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* fix(ecstore): stop pruning at nonempty directories (#7616) * fix(ecstore): stop pruning at nonempty directories * test(ecstore): release pruning fixtures before temp cleanup (cherry picked from commit8f150d1d8e) * fix(heal): preserve retryable batch failures during recovery (#7642) * fix(heal): preserve retryable batch failures during recovery * test(heal): pin prebuilt hooks binaries in ci (cherry picked from commit5cd58319ed) * fix(s3): reject oversize single PUT early and map body errors to 4xx (#7635) * fix(s3): reject oversize single PUT early and map body errors to 4xx A single PutObject above the 5 GiB single-request ceiling was only rejected after the client had streamed 5 GiB into s3s's read-time body budget, and the resulting BodySizeLimitExceeded surfaced from the erasure writer as 500 InternalError. A body whose connection hit EOF before Content-Length bytes arrived (hyper's IncompleteBody) was also a 500. SDKs retry 500s, so one oversize upload was resent from offset 0 five times. - PutObject and UploadPart reject a declared length above MAX_SINGLE_PUT_OBJECT_SIZE with 400 EntityTooLarge before reading the body; the constant moves to rustfs_config so the s3s limit and the admission check share one value. - ApiError maps BodySizeLimitExceeded to EntityTooLarge and a hyper body EOF to IncompleteBody across both io::Error conversions. Fixes #7596. * test(s3): cover UploadPart admission, aws-chunked length, real s3s limit - Poll-counting test body proves PutObject and UploadPart reject a declared size above the ceiling with zero body polls; exact-cap and zero-length parts pass admission. - A STREAMING-* aws-chunked PUT whose framed Content-Length exceeds the cap is admitted when the decoded length is within it and rejected when the decoded length is over it. - The display-based BodySizeLimitExceeded matcher is checked against the real error produced by the pinned s3s Body budget. (cherry picked from commit50b31bc75b) * fix(ecstore): make directory mtime fixture portable (#7623) * fix(ecstore): make directory mtime fixture portable * style(ecstore): format mtime fixture assertion --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commitb1cc286cac) * fix(storage): prevent readiness after native migration failures (#7652) * fix(storage): prevent readiness after native migration failures * fix(storage): skip unsupported IAM records before reading * fix(storage): use stable typed migration metadata errors * fix(storage): include migration record in startup errors * test(storage): cover native migration startup failures * test(storage): use array chunks in migration fixture --------- Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <214054+rjregenold@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit0cbc3ffe61) * fix(admin): expose OIDC account display fields (#7654) Expose verified OIDC username and email claims as display-only metadata on self-account responses while preserving the virtual parent as the authorization identity.\n\nKeep rustfs-madmin public response structs unchanged by adding the optional wire fields through private handler response wrappers. (cherry picked from commitf02bc947cd) * fix(replication): correct peer joins and remote-state reporting (#7650) * fix(replication): propagate verified peer deployment identities * fix(replication): report actual remote peer state * fix(replication): defer initial sync until all peers join * test(replication): shut down TLS fixtures cleanly --------- Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit853ae63b6a) * fix(s3): bound stalled UploadPart request bodies (#7659) * fix(s3): bound stalled UploadPart request bodies * fix(ci): preserve the S3S footprint ratchet (cherry picked from commit666dfd9f9f) * fix(tables): reject reserved warehouse locations (#7671) Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit414176c47f) * fix(ci): bind nightly lanes to one resolved source (#7688) (cherry picked from commit01d8e4347f) * fix(replication): close the pre-stable convergence gaps from backlog#2367 (#7626) * fix(replication): total-order rule sort and honor V1 top-level Prefix Rule matching had two defects from the pre-GA replication audit (rustfs/backlog#2367 C-1 and C-2): - The actionable-rule sort compared same-destination rules by priority but answered Equal for any other pair, which is not a total order; the standard library sort panics on such comparators once a slice exceeds the insertion-sort threshold, so an object matching more than 