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https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs.git
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cd327c81f5
Addresses security/correctness audit findings in the target-plugin control plane, TLS reload coordinator, and runtime extension registries. control_plane (backlog#977): - Install now preserves the currently installed revision as previous_revision so Rollback actually restores the prior version instead of a no-op. - Split the gate: circuit-breaker and runtime-activation checks apply only to Install/Enable; Disable and Rollback stay available as break-glass remediation while the breaker is open. - Enforce the sidecar runtime protocol version for every external transport (previously skippable by declaring a non-gRPC transport) and validate the plugin api_compatibility_version at planning time. - Download/signature/provenance host allowlisting now matches the full host authority, so an allowlisted host never implicitly authorizes a different host:port. TLS reload coordinator/validate (backlog#981, #970-coordinator): - Compute the fingerprint before building material in register() to remove the TOCTOU that could permanently pin an old certificate; rotation self-heals. - Always start a detection loop when reload is enabled; Watch mode no longer returns success without any loop. - validate_cert_key_pairing now verifies the private key matches the certificate's public key instead of only parsing both files. - Normalize a zero poll interval to a positive minimum to avoid a panic that silently killed the poll loop. - Serialize reload cycles with a per-target mutex; a first-step fingerprint read failure now records last_error and a failure metric. - Duplicate label registration stops and joins the previous loop before publishing the replacement (stop-before-start), preventing orphaned loops. runtime extension points (backlog#983 runtime subset): - ops_profiler/ops_diagnostics authorize before probing the registry so an unauthorized caller cannot learn whether a backend/surface exists. - s3_hooks dispatch_post_auth actually traverses the registered hooks for the point instead of unconditionally returning Continue. - sidecar send_with_timeout redacts errors and uses the configurable failure threshold via policy, and a successful send resets the breaker accounting. Relates to rustfs/backlog#977 Relates to rustfs/backlog#981 Relates to rustfs/backlog#970 Relates to rustfs/backlog#983 Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
459 lines
16 KiB
Rust
459 lines
16 KiB
Rust
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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use crate::TargetDomain;
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use crate::runtime::sidecar_protocol::SidecarHandshake;
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use std::time::Duration;
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use thiserror::Error;
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const DEFAULT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD: usize = 3;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct SidecarRuntimePolicy {
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pub allow_external_sidecars: bool,
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pub require_sandbox: bool,
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pub require_provenance: bool,
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pub max_queue_depth: usize,
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pub operation_timeout: Duration,
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pub failure_threshold: usize,
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pub redact_error_details: bool,
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}
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impl Default for SidecarRuntimePolicy {
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fn default() -> Self {
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Self {
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allow_external_sidecars: false,
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require_sandbox: true,
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require_provenance: true,
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max_queue_depth: 0,
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operation_timeout: Duration::from_secs(5),
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failure_threshold: DEFAULT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD,
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redact_error_details: true,
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}
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}
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}
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impl SidecarRuntimePolicy {
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pub fn verified_external(max_queue_depth: usize, operation_timeout: Duration, failure_threshold: usize) -> Self {
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Self {
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allow_external_sidecars: true,
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require_sandbox: true,
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require_provenance: true,
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max_queue_depth,
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operation_timeout,
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failure_threshold: failure_threshold.max(1),
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redact_error_details: true,
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}
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}
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pub fn failure_threshold(&self) -> usize {
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self.failure_threshold.max(1)
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}
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pub fn validate_activation(&self, safety_checks: &SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks) -> Result<(), SidecarRuntimePolicyError> {
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validate_runtime_policy(self, safety_checks)
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}
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks {
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pub sandboxed: bool,
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pub provenance_verified: bool,
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pub queue_depth: usize,
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}
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impl SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks {
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pub fn verified(queue_depth: usize) -> Self {
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Self {
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sandboxed: true,
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provenance_verified: true,
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queue_depth,
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}
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}
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Error, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum SidecarRuntimePolicyError {
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#[error("external sidecar runtime is disabled by policy")]
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ExternalSidecarDisabled,
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#[error("sidecar runtime requires sandbox isolation")]
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SandboxRequired,
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#[error("sidecar runtime requires verified provenance")]
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ProvenanceRequired,
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#[error("sidecar runtime queue depth {queue_depth} exceeds policy bound {max_queue_depth}")]
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QueueDepthExceeded { queue_depth: usize, max_queue_depth: usize },
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub struct SidecarPluginRuntime {
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pub endpoint: String,
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pub handshake: SidecarHandshake,
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pub healthy: bool,
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pub failure_count: usize,
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pub degraded_to_builtin: bool,
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pub last_error: Option<String>,
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}
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impl SidecarPluginRuntime {
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pub fn new(endpoint: impl Into<String>, handshake: SidecarHandshake) -> Self {
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Self {
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endpoint: endpoint.into(),
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handshake,
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healthy: false,
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failure_count: 0,
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degraded_to_builtin: false,
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last_error: None,
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}
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}
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pub fn enable(&mut self, expected_plugin_id: &str, required_domain: TargetDomain) -> Result<(), String> {
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self.handshake.validate(expected_plugin_id)?;
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if !self.handshake.supported_domains.contains(&required_domain) {
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return Err(format!(
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"sidecar plugin {} does not support required domain {:?}",
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self.handshake.plugin_id, required_domain
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));
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}
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self.healthy = true;
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self.degraded_to_builtin = false;
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self.last_error = None;
