Files
rustfs/crates/replication/src/delete.rs
T
唐小鸭 1cf0f7af15 feat(replication): split oversized hot-path functions, proxy unreplicated reads, and fail SSE-C passthrough closed (#6170)
* refactor(replication): split four oversized hot-path functions into focused helpers

Pure-move decomposition of the four oversized functions flagged by the
replication compatibility review (P1-18), unblocking migration milestone
M2 which requires resyncer moves to stay mechanical:

- resync_bucket (522 lines -> 61-line step sequence): leader lock,
  target resolution, walk/collector/worker spawning, and dispatch loop
  extracted into focused helpers; pure decision helpers (DTO builders,
  HEAD-result classification) separated from IO orchestration.
- replicate_all (411 lines -> 113-line main body): initial target-info
  seeding, read/stat option builders, skip-path notes, target HEAD
  action resolution, and the multipart/single-put payload transport
  extracted as private free functions.
- start_mrf_processor (306 lines -> 46-line spawn body): recovery guard,
  ledger load, per-entry replay (delete/object/metadata), and retained
  entry resolution extracted; retry bookkeeping semantics preserved
  exactly (inner continue-paths push inside helpers, outer Missed push
  stays in the loop).
- apply_iam_item (255 lines -> match dispatch skeleton): one helper per
  IAM item type.

No behavior change: log texts, error paths, event emissions, and metric
counts are byte-identical; existing tests unchanged and green (238
ecstore replication/mrf/resync + 232 rustfs site-replication).

* feat(replication): proxy GET/HEAD/Tagging for unreplicated objects to replication targets (#6172)

* feat(replication): proxy GET/HEAD/Tagging for unreplicated objects to replication targets

Implements the MinIO active-active read-proxy protocol (P1-5 of the
replication compatibility review): when a GET/HEAD/GetObjectTagging/
PutObjectTagging/DeleteObjectTagging request fails locally with
not-found and the bucket has replication targets, the request is proxied
to the targets in rule order, mirroring bucket-replication.go
proxyGetToReplicationTarget/proxyHeadToRepTarget/proxyTaggingToRepTarget.

Protocol surface:
- Anti-loop: inbound {x-rustfs-,x-minio-}source-proxy-request is parsed
  into ObjectOptions (proxy_request + proxy_header_set, matching MinIO
  ProxyRequest/ProxyHeaderSet); a request carrying the marker with ANY
  value is never re-proxied. Outbound client proxy calls send the marker
  as "true"; replication worker convergence HEADs send it as "false" so
  a peer's proxy layer cannot answer a convergence check by proxying
  back to the source (which would fake Completed without a PUT).
- Target selection: new replication_proxy.rs get_proxy_targets — empty
  when the marker is set, versioning is suspended, or no replication
  config; otherwise filter_target_arns -> TargetClient lookup, skipping
  targets with proxying disabled.
- TargetClient gains head_object_for_proxy/get_object (streaming) and
  the three tagging calls. Proxy calls never send the replication-check
  SSE-C exemption header; customer SSE-C keys are forwarded verbatim so
  the target performs real decryption. Conditional (If-*) headers are
  not forwarded (MinIO parity); Range and part_number are, with
  parts_count/tag_count/storage_class/expiration passed through.
- Metrics: proxy counters now count only real client proxy traffic,
  MinIO-aligned (one total per proxied request, one failed when no
  target served it). The previous misattributed counters — replication
  worker HEAD/PUT (#2672) and local tagging operations (#2682) — are
  removed; ReplProxyMetric now maps the tagging counters instead of
  dropping them.

e2e (fake_s3_target extended with tagging + header journaling): proxied
GET body + outbound header contract (marker present, no
replication-check, SSE-C passthrough), HEAD, anti-loop 404 with zero
outbound requests, GetObjectTagging, and metric mapping unit tests.

