Files
rustfs/crates/ecstore/src/bucket/replication/replication_target_boundary.rs
T
Zhengchao An 123967e729 fix(ecstore): fail closed on an unreadable bucket-targets blob (#7172)
* fix(ecstore): correct sealed-credential test helper parameter type

The helper took a HashMap that nothing imports, so the ecstore test target did not compile.

* fix(ecstore): fail closed on an unreadable bucket-targets blob

An undecodable bucket-targets.json was replaced by an empty BucketTargets,
so every replication target of that bucket disappeared, replication stopped,
and no caller saw an error. A missing secretKey alone triggers it, because
Credentials has no struct-level serde(default).

parse_all_configs now retains the failure instead: the raw bytes stay and the
typed field stays None, which BucketMetadata::bucket_targets_unreadable reads
as "exists but cannot be read" — the same distinction the fabricated marker
draws for bucket metadata as a whole. One corrupt sub-config still never fails
the metadata load, so an unreadable bucket cannot take down its neighbours or
the node.

BucketTargetSys records such buckets and answers every targets query with the
new BucketRemoteTargetsUnreadable, leaving any snapshot from an earlier
readable load in place so in-flight replication is not torn down. The
replication heal queue reports Missed rather than scheduling against an empty
target set, and the admin listing surfaces the fault instead of an empty list.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#2282

* fix(ecstore): report corrupt permissive bucket configs as invalid

Audit of the remaining parse_all_configs branches. Policy, versioning, object
lock and replication already fail closed at their accessors; encryption,
public access block and quota did not, and for those three "absent" is exactly
the state that grants something — plaintext storage, anonymous access,
unbounded capacity. They now report a stored-but-undecodable payload as
invalid rather than as ConfigNotFound, matching the guard the versioning and
object-lock accessors already use. The quota enforcement path already refused
such a payload; only the metadata read path was misreporting it.

The branches left degrading, and the concrete reason each is safe, are
recorded in the table on parse_all_configs.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#2282
2026-09-05 13:02:23 +08:00

1321 lines
59 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::BucketTargetError;
use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::BucketTargetSys;
use aws_sdk_s3::operation::head_object::HeadObjectOutput;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{ObjectLockLegalHoldStatus, ObjectLockRetentionMode};
use http::HeaderMap;
use rustfs_replication::{
ReplicationSourceObject, ReplicationTargetObject, replication_action_for_target, target_is_newer_than_source_null_version,
};
use rustfs_utils::http::{
AMZ_BUCKET_REPLICATION_STATUS, AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_LEGAL_HOLD, AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE, AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_RETAIN_UNTIL_DATE,
AMZ_OBJECT_TAGGING, AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION, AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT, AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID,
AMZ_STORAGE_CLASS, AMZ_TAG_COUNT, CACHE_CONTROL, CONTENT_DISPOSITION, CONTENT_ENCODING, CONTENT_LANGUAGE, CONTENT_TYPE,
HeaderExt as _, SUFFIX_OBJECTLOCK_LEGALHOLD_TIMESTAMP, SUFFIX_OBJECTLOCK_RETENTION_TIMESTAMP,
SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC, SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_LEGALHOLD_TIMESTAMP,
SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_RETENTION_TIMESTAMP, SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_TAGGING_TIMESTAMP, SUFFIX_TAGGING_TIMESTAMP,
get_str, insert_header_map, is_internal_key, is_object_encryption_marker, is_replication_stripped_encryption_key,
ssec_replication_transport_header,
};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::{
AdvancedPutOptions, HeadObjectSdkError, PutObjectOptions, PutObjectPartOptions, RemotePutObjectResponse, RemoveObjectOptions,
S3ClientError, TargetClient, resolve_read_api_version_id,
};
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::target::BucketTarget;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::target::BucketTargets;
pub use rustfs_replication::SsecPassthroughCapability;
pub use rustfs_replication::{ObjectLockIntegrity, object_lock_put_integrity};
pub(crate) use rustfs_replication::{
SsecPassthroughGate, is_replication_target_offline_error, ssec_passthrough_gate, version_identity_drifted,
};
use super::replication_config_store::ReplicationConfigStore;
use super::replication_error_boundary::{Error, Result};
use super::replication_filemeta_boundary::{ReplicationAction, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationType};
use super::replication_storage_boundary::ObjectInfo;
use super::replication_tagging_boundary::ReplicationTagFilter;
static STANDARD_HEADERS: &[&str] = &[
CONTENT_TYPE,
CACHE_CONTROL,
CONTENT_ENCODING,
CONTENT_LANGUAGE,
CONTENT_DISPOSITION,
AMZ_STORAGE_CLASS,
AMZ_OBJECT_TAGGING,
AMZ_BUCKET_REPLICATION_STATUS,
AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE,
AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_RETAIN_UNTIL_DATE,
AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_LEGAL_HOLD,
AMZ_TAG_COUNT,
AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION,
];
const ERR_REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_METADATA_UNSUPPORTED: &str = "replication source contains unsupported encryption metadata";
pub(crate) const ERR_REPLICATION_SSEC_PASSTHROUGH_UNSUPPORTED: &str = "replication target does not support SSE-C passthrough: the replica would lose its decryption material \
(run ?replication-check to re-probe)";
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum ReplicationSourceEncryption {
Plaintext,
SseS3,
SseKms,
SseC,
Unsupported,
}
fn metadata_value<'a>(metadata: &'a HashMap<String, String>, name: &str) -> Option<&'a str> {
metadata
.iter()
.find(|(key, _)| key.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name))
.map(|(_, value)| value.as_str())
}
fn classify_replication_source_encryption(metadata: &HashMap<String, String>) -> ReplicationSourceEncryption {
let is_ssec = replication_object_is_ssec_encrypted(metadata);
let sse = metadata_value(metadata, AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION);
let kms_key_id = metadata_value(metadata, AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID);
let kms_context = metadata_value(metadata, AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT);
if is_ssec {
// Stored SSE-C objects always carry x-amz-server-side-encryption=AES256
// alongside the customer-algorithm key; only KMS evidence marks a
// mixed, unsupported state.
