8]) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
let mut payloads = Vec::new();
let mut pos = 0;
while pos + 8 <= encrypted.len() {
let header = &encrypted[pos..pos + 8];
pos += 8;
if header[0] == 0xFF {
break;
}
let len = (header[1] as usize) | ((header[2] as usize) << 8) | ((header[3] as usize) << 16);
let payload_len = len - 4;
payloads.push(encrypted[pos..pos + payload_len].to_vec());
pos += payload_len;
}
payloads
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_encrypt_decrypt_reader_aes256gcm() {
let data = b"hello sse encrypt";
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let reader = BufReader::new(&data[..]);
let encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
// Encrypt
let mut encrypt_reader = encrypt_reader;
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
// Decrypt using DecryptReader
let reader = Cursor::new(encrypted.clone());
let decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut decrypt_reader = decrypt_reader;
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
decrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut decrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(&decrypted, data);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_only() {
// Encrypt some data first
let data = b"test decrypt only";
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
// Encrypt
let reader = BufReader::new(&data[..]);
let encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypt_reader = encrypt_reader;
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
// Now test DecryptReader
let reader = Cursor::new(encrypted.clone());
let decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut decrypt_reader = decrypt_reader;
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
decrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut decrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(&decrypted, data);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_encrypt_decrypt_reader_large() {
use rand::Rng;
let size = 1024 * 1024;
let mut data = vec![0u8; size];
rand::rng().fill(&mut data[..]);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let reader = std::io::Cursor::new(data.clone());
let encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypt_reader = encrypt_reader;
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
let reader = std::io::Cursor::new(encrypted.clone());
let decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut decrypt_reader = decrypt_reader;
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
decrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut decrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(&decrypted, &data);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_large_with_small_chunks() {
let size = 1024 * 1024;
let mut data = vec![0u8; size];
rand::rng().fill(&mut data[..]);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let reader = Cursor::new(data.clone());
let mut encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
let reader = ChunkedCursor::new(encrypted, 3);
let mut decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
decrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut decrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(decrypted, data);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_large_with_pending_chunks() {
let size = 1024 * 1024;
let mut data = vec![0u8; size];
rand::rng().fill(&mut data[..]);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let reader = Cursor::new(data.clone());
let mut encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
let reader = PendingChunkedCursor::new(encrypted, 3);
let mut decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
decrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut decrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(decrypted, data);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_large_through_reader_stream() {
let size = 1024 * 1024;
let mut data = vec![0u8; size];
rand::rng().fill(&mut data[..]);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let reader = Cursor::new(data.clone());
let mut encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
let reader = ChunkedCursor::new(encrypted, 8192);
let decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut stream = ReaderStream::with_capacity(Box::new(decrypt_reader), 262_144);
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
while let Some(chunk) = stream.next().await {
let bytes = chunk.expect("operation should succeed");
decrypted.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
}
assert_eq!(decrypted, data);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_large_through_hard_limit_reader_stream() {
let size = 1024 * 1024;
let mut data = vec![0u8; size];
rand::rng().fill(&mut data[..]);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let reader = Cursor::new(data.clone());
let mut encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
let reader = ChunkedCursor::new(encrypted, 8192);
let decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let limit_reader = HardLimitReader::new(decrypt_reader, size as i64);
let mut stream = ReaderStream::with_capacity(Box::new(limit_reader), 262_144);
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
while let Some(chunk) = stream.next().await {
let bytes = chunk.expect("operation should succeed");
decrypted.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
}
assert_eq!(decrypted, data);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_multipart_segments() {
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut base_nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut base_nonce);
let part_one = vec![0xA5; 512 * 1024];
let part_two = vec![0x5A; 256 * 1024];
async fn encrypt_part(data: &[u8], key: [u8; 32], base_nonce: [u8; 12], part_number: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
let nonce = derive_part_nonce(&base_nonce, part_number);
let reader = BufReader::new(Cursor::new(data.to_vec()));
let mut encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
encrypted
}
let encrypted_one = encrypt_part(&part_one, key, base_nonce, 1).await;
let encrypted_two = encrypt_part(&part_two, key, base_nonce, 2).await;
let mut combined = Vec::with_capacity(encrypted_one.len() + encrypted_two.len());
combined.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_one);
combined.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_two);
let reader = BufReader::new(Cursor::new(combined));
let mut decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new_multipart(reader, key, base_nonce, vec![1, 2]);
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
decrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut decrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
let mut expected = Vec::with_capacity(part_one.len() + part_two.len());
expected.extend_from_slice(&part_one);
expected.extend_from_slice(&part_two);
assert_eq!(decrypted, expected);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_encrypt_reader_uses_distinct_nonces_per_block() {
let data = vec![0xAB; ENCRYPTION_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let reader = Cursor::new(data);
let mut encrypt_reader = EncryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut encrypted = Vec::new();
encrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut encrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
let payloads = extract_encrypted_payloads(&encrypted);
assert!(payloads.len() >= 2);
assert_ne!(payloads[0], payloads[1]);
}
#[test]
fn test_part_and_block_nonces_do_not_collide_across_parts() {
let base_nonce = [0u8; 12];
let part_one_block_one = derive_block_nonce(&derive_part_nonce(&base_nonce, 1), 1);
let part_two_block_zero = derive_block_nonce(&derive_part_nonce(&base_nonce, 2), 0);
assert_ne!(part_one_block_one, part_two_block_zero);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_accepts_legacy_single_nonce_streams() {
let mut data = vec![0u8; ENCRYPTION_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 + 17];
rand::rng().fill(&mut data[..]);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let encrypted = encrypt_with_legacy_nonce_reuse(&data, key, nonce);
let reader = Cursor::new(encrypted);
let mut decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(reader, key, nonce);
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
decrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut decrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
assert_eq!(decrypted, data);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_accepts_legacy_multipart_nonce_layout() {
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
let mut base_nonce = [0u8; 12];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key);
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut base_nonce);
let part_one = vec![0x11; ENCRYPTION_BLOCK_SIZE + 97];
let part_two = vec![0x22; ENCRYPTION_BLOCK_SIZE + 33];
let encrypted_one = encrypt_part_with_legacy_nonce_layout(&part_one, key, base_nonce, 1).await;
let encrypted_two = encrypt_part_with_legacy_nonce_layout(&part_two, key, base_nonce, 2).await;
let mut combined = Vec::with_capacity(encrypted_one.len() + encrypted_two.len());
combined.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_one);
combined.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_two);
let reader = BufReader::new(Cursor::new(combined));
let mut decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new_multipart(reader, key, base_nonce, vec![1, 2]);
let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
decrypt_reader
.read_to_end(&mut decrypted)
.await
.expect("operation should succeed");
let mut expected = Vec::with_capacity(part_one.len() + part_two.len());
expected.extend_from_slice(&part_one);
expected.extend_from_slice(&part_two);
assert_eq!(decrypted, expected);
}
// Regression: a corrupted block header whose length yields a payload shorter than 16 bytes
// must not panic. Header (8 bytes): [typ, len_lo, len_mid, len_hi, crc0..crc3]; payload is
// `len - 4` bytes. Pre-fix, poll_read sliced `ciphertext_buf[0..16]` unconditionally,
// panicking with "range end index 16 out of range for slice of length N" when N < 16.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_decrypt_reader_short_block_no_panic() {
let key = [0u8; 32];
let nonce = [0u8; 12];
// len = 8 -> payload_len = 4 (< 16). Provide exactly 4 payload bytes.
let len: usize = 8;
let mut input = vec![
0x00u8, // typ (regular block)
(len & 0xFF) as u8,
((len >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8,
((len >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8,
];
input.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 4]); // crc (unused before the panic site)
input.extend_from_slice(&[0x01u8, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04]); // 4-byte payload
let mut decrypt_reader = DecryptReader::new(Cursor::new(input), key, nonce);
let mut out = Vec::new();
let res = decrypt_reader.read_to_end(&mut out).await;
assert!(res.is_err(), "corrupted short encrypted block must return an error, not panic");
}
}