Files
rustfs/scripts/test_entrypoint_credentials.sh
T
Zhengchao An 3f1acfe8a7 fix(docker): warn instead of rejecting default or missing credentials (#4728)
* fix(docker): warn instead of rejecting default or missing credentials

The entrypoint hard-reject from #4278 broke the container-first UX and
the repo's own scheduled e2e lanes (e2e-s3tests, mint boot rustfs-ci
images with default credentials and died at startup). Maintainer
decision: ship no baked-in credentials, warn instead of block.

- missing credentials: warn and start; wording accounts for the
  RUSTFS_ROOT_*/MINIO_* alias sources the entrypoint does not inspect
- default rustfsadmin via env/CLI/file: warn and start; the warning
  notes all-default pairs cannot derive an internode RPC secret
- malformed config stays fatal: source conflicts, unreadable files,
  empty or whitespace-only values, flags missing their argument
- present-but-empty env vars now hit the empty-value hard failure
  instead of running the binary with an empty root credential
- empty/default checks trim CR and blanks like the binary; files
  without a trailing newline are no longer falsely rejected as empty
- the no-baked-credentials guard covers all four Dockerfiles, and the
  test harness refuses hosts where /usr/bin/rustfs exists
- e2e-s3tests/mint move to non-default credentials (rustfsadmin-ci),
  which also restores RPC-secret derivation for the multi-node lane

GHSA-68cw fail-closed RPC derivation (#4402) is untouched; helm stays
fail-closed by design.

