Files
rustfs/crates/targets/src/runtime/sidecar.rs
T
houseme cd327c81f5 fix(targets): harden control-plane, TLS reload, and runtime extension points (#4504)
Addresses security/correctness audit findings in the target-plugin control
plane, TLS reload coordinator, and runtime extension registries.

control_plane (backlog#977):
- Install now preserves the currently installed revision as previous_revision
  so Rollback actually restores the prior version instead of a no-op.
- Split the gate: circuit-breaker and runtime-activation checks apply only to
  Install/Enable; Disable and Rollback stay available as break-glass
  remediation while the breaker is open.
- Enforce the sidecar runtime protocol version for every external transport
  (previously skippable by declaring a non-gRPC transport) and validate the
  plugin api_compatibility_version at planning time.
- Download/signature/provenance host allowlisting now matches the full
  host authority, so an allowlisted host never implicitly authorizes a
  different host:port.

TLS reload coordinator/validate (backlog#981, #970-coordinator):
- Compute the fingerprint before building material in register() to remove the
  TOCTOU that could permanently pin an old certificate; rotation self-heals.
- Always start a detection loop when reload is enabled; Watch mode no longer
  returns success without any loop.
- validate_cert_key_pairing now verifies the private key matches the
  certificate's public key instead of only parsing both files.
- Normalize a zero poll interval to a positive minimum to avoid a panic that
  silently killed the poll loop.
- Serialize reload cycles with a per-target mutex; a first-step fingerprint
  read failure now records last_error and a failure metric.
- Duplicate label registration stops and joins the previous loop before
  publishing the replacement (stop-before-start), preventing orphaned loops.

runtime extension points (backlog#983 runtime subset):
- ops_profiler/ops_diagnostics authorize before probing the registry so an
  unauthorized caller cannot learn whether a backend/surface exists.
- s3_hooks dispatch_post_auth actually traverses the registered hooks for the
  point instead of unconditionally returning Continue.
- sidecar send_with_timeout redacts errors and uses the configurable failure
  threshold via policy, and a successful send resets the breaker accounting.

Relates to rustfs/backlog#977
Relates to rustfs/backlog#981
Relates to rustfs/backlog#970
Relates to rustfs/backlog#983

