Files
rustfs/crates/madmin/src/account.rs
T
Sinan Eldem b93e7b2355 feat(admin): self-service account management and TOTP two-factor authentication (#6596)
* feat(madmin): add account and two-factor wire contract

Defines the self-service account and MFA API shapes in one place so the
console and the `rc` CLI decode identical payloads instead of each
carrying its own copy of the contract.

`AccountMutability` is part of the contract on purpose: a client needs to
know whether the server will accept a password change for this identity
before offering the control, rather than discovering it from a rejected
request.

* feat(s3-types): add IAM identity audit events

Adds `iam:Identity:CredentialChanged` and `iam:Identity:AuthChallenge`
so account and authentication activity reaches the audit pipeline in its
own namespace, the way the KMS events already do. Neither is reachable
from a bucket notification config.

Two variants for the whole surface rather than one per operation:
`mask()` gives every variant its own bit in a `u64`, and the budget is
nearly spent (63 of 64 used after this). The per-operation detail lives
in `AuditEntry::api.name` and the `iamOperation` tag, which is what a
SIEM filters on anyway. Splitting these further needs `mask()` widened
first.

* feat(iam): add two-factor authentication primitives

Implements the state machine behind TOTP enrollment and verification in
the IAM domain, so the admin handlers stay HTTP plumbing and the console
and CLI drive identical logic.

* `totp`: RFC 6238 over the workspace's existing hmac/sha1, pinned to the
  published Appendix B vectors. SHA-1, 6 digits, 30s: the parameters every
  mainstream authenticator app implements. Verification returns the
  matched time step so the caller can burn it.
* `recovery`: ten single-use codes, 100 bits each, in a Crockford base32
  alphabet without I/L/O/U. Stored as domain-separated SHA-256 digests —
  a password KDF would have to run once per stored code on every attempt,
  turning each guess into an attacker-controlled cost, and with uniform
  100-bit input there is no dictionary for it to defend against.
* `challenge`: stateless HMAC tokens. A TTL cache would be node-local, so
  a cluster without session affinity would issue on one node and verify
  on another; nothing here needs replicating.
* `record`: two-phase enrollment, replay high-water mark, and lockout.
  Pending enrollment never gates a login, so a mis-scanned QR cannot lock
  an operator out, and re-configuring keeps the old factor working until
  the new one is confirmed.
* `store`: one object per identity under `config/mfa/`, a sibling of
  `config/iam/` so the IAM cache loader's startup walk does not sweep it
  up. Optimistic `If-Match` writes; deliberately uncached, because a cache
  would need cluster-wide invalidation to keep the replay mark and the
  lockout counter honest.
* `qr`: server-side rendering, so neither client needs a QR encoder.

Enrollment is refused without `RUSTFS_IAM_MASTER_KEY`. A TOTP secret is
credential-equivalent, and one written in plaintext could be lifted off a
disk — worse than no second factor, because the user believes they have
one. IAM identities tolerate a missing master key for backward
compatibility; a new feature has no such history to honour.

Also adds `IamSys::revoke_sts_sessions_for_parent`, so a credential
rotation can invalidate the sessions minted under the old secret.

* feat(admin): add self-service account endpoints and the two-factor login gate

Adds the account surface (`/v3/account/*`), the second-factor endpoints,
the administrative reset (`/v3/user/mfa`), and `PUT
/v3/set-user-secret-key`, plus the gate on `AssumeRole`.

What the gate covers, and what it deliberately does not:

* `AssumeRole` is the only interactive login RustFS has, so it is where a
  second factor can be enforced. With one enrolled it requires
  `TokenCode`; without an enrollment the code path is unchanged, so
  existing deployments are untouched.
* A request signed directly with a long-term access key stays ungated.
  Gating it would break every script and CLI the moment a human enabled
  2FA on their own account, and would add no protection: whoever holds
  the secret key already has full access without presenting a code. This
  is the division AWS draws; making 2FA meaningful for API access needs an
  `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent` policy condition, tracked separately.

`SerialNumber`/`TokenCode` are STS's own parameters, so an SDK or script
authenticates the same way the console does.