let sse_compatible = sse.map(str::trim).is_none_or(|value| value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("AES256"));
return if sse_compatible && kms_key_id.is_none() && kms_context.is_none() {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC
} else {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
};
}
match sse.map(str::trim) {
None if kms_key_id.is_none() && kms_context.is_none() => {
// Sealed material without any recognizable SSE marker (e.g. an
// object written by MinIO, which does not persist the x-amz SSE
// intent header) must fail closed: replicating it as plaintext
// ships ciphertext the target can never decrypt.
if metadata.keys().any(|key| is_object_encryption_marker(key)) {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
} else {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Plaintext
}
}
Some(value) if value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("AES256") && kms_key_id.is_none() && kms_context.is_none() => {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseS3
}
Some(value) if value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("aws:kms") => ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseKms,
_ if kms_key_id.is_some() => ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseKms,
_ => ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported,
}
}
fn is_legacy_source_replication_timestamp_key(key: &str) -> bool {
fn has_prefix_and_suffix(key: &str, prefix: &str, suffix: &str) -> bool {
let key = key.as_bytes();
key.len() == prefix.len() + suffix.len()
&& key[..prefix.len()].eq_ignore_ascii_case(prefix.as_bytes())
&& key[prefix.len()..].eq_ignore_ascii_case(suffix.as_bytes())
}
[
SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_TAGGING_TIMESTAMP,
SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_RETENTION_TIMESTAMP,
SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_LEGALHOLD_TIMESTAMP,
]
.iter()
.any(|suffix| {
["x-rustfs-", "x-minio-"]
.iter()
.any(|prefix| has_prefix_and_suffix(key, prefix, suffix))
})
}
pub(crate) fn replication_object_is_ssec_encrypted(user_defined: &HashMap<String, String>) -> bool {
rustfs_replication::is_ssec_encrypted(user_defined)
}
/// HeadObjectOutput adapter over the pure SSE-C passthrough evidence
/// judgment owned by `rustfs-replication`: extract the echoed
/// customer-algorithm header and let the crate-owned policy decide.
pub(crate) fn ssec_passthrough_evidence_present(head: &HeadObjectOutput) -> bool {
rustfs_replication::ssec_passthrough_evidence_present(head.sse_customer_algorithm.as_deref())
}
pub(crate) struct ReplicationTargetStore;
impl ReplicationTargetStore {
pub(crate) async fn list_bucket_targets(bucket: &str) -> std::result::Result<BucketTargets, BucketTargetError> {
BucketTargetSys::get().list_bucket_targets(bucket).await
}
pub(crate) async fn remote_target_client(bucket: &str, arn: &str) -> Option<Arc<TargetClient>> {
BucketTargetSys::get().get_remote_target_client(bucket, arn).await
}
pub(crate) async fn target_is_offline(target_client: &Arc<TargetClient>) -> bool {
BucketTargetSys::get().is_target_offline(target_client).await
}
pub(crate) async fn mark_target_offline(target_client: &Arc<TargetClient>) {
BucketTargetSys::get().mark_target_offline(target_client).await
}
/// Returns the cached verdict and whether it has outlived its TTL.
pub(crate) async fn ssec_passthrough_capability(arn: &str) -> (SsecPassthroughCapability, bool) {
BucketTargetSys::get().ssec_passthrough_capability(arn).await
}
pub(crate) async fn record_ssec_passthrough_capability(arn: &str, capability: SsecPassthroughCapability) {
BucketTargetSys::get()
.record_ssec_passthrough_capability(arn, capability)
.await
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn register_test_target(target_client: &Arc<TargetClient>) {
BucketTargetSys::get().arn_remotes_map.write().await.insert(
target_client.arn.clone(),
crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::ArnTarget::with_client(target_client.clone()),
);
}
}
pub(crate) fn replication_put_object_options(sc: &str, object_info: &ObjectInfo) -> Result<(PutObjectOptions, bool)> {
use base64_simd::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD;
use rustfs_utils::http::{AMZ_CHECKSUM_TYPE, AMZ_CHECKSUM_TYPE_FULL_OBJECT};
let mut meta = HashMap::new();
let source_encryption = classify_replication_source_encryption(&object_info.user_defined);
let is_ssec = matches!(source_encryption, ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC);
if matches!(source_encryption, ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported) {
return Err(Error::other(ERR_REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_METADATA_UNSUPPORTED));
}
for (key, value) in object_info.user_defined.iter() {
if is_ssec && let Some(transport_header) = ssec_replication_transport_header(key) {
meta.insert(transport_header.to_string(), value.to_string());
continue;
}
// Encryption metadata that is not remapped for SSE-C passthrough must
// never leave the source site: envelopes and intent headers are only
// meaningful to the source KMS.
if is_replication_stripped_encryption_key(key) {
continue;
}
if is_legacy_source_replication_timestamp_key(key) {
meta.insert(format!("x-amz-meta-{key}"), value.to_string());
continue;
}
if is_internal_key(key) || is_standard_header(key) {
continue;
}
meta.insert(key.to_string(), value.to_string());
}
// Managed SSE replicates as plaintext (the replication reader decrypts via
// the object-encryption resolver) and re-encrypts on the target with the
// target's own KMS. Send only the encryption intent — never the source
// key id, whose meaning is local to the source site's KMS.