Rolling note: proxying only activates for buckets with replication
targets; requests carrying the marker keep pre-upgrade behavior.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1675 (P1-5)

* fix(replication): fail SSE-C passthrough closed on targets that drop transport headers (#6178)

SSE-C ciphertext passthrough replicates via X-Rustfs-Replication-* transport
headers. A MinIO/generic-S3 target silently discards them, storing bare
ciphertext with no decryption material — yet the PUT succeeded, so the object
reported COMPLETED with a silently unreadable replica (backlog#1675 N2).

Fail-closed design:
- SsecPassthroughCapability {Unknown, Supported, Unsupported} cached in
  BucketTargetSys per target ARN with a recording timestamp. Entries reset
  whenever the target is rebuilt, edited, or removed (arn_remotes_map
  lifecycle) and expire after SSEC_PASSTHROUGH_CAPABILITY_TTL (10 minutes):
  an expired verdict in either direction is re-earned through the audit, so
  an Unsupported target recovers automatically after an upgrade (at most one
  wasted PUT+HEAD audit per bad target per TTL window) and a Supported
  verdict cannot outlive a backend swapped behind the same endpoint.
- Replication worker (replicate_object and replicate_all): fresh Unsupported
  targets never receive the PUT — the attempt fails immediately into the
  normal MRF retry channel with a "run ?replication-check to re-probe" hint.
  Unknown or expired verdicts are audited: after the PUT the worker HEADs
  the replica back through the replication-check channel (source version id
  mapped through resolve_read_api_version_id, so null-version objects audit
  correctly) and requires SSE-C evidence (the echoed customer-algorithm
  header); missing evidence records Unsupported and fails the attempt.
  Convergence HEADs are audited the same way, so a broken ciphertext replica
  from an earlier attempt can never launder itself into COMPLETED via an
  ETag match. The gate/evidence policy is pure (replication_target_boundary,
  staleness folded in as an input) for the M2 worker migration.
- replication-check grows an SsecPassthrough probe phase: a probe PUT
  carrying the live transport-header shape, HEAD-back for evidence, and a
  machine-readable Code BucketRemoteSsecPassthroughUnsupported on failure.
  The probe verdict is synced into the runtime capability cache. Unlike
  VersionFidelity, a failed SsecPassthrough phase does NOT fail the target
  overall — it is a capability limit, not a broken replication contract,
  and a plaintext-only deployment against such a target must not turn red.
- fake_s3_target: default mode now models a RustFS target (stores the
  transport headers, echoes SSE-C evidence); the new
  drop_unlisted_replication_headers mode models MinIO. The journal records
  whether a request carried transport headers.

Receiver-echo verification: the replication-check HEAD exemption only skips
SSE-C key validation; the response has always built sse-customer-algorithm
from stored metadata (rustfs/src/app/object_usecase.rs), so no receiver
change was needed — pinned end to end by the replication-check e2e against
a real RustFS target.

Rolling-upgrade constraint: RustFS targets older than the replication-check
HEAD exemption (#5898) answer the audit HEAD without SSE-C evidence (or fail
it outright), so SSE-C replication to such targets reports FAILED. This is
deliberate — FAILED-and-retryable beats a silently undecryptable replica —
and self-heals: once the target is upgraded, the next TTL expiry (or a
manual ?replication-check re-probe) re-audits and records Supported.
Plaintext and managed-SSE replication are unaffected. The capability cache
is per-node; each node audits independently.

Known limitations:
- The audit judges evidence from the echoed customer-algorithm header only.
  A hypothetical target that preserves that one header while dropping other
  transport headers (partial-drop) would pass the audit; no known target
  behaves this way — observed targets drop the whole unknown-header family.
- A mixed-version target cluster can flap the verdict between audits routed
  to different target nodes until the rollout completes; the TTL bounds how
  long each stale verdict persists.

New e2e (backlog#1675 C1 + N2, red-first): fail-closed against a
header-dropping fake (FAILED + no second PUT via the capability cache,
journal-asserted; red run showed the old COMPLETED), replication-check
reports the SsecPassthrough phase Code while the target stays OK overall,
SSE-C heal convergence after a real target outage, and SSE-C
existing-object resync landing a REPLICA readable with the customer key.
TTL expiry in both directions is pinned at the cache and gate seams.