`caller_identity` resolves who a request acts as. The console signs with
a short-lived STS session, so "the caller" is almost never the key that
signed. It reports two separate capabilities: root cannot rotate its
secret (a process-wide `OnceLock` that also derives the internode RPC
secret) but *can* enroll a second factor — conflating the two would leave
the default deployment's console login unprotectable.

The self-service routes carry no admin action. Giving them one would be
wrong in both directions: it would stop an ordinary user from changing
their own password, and let any holder of that action change someone
else's. They gate on possession of the credential plus, for the
mutations, knowledge of the current secret — a signature only proves a
credential was used, so without that a hijacked tab could rewrite the
account's credentials or strip its second factor.

`set-user-secret-key` exists because the only prior way to change a
password was to re-POST the whole user through `add-user`, which rewrote
`status` and dropped the policy field — a password reset that silently
re-enabled a disabled account.

Wrong, replayed and malformed codes are indistinguishable on the wire;
the distinction survives only in the audit trail, where no submitted
value, secret or code is ever recorded.

* test(e2e): cover the two-factor lifecycle and its regressions

Unit tests cover the state machine at its edges; only an end-to-end test
proves the pieces are wired together and that the existing
authentication paths still behave.

Asserts, against a real server: enrollment is refused without a master
key; the full enroll/activate flow works with a genuine RFC 6238 code;
`AssumeRole` refuses without a factor and accepts a valid one; a recovery
code works exactly once; a direct SigV4 admin request keeps working with
a factor enrolled; `AssumeRole` for an unenrolled identity is unchanged;
and a password rotation invalidates the old secret.

The test computes TOTP codes itself rather than calling the server's
implementation — a shared helper could agree with a bug on both sides.

This suite caught a real defect during development: enrollment was
refused for root because its *password* is immutable, which would have
left the default deployment — an administrator signing into the console
as root — unable to protect the one login the feature exists for.

* docs(operations): document the two-factor authentication model

Records what the second factor protects and what it deliberately does
not, because several of the boundaries look like gaps until the
alternative is spelled out: why direct SigV4 access stays ungated, why
root credentials cannot be rotated at runtime, why secret keys cannot be
hashed in an S3 server, and why at-rest protection is mandatory for a
TOTP secret but optional for an IAM identity.

Also states the limitations plainly, including that GHSA-m77q-r63m-pj89
is unaffected: a holder of the root secret can still forge a session
token, 2FA claim included.

Placed alongside the other authentication and KMS security documents
rather than under a new `docs/security/`, which `.gitignore` excludes.

* fix(admin): route the new account handlers through the admin s3 facade

Two of the guardrails in the CI "Quick Checks" job rejected the previous
commits, so the required check would have gone red as soon as a maintainer
approved the workflow run.

`check_architecture_migration_rules.sh` requires everything under
`rustfs/src/admin` to reach `ECStore` through a domain module rather than
the root of `storage_api`. The MFA handler and the two `AssumeRole`
signatures now use `storage_api::runtime::ECStore`, which is where the
other ten admin handlers already take it from.

`check_s3s_footprint.sh` ratchets two counters that new code may not grow:
files referencing `s3s` and error-macro invocation lines. This branch added
four files and thirty-two lines to them. The ratchet is lower-only and its
header forbids raising a baseline to get green, so the construction moves
behind the facade instead: `storage_api::s3` now re-exports the request and
body types these handlers need and gains an `error` constructor over
`S3Error::with_message`. That is the same constructor the macro expands to
and the one `handlers/mod.rs`, `rebalance_internal_error` and
`invalid_object_lock_configuration` already call, so this is the existing
practice rather than a new one, and it keeps the `s3s` dependency in the
boundary file the s3gate migration replaces.

Every error code and message is carried over unchanged. In `sts.rs` only
the call site this branch added is converted; the sixteen that predate it
are left alone, because rewriting them would put unrelated churn in a
feature PR and push the counter below the baseline it is meant to hold.
2026-08-26 09:35:29 +08:00