if matches!(source_encryption, ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseS3) {
meta.insert(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "AES256".to_string());
} else if matches!(source_encryption, ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseKms) {
meta.insert(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "aws:kms".to_string());
}
let mut is_multipart = object_info.is_multipart();
if let Some(checksum_data) = &object_info.checksum
&& !checksum_data.is_empty()
{
if is_ssec {
let encoded = BASE64_STANDARD.encode_to_string(checksum_data);
insert_header_map(&mut meta, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC, encoded);
} else if object_info.is_encrypted() {
// Encrypted checksums cannot be exposed as plaintext headers, and
// decrypt_checksums reports is_multipart=false for them (a value
// the response path relies on). Keep the object's own multipart
// flag so encrypted objects stay on the multipart route.
} else {
let (checksum_meta, checksum_record_is_multipart) = object_info.decrypt_checksums(0, &HeaderMap::new())?;
// The checksum record describes how the *checksum* is composed,
// not how the object is stored. A full-object checksum carries no
// MULTIPART flag even on a multipart upload, so trusting it here
// routed a 768-part object through a single PutObject and the
// target rejected the 6 GiB body with EntityTooLarge
// (rustfs#6825). The object's own shape is the authority: the
// record may only add multipart-ness, never take it away.
is_multipart = object_info.is_multipart() || checksum_record_is_multipart;
for (key, value) in checksum_meta.iter() {
if key != AMZ_CHECKSUM_TYPE {
meta.insert(key.clone(), value.clone());
}
}
if !object_info.is_multipart()
&& checksum_meta
.get(AMZ_CHECKSUM_TYPE)
.is_some_and(|value| value == AMZ_CHECKSUM_TYPE_FULL_OBJECT)
{
is_multipart = false;
}
}
}
let storage_class = if sc.is_empty() {
let obj_sc = object_info.storage_class.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
if obj_sc == ReplicationConfigStore::STANDARD || obj_sc == ReplicationConfigStore::RRS {
obj_sc.to_string()
} else {
sc.to_string()
}
} else {
sc.to_string()
};
let mut put_options = PutObjectOptions {
user_metadata: meta,
content_type: object_info.content_type.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
content_encoding: object_info.content_encoding.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
expires: object_info.expires.unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
storage_class,
internal: AdvancedPutOptions {
source_version_id: object_info.version_id.map(|value| value.to_string()).unwrap_or_default(),
source_etag: object_info.etag.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
source_mtime: object_info.mod_time.unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
replication_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
replication_request: true,
..Default::default()
},
..Default::default()
};
if !object_info.user_tags.is_empty() {
let tags = ReplicationTagFilter::decode_tags_to_map(&object_info.user_tags);
if !tags.is_empty() {
put_options.user_tags = tags;
}
}
// Load the stored tagging timestamp independently of whether any tags
// remain: DeleteObjectTagging leaves the object tagless but stamps this
// key, and the deletion's LWW timestamp must still reach the replica.
// With no stored key, fall back to mod_time only while tags exist
// (MinIO parity); a tagless object without the key was never tagged and
// keeps the epoch default (no header).
put_options.internal.tagging_timestamp = if let Some(timestamp) = get_str(&object_info.user_defined, SUFFIX_TAGGING_TIMESTAMP)
{
OffsetDateTime::parse(&timestamp, &Rfc3339)
.map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("Failed to parse tagging timestamp: {err}")))?
} else if !put_options.user_tags.is_empty() {
object_info.mod_time.unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
} else {
OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH
};
let metadata = &*object_info.user_defined;
if let Some(language) = metadata.lookup(CONTENT_LANGUAGE) {
put_options.content_language = language.to_string();
}
if let Some(content_disposition) = metadata.lookup(CONTENT_DISPOSITION) {
put_options.content_disposition = content_disposition.to_string();
}
if let Some(cache_control) = metadata.lookup(CACHE_CONTROL) {
put_options.cache_control = cache_control.to_string();
}
if let Some(mode) = metadata.lookup(AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE).filter(|mode| !mode.is_empty()) {
put_options.mode = Some(ObjectLockRetentionMode::from(mode.to_uppercase().as_str()));
}
if let Some(retain_until_date) = metadata.lookup(AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_RETAIN_UNTIL_DATE) {
if !retain_until_date.is_empty() {
put_options.retain_until_date = OffsetDateTime::parse(retain_until_date, &Rfc3339)
.map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("Failed to parse retain until date: {err}")))?;
}
put_options.internal.retention_timestamp =
if let Some(timestamp) = get_str(&object_info.user_defined, SUFFIX_OBJECTLOCK_RETENTION_TIMESTAMP) {
OffsetDateTime::parse(&timestamp, &Rfc3339).unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
} else {
object_info.mod_time.unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
};
}
if let Some(legal_hold) = metadata.lookup(AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_LEGAL_HOLD) {
put_options.legalhold = Some(ObjectLockLegalHoldStatus::from(legal_hold.to_uppercase().as_str()));
put_options.internal.legalhold_timestamp =
if let Some(timestamp) = get_str(&object_info.user_defined, SUFFIX_OBJECTLOCK_LEGALHOLD_TIMESTAMP) {
OffsetDateTime::parse(&timestamp, &Rfc3339).unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
} else {
object_info.mod_time.unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
};
}
Ok((put_options, is_multipart))
}
pub(crate) fn replication_put_object_header_size(put_options: &PutObjectOptions) -> usize {
put_options
.header()
.iter()
.map(|(key, value)| key.as_str().len() + value.as_bytes().len() + 4)
.sum()
}
fn replication_source_object(object_info: &ObjectInfo) -> ReplicationSourceObject<'_> {