* refactor(replication): move resyncer pure decision logic into rustfs-replication (M2) (#6180)

* refactor(replication): move resyncer pure decision logic into rustfs-replication (M2)

Pure-move milestone M2 of the ECStore replication split (backlog#1675
P1-17): relocate the resyncer's IO-free decision helpers, with their unit
tests, into the crates they already belong to by type ownership. No
behavior change.

Moved into crates/replication:
- resync.rs: resync_status_duration
- delete.rs: resync_existing_delete_replication_info,
  replicate_delete_outcome, target_delete_version_id,
  delete_marker_purge_version_id, delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry
- object.rs: version_identity_drifted, is_replication_target_offline_error,
  SsecPassthroughCapability, SsecPassthroughGate, ssec_passthrough_gate,
  ssec_passthrough_evidence_present (param-demoted to the echoed
  customer-algorithm string; ECStore keeps the HeadObjectOutput adapter)
- filemeta.rs: NULL_VERSION_ID wire literal (crate-owned copy per the
  filemeta-independence contract)

ECStore rewiring (Rule #14: imports stay in *_boundary.rs):
- resync/object-decision/target boundaries re-export the moved symbols;
  resyncer call sites are unchanged
- bucket_target_sys keeps only the verdict cache + TTL and re-exports the
  capability enum so existing consumer paths keep compiling

Not moved (signatures carry ECStore or aws-sdk types):
verify_resync_head_result, resync_target_error_detail, the SdkError
classifiers, the replicate_all_* option/info builders, and the env-coupled
bounded_resync_max_jobs admission clamp. README milestone table updated.

* chore(replication): retire the datatypes.rs relay early

README sanctions retiring datatypes.rs ahead of M4. The module was a
pure relay (resync boundary -> datatypes -> mod.rs facade) with no
external consumer importing it directly, so the facade now re-exports
ResyncStatusType from replication_resync_boundary and the relay file is
deleted. Consumers stay behind the ECStore facade, keeping Migration
Rule #15 intact — the original retirement wording ("consumers import
through rustfs-replication directly") conflicted with that rule and is
corrected in the README.

* chore(arch): extend migration guards to the M2-moved decision contracts

The adversarial review of the M2 move found the per-symbol ratchet in
check_architecture_migration_rules.sh was not extended for the moved
symbols, leaving them free to be redefined in ECStore or imported past
their boundary without CI noticing:

- resync definition pin + boundary fences gain resync_status_duration;
- the object-decision boundary fences gain the five delete-family
  helpers (delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry, delete_marker_purge_version_id,
  replicate_delete_outcome, resync_existing_delete_replication_info,
  target_delete_version_id);
- the target-boundary fence gains the SSE-C gate family, the offline
  classifier, and version_identity_drifted;
- a new definition pin rejects ECStore redefinitions of the M2-moved
  fns/enums (ssec_passthrough_evidence_present deliberately excluded:
  ECStore keeps a thin HeadObjectOutput adapter under that name).

Mutation-verified: a probe fn ssec_passthrough_gate under
crates/ecstore/src/bucket/replication trips the new pin.

Also anchors the intentionally-duplicated NULL_VERSION_ID wire literal
from the filemeta side and tightens the M2 README note on
bounded_resync_max_jobs.
2026-08-18 21:45:38 +08:00