333 lines
12 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Wire contract for self-service account and multi-factor authentication.
//!
//! Console and the `rc` CLI both decode these shapes, so this module is the
//! single definition of the account/MFA API surface. Adding a field here is
//! additive; renaming or removing one is a breaking change for both clients.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
/// Error code returned when a session-minting request needs an MFA proof.
///
/// Emitted by `AssumeRole` when the caller's identity has TOTP enabled and the
/// request carried no `TokenCode`. Clients match on this exact string to decide
/// whether to prompt for a second factor instead of reporting a login failure.
pub const ERR_MFA_REQUIRED: &str = "MultiFactorAuthRequired";
/// Error code returned when too many second-factor attempts have failed.
pub const ERR_MFA_LOCKED: &str = "MultiFactorAuthLocked";
/// How the calling credential was established.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum IdentityType {
/// The server's bootstrap root credential.
Root,
/// A built-in IAM user stored under `config/iam/users/`.
Iam,
/// A temporary STS session credential.
Sts,
/// A service account minted from a parent identity.
ServiceAccount,
}
impl IdentityType {
pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::Root => "root",
Self::Iam => "iam",
Self::Sts => "sts",
Self::ServiceAccount => "service-account",
}
}
}
/// Where the identity's long-term secret lives.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum CredentialsSource {
/// Provisioned from the server process environment; immutable at runtime.
Env,
/// Stored in the IAM object store; mutable through the admin API.
Iam,
}
impl CredentialsSource {
pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::Env => "env",
Self::Iam => "iam",
}
}
}
/// Which self-service mutations the server will accept for this identity.
///
/// Clients use this to disable controls instead of letting the user submit a
/// request that is guaranteed to fail. Root credentials report `false` for both
/// because they are pinned by a process-wide `OnceLock` and feed the derived
/// internode RPC secret.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct AccountMutability {
#[serde(default)]
pub password: bool,
#[serde(default)]
pub username: bool,
}
/// MFA state as reported alongside the account summary.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct AccountMfaSummary {
#[serde(default)]
pub enabled: bool,
/// An enrollment has been started but not yet activated.
#[serde(default)]
pub pending: bool,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option", default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub activated_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
#[serde(default)]
pub recovery_codes_remaining: u32,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option", default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub last_verified_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
/// Server-side at-rest protection is unavailable, so enrollment is refused.
#[serde(default)]
pub enrollment_available: bool,
/// Human-readable reason when `enrollment_available` is false.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub enrollment_blocked_reason: Option<String>,
}
/// Response of `GET /rustfs/admin/v3/account/info`.
///
/// Describes the caller to itself. It never accepts a target parameter, so it
/// cannot be used to enumerate other identities.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SelfAccountInfo {
/// The long-term identity behind the request. For STS and service-account
/// credentials this is the parent, not the ephemeral access key.
pub access_key: String,
pub identity_type: IdentityType,
/// The ephemeral access key actually presented, when it differs.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub session_access_key: Option<String>,
pub is_admin: bool,
pub status: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub member_of: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub policies: Vec<String>,
pub credentials_source: CredentialsSource,
pub mutable: AccountMutability,
pub mfa: AccountMfaSummary,
}
/// Request body of `POST /rustfs/admin/v3/account/password`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ChangePasswordRequest {
/// Proof of possession. Required even though the request is already signed:
/// a signature only proves the credential was used, not that the human at
/// the keyboard knows it.
pub current_secret_key: String,
pub new_secret_key: String,
}
/// Request body of `PUT /rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-secret-key`.
///
/// Administrative reset of another user's secret key. Unlike `add-user` this
/// preserves the target's status, policies and group memberships.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SetUserSecretKeyRequest {
pub secret_key: String,
}
/// Response of `GET /rustfs/admin/v3/account/mfa`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct MfaStatus {
#[serde(default)]
pub enabled: bool,
#[serde(default)]
pub pending: bool,
pub algorithm: String,
pub digits: u8,
pub period_seconds: u32,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option", default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub activated_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option", default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub pending_expires_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
#[serde(default)]