ReplicationSourceObject {
mod_time: object_info
.mod_time
.map(|mod_time| OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(mod_time.unix_timestamp()).unwrap_or(mod_time)),
version_id: object_info.version_id.map(|version_id| version_id.to_string()),
etag: object_info.etag.as_deref(),
actual_size: object_info.get_actual_size_or_physical(),
delete_marker: object_info.delete_marker,
content_type: object_info.content_type.as_deref(),
content_encoding: object_info.content_encoding.as_deref(),
user_tags: object_info.user_tags.as_str(),
user_defined: object_info.user_defined.as_ref(),
}
}
fn replication_target_last_modified(target: &HeadObjectOutput) -> Option<OffsetDateTime> {
target
.last_modified
.map(|dt| OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(dt.secs()).unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH))
}
fn replication_target_object(target: &HeadObjectOutput) -> ReplicationTargetObject<'_> {
ReplicationTargetObject {
last_modified: replication_target_last_modified(target),
version_id: target.version_id.as_deref(),
etag: target.e_tag.as_deref(),
content_length: target.content_length.unwrap_or_default(),
delete_marker: target.delete_marker.unwrap_or_default(),
content_type: target.content_type.as_deref(),
metadata: target.metadata.as_ref(),
tag_count: target.tag_count.unwrap_or_default(),
}
}
pub(crate) fn replication_action_for_target_head(
object_info: &ObjectInfo,
target: &HeadObjectOutput,
op_type: ReplicationType,
) -> ReplicationAction {
replication_action_for_target(&replication_source_object(object_info), &replication_target_object(target), op_type)
}
pub(crate) fn replication_target_head_is_newer_null_version(object_info: &ObjectInfo, target: &HeadObjectOutput) -> bool {
target_is_newer_than_source_null_version(&replication_source_object(object_info), &replication_target_object(target))
}
pub(crate) fn replication_delete_remove_options(
delete_marker: bool,
replication_mtime: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
) -> RemoveObjectOptions {
RemoveObjectOptions {
force_delete: false,
governance_bypass: false,
replication_delete_marker: delete_marker,
replication_mtime,
replication_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
replication_request: true,
replication_validity_check: false,
}
}
pub(crate) fn replication_delete_marker_purge_remove_options(replication_mtime: Option<OffsetDateTime>) -> RemoveObjectOptions {
RemoveObjectOptions {
force_delete: false,
governance_bypass: false,
replication_delete_marker: false,
replication_mtime,
replication_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
replication_request: true,
replication_validity_check: false,
}
}
pub(crate) fn replication_force_delete_remove_options() -> RemoveObjectOptions {
RemoveObjectOptions {
force_delete: true,
governance_bypass: false,
replication_delete_marker: false,
replication_mtime: None,
replication_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
replication_request: true,
replication_validity_check: false,
}
}
pub(crate) fn replication_complete_multipart_options(
actual_size: String,
source_etag: String,
source_mtime: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
source_internal: &AdvancedPutOptions,
) -> PutObjectOptions {
let mut user_metadata = HashMap::new();
insert_header_map(&mut user_metadata, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE, actual_size);
PutObjectOptions {
user_metadata,
internal: AdvancedPutOptions {
source_etag,
// AdvancedPutOptions::default() stamps now_utc(); an absent source
// mtime must degrade to epoch so header() suppresses the header
// instead of asserting the replication time as the object's mtime.
source_mtime: source_mtime.unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
// Carry the per-category LWW timestamps on the complete request as
// well: the receiver's CompleteMultipartUpload options builder
// parses the same headers, so the multipart transport gets the
// same receiver-side LWW as the single-PUT transport
// (rustfs/backlog#1953). Epoch values keep the headers suppressed.
tagging_timestamp: source_internal.tagging_timestamp,
retention_timestamp: source_internal.retention_timestamp,
legalhold_timestamp: source_internal.legalhold_timestamp,
replication_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
replication_request: true,
..Default::default()
},
..Default::default()
}
}
fn is_standard_header(key: &str) -> bool {
STANDARD_HEADERS.iter().any(|header| header.eq_ignore_ascii_case(key))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use aws_smithy_types::DateTime;
use rustfs_replication::content_matches_by_etag;
use rustfs_utils::http::{
SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC,
get_header_map,
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::Duration;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Serialize an object-level checksum record the way
/// `complete_multipart_upload` persists it for a **full-object** checksum:
/// the record carries the plain algorithm type, without the MULTIPART
/// flags that a composite record gets.
fn full_object_multipart_checksum_record() -> bytes::Bytes {
let checksum_type = rustfs_rio::ChecksumType::from_string_with_obj_type("crc32", "FULL_OBJECT");
assert!(checksum_type.is_set(), "crc32 FULL_OBJECT must be a valid checksum type");
assert!(checksum_type.full_object_requested());
let mut combined = Vec::new();
let mut checksum = rustfs_rio::Checksum {
checksum_type,
..Default::default()
};
for part in [b"part-one".as_slice(), b"part-two".as_slice()] {
let part_checksum = rustfs_rio::Checksum::new_from_data(checksum_type, part).expect("part checksum");
combined.extend_from_slice(part_checksum.raw.as_slice());
checksum.add_part(&part_checksum, part.len() as i64).expect("add part");
}
checksum.to_bytes(&combined)
}
#[test]
fn multipart_object_with_full_object_checksum_keeps_the_multipart_route() {
// rustfs#6825: a 768-part upload was replicated with a single
// PutObject and rejected by the target with EntityTooLarge. The
// object's storage shape says multipart; only the checksum record
// looked single-part, and the checksum record must not decide the
// transport.