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self.failure_count = 0;
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Ok(())
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}
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pub fn enable_with_policy(
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&mut self,
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expected_plugin_id: &str,
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required_domain: TargetDomain,
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policy: &SidecarRuntimePolicy,
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safety_checks: &SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks,
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) -> Result<(), String> {
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self.handshake.validate(expected_plugin_id)?;
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if !self.handshake.supported_domains.contains(&required_domain) {
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return Err(format!(
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"sidecar plugin {} does not support required domain {:?}",
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self.handshake.plugin_id, required_domain
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));
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}
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policy.validate_activation(safety_checks).map_err(|err| err.to_string())?;
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self.healthy = true;
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self.degraded_to_builtin = false;
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self.last_error = None;
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self.failure_count = 0;
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Ok(())
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}
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pub fn mark_unhealthy(&mut self) {
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self.healthy = false;
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}
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pub fn record_failure(&mut self, error: impl Into<String>) {
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self.failure_count = self.failure_count.saturating_add(1);
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self.healthy = false;
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self.last_error = Some(error.into());
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if self.failure_count >= DEFAULT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD {
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self.degraded_to_builtin = true;
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}
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}
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pub fn record_failure_with_policy(&mut self, policy: &SidecarRuntimePolicy, error: impl Into<String>) {
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self.failure_count = self.failure_count.saturating_add(1);
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self.healthy = false;
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self.last_error = Some(if policy.redact_error_details {
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"sidecar operation failed".to_string()
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} else {
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error.into()
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});
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if self.failure_count >= policy.failure_threshold() {
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self.degraded_to_builtin = true;
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}
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}
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/// Simulates a send bounded by the policy's operation timeout. On timeout the
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/// failure is recorded through the policy (so error details are redacted when
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/// `redact_error_details` is set and the configurable failure threshold —
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/// not a hardcoded constant — drives circuit breaking). A successful send
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/// clears the failure count so transient blips never accumulate toward the
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/// breaker.
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pub fn send_with_timeout(&mut self, policy: &SidecarRuntimePolicy, simulated_latency: Duration) -> Result<(), String> {
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if simulated_latency > policy.operation_timeout {
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self.record_failure_with_policy(
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policy,
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format!(
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"sidecar send timeout after {:?} (budget {:?})",
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simulated_latency, policy.operation_timeout
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),
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);
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return Err(self
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.last_error
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.clone()
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.unwrap_or_else(|| "sidecar operation failed".to_string()));
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}
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self.healthy = true;
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self.last_error = None;
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// Success resets the circuit-breaker accounting: a healthy send must not
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// leave stale failures that could trip the breaker on the next blip.
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self.failure_count = 0;
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self.degraded_to_builtin = false;
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Ok(())
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}
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pub fn shutdown(&mut self) {
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self.healthy = false;
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}
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}
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fn validate_runtime_policy(
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policy: &SidecarRuntimePolicy,
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safety_checks: &SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks,
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) -> Result<(), SidecarRuntimePolicyError> {
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if !policy.allow_external_sidecars {
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return Err(SidecarRuntimePolicyError::ExternalSidecarDisabled);
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}
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if policy.require_sandbox && !safety_checks.sandboxed {
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return Err(SidecarRuntimePolicyError::SandboxRequired);
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}
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if policy.require_provenance && !safety_checks.provenance_verified {
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return Err(SidecarRuntimePolicyError::ProvenanceRequired);
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}
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if safety_checks.queue_depth > policy.max_queue_depth {
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return Err(SidecarRuntimePolicyError::QueueDepthExceeded {
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queue_depth: safety_checks.queue_depth,
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max_queue_depth: policy.max_queue_depth,
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});
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::{SidecarPluginRuntime, SidecarRuntimePolicy, SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks};
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use crate::TargetDomain;
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use crate::runtime::sidecar_protocol::{SIDECAR_RUNTIME_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SidecarHandshake, SidecarPluginCapability};
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use std::time::Duration;
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fn notify_sidecar_handshake() -> SidecarHandshake {
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SidecarHandshake {
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protocol_version: SIDECAR_RUNTIME_PROTOCOL_VERSION.to_string(),
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plugin_id: "external:webhook".to_string(),
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plugin_version: "1.2.3".to_string(),
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supported_domains: vec![TargetDomain::Notify],
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capabilities: vec![
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SidecarPluginCapability::HealthCheck,
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SidecarPluginCapability::SendEvent,
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SidecarPluginCapability::Shutdown,
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],
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_enable_marks_runtime_healthy() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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runtime
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.enable("external:webhook", TargetDomain::Notify)
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.expect("sidecar runtime should enable");
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assert!(runtime.healthy);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_policy_rejects_external_activation_by_default() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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let result = runtime.enable_with_policy(
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"external:webhook",
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TargetDomain::Notify,