20 enabled rules across two or more targets could panic the PUT or DELETE task. Rules now sort by priority descending with destination and id as tie-breakers, and filter_target_arns preserves that order instead of draining a HashSet. - A V1 rule written without a <Filter> carries its prefix at the top level; that field was never read, so <Prefix>logs/</Prefix> matched every object. ReplicationRuleExt::prefix now falls back to it, with a <Filter> keeping precedence. The existing prefix fixtures were built this way and had been asserting nothing. * fix(admin): advertise data-usage and listen capabilities to rc The rc client gated `rc du` and `rc watch` on a pinned contract that matched server versions by the string prefix `1.0.0-rc.`; a server that reports `1.0.0` no longer matches, and the dynamic `advertised` list did not carry either name, so `rc du` against a GA server fails with an unsupported-capability error (rustfs/backlog#2367 E-2). Advertise `admin.data-usage` from the admin route inventory like the IAM entries, and `listen_notification` for the bucket `?events=` extension route the admin router dispatches. The client merges advertised entries ahead of its pinned contract, so no version sniffing is needed. * fix(site-replication): stop notifying the local site on remove and rotate The pending-remove and pending-rotation notification loops skipped the local site by endpoint only, while finalization identifies it by deployment id or endpoint. The reconcile tick resolves the local peer from the node's own listen address (and a handler from the request Host), so `remove --all` dialed the site's registered endpoint, waited out the request timeout against the lifecycle lock it was holding, and answered `Partial: failed to notify 1 peer(s)` for a removal that had succeeded (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-4, backlog#2195 item 3). Both loops now iterate the peers still awaiting notification through one helper that applies the finalization identity. * fix(site-replication): promote and settle IAM retries without a tick of slack Two retry-queue behaviours kept an IAM change from converging for ten to twenty minutes after a peer came back (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-1 and A-3, backlog#2305): - The lightweight 30-second pass filtered its reachability probe to bucket ops, so a backed-off IAM or bucket-metadata snapshot waited for the 600-second tick to notice the peer. It now probes every backed-off class and still replays only bounded bucket ops; promotion is a state flip the heavyweight tick acts on. - Backoffs are multiples of the tick interval, so a failure stamped δ seconds after a tick was 600 − δ old at the next tick and slipped a whole extra interval. The heavyweight drain now evaluates backoff halfway to its next tick. - An IAM entry first created by a non-deletion failure (the add bootstrap's snapshot send, the drain's own replay, an import-iam schedule) was never stamped `deletions_recorded`, so a later recorded deletion could not settle it and it escalated to the marker only `replicate repair` clears. Entries created by this binary now start recorded; a row persisted by an older binary keeps the escalation semantics. * fix(site-replication): reload peer node caches after bucket wiring writes Every S3 bucket-config write ends by asking the other nodes of the cluster to reload the bucket's metadata; the site-replication writers never did. On a multi-node site the node that ran the pairing (or applied a peer's bucket-meta item) rewrote the bucket targets and the derived replication rules on disk, while every other node kept serving its cached copy for up to the 15-minute refresh. A `resync start` routed to such a node reported every freshly wired bucket as `Config not found` and a bucket whose operator target the pairing had replaced as `recorded remote target no longer exists` (rustfs/backlog#2367 A-5, backlog#2195 item 2; functional SITE-105). Add one best-effort reload helper in the site-replication hooks and call it after the bucket setup, versioning, peer bucket-meta apply, removed-peer cleanup, make-with-versioning, and endpoint-refresh writes; the ensure helpers now report whether they wrote so unchanged passes stay silent. The resync manifest and start now read the persisted wiring instead of the node-local cache, matching the target read the start path already did. The new four-node e2e pairs two clusters and starts a resync through a non-coordinator node right after pairing; it also covers an IAM user created on a non-coordinator node converging to the peer site. * test(e2e): cover delete-marker replication from a multi-node source The functional suite reported delete markers created on a 3-node source never reaching the target (rustfs/backlog#2195 item 4, REP-105). The report was a probe defect, but the shape had no coverage: the existing delete-marker e2e runs a single-node source. Pin it against a four-node source replicating to a four-node peer and to a single-node target, with the write and the delete issued through different nodes. * ci(e2e): refresh the distributed selection for the new replication cases Four distributed cases were added (two site-replication, two delete-marker replication). The linux digest is derived from the last CI listing of the lane (34 cases, matching the previous pin) plus the four new names; the darwin digest is the local listing, which selects the same 38 cases. (cherry picked from commitaeaba86d73) * fix(e2e): require a verified server binary for every e2e run (#7687) * fix(ci): share quick checks and lint workflows * fix(ci): install actionlint from its verified release * fix(ci): reject dependencies on required quick checks * feat(test): verify the E2E server build and source identity * test(e2e): register verified Darwin test membership * test(e2e): record verified Linux receipt test membership * test(e2e): record compiled Darwin receipt test membership * test(e2e): record compiled Linux receipt test membership * test(e2e): record Darwin e2e-full membership after merging main * fix(test): route scanner/heal evidence E2E runs through the verified server binary The evidence runners built rustfs with plain cargo and then ran e2e_test directly, which now fails without a run receipt. They build through scripts/e2e_binary.py and run the e2e_test invocations under e2e_binary.py run; the obsolete rustfs.features stamp is removed. * docs(e2e): run server-backed e2e commands through the verified binary wrapper * test(e2e): record Linux e2e-full membership from the branch CI listing (cherry picked from commit2909b1bfe1) * fix(kms): classify KMS/SSE error contracts and SSE-S3 headers (#7697) * fix(sse): classify bare SSE-KMS writes when no KMS is available A `aws:kms` request without a key id, on a bucket without a default key, returned `500 InternalError` whenever no KMS service was running: the "no KMS key available" branch exited with an untyped storage error before the availability classification that the keyed form already received. Route that branch through the same split: `503 ServiceUnavailable` while a configured KMS is stopped, `400 InvalidRequest` when KMS was never configured, and `400 InvalidRequest` naming the missing key id when a running KMS has no default key. `CreateMultipartUpload` shares the path. Adds a unit test for the bare form and an e2e module that stops KMS through the admin API, runs a master-key-only node, and runs a Local KMS without a default key; refreshes the e2e-full selection digests. (cherry picked from commit c3259dadc3d603a9185a5b0ad9f83dfb884e61c8) * fix(sse): keep KMS error classes on the encrypted read path GetObject, CopyObject and UploadPartCopy on an SSE-KMS object whose key no longer exists answered `500 InternalError` ("KMS key not found") while PutObject under the same key already answered `400 KMS.NotFoundException`. The read path carries its classification through ecstore's `EncryptionResolutionErrorKind`, which had no kind for a missing key, a denied KMS grant or a missing backend capability, so all three folded onto `DecryptionFailed` and the S3 layer reported an internal fault. Add `KeyNotFound`, `AccessDenied` and `NotImplemented` kinds, map them on both sides of the boundary, and give an envelope the configured backend cannot unwrap a diagnosable message while keeping its `500`. Unit tests cover the kind round trip and the reader wrapping; a new e2e test deletes a key immediately and checks GET/Copy return 400 with `KMS.NotFoundException` while HEAD stays 200. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing (the previous digests predated the delete-authorization tests) and the e2e `create_default_key` helper is updated to the accepted `EncryptDecrypt` spelling. (cherry picked from commit 2523a9814e97caea318d4ff1a51bef3a4d4445b2) * fix(kms): classify key-management errors on the admin routes `POST /kms/keys`, the legacy `create-key` alias and `generate-data-key` reported every backend refusal as `500`: a blank key name (which each backend failed on differently, the Local backend by writing a key file with an empty stem), a name already taken, an unknown key, a disabled key and a capability the backend lacks. `delete` and the lifecycle routes already classified the same errors. Refuse a blank or whitespace name in `KmsManager::create_key` before any backend sees it, and share one `KmsError` to status mapping across create, delete and generate-data-key (400 for validation and key state, 404 for an unknown key, 409 for a taken name, 501 for a missing capability, 500 only for damaged material). The XML-error routes carry the same status explicitly since s3s derives none for a custom code. The read-only Static backend now reports create, delete and cancel-deletion as `UnsupportedCapability`, matching its rotate and enable/disable answers, so the admin API returns 501 for all of them. (cherry picked from commit e33cac5493c4d9d6662e0d2980b58ba2b24a6d1b) * fix(sse): stop SSE-S3 responses from naming the wrapping KMS key `x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id` is defined for `aws:kms` objects only, but PutObject, CopyObject, CreateMultipartUpload and GetObject returned it for `AES256` objects too, carrying the KMS key that wraps the SSE-S3 data key (the service default, or the literal `default` on a node without KMS). The write paths copied `kms_key_id` from the encryption material unconditionally, and the single-decrypt GET classification did the same after resolving the key for authorization. Add `EncryptionMaterial::response_kms_key_id`, which yields the id only for SSE-KMS, use it at the four write-response sites, and gate the GET classification the same way. CompleteMultipartUpload and HeadObject already omitted the header. Unit tests pin both directions; a new e2e test covers Put/Get/Head/Copy and CreateMultipartUpload for AES256 with an aws:kms control. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing. (cherry picked from commit 29d793a63352b0b60fd53c565e80fdbede8964bb) * fix(s3): validate PutBucketEncryption rules before storing them A default-encryption rule naming an unknown `SSEAlgorithm` (for example `AES128`), a rule without `ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault`, an empty rule list, or a `KMSMasterKeyID` on an `AES256` rule was stored as written: the only algorithm check on the route decided whether to fill in the default KMS key. `GetBucketEncryption` then advertised that configuration while the write path encrypted header-less writes under its `AES256` fallback, so the bucket's declared and actual schemes disagreed. Two comments claimed the route already refused unknown algorithms. Validate the configuration before any of it is applied: `MalformedXML` for a malformed rule set or unknown algorithm, `InvalidArgument` for a key id on a non-KMS rule, and nothing stored on refusal. Correct the two comments to describe when the AES256 fallback is still reachable. Unit tests cover every refusal and the accepted shapes; an e2e test checks the refusals leave the previous configuration in place. The e2e-full selection digests are refreshed from the current listing. (cherry picked from commit 29e4486dce41197ed93f5253cdbabc57d27a4ddb) * test(e2e): refresh e2e-full selection for the combined KMS/SSE fixes * test: align two unit tests with the new KMS and bucket-encryption contracts `scheduled_deletion_carries_a_deadline_and_can_be_cancelled` still expects the state error (`InvalidOperation`) for cancelling a key that is not pending deletion; only the Static backend's mutations moved to `UnsupportedCapability`. The uninitialized-store PutBucketEncryption test now sends a well-formed AES256 rule so it reaches the store lookup instead of the new configuration validation. (cherry picked from commite2e6a2535a) * fix(site-replication): keep an operator's bucket-level target to a peer instead of taking it over (#7709) * fix(site-replication): keep an operator's bucket-level target to a peer instead of taking it over Site replication wired each bucket by looking for an existing replication target "to the same peer" and rewriting the first match in place as its own same-name target. An operator's bucket-level target that happened to point at that site (different target bucket, operator credentials) was the first match whenever it pre-dated the join, and the reconciler repeats the pass every 600s, so the takeover also depended on target order afterwards. The operator's rule then named an ARN no target backed and their bucket replication stopped silently, while the inherited bucket-level reset id made every site resync report the bucket as owned by another resync (rustfs/backlog#2479, rustfs/backlog#2489). Follow MinIO's `getRemoteARN` / `getRemoteARNForPeer` shape instead: - Wiring updates a target in place only under the same ARN, or when it is recognisably the site's own under an older ARN shape (same peer, same-name target bucket, site replication service account). Anything else gets the site target added next to it. - The site resync manifest takes the target the derived `site-repl-<deployment id>` rule names (same-name shape as fallback), so an operator target to the peer neither aborts the bucket as "multiple remote targets matched peer" nor gets resynced into. - Peer removal prunes only targets a pruned derived rule names or the same-name target bucket; operator targets stamped with the peer's deployment id survive together with their rules. Unit tests cover the three predicates. e2e `test_site_replication_keeps_operator_bucket_target_to_peer` runs a bucket-level replication plus `replication-reset` to the future peer, joins the sites, and requires the operator target untouched, both paths delivering, the site resync completing against the site target, and the operator target and rule surviving `replicate remove --all`; without the fix it fails at the join with the operator target gone. The repl-nightly selection digest is refreshed for the new case. * test(site-replication): drop a redundant clone flagged by clippy The reconcile unit test cloned the remote peer into the state map although the binding is not used afterwards; workspace clippy (-D warnings) rejects that as redundant_clone. (cherry picked from commitecdc55fa4b) * fix: enforce S3 permissions for recursive force deletion (#7661) * fix: enforce S3 authorization for recursive deletion * fix: satisfy the s3s footprint guard * fix: restore list versions policy compatibility (#7686) (cherry picked from commit3fd1ce414d) * fix(ci): repair functional defaults and chain regression checks (#7664) * fix(ci): default functional suites to nightly packages * test(ci): follow the fault-tolerance chain handoff (cherry picked from commit509a0fa90c) * fix(ci): align security workflow tests with chain (#7679) (cherry picked from commitd9e47d2813) * test(ecstore): keep tier cleanup tests stable after immediate receipt queueing Release PR #7766 made PUT/CopyObject overwrites queue the tier free-version cleanup receipt immediately, which broke two ecstore tests on release CI. In tier_overwrite_put_and_self_copy_recover_persisted_cleanup_owners the restarted store already runs expiry workers from the second iteration on, so they deleted the remote bytes before the test could assert that the commit leaves them in place; the test now fails the first remote DELETE via set_remove_failure(true) so the cleanup owner stays durable and the later restart still has to rediscover it from xl.meta (the failed remove does not bump remove_count, and the test re-enables removes before the recovery wait). In batch_transitioned_delete_post_commit_failures_roll_back_without_free_version_receipt the convergence loop now treats a transient InsufficientReadQuorum as "not yet converged", because cleanup rewrites xl.meta disk by disk and a racing read can briefly miss quorum (seen in the rio-v2 lane); any other error still panics. * Revert "fix(ci): align security workflow tests with chain (#7679)" This reverts commit4544359f6d. * Revert "fix(ci): repair functional defaults and chain regression checks (#7664)" This reverts commit5ba7ec0291. * fix(ecstore): pass shard integrity to backported ingest-mode test The stalled-reader test backported with #7659 used main's four-argument encode_with_ingest_mode, but release's signature takes an optional IntegrityBuilder, so pass None to keep the test focused on ingest-mode cleanup. --------- Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com> Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <rregenold@teamraft.com> Co-authored-by: RJ Regenold <214054+rjregenold@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: GatewayJ <835269233@qq.com> Co-authored-by: Jason Kossis <jkossis@gmail.com>
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RustFS Testing
Use this when: you need to pick a test layer for a change, name a test so a gate keeps selecting it, understand why #[serial] does nothing under nextest, or handle a flaky test.
Source of truth: .config/nextest.toml (profiles, test-groups, quarantine), .config/make/tests.mak (make test), .github/workflows/*.yml (what runs when; matrix in ci-gates.md).
Test taxonomy
Pick the lowest layer that can prove the change; add a higher-layer test only when the behaviour is not observable below it.
| Layer | What it covers | Entry command | When it runs (details: ci-gates.md) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit & crate integration | Per-crate logic and in-process integration tests | cargo nextest run --all --exclude e2e_test (or -p <crate>); make test wraps it |
Every PR, required (Test and Lint, ci profile) |
| ecstore black-box | Erasure-coded read/write/recovery validation; profiles quick / full / destructive / fuzz |
scripts/run_ecstore_validation_suite.sh --profile quick |
Local and release validation only; not wired into any workflow. Contract: ecstore-validation-suite-design.md |
e2e (e2e_test crate) |
A real rustfs binary per test, driven over the S3, admin, and protocol APIs |
python3 scripts/e2e_binary.py build --features e2e-test-hooks, then python3 scripts/e2e_binary.py run --features e2e-test-hooks -- cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test |
PR: e2e-smoke (report-only); merge queue / main push: e2e-full; nightly: e2e-repl-nightly, e2e-nightly, e2e-protocols, e2e-distributed. Guide: crates/e2e_test/README.md; 4-node 4-disk map: distributed-e2e.md |
| Outbound target matrix | Replication of every object shape (empty, plain, retention, legal hold, multipart) against every remote-target failure mode the fake target models; an explicit expectation table pins known-red cells to an open issue | python3 scripts/e2e_binary.py build, then python3 scripts/e2e_binary.py run -- cargo nextest run -p e2e_test -E 'test(/^replication_target_matrix_test::/)' |
With e2e-repl-nightly; required locally for any change to outbound client defaults (SOP: docs/postmortems/2026-09-03-replication-checksum-default-regression.md) |
| s3s-e2e conformance | External S3 conformance tool against a live server | ./scripts/e2e-run.sh ./target/debug/rustfs <data-dir> |
PR, report-only (second half of the End-to-End Tests job) |
| S3 compatibility | ceph/s3-tests (boto3; allow-list scripts/s3-tests/implemented_tests.txt) and MinIO mint |
scripts/s3-tests/run.sh; mint via .github/workflows/mint.yml |
s3-tests: PR report-only plus a weekly full sweep; mint: weekly, report-only |
| Chaos / fault-injection | Single-node disk fault injection (crates/e2e_test/src/chaos.rs, crates/e2e_test/src/fault_proxy.rs) plus the 4-node kill/fresh-drive/blackhole cases in crates/e2e_test/src/distributed/chaos_test.rs |
Part of the e2e crate (e2e-reliability and e2e-distributed) |
Reliability cases with e2e-full; 4-node chaos on storage-sensitive PRs and nightly via e2e-distributed |
| Fuzz | cargo-fuzz targets over untrusted parsing surfaces; isolated sub-workspace under fuzz/ |
./scripts/fuzz/run.sh (see fuzz/README.md) |
PR smoke on the paths listed in .github/workflows/fuzz.yml, plus nightly corpus |
| Benchmarks | Criterion benches under each crate's benches/ |
cargo bench -p <crate> |
On demand; never a gate |
Every script named above is indexed with status and wiring in scripts/README.md. Fixed GHSA advisories map to named regression tests in security-regressions.md.
The scanner checkpoint fixture diagnoses retained subtree coverage across budget interruption, persistence, reload, and plan invalidation.
The scanner cache cost profile separates clone, subtree copy, encoding, and counted save costs without changing production cache behavior.
The Pool layout compatibility reference defines the topology and EC regression matrix for single-drive, single-node multi-drive, and multi-node expansion pools.
Naming conventions
Reserved test-name substrings (migration gate)
scripts/check_migration_gate_count.sh (runs in Test and Lint) selects migration-critical tests by name substring and fails when the count drops below .config/migration-gate-floor.txt. A rename that drops a substring silently thins the gate, so these substrings are reserved:
| Substring | Guards |
|---|---|
data_movement |
Cross-pool / cross-set object data-movement proofs |
rebalance |
Pool rebalance correctness |
decommission |
Pool decommission correctness |
source_cleanup |
Post-migration source cleanup |
delete_marker |
Delete-marker handling across migration |
A deliberate reduction lowers the floor in the same PR. The list above mirrors the script; change both together.
General naming
- Name a regression test after what it pins (issue or advisory number, or the invariant) so
rgfinds the guard for a past bug. - e2e lane membership is selected by test-name patterns in
.config/nextest.toml(for example_real_dual_node/_real_single_noderoute replication tests to the nightly lane). Follow the existing marker of the suite you extend. - Symbol naming follows the Rust API Guidelines (see
AGENTS.md).
nextest and #[serial]
cargo-nextest is the runner: make test requires it and CI installs it. nextest runs every test in its own process, so serial_test's in-process #[serial] mutex does not serialize tests against each other; it only affects the plain cargo test fallback. Cross-test serialization under nextest comes from a [test-groups] entry with max-threads = 1 in .config/nextest.toml (for example ecstore-serial-flaky, e2e-reliability) or from a -j 1 lane. Prefer making tests self-isolating (per-test instance context, random port, own temp dir) over adding serialization. RUSTFS_ALLOW_CARGO_TEST_FALLBACK=1 make test runs plain cargo test; its results are not authoritative because [test-groups] do not apply.
Time-driven tests use paused tokio time (start_paused plus tokio::time::advance) or explicit synchronization instead of fixed sleep windows.
Profiles
All profiles are defined in .config/nextest.toml; its block comments hold the filters and rationale.
| Profile | Role |
|---|---|
default |
Local runs; never retries |
ci |
PR gate for everything except e2e_test; global retries = 0 plus the quarantine list |
e2e-smoke |
PR subset of e2e_test |
e2e-full |
Merge-queue / main-push single-node e2e lane |
e2e-repl-nightly |
Nightly slow / cross-process replication lane |
e2e-nightly |
Nightly serial multi-process cluster fault lane |
e2e-distributed |
Storage-sensitive PR and nightly 4-node 4-disk S3 / lock / versioning / replication / quota / expand / decommission / rebalance / site-replication / chaos / upgrade (history + IAM AK/SK) lane |
e2e-protocols |
Nightly fixed-port FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV lane, run with -j 1 |
Membership of each e2e profile is pinned by a digest in .config/e2e-<profile>-selection.txt and checked by scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile <profile> before the lane runs. To list what a profile selects on your platform (the result is platform-dependent because some modules are linux-only):
cargo nextest list -p e2e_test --profile e2e-smoke --message-format json \
| jq -r '.["rust-suites"][].testcases | to_entries[] | select(.value["filter-match"].status == "matches") | .key | split("::")[0]' \
| sort | uniq -c
Flake policy
A flaky test fails non-deterministically without a corresponding code change. Retry semantics live in .config/nextest.toml: default never retries, ci has global retries = 0, and only quarantined tests get retries = 2 under ci. A quarantined test that passes on retry is marked flaky in target/nextest/ci/junit.xml (uploaded as a CI artifact); that marker, not a green check, is how a live flake stays visible.
- Discover — a non-deterministic failure (CI or local) or a
flakyJUnit marker. - Open an issue within 24h describing symptom, suspected cause, and affected suite. No silent re-runs.
- Quarantine — add a
[[profile.ci.overrides]]entry withretries = 2and a comment linking exactly one OPEN issue. The current quarantine list is the[[profile.ci.overrides]]block in.config/nextest.toml. - Fix or delete within 30 days — make the test robust and remove the entry, or delete the test. An entry without a live OPEN issue link is a policy violation.
Coverage
.github/workflows/coverage.ymlmeasures workspace line coverage on its schedule and on manual dispatch:cargo llvm-cov nextest --workspace --exclude e2e_testunder theciprofile, the same scope as the PR gate. The per-crate table lands in the job summary; lcov and JSON exports are uploaded as an artifact (retention set in the workflow).- PRs touching the paths listed in
coverage.ymlalso run a report-only comparison against.config/coverage-baselines.tomlviascripts/check_security_coverage.py: a regression is recorded in the summary without failing the job; missing or malformed coverage evidence fails closed. make coverage(.config/make/coverage.mak) is the local equivalent; it writestarget/llvm-cov/lcov.infoandcoverage.jsonand prints the same table viascripts/coverage_per_crate.py.- Not measured: doctests (
ci.ymlruns them uninstrumented) and thee2e_testcrate. - A baseline change needs a linked coverage run and a reviewed explanation in the PR.