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
etag: Some("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef-768".to_string()),
checksum: Some(full_object_multipart_checksum_record()),
size: 6 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(object_info.is_multipart(), "the fixture must be a multipart object");
let (_, checksum_says_multipart) = object_info
.decrypt_checksums(0, &HeaderMap::new())
.expect("checksum record must decode");
assert!(
!checksum_says_multipart,
"fixture precondition: a full-object record carries no MULTIPART flag, which is what used to \
downgrade the transport"
);
let (_, is_multipart) = replication_put_object_options("STANDARD", &object_info).expect("build put options");
assert!(
is_multipart,
"a multipart object must replicate over multipart whatever its checksum record looks like"
);
}
#[test]
fn checksum_record_never_changes_the_transport_a_single_part_object_needs() {
// The mirror of the rustfs#6825 guard: an object stored as one PUT
// must keep the single-PUT transport, or its replica's ETag would
// change shape and every ETag-based convergence check would re-copy it.
let checksum =
rustfs_rio::Checksum::new_from_data(rustfs_rio::ChecksumType::CRC32, b"whole-object").expect("checksum fixture");
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
etag: Some("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string()),
checksum: Some(checksum.to_bytes(&[])),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(!object_info.is_multipart(), "the fixture must be a single-part object");
let (_, is_multipart) = replication_put_object_options("STANDARD", &object_info).expect("build put options");
assert!(!is_multipart, "a single-part object must not be promoted onto the multipart transport");
}
#[test]
fn composite_checksum_multipart_object_keeps_the_multipart_route() {
// The checksum shape that already worked before rustfs#6825, pinned so
// the fix cannot regress it.
let mut checksum_type = rustfs_rio::ChecksumType::from_string("crc32");
checksum_type
.merge(rustfs_rio::ChecksumType::MULTIPART)
.merge(rustfs_rio::ChecksumType::INCLUDES_MULTIPART);
let mut combined = Vec::new();
for part in [b"part-one".as_slice(), b"part-two".as_slice()] {
let part_checksum =
rustfs_rio::Checksum::new_from_data(rustfs_rio::ChecksumType::from_string("crc32"), part).expect("part checksum");
combined.extend_from_slice(part_checksum.raw.as_slice());
}
let checksum = rustfs_rio::Checksum::new_from_data(checksum_type, &combined).expect("composite checksum");
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
etag: Some("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef-2".to_string()),
checksum: Some(checksum.to_bytes(&combined)),
..Default::default()
};
let (_, is_multipart) = replication_put_object_options("STANDARD", &object_info).expect("build put options");
assert!(is_multipart, "a composite-checksum multipart object must stay on the multipart transport");
}
#[test]
fn replication_action_for_target_head_existing_object_source_newer_null_version_requires_replication() {
let source = ObjectInfo {
mod_time: Some(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::seconds(20)),
version_id: None,
..Default::default()
};
let target = HeadObjectOutput::builder().last_modified(DateTime::from_secs(10)).build();
assert_eq!(
replication_action_for_target_head(&source, &target, ReplicationType::ExistingObject),
ReplicationAction::All,
"a newer source null version must not be skipped during existing-object replication"
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_action_for_target_head_existing_object_target_newer_null_version_skips() {
let source = ObjectInfo {
mod_time: Some(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::seconds(10)),
version_id: None,
..Default::default()
};
let target = HeadObjectOutput::builder().last_modified(DateTime::from_secs(20)).build();
assert_eq!(
replication_action_for_target_head(&source, &target, ReplicationType::ExistingObject),
ReplicationAction::None,
"a newer target null-version object should not be overwritten by existing-object replication"
);
assert!(replication_target_head_is_newer_null_version(&source, &target));
}
#[test]
fn replication_source_uses_physical_size_for_unknown_compressed_object() {
let mut metadata = HashMap::new();
rustfs_utils::http::insert_str(&mut metadata, rustfs_utils::http::SUFFIX_COMPRESSION, "zstd".to_string());
let source = ObjectInfo {
size: 128,
actual_size: -1,
user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
..Default::default()
};
assert_eq!(replication_source_object(&source).actual_size, 128);
}
#[test]
fn replication_target_head_content_matches_compare_etag_only() {
let source = ObjectInfo {
etag: Some("\"abc123\"".to_string()),
..Default::default()
};
let target_match = HeadObjectOutput::builder().e_tag("\"abc123\"").build();
assert!(
content_matches_by_etag(&replication_source_object(&source), &replication_target_object(&target_match)),
"identical ETags must match"
);
let target_unquoted_match = HeadObjectOutput::builder().e_tag("abc123").build();
assert!(
content_matches_by_etag(&replication_source_object(&source), &replication_target_object(&target_unquoted_match)),
"quoted and unquoted ETags with identical values must match"
);
let target_different_version = HeadObjectOutput::builder()
.e_tag("\"abc123\"")
.version_id("aws-alphanumeric-id")
.build();
assert!(
content_matches_by_etag(&replication_source_object(&source), &replication_target_object(&target_different_version)),
"matching ETags with different version IDs must still match"
);
let target_different_content = HeadObjectOutput::builder().e_tag("\"def456\"").build();
assert!(
!content_matches_by_etag(&replication_source_object(&source), &replication_target_object(&target_different_content)),
"different ETags must not match"
);
let source_no_etag = ObjectInfo {
etag: None,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(
!content_matches_by_etag(&replication_source_object(&source_no_etag), &replication_target_object(&target_match)),
"missing source ETag must not match"
);
let target_no_etag = HeadObjectOutput::builder().build();
assert!(
!content_matches_by_etag(&replication_source_object(&source), &replication_target_object(&target_no_etag)),
"missing target ETag must not match"
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_action_for_target_head_compares_http_date_precision() {
for (source_nanos, target_secs, expected) in [
(10_123_456_789, 10, ReplicationAction::None),
(-10_876_543_211, -11, ReplicationAction::None),
(10_600_000_000, 11, ReplicationAction::All),
] {
let mod_time = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp_nanos(source_nanos).expect("valid timestamp");