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&SidecarRuntimePolicy::default(),
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&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks::verified(0),
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);
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assert_eq!(
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result.as_ref().map_err(String::as_str),
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Err("external sidecar runtime is disabled by policy")
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);
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assert!(!runtime.healthy);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_policy_requires_sandbox_and_provenance() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_secs(5), 3);
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let missing_sandbox = runtime.enable_with_policy(
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"external:webhook",
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TargetDomain::Notify,
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&policy,
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&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks {
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sandboxed: false,
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provenance_verified: true,
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queue_depth: 0,
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},
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);
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assert_eq!(
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missing_sandbox.as_ref().map_err(String::as_str),
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Err("sidecar runtime requires sandbox isolation")
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);
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let missing_provenance = runtime.enable_with_policy(
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"external:webhook",
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TargetDomain::Notify,
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&policy,
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&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks {
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sandboxed: true,
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provenance_verified: false,
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queue_depth: 0,
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},
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);
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assert_eq!(
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missing_provenance.as_ref().map_err(String::as_str),
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Err("sidecar runtime requires verified provenance")
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);
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assert!(!runtime.healthy);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_policy_enforces_queue_bound() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(2, Duration::from_secs(5), 3);
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let result = runtime.enable_with_policy(
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"external:webhook",
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TargetDomain::Notify,
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&policy,
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&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks::verified(3),
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);
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assert_eq!(
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result.as_ref().map_err(String::as_str),
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Err("sidecar runtime queue depth 3 exceeds policy bound 2")
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);
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assert!(!runtime.healthy);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_policy_allows_verified_external_activation() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_secs(5), 3);
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runtime
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.enable_with_policy(
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"external:webhook",
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TargetDomain::Notify,
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&policy,
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&SidecarRuntimeSafetyChecks::verified(1),
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)
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.expect("verified sidecar runtime should enable");
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assert!(runtime.healthy);
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assert_eq!(policy.failure_threshold(), 3);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_policy_redacts_failure_details() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_secs(5), 2);
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runtime.record_failure_with_policy(&policy, "secret token leaked in transport error");
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runtime.record_failure_with_policy(&policy, "another secret error");
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assert_eq!(runtime.last_error.as_deref(), Some("sidecar operation failed"));
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assert!(runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_enable_rejects_domain_mismatch() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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let result = runtime.enable("external:webhook", TargetDomain::Audit);
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assert!(result.is_err());
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assert!(!runtime.healthy);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_shutdown_marks_runtime_unhealthy() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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runtime
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.enable("external:webhook", TargetDomain::Notify)
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.expect("sidecar runtime should enable");
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runtime.shutdown();
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assert!(!runtime.healthy);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_degrades_to_builtin_after_failure_threshold() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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runtime.record_failure("send failed");
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runtime.record_failure("send failed again");
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runtime.record_failure("send failed third time");
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assert!(runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
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assert!(!runtime.healthy);
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assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 3);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_send_timeout_redacts_error_and_uses_policy_threshold() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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// redact_error_details defaults to true; threshold 2 is honored, not the
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// hardcoded DEFAULT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD.
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let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_millis(50), 2);
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let result = runtime.send_with_timeout(&policy, Duration::from_millis(75));
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assert!(result.is_err());
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// The raw budget/latency detail must not leak; it is redacted.
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assert_eq!(runtime.last_error.as_deref(), Some("sidecar operation failed"));
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assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 1);
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assert!(!runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
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// Second timeout hits the configured threshold and degrades.
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let _ = runtime.send_with_timeout(&policy, Duration::from_millis(75));
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assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 2);
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assert!(runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sidecar_runtime_successful_send_clears_failure_count() {
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let mut runtime = SidecarPluginRuntime::new("grpc://127.0.0.1:50051", notify_sidecar_handshake());
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let policy = SidecarRuntimePolicy::verified_external(16, Duration::from_millis(50), 3);
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// Accumulate a failure, then a successful send must reset the breaker
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// accounting so a later single failure does not immediately degrade.
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let _ = runtime.send_with_timeout(&policy, Duration::from_millis(75));
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assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 1);
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runtime
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.send_with_timeout(&policy, Duration::from_millis(10))
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.expect("a within-budget send should succeed");
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assert_eq!(runtime.failure_count, 0);
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assert!(!runtime.degraded_to_builtin);
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assert!(runtime.healthy);
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assert!(runtime.last_error.is_none());
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}
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}
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