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73e4ef4dd4
Open the managed-SSE replication gate (backlog#1783, PR-B of 3, after #5872): the replication reader already decrypts through the injected object-encryption resolver, so the source sends plaintext plus an encryption intent header (AES256 / aws:kms, never the source key id) and the target re-encrypts on its normal PUT path with its own KMS. No DEK crosses sites. - replication_put_object_options: fail closed only on Unsupported; insert the SSE intent after the strip loop. - TargetClient::create_multipart_upload sends the full opts.header() set, fixing multipart replicas losing content-type/user metadata (plaintext included). - Preserve source ETag and mtime on replicas (authorized replication only): receiver wires x-rustfs-source-etag into preserve_etag for PUT and CompleteMultipartUpload, resolve_complete_etag consumes it, and complete options carry source_etag/source_mtime (absent mtime degrades to epoch, not now_utc). Without this every replication HEAD comparison re-drives re-encrypted objects forever. - e2e: managed SSE contracts flip to success on an independent-KMS dual-process pair (byte-identical plain GET proves target-owned envelopes; ETag/mtime preserved; version stable across scanner cycles; resync converges; multipart keeps structure and metadata); new target-without-KMS fail-closed contract; SSE-C stays FAILED. Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>