* chore(docker): reword entrypoint comment flagged by typos check
2026-07-11 19:13:04 +08:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT_DIR=$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)
TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT
ENTRYPOINT="$ROOT_DIR/entrypoint.sh"
# Warn-path cases run the entrypoint through to `exec /usr/bin/rustfs`; on a
# host that actually has the binary they would start real servers and hang.
if [ -e /usr/bin/rustfs ]; then
echo "refusing to run: /usr/bin/rustfs exists on this host" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Every image that ships the entrypoint must not bake root credentials into
# its ENV — with hard-fail enforcement gone, this guard is the remaining
# teeth of the "no built-in default credentials" policy.
for dockerfile in Dockerfile Dockerfile.glibc Dockerfile.source Dockerfile.decommission-local; do
if grep -Eq 'RUSTFS_(ACCESS|SECRET)_KEY=' "$ROOT_DIR/$dockerfile"; then
echo "$dockerfile must not bake root credentials into image ENV" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
assert_contains() {
if ! grep -q "$2" "$1"; then
echo "Expected ${1##*/} to contain: $2" >&2
cat "$1" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
assert_lacks() {
if grep -q "$2" "$1"; then
echo "Expected ${1##*/} to not contain: $2" >&2
cat "$1" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
# The test environment has no /usr/bin/rustfs, so a run that passes credential
# validation still exits non-zero at exec time. "Starting: /usr/bin/rustfs" on
# stdout is the proof that validation let startup proceed.
run_expect_start() {
label="$1"
expected="$2"
shift 2
log_file="$TMP_DIR/$label.log"
env -i PATH="$PATH" RUSTFS_VOLUMES="$TMP_DIR/data" RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY= "$@" sh "$ENTRYPOINT" rustfs >"$log_file" 2>&1 || true
assert_contains "$log_file" "$expected"
assert_contains "$log_file" "Starting: /usr/bin/rustfs"
assert_lacks "$log_file" "^ERROR:"
}
run_expect_failure() {
label="$1"
expected="$2"
shift 2
log_file="$TMP_DIR/$label.log"
if env -i PATH="$PATH" RUSTFS_VOLUMES="$TMP_DIR/data" RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY= "$@" sh "$ENTRYPOINT" rustfs >"$log_file" 2>&1; then
echo "Expected $label to fail" >&2
exit 1
fi
assert_contains "$log_file" "$expected"
assert_lacks "$log_file" "Starting: /usr/bin/rustfs"
}
# CLI-flag variants cannot go through the env-pair helpers, so they run
# inline with the same assertions.
run_cli_expect_start() {
label="$1"
expected="$2"
shift 2
log_file="$TMP_DIR/$label.log"
env -i PATH="$PATH" RUSTFS_VOLUMES="$TMP_DIR/data" RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY= RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret sh "$ENTRYPOINT" rustfs "$@" >"$log_file" 2>&1 || true
assert_contains "$log_file" "$expected"
assert_contains "$log_file" "Starting: /usr/bin/rustfs"
assert_lacks "$log_file" "^ERROR:"
}
run_cli_expect_failure() {
label="$1"
expected="$2"
shift 2
log_file="$TMP_DIR/$label.log"
if env -i PATH="$PATH" RUSTFS_VOLUMES="$TMP_DIR/data" RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY= RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret sh "$ENTRYPOINT" rustfs "$@" >"$log_file" 2>&1; then
echo "Expected $label to fail" >&2
exit 1
fi
assert_contains "$log_file" "$expected"
assert_lacks "$log_file" "Starting: /usr/bin/rustfs"
}
# Missing credentials warn for both keys but still start.
run_expect_start \
"missing-both" \
"WARNING: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY or RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE is not set"
assert_contains "$TMP_DIR/missing-both.log" "WARNING: RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY or RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY_FILE is not set"
run_expect_start \
"missing-secret" \
"WARNING: RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY or RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY_FILE is not set" \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=custom-access
# Default credentials warn but still start, via env, CLI flag (both forms),
# and file.
run_expect_start \
"default-access-env" \
"WARNING: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY uses the default rustfsadmin credential" \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=rustfsadmin \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
run_expect_start \
"default-secret-env" \
"WARNING: RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY uses the default rustfsadmin credential" \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=custom-access \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=rustfsadmin
run_cli_expect_start \
"default-access-cli" \
"WARNING: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY uses the default rustfsadmin credential" \
--access-key rustfsadmin
run_cli_expect_start \
"default-access-cli-equals" \
"WARNING: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY uses the default rustfsadmin credential" \
--access-key=rustfsadmin
default_access_file="$TMP_DIR/default-access-key"
printf 'rustfsadmin\n' >"$default_access_file"
run_expect_start \
"default-access-file" \
"WARNING: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE contains the default rustfsadmin credential" \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE="$default_access_file" \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
# CRLF-edited default-credential files must still be detected (the binary
# trims before comparing, so must we).
crlf_default_file="$TMP_DIR/crlf-default-access-key"
printf 'rustfsadmin\r\n' >"$crlf_default_file"
run_expect_start \
"default-access-file-crlf" \
"WARNING: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE contains the default rustfsadmin credential" \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE="$crlf_default_file" \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
# A newline-less secret file (printf/echo -n style) is well-formed: the
# binary accepts it, so the entrypoint must not reject it as empty.
no_newline_file="$TMP_DIR/no-newline-access-key"
printf 'custom-access' >"$no_newline_file"
run_expect_start \
"proper-access-file-no-newline" \
"Starting: /usr/bin/rustfs" \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE="$no_newline_file" \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
assert_lacks "$TMP_DIR/proper-access-file-no-newline.log" "WARNING:"
# Proper credentials start with no credential diagnostics at all.
run_expect_start \
"proper-creds" \
"Starting: /usr/bin/rustfs" \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=custom-access \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
assert_lacks "$TMP_DIR/proper-creds.log" "WARNING:"
# Malformed configuration still fails hard: conflicting sources, unreadable
# credential files, empty values, and flags missing their argument must stop
# the container before startup.
conflict_file="$TMP_DIR/conflict-access-key"
printf 'custom-access\n' >"$conflict_file"
run_expect_failure \
"conflict-access-sources" \
"ERROR: Set either RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY or RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE, not both." \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=custom-access \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE="$conflict_file" \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
run_expect_failure \
"unreadable-access-file" \
"ERROR: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE points to an unreadable file." \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE="$TMP_DIR/does-not-exist" \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
run_cli_expect_failure \
"empty-access-cli-value" \
"ERROR: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY must not be empty." \
--access-key=
# Present-but-empty env vars (e.g. an unexpanded compose interpolation) are
# malformed values, not missing credentials — the binary would otherwise run
# with an empty root credential.
run_expect_failure \
"empty-access-env-value" \
"ERROR: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY must not be empty." \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY= \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
run_expect_failure \
"empty-access-file-env-value" \
"ERROR: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE must not be empty." \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY_FILE= \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
# Whitespace-only values trim to empty in the binary, so they must hit the
# same empty-value hard failure instead of starting with an empty credential.
run_expect_failure \
"whitespace-access-env-value" \
"ERROR: RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY must not be empty." \
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=" " \
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=custom-secret
run_cli_expect_failure \
"access-flag-missing-argument" \
"ERROR: --access-key requires a value." \
--access-key
# Non-server commands skip credential validation entirely.
cargo_log="$TMP_DIR/cargo.log"
if ! env -i PATH="$PATH" RUSTFS_VOLUMES="$TMP_DIR/data" RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY= sh "$ENTRYPOINT" cargo --version >"$cargo_log" 2>&1; then
echo "Expected cargo passthrough to skip server credential checks" >&2
cat "$cargo_log" >&2
exit 1
fi
assert_lacks "$cargo_log" "RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY"
assert_lacks "$cargo_log" "RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY"
echo "entrypoint credential policy tests passed"