pub recovery_codes_remaining: u32,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option", default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub last_verified_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
#[serde(default)]
pub enrollment_available: bool,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub enrollment_blocked_reason: Option<String>,
}
/// Response of `POST /rustfs/admin/v3/account/mfa/enroll`.
///
/// The secret appears here exactly once per enrollment. Clients must render it
/// and then discard it; persisting it in browser storage or a config file
/// defeats the second factor.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct MfaEnrollResponse {
/// Base32 (RFC 4648, unpadded) shared secret for manual entry.
pub secret_base32: String,
/// `otpauth://totp/...` provisioning URI for QR scanning.
pub otpauth_uri: String,
/// Server-rendered QR as a standalone SVG document. Rendered by the server
/// so neither client needs its own QR encoder.
pub qr_svg: String,
/// Server-rendered QR as Unicode half-block art for terminals.
pub qr_utf8: String,
pub algorithm: String,
pub digits: u8,
pub period_seconds: u32,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub expires_at: OffsetDateTime,
}
/// Request body carrying a single second-factor code.
///
/// Accepts either a TOTP digit code or a recovery code; the server decides
/// which by format, so clients do not need to classify user input.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct MfaCodeRequest {
pub code: String,
}
/// Request body of `DELETE /rustfs/admin/v3/account/mfa`.
///
/// Turning off the second factor is a step-up operation: a hijacked browser
/// session holding only STS credentials must not be able to do it silently.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct MfaDisableRequest {
pub code: String,
pub current_secret_key: String,
}
/// Response of MFA activation and recovery-code regeneration.
///
/// This is the only place recovery codes appear in plaintext; the server keeps
/// only their hashes.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RecoveryCodesResponse {
pub recovery_codes: Vec<String>,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub generated_at: OffsetDateTime,
}
/// Response of `GET /rustfs/admin/v3/mfa/challenge`.
///
/// Requires a valid signature, so a caller only ever learns the MFA state of
/// the identity whose secret key it already holds.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct MfaChallengeResponse {
pub required: bool,
/// Opaque, signed, time-bound value to echo back as `SerialNumber`.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub challenge: Option<String>,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option", default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub expires_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
}
/// Response of `GET /rustfs/admin/v3/user/mfa?accessKey=...`.
///
/// Deliberately narrower than [`MfaStatus`]: an administrator inspecting
/// someone else's account has no need for their enrollment internals.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserMfaStatus {
pub access_key: String,
pub enabled: bool,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option", default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub activated_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
#[serde(default)]
pub recovery_codes_remaining: u32,
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn identity_type_wire_values_are_kebab_case() {
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&IdentityType::Root).expect("serialize"), "\"root\"");
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_string(&IdentityType::ServiceAccount).expect("serialize"),
"\"service-account\""
);
assert_eq!(IdentityType::ServiceAccount.as_str(), "service-account");
}
#[test]
fn credentials_source_wire_values_are_stable() {
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&CredentialsSource::Env).expect("serialize"), "\"env\"");
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&CredentialsSource::Iam).expect("serialize"), "\"iam\"");
}
#[test]
fn account_info_round_trips() {
let info = SelfAccountInfo {
access_key: "sinan".to_string(),
identity_type: IdentityType::Iam,
session_access_key: Some("temp".to_string()),
is_admin: true,
status: "enabled".to_string(),
member_of: vec!["ops".to_string()],
policies: vec!["consoleAdmin".to_string()],
credentials_source: CredentialsSource::Iam,
mutable: AccountMutability {
password: true,
username: false,
},
mfa: AccountMfaSummary {
enabled: true,
recovery_codes_remaining: 7,
enrollment_available: true,
..Default::default()
},
};
let encoded = serde_json::to_string(&info).expect("serialize");
let decoded: SelfAccountInfo = serde_json::from_str(&encoded).expect("deserialize");
assert_eq!(decoded.access_key, "sinan");
assert_eq!(decoded.identity_type, IdentityType::Iam);
assert!(decoded.mutable.password);
assert!(!decoded.mutable.username);
assert_eq!(decoded.mfa.recovery_codes_remaining, 7);
}
#[test]
fn mfa_challenge_defaults_to_not_required() {
// Older servers omit the whole payload; clients must not prompt.
let decoded: MfaChallengeResponse = serde_json::from_str("{\"required\":false}").expect("deserialize");
assert!(!decoded.required);
assert!(decoded.challenge.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn mfa_status_tolerates_absent_optional_fields() {
let decoded: MfaStatus =
serde_json::from_str("{\"algorithm\":\"SHA1\",\"digits\":6,\"period_seconds\":30}").expect("deserialize");
assert!(!decoded.enabled);
assert!(!decoded.pending);
assert_eq!(decoded.digits, 6);
assert!(decoded.activated_at.is_none());
}
}