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-08 16:18:30 +00:00

459 lines
16 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::TargetDomain;
use crate::runtime::sidecar_protocol::SidecarHandshake;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::time::Duration;
use thiserror::Error;
const DEFAULT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD: usize = 3;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SidecarRuntimePolicy {
pub allow_external_sidecars: bool,
pub require_sandbox: bool,
pub require_provenance: bool,
pub max_queue_depth: usize,
pub operation_timeout: Duration,
pub failure_threshold: usize,
pub redact_error_details: bool,
}
impl Default for SidecarRuntimePolicy {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
allow_external_sidecars: false,
require_sandbox: true,
require_provenance: true,
max_queue_depth: 0,
operation_timeout: Duration::from_secs(5),
failure_threshold: DEFAULT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD,
redact_error_details: true,
}
}
}
impl SidecarRuntimePolicy {
pub fn verified_external(max_queue_depth: usize, operation_timeout: Duration, failure_threshold: usize) -> Self {
Self {
allow_external_sidecars: true,
require_sandbox: true,
require_provenance: true,
max_queue_depth,
operation_timeout,
failure_threshold: failure_threshold.max(1),
redact_error_details: true,
}
}
pub fn failure_threshold(&self) -> usize {
self.failure_threshold.max(1)
}
pub fn validate_activation(&self, safety_checks: &SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks) -> Result<(), SidecarRuntimePolicyError> {
validate_runtime_policy(self, safety_checks)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks {
pub sandboxed: bool,
pub provenance_verified: bool,
pub queue_depth: usize,
}
impl SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks {
pub fn verified(queue_depth: usize) -> Self {
Self {
sandboxed: true,
provenance_verified: true,
queue_depth,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Error, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SidecarRuntimePolicyError {
#[error("external sidecar runtime is disabled by policy")]
ExternalSidecarDisabled,
#[error("sidecar runtime requires sandbox isolation")]
SandboxRequired,
#[error("sidecar runtime requires verified provenance")]
ProvenanceRequired,
#[error("sidecar runtime queue depth {queue_depth} exceeds policy bound {max_queue_depth}")]
QueueDepthExceeded { queue_depth: usize, max_queue_depth: usize },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub struct SidecarPluginRuntime {
pub endpoint: String,
pub handshake: SidecarHandshake,
pub healthy: bool,
pub failure_count: usize,
pub degraded_to_builtin: bool,
pub last_error: Option<String>,
}
impl SidecarPluginRuntime {
pub fn new(endpoint: impl Into<String>, handshake: SidecarHandshake) -> Self {
Self {
endpoint: endpoint.into(),
handshake,
healthy: false,
failure_count: 0,
degraded_to_builtin: false,
last_error: None,
}
}
pub fn enable(&mut self, expected_plugin_id: &str, required_domain: TargetDomain) -> Result<(), String> {
self.handshake.validate(expected_plugin_id)?;
if !self.handshake.supported_domains.contains(&required_domain) {
return Err(format!(
"sidecar plugin {} does not support required domain {:?}",
self.handshake.plugin_id, required_domain
));
}
self.healthy = true;
self.degraded_to_builtin = false;
self.last_error = None;
self.failure_count = 0;
Ok(())
}
pub fn enable_with_policy(
&mut self,
expected_plugin_id: &str,
required_domain: TargetDomain,
policy: &SidecarRuntimePolicy,
safety_checks: &SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks,
) -> Result<(), String> {
self.handshake.validate(expected_plugin_id)?;
if !self.handshake.supported_domains.contains(&required_domain) {
return Err(format!(
"sidecar plugin {} does not support required domain {:?}",
self.handshake.plugin_id, required_domain
));
}
policy.validate_activation(safety_checks).map_err(|err| err.to_string())?;
self.healthy = true;
self.degraded_to_builtin = false;
self.last_error = None;
self.failure_count = 0;
Ok(())
}
pub fn mark_unhealthy(&mut self) {
self.healthy = false;
}
pub fn record_failure(&mut self, error: impl Into<String>) {
self.failure_count = self.failure_count.saturating_add(1);
self.healthy = false;
self.last_error = Some(error.into());
if self.failure_count >= DEFAULT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD {
self.degraded_to_builtin = true;
}
}
pub fn record_failure_with_policy(&mut self, policy: &SidecarRuntimePolicy, error: impl Into<String>) {
self.failure_count = self.failure_count.saturating_add(1);
self.healthy = false;
self.last_error = Some(if policy.redact_error_details {
"sidecar operation failed".to_string()
} else {
error.into()
});
if self.failure_count >= policy.failure_threshold() {
self.degraded_to_builtin = true;
}
}
/// Simulates a send bounded by the policy's operation timeout. On timeout the
/// failure is recorded through the policy (so error details are redacted when
/// `redact_error_details` is set and the configurable failure threshold —
/// not a hardcoded constant — drives circuit breaking). A successful send
/// clears the failure count so transient blips never accumulate toward the
/// breaker.
pub fn send_with_timeout(&mut self, policy: &SidecarRuntimePolicy, simulated_latency: Duration) -> Result<(), String> {
if simulated_latency > policy.operation_timeout {
self.record_failure_with_policy(
policy,
format!(
"sidecar send timeout after {:?} (budget {:?})",
simulated_latency, policy.operation_timeout
),
);
return Err(self
.last_error
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| "sidecar operation failed".to_string()));
}
self.healthy = true;
self.last_error = None;
// Success resets the circuit-breaker accounting: a healthy send must not
// leave stale failures that could trip the breaker on the next blip.
self.failure_count = 0;
self.degraded_to_builtin = false;
Ok(())
}
pub fn shutdown(&mut self) {
self.healthy = false;
}
}
fn validate_runtime_policy(
policy: &SidecarRuntimePolicy,
safety_checks: &SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks,
) -> Result<(), SidecarRuntimePolicyError> {
if !policy.allow_external_sidecars {
return Err(SidecarRuntimePolicyError::ExternalSidecarDisabled);
}
if policy.require_sandbox && !safety_checks.sandboxed {
return Err(SidecarRuntimePolicyError::SandboxRequired);
}
if policy.require_provenance && !safety_checks.provenance_verified {
return Err(SidecarRuntimePolicyError::ProvenanceRequired);
}
if safety_checks.queue_depth > policy.max_queue_depth {