530 lines
21 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use std::any::Any;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::storage_api::DeletedObject;
use crate::{
MrfOpKind, MrfReplicateEntry, NULL_VERSION_ID, REPLICATE_EXISTING_DELETE, ReplicateObjectInfo, ReplicationState,
ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationType, ReplicationWorkerOperation,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
pub delete_object: DeletedObject,
pub bucket: String,
pub event_type: String,
pub op_type: ReplicationType,
pub reset_id: String,
pub target_arn: String,
}
impl DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
pub fn admitted_target_arns(&self) -> Vec<String> {
if !self.target_arn.is_empty() {
return vec![self.target_arn.clone()];
}
let mut target_arns = if !self.delete_object.force_delete_target_arns.is_empty() {
self.delete_object.force_delete_target_arns.clone()
} else {
self.delete_object
.replication_state
.as_ref()
.map(admitted_target_arns_from_replication_state)
.unwrap_or_default()
};
target_arns.sort();
target_arns.dedup();
target_arns
}
}
impl ReplicationWorkerOperation for DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
fn as_any(&self) -> &dyn Any {
self
}
fn to_mrf_entry(&self) -> MrfReplicateEntry {
MrfReplicateEntry {
bucket: self.bucket.clone(),
object: self.delete_object.object_name.clone(),
version_id: self.delete_object.version_id,
retry_count: 0,
size: 0,
op: MrfOpKind::Delete,
force_delete: self.delete_object.force_delete,
delete_marker_version_id: self.delete_object.delete_marker_version_id,
delete_marker: self.delete_object.delete_marker,
// Persist the original delete-marker mtime as Unix nanoseconds so replay after a
// restart stamps the replica with the source timestamp rather than the replay time
// (backlog#867). None when unknown; replay then falls back to the current time.
delete_marker_mtime: self
.delete_object
.delete_marker_mtime
.and_then(|t| i64::try_from(t.unix_timestamp_nanos()).ok()),
target_arns: self.admitted_target_arns(),
force_delete_id: self.delete_object.force_delete_id,
force_delete_generation: self.delete_object.force_delete_generation,
force_delete_local_commit: self.delete_object.force_delete,
}
}
fn get_bucket(&self) -> &str {
&self.bucket
}
fn get_object(&self) -> &str {
&self.delete_object.object_name
}
fn get_size(&self) -> i64 {
0
}
fn is_delete_marker(&self) -> bool {
true
}
fn get_op_type(&self) -> ReplicationType {
self.op_type
}
}
pub fn is_version_delete_replication(dobj: &DeletedObject) -> bool {
dobj.version_id.is_some() || (dobj.delete_marker_version_id.is_some() && !dobj.delete_marker)
}
pub fn should_retry_delete_marker_purge(dobj: &DeletedObject) -> bool {
dobj.delete_marker_version_id.is_some()
}
fn admitted_target_arns_from_replication_state(state: &ReplicationState) -> Vec<String> {
let mut target_arns = state.targets.keys().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>();
target_arns.extend(state.purge_targets.keys().cloned());
target_arns
}
pub fn is_retryable_delete_replication_head_error(is_not_found: bool, code: Option<&str>) -> bool {
!(is_not_found || matches!(code, Some("MethodNotAllowed" | "405")))
}
/// Build the delete-replication work item for an existing delete marker or
/// version purge discovered during a resync scan.
pub fn resync_existing_delete_replication_info(roi: &ReplicateObjectInfo, target_arn: &str) -> DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
let (version_id, dm_version_id) = if roi.version_purge_status.is_empty() {
(None, roi.version_id)
} else {
(roi.version_id, None)
};
DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
delete_object: DeletedObject {
object_name: roi.name.clone(),
delete_marker_version_id: dm_version_id,
version_id,
replication_state: roi.replication_state.clone(),
delete_marker: roi.delete_marker,
delete_marker_mtime: roi.mod_time,
..Default::default()
},
bucket: roi.bucket.clone(),
event_type: REPLICATE_EXISTING_DELETE.to_string(),
op_type: ReplicationType::ExistingObject,
target_arn: target_arn.to_string(),
..Default::default()
}
}
/// Whether a delete replication fully succeeded — the MRF replay acknowledges
/// (drops) an entry exactly when this returns true.
///
/// The delayed purge is deliberately NOT an input: holding the outcome hostage
/// to it (`&& !requires_delayed_purge`) forced `false` for every delete-marker
/// entry and retained them all in the durable MRF journal forever. Purge