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
mod_time: Some(mod_time),
version_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
etag: Some("abc123".to_string()),
size: 10,
..Default::default()
};
let target = HeadObjectOutput::builder()
.last_modified(DateTime::from_secs(target_secs))
.version_id(object_info.version_id.expect("version ID").to_string())
.e_tag("abc123")
.content_length(10)
.build();
assert_eq!(
replication_action_for_target_head(&object_info, &target, ReplicationType::Object),
expected
);
}
}
#[test]
fn replication_remove_options_mark_replication_requests() {
let mtime = OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::seconds(10);
let delete = replication_delete_remove_options(true, Some(mtime));
assert!(!delete.force_delete);
assert!(delete.replication_delete_marker);
assert_eq!(delete.replication_mtime, Some(mtime));
assert_eq!(delete.replication_status, ReplicationStatusType::Replica);
assert!(delete.replication_request);
let purge = replication_delete_marker_purge_remove_options(Some(mtime));
assert!(!purge.force_delete);
assert!(!purge.replication_delete_marker);
assert_eq!(purge.replication_mtime, Some(mtime));
assert_eq!(purge.replication_status, ReplicationStatusType::Replica);
assert!(purge.replication_request);
let force = replication_force_delete_remove_options();
assert!(force.force_delete);
assert!(!force.replication_delete_marker);
assert_eq!(force.replication_status, ReplicationStatusType::Replica);
assert!(force.replication_request);
}
#[test]
fn replication_complete_multipart_options_sets_actual_size() {
let source_mtime = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_000).expect("valid test timestamp");
let source_internal = AdvancedPutOptions {
tagging_timestamp: OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_100).expect("valid test timestamp"),
retention_timestamp: OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_200).expect("valid test timestamp"),
legalhold_timestamp: OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_300).expect("valid test timestamp"),
..Default::default()
};
let options = replication_complete_multipart_options(
"1024".to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef-3".to_string(),
Some(source_mtime),
&source_internal,
);
assert_eq!(options.internal.source_etag, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef-3");
assert_eq!(options.internal.source_mtime, source_mtime);
// The complete request must carry the same per-category LWW timestamps
// as the initiate request; the receiver reads them from the complete
// headers (rustfs/backlog#1953).
assert_eq!(options.internal.tagging_timestamp, source_internal.tagging_timestamp);
assert_eq!(options.internal.retention_timestamp, source_internal.retention_timestamp);
assert_eq!(options.internal.legalhold_timestamp, source_internal.legalhold_timestamp);
// Absent source mtime must degrade to epoch (header suppressed), not
// the AdvancedPutOptions default of now_utc() — that default would
// stamp the replication time as the replica's mtime and break the
// multipart HEAD convergence. Unset category timestamps stay epoch so
// header() keeps suppressing them.
let options_no_mtime =
replication_complete_multipart_options("1024".to_string(), String::new(), None, &AdvancedPutOptions::default());
assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.source_mtime.unix_timestamp(), 0);
assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.tagging_timestamp.unix_timestamp(), 0);
assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.retention_timestamp.unix_timestamp(), 0);
assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.legalhold_timestamp.unix_timestamp(), 0);
assert_eq!(
get_header_map(&options.user_metadata, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE).as_deref(),
Some("1024")
);
assert_eq!(options.internal.replication_status, ReplicationStatusType::Replica);
assert!(options.internal.replication_request);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_filter_and_map_metadata() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_MULTIPART_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
REPLICATION_ENCRYPTED_MULTIPART_HEADER, REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSE_IV_HEADER,
REPLICATION_SSE_SEAL_ALGORITHM_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSE_SEALED_KEY_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER,
REPLICATION_SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER, SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER,
};
// The stored shape of a real SSE-C object: SSE marker plus customer
// material, per encryption_material_to_metadata. Every transport-table
// source key is present so each mapping is pinned individually.
let mut metadata = HashMap::new();
metadata.insert(CONTENT_TYPE.to_string(), "text/plain".to_string());
metadata.insert("x-user-meta".to_string(), "value".to_string());
metadata.insert(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "AES256".to_string());
metadata.insert(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string());
metadata.insert(SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER.to_string(), "md5-value".to_string());
metadata.insert(SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER.to_string(), "1024".to_string());
metadata.insert(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), "iv-direct".to_string());
metadata.insert(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), "iv-minio".to_string());
metadata.insert(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "DAREv2-HMAC-SHA256".to_string());
metadata.insert(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), "sealed".to_string());
metadata.insert(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_MULTIPART_HEADER.to_string(), "true".to_string());
rustfs_utils::http::insert_str(
&mut metadata,
rustfs_utils::http::SUFFIX_REPLICATION_GENERATION,
Uuid::from_u128(1).to_string(),
);
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
user_tags: Arc::new("env=prod".to_string()),
content_type: Some("text/plain".to_string()),
content_encoding: Some("gzip".to_string()),
mod_time: Some(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
version_id: Some(Uuid::nil()),
etag: Some("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string()),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, is_multipart) = replication_put_object_options("STANDARD", &object_info).expect("build put options");
assert!(!is_multipart);
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get("x-user-meta"), Some(&"value".to_string()));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(CONTENT_TYPE));
// Every stored SSE-C material key is remapped onto its transport name.