return Err(SidecarRuntimePolicyError::QueueDepthExceeded {
queue_depth: safety_checks.queue_depth,
max_queue_depth: policy.max_queue_depth,
});
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{SidecarPluginRuntime, SidecarRuntimePolicy, SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks};
use crate::TargetDomain;
use crate::runtime::sidecar_protocol::{SIDECAR_RUNTIME_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SidecarHandshake, SidecarPluginCapability};
use std::time::Duration;
fn notify_sidecar_handshake() -> SidecarHandshake {
SidecarHandshake {
protocol_version: SIDECAR_RUNTIME_PROTOCOL_VERSION.to_string(),
plugin_id: "external:webhook".to_string(),
plugin_version: "1.2.3".to_string(),
supported_domains: vec![TargetDomain::Notify],
capabilities: vec![
SidecarPluginCapability::HealthCheck,
SidecarPluginCapability::SendEvent,
SidecarPluginCapability::Shutdown,
],
}
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_enable_marks_runtime_healthy() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
runtime
.enable("external:webhook", TargetDomain::Notify)
.expect("sidecar runtime should enable");
assert!(runtime.healthy);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_policy_rejects_external_activation_by_default() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
let result = runtime.enable_with_policy(
"external:webhook",
TargetDomain::Notify,
&SidecarRuntimePolicy::default(),
&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks::verified(0),
);
assert_eq!(
result.as_ref().map_err(String::as_str),
Err("external sidecar runtime is disabled by policy")
);
assert!(!runtime.healthy);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_policy_requires_sandbox_and_provenance() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_secs(5), 3);
let missing_sandbox = runtime.enable_with_policy(
"external:webhook",
TargetDomain::Notify,
&policy,
&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks {
sandboxed: false,
provenance_verified: true,
queue_depth: 0,
},
);
assert_eq!(
missing_sandbox.as_ref().map_err(String::as_str),
Err("sidecar runtime requires sandbox isolation")
);
let missing_provenance = runtime.enable_with_policy(
"external:webhook",
TargetDomain::Notify,
&policy,
&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks {
sandboxed: true,
provenance_verified: false,
queue_depth: 0,
},
);
assert_eq!(
missing_provenance.as_ref().map_err(String::as_str),
Err("sidecar runtime requires verified provenance")
);
assert!(!runtime.healthy);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_policy_enforces_queue_bound() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(2, Duration::from_secs(5), 3);
let result = runtime.enable_with_policy(
"external:webhook",
TargetDomain::Notify,
&policy,
&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks::verified(3),
);
assert_eq!(
result.as_ref().map_err(String::as_str),
Err("sidecar runtime queue depth 3 exceeds policy bound 2")
);
assert!(!runtime.healthy);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_policy_allows_verified_external_activation() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_secs(5), 3);
runtime
.enable_with_policy(
"external:webhook",
TargetDomain::Notify,
&policy,
&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks::verified(1),
)
.expect("verified sidecar runtime should enable");
assert!(runtime.healthy);
assert_eq!(policy.failure_threshold(), 3);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_policy_redacts_failure_details() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_secs(5), 2);
runtime.record_failure_with_policy(&policy, "secret token leaked in transport error");
runtime.record_failure_with_policy(&policy, "another secret error");
assert_eq!(runtime.last_error.as_deref(), Some("sidecar operation failed"));
assert!(runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_enable_rejects_domain_mismatch() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
let result = runtime.enable("external:webhook", TargetDomain::Audit);
assert!(result.is_err());
assert!(!runtime.healthy);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_shutdown_marks_runtime_unhealthy() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
runtime
.enable("external:webhook", TargetDomain::Notify)
.expect("sidecar runtime should enable");
runtime.shutdown();
assert!(!runtime.healthy);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_degrades_to_builtin_after_failure_threshold() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
runtime.record_failure("send failed");
runtime.record_failure("send failed again");
runtime.record_failure("send failed third time");
assert!(runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
assert!(!runtime.healthy);
assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 3);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_send_timeout_redacts_error_and_uses_policy_threshold() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
// redact_error_details defaults to true; threshold 2 is honored, not the
// hardcoded DEFAULT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD.
let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_millis(50), 2);
let result = runtime.send_with_timeout(&policy, Duration::from_millis(75));
assert!(result.is_err());
// The raw budget/latency detail must not leak; it is redacted.
assert_eq!(runtime.last_error.as_deref(), Some("sidecar operation failed"));
assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 1);
assert!(!runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
// Second timeout hits the configured threshold and degrades.
let _ = runtime.send_with_timeout(&policy, Duration::from_millis(75));
assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 2);
assert!(runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
}
#[test]
fn sidecar_runtime_successful_send_clears_failure_count() {
let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_millis(50), 3);
// Accumulate a failure, then a successful send must reset the breaker
// accounting so a later single failure does not immediately degrade.
let _ = runtime.send_with_timeout(&policy, Duration::from_millis(75));
assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 1);
runtime
.send_with_timeout(&policy, Duration::from_millis(10))
.expect("a within-budget send should succeed");
assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 0);
assert!(!runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
assert!(runtime.healthy);
assert!(runtime.last_error.is_none());
}
}