/// failures persist their own purge-intent entry instead
/// (`watch_and_purge_source_delete_marker`), and replays of those entries
/// report purge success through `purge_stale_delete_marker_targets`.
pub fn replicate_delete_outcome(
expected_targets: usize,
replicated_targets: usize,
state_persisted: bool,
source_state_verified: bool,
replication_status: &ReplicationStatusType,
) -> bool {
expected_targets > 0
&& replicated_targets == expected_targets
&& state_persisted
&& source_state_verified
&& *replication_status == ReplicationStatusType::Completed
}
pub fn target_delete_version_id(version_id: Uuid, version_purge: bool) -> Option<String> {
if version_id.is_nil() {
version_purge.then(|| NULL_VERSION_ID.to_string())
} else {
Some(version_id.to_string())
}
}
/// Which version a delete-marker purge should address on one target.
///
/// `None` means do not purge at all: the recorded mapping disagreed across the
/// dual internal prefixes, and guessing an id could destroy a live version on
/// the target. `Some(id)` is the exact version the target reported when it
/// accepted the marker; falling back to a source-derived id is only correct
/// when the target mirrors source version ids, which a generic S3 target does
/// not.
pub fn delete_marker_purge_version_id(
state: Option<&ReplicationState>,
arn: &str,
delete_marker_version_id: Uuid,
) -> Option<Option<String>> {
if state.is_some_and(|state| state.target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt) {
return None;
}
let recorded = state.and_then(|state| state.target_delete_marker_version_ids.get(arn).cloned());
Some(match recorded {
Some(version_id) => Some(version_id),
None => target_delete_version_id(delete_marker_version_id, true),
})
}
/// Shape an exhausted purge intent as a marker-creation delete entry. Replay
/// reconstructs it with `delete_marker: true`, finds the source marker gone,
/// and funnels into the stale-marker branch of `replicate_delete_with_outcome`
/// — which re-runs the purge without touching source state and reports purge
/// success as the replay outcome.
pub fn delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry(dobj: &DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, failed_arns: Vec<String>) -> MrfReplicateEntry {
let mut entry = dobj.to_mrf_entry();
entry.delete_marker = true;
entry.version_id = None;
entry.retry_count = 0;
entry.target_arns = failed_arns;
entry
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::collections::HashMap;
use super::{
DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry, delete_marker_purge_version_id,
is_retryable_delete_replication_head_error, is_version_delete_replication, replicate_delete_outcome,
should_retry_delete_marker_purge, target_delete_version_id,
};
use crate::storage_api::DeletedObject;
use crate::{
MrfOpKind, NULL_VERSION_ID, ReplicationState, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationType, ReplicationWorkerOperation,
VersionPurgeStatusType,
};
use uuid::Uuid;
#[test]
fn deleted_object_replication_info_encodes_delete_mrf_entry() {
let version_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let delete_marker_version_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let mtime = time::OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp_nanos(1_705_312_200_123_456_789).expect("valid mtime");
let info = DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
op_type: ReplicationType::Delete,
delete_object: DeletedObject {
object_name: "object".to_string(),
version_id: Some(version_id),
delete_marker_version_id: Some(delete_marker_version_id),
delete_marker: true,
delete_marker_mtime: Some(mtime),
..Default::default()
},
target_arn: "arn:target-a".to_string(),
..Default::default()
};
let entry = info.to_mrf_entry();
assert_eq!(entry.bucket, "bucket");
assert_eq!(entry.object, "object");
assert_eq!(entry.version_id, Some(version_id));
assert!(!entry.force_delete);
assert_eq!(entry.delete_marker_version_id, Some(delete_marker_version_id));
assert_eq!(entry.op, MrfOpKind::Delete);
assert!(entry.delete_marker);
// The original mtime must be persisted (as Unix nanos) so replay keeps the source
// timestamp instead of stamping the replica with the replay time (backlog#867).
assert_eq!(
entry.delete_marker_mtime,
Some(mtime.unix_timestamp_nanos() as i64),
"delete-marker mtime must be persisted in the MRF entry"
);
assert_eq!(entry.target_arns, vec!["arn:target-a".to_string()]);
assert_eq!(info.get_object(), "object");
}
#[test]
fn deleted_object_replication_info_without_mtime_yields_none() {
// Absent source mtime must persist as None so replay falls back to the current time,
// preserving pre-#867 behaviour.
let info = DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
delete_object: DeletedObject {
object_name: "object".to_string(),
delete_marker: true,
delete_marker_mtime: None,
..Default::default()
},
..Default::default()
};
assert_eq!(info.to_mrf_entry().delete_marker_mtime, None);
assert!(info.to_mrf_entry().target_arns.is_empty());
assert!(!info.to_mrf_entry().force_delete);
}
#[test]
fn deleted_object_replication_info_uses_explicit_target_over_replay_state() {
let info = DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
delete_object: DeletedObject {
object_name: "object".to_string(),
replication_state: Some(ReplicationState {
targets: HashMap::from([("arn:target-state".to_string(), ReplicationStatusType::Pending)]),
purge_targets: HashMap::from([("arn:purge-state".to_string(), VersionPurgeStatusType::Pending)]),
..Default::default()
}),
..Default::default()
},
target_arn: "arn:target-explicit".to_string(),
..Default::default()
};
assert_eq!(info.to_mrf_entry().target_arns, vec!["arn:target-explicit".to_string()]);
}
#[test]
fn deleted_object_replication_info_serializes_replay_targets_when_target_is_implicit() {
let info = DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
delete_object: DeletedObject {
object_name: "object".to_string(),
replication_state: Some(ReplicationState {
targets: HashMap::from([("arn:target-b".to_string(), ReplicationStatusType::Pending)]),
purge_targets: HashMap::from([
("arn:target-a".to_string(), VersionPurgeStatusType::Pending),
("arn:target-b".to_string(), VersionPurgeStatusType::Complete),
]),
..Default::default()
}),
..Default::default()
},
..Default::default()
};
assert_eq!(
info.to_mrf_entry().target_arns,
vec!["arn:target-a".to_string(), "arn:target-b".to_string()],
"MRF deletes must preserve the admitted target identities in stable order"
);
}
#[test]
fn deleted_object_replication_info_preserves_force_delete_handoff() {
let operation_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let info = DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
delete_object: DeletedObject {
object_name: "prefix/".to_string(),
force_delete: true,
force_delete_id: Some(operation_id),
force_delete_target_arns: vec![
"arn:target-b".to_string(),
"arn:target-a".to_string(),
"arn:target-b".to_string(),
],
force_delete_generation: Some(17),
..Default::default()
},
..Default::default()
};
let entry = info.to_mrf_entry();
assert!(entry.force_delete);
assert_eq!(entry.force_delete_id, Some(operation_id));
assert_eq!(entry.force_delete_generation, Some(17));
assert!(entry.force_delete_local_commit);
assert_eq!(entry.target_arns, vec!["arn:target-a", "arn:target-b"]);
}
#[test]
fn version_delete_replication_tracks_delete_marker_version_purge() {
let dobj = DeletedObject {
delete_marker: false,
delete_marker_version_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(is_version_delete_replication(&dobj));
}
#[test]
fn version_delete_replication_tracks_explicit_version_id() {
let dobj = DeletedObject {
version_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(is_version_delete_replication(&dobj));
}
#[test]
fn version_delete_replication_keeps_delete_marker_creation_separate() {
let dobj = DeletedObject {
delete_marker: true,
delete_marker_version_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(!is_version_delete_replication(&dobj));
}
#[test]
fn delete_marker_purge_retry_covers_version_purge_and_marker_creation() {
let version_purge = DeletedObject {
delete_marker: false,
delete_marker_version_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
..Default::default()
};
let marker_creation = DeletedObject {
delete_marker: true,
delete_marker_version_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(should_retry_delete_marker_purge(&version_purge));
assert!(should_retry_delete_marker_purge(&marker_creation));
let marker_without_version = DeletedObject {
delete_marker: true,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(!should_retry_delete_marker_purge(&marker_without_version));
}
#[test]
fn retryable_delete_replication_head_error_allows_expected_delete_marker_responses() {
assert!(!is_retryable_delete_replication_head_error(false, Some("405")));
assert!(!is_retryable_delete_replication_head_error(false, Some("MethodNotAllowed")));
assert!(!is_retryable_delete_replication_head_error(true, Some("NoSuchKey")));
assert!(is_retryable_delete_replication_head_error(false, Some("AccessDenied")));
}
/// P1-21 regression guard for the outcome formula. A fully successful
/// delete-marker replication must acknowledge its MRF entry: the formula
/// once carried `&& !requires_delayed_purge`, which pinned every
/// delete-marker entry to Missed and retained the whole backlog forever.
/// (Deterministically staging a marker-creation entry in the durable
/// journal from e2e would require saturating the worker queues, so the
/// formula is pinned here instead; the purge-intent replay half is pinned
/// by the delayed-purge e2e pair.)
#[test]
fn test_replicate_delete_outcome_is_not_held_hostage_by_the_delayed_purge() {
assert!(
replicate_delete_outcome(1, 1, true, true, &ReplicationStatusType::Completed),
"a completed delete-marker replication must be acknowledgeable even though a delayed purge watch is pending"
);
assert!(!replicate_delete_outcome(0, 0, true, true, &ReplicationStatusType::Completed));
assert!(!replicate_delete_outcome(2, 1, true, true, &ReplicationStatusType::Completed));
assert!(!replicate_delete_outcome(1, 1, false, true, &ReplicationStatusType::Completed));
assert!(!replicate_delete_outcome(1, 1, true, false, &ReplicationStatusType::Completed));
assert!(!replicate_delete_outcome(1, 1, true, true, &ReplicationStatusType::Failed));
}
#[test]
fn test_delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry_replays_through_the_stale_marker_branch() {
let delete_marker_version_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let dobj = DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
delete_object: DeletedObject {
object_name: "doc.txt".to_string(),
// A version-purge flavored source event: the entry must still
// be reshaped as a marker-creation delete so replay funnels
// into the stale-marker branch instead of re-running the full
// delete replication (whose source-state stamping would fail
// against the already-purged version).
delete_marker: false,
version_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
delete_marker_version_id: Some(delete_marker_version_id),
..Default::default()
},
bucket: "bucket-a".to_string(),
..Default::default()
};
let entry = delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry(&dobj, vec!["arn:a".to_string()]);
assert!(entry.delete_marker, "purge intents must replay as marker-creation deletes");
assert_eq!(entry.version_id, None, "the purged data version must not leak into the replay");
assert_eq!(entry.delete_marker_version_id, Some(delete_marker_version_id));
assert_eq!(
entry.target_arns,
vec!["arn:a".to_string()],
"only the targets whose purge failed may be retried"
);
assert_eq!(entry.retry_count, 0);
assert_eq!(entry.bucket, "bucket-a");
assert_eq!(entry.object, "doc.txt");
}
#[test]
fn target_delete_version_id_preserves_explicit_null_purges() {
let version_id = Uuid::new_v4();
assert_eq!(target_delete_version_id(version_id, true), Some(version_id.to_string()));
assert_eq!(target_delete_version_id(Uuid::nil(), true).as_deref(), Some(NULL_VERSION_ID));
assert_eq!(target_delete_version_id(Uuid::nil(), false), None);
}
#[test]
fn delete_marker_purge_prefers_the_recorded_target_version() {
let source = Uuid::new_v4();
let arn = "arn:rustfs:replication::target:bucket";
// No recorded mapping: fall back to deriving from the source uuid.
assert_eq!(delete_marker_purge_version_id(None, arn, source), Some(Some(source.to_string())));
// Recorded mapping wins — a generic S3 target assigns its own id, so the
// derived one would purge the wrong version or nothing at all.
let mut state = ReplicationState::default();
state
.target_delete_marker_version_ids
.insert(arn.to_string(), "target-assigned-id".to_string());
assert_eq!(
delete_marker_purge_version_id(Some(&state), arn, source),
Some(Some("target-assigned-id".to_string()))
);
// A mapping recorded for a different ARN must not be reused.
assert_eq!(
delete_marker_purge_version_id(Some(&state), "arn:rustfs:replication::other:bucket", source),
Some(Some(source.to_string()))
);
// Inconsistent persisted metadata: refuse to purge rather than guess.
let mut corrupt = state.clone();
corrupt.target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt = true;
assert_eq!(delete_marker_purge_version_id(Some(&corrupt), arn, source), None);
}
}