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER), Some(&"AES256".to_string()));
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER), Some(&"md5-value".to_string()));
assert_eq!(
options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER),
Some(&"1024".to_string())
);
assert_eq!(
options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER),
Some(&"iv-direct".to_string())
);
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSE_IV_HEADER), Some(&"iv-minio".to_string()));
assert_eq!(
options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSE_SEAL_ALGORITHM_HEADER),
Some(&"DAREv2-HMAC-SHA256".to_string())
);
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSE_SEALED_KEY_HEADER), Some(&"sealed".to_string()));
assert_eq!(
options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_ENCRYPTED_MULTIPART_HEADER),
Some(&"true".to_string())
);
// The stored keys themselves and the SSE intent header must not leave
// the source verbatim.
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER));
assert!(
options
.user_metadata
.keys()
.all(|key| !key.contains(rustfs_utils::http::SUFFIX_REPLICATION_GENERATION)),
"source-local mutation generation must never cross the replication wire"
);
assert!(
!options
.user_metadata
.contains_key(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER)
);
assert_eq!(options.content_type, "text/plain");
assert_eq!(options.content_encoding, "gzip");
assert_eq!(options.user_tags.get("env"), Some(&"prod".to_string()));
assert_eq!(options.internal.source_version_id, Uuid::nil().to_string());
assert_eq!(options.internal.source_etag, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
assert_eq!(options.internal.replication_status, ReplicationStatusType::Replica);
assert!(options.internal.replication_request);
}
/// DeleteObjectTagging leaves the object tagless but stamps the
/// tagging-timestamp internal key; the deletion's LWW timestamp must
/// still be loaded (and therefore sent) so the replica can order the
/// deletion against concurrent tag edits.
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_carry_tagging_timestamp_after_tag_deletion() {
let mut metadata = std::collections::HashMap::new();
rustfs_utils::http::insert_str(&mut metadata, SUFFIX_TAGGING_TIMESTAMP, "2026-01-02T03:04:05Z".to_string());
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
user_tags: Arc::new(String::new()),
mod_time: Some(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
version_id: Some(Uuid::nil()),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("build put options");
assert!(options.user_tags.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
options.internal.tagging_timestamp,
OffsetDateTime::parse("2026-01-02T03:04:05Z", &Rfc3339).expect("valid timestamp"),
"the stored tagging timestamp must load independently of remaining tags"
);
// A tagless object without the stored key was never tagged: the epoch
// default keeps the header unsent.
let untagged = ObjectInfo {
user_tags: Arc::new(String::new()),
mod_time: Some(OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_700_000_000).expect("timestamp")),
version_id: Some(Uuid::nil()),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &untagged).expect("build put options");
assert_eq!(options.internal.tagging_timestamp, OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_do_not_promote_legacy_user_timestamp_metadata() {
let legacy_keys = [
"x-rustfs-source-replication-tagging-timestamp",
"x-rustfs-source-replication-retention-timestamp",
"x-rustfs-source-replication-legalhold-timestamp",
"x-minio-source-replication-tagging-timestamp",
"x-minio-source-replication-retention-timestamp",
"x-minio-source-replication-legalhold-timestamp",
];
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(
legacy_keys
.iter()
.map(|key| (key.to_string(), "2099-01-02T03:04:05Z".to_string()))
.collect(),
),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("build put options");
for legacy_key in legacy_keys {
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(legacy_key));
assert_eq!(
options
.user_metadata
.get(&format!("x-amz-meta-{legacy_key}"))
.map(String::as_str),
Some("2099-01-02T03:04:05Z")
);
}
assert_eq!(options.internal.tagging_timestamp, OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH);
assert_eq!(options.internal.retention_timestamp, OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH);
assert_eq!(options.internal.legalhold_timestamp, OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_carry_retention_timestamp_after_clear() {
let mut metadata = HashMap::from([
(AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE.to_string(), String::new()),
(AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_RETAIN_UNTIL_DATE.to_string(), String::new()),
]);
rustfs_utils::http::insert_str(&mut metadata, SUFFIX_OBJECTLOCK_RETENTION_TIMESTAMP, "2026-01-02T03:04:05Z".to_string());
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("retention clear must replicate");
assert!(options.mode.is_none());
assert_eq!(options.retain_until_date, OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH);
assert_eq!(
options.internal.retention_timestamp,
OffsetDateTime::parse("2026-01-02T03:04:05Z", &Rfc3339).expect("valid timestamp")
);
let headers = options.header();
assert!(!headers.contains_key(AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE));
assert!(!headers.contains_key(AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_RETAIN_UNTIL_DATE));
assert_eq!(
rustfs_utils::http::get_header(&headers, SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_RETENTION_TIMESTAMP).as_deref(),
Some("2026-01-02T03:04:05Z")
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_strip_encryption_metadata_from_plaintext_objects() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER, SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER};
// Migration leftovers: original-size metadata is not an encryption
// marker (older plaintext objects can retain it), so the object still
// classifies as plaintext — but the keys must be stripped, never
// forwarded as plain user metadata (backlog#1783 D2). The SSE-C
// original-size key is also a transport-table source key, so this
// doubles as the guard for the is_ssec gate: without SSE-C
// classification it must be stripped, not remapped.
let metadata = HashMap::from([
("x-user-meta".to_string(), "value".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER.to_string(), "1024".to_string()),
(SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER.to_string(), "1024".to_string()),
]);
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("build put options");
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get("x-user-meta"), Some(&"value".to_string()));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER));
assert!(
!options
.user_metadata
.keys()
.any(|key| key.to_ascii_lowercase().starts_with("x-rustfs-replication-")),
"non-SSE-C objects must never emit SSE replication transport keys"
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_fail_closed_on_sealed_material_without_sse_marker() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
};
// Sealed material without a recognizable SSE marker (MinIO-written
// objects, or corrupted metadata) must fail closed instead of
// replicating ciphertext as a plaintext object.
for sealed_key in [
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
] {
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([(sealed_key.to_string(), "sealed-envelope".to_string())])),
..Default::default()
};
let err = match replication_put_object_options("", &object_info) {
Ok(_) => panic!("sealed material without an SSE marker must fail closed ({sealed_key})"),
Err(err) => err,
};
assert!(err.to_string().contains(ERR_REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_METADATA_UNSUPPORTED));
assert!(!err.to_string().contains("sealed-envelope"));
}
}
/// Pins the HeadObjectOutput field extraction feeding the crate-owned
/// evidence judgment (the gate/evidence policy matrix itself is pinned in
/// `rustfs-replication`'s object tests).
#[test]
fn ssec_passthrough_evidence_requires_customer_algorithm_echo() {
let with_evidence = HeadObjectOutput::builder().sse_customer_algorithm("AES256").build();
assert!(ssec_passthrough_evidence_present(&with_evidence));
let empty_algorithm = HeadObjectOutput::builder().sse_customer_algorithm("").build();
assert!(
!ssec_passthrough_evidence_present(&empty_algorithm),
"an empty echo is not evidence of preserved SSE-C material"
);
let without_evidence = HeadObjectOutput::builder().e_tag("\"abc\"").content_length(8).build();
assert!(
!ssec_passthrough_evidence_present(&without_evidence),
"a plain HEAD response must classify the target as having dropped the material"
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_adds_ssec_checksum_metadata() {
let metadata = HashMap::from([(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string())]);
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
checksum: Some(bytes::Bytes::from_static(b"checksum")),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("build put options");
assert!(get_header_map(&options.user_metadata, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC).is_some());
}
#[test]
fn replication_source_encryption_classification_is_explicit_and_fail_closed() {
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::new()),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Plaintext
);
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([(
"x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(),
"AES256".to_string()
)])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseS3
);
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([(
"x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(),
"AWS:KMS".to_string()
)])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseKms
);
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string())])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC
);
// Real stored SSE-C objects carry the AES256 SSE marker alongside the
// customer algorithm (encryption_material_to_metadata writes both).
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([
(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC
);
// SSE-C material mixed with KMS evidence stays unsupported.
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([
(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID.to_string(), "key-1".to_string()),
])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
);
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([
(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), "aws:kms".to_string()),
])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
);
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([(
"x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(),
"unsupported-algorithm".to_string(),
)])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
);
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([(
AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT.to_string(),
"opaque-context".to_string(),
)])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_sends_sse_s3_intent_without_source_material() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER,
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER,
};
// The stored shape of a managed SSE-S3 object per
// encryption_material_to_metadata: SSE marker plus envelope material.
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER.to_string(), "default".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), "sealed-envelope".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), "iv".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256-GCM".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER.to_string(), "1024".to_string()),
("x-user-meta".to_string(), "value".to_string()),
])),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("managed SSE-S3 must build put options");
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION), Some(&"AES256".to_string()));
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get("x-user-meta"), Some(&"value".to_string()));
// No envelope material and no key id may leave the source.
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER));
assert!(
!options.user_metadata.values().any(|value| value.contains("sealed-envelope")),
"source envelope material must never leave the source site"
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_sends_sse_kms_intent_without_source_key_id() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT_HEADER,
};
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "aws:kms".to_string()),
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID.to_string(), "source-key-1".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), "sealed-envelope".to_string()),
(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT_HEADER.to_string(), "ctx".to_string()),
])),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("managed SSE-KMS must build put options");
// Intent only: the target encrypts with its own default KMS key.
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION), Some(&"aws:kms".to_string()));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER));
assert!(
!options
.user_metadata
.contains_key(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT_HEADER)
);
assert!(
!options
.user_metadata
.values()
.any(|value| value.contains("sealed-envelope") || value.contains("source-key-1")),
"source KMS identifiers and envelopes must never leave the source site"
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_rejects_unknown_encryption_without_echoing_metadata() {
let secret_like_value = "opaque-context-that-must-not-be-logged";
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "unsupported-algorithm".to_string()),
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT.to_string(), secret_like_value.to_string()),
])),
..Default::default()
};
let err = match replication_put_object_options("", &object_info) {
Ok(_) => panic!("unknown encryption must fail closed"),
Err(err) => err,
};
assert!(err.to_string().contains(ERR_REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_METADATA_UNSUPPORTED));
assert!(!err.to_string().contains(secret_like_value));
}
// T3 (#1264): the outbound replication path forwards a stored object checksum into
// user_metadata via decrypt_checksums, which is algorithm-agnostic. This locks that
// the AWS 2026-04 additional algorithms (XXHash3/64/128, SHA-512, MD5) are forwarded
// identically to the classic five — i.e. replication treats the new algorithms
// consistently, with no new-algorithm-specific gap on the outbound side.
#[test]
fn replication_put_object_options_forwards_new_algorithm_checksums_like_classic() {
use rustfs_rio::{Checksum, ChecksumType};
let payload = b"replication checksum consistency payload";
let cases = [
// classic five (baseline)
("CRC32", ChecksumType::CRC32),
("SHA256", ChecksumType::SHA256),
// AWS 2026-04 additional algorithms
("XXHASH3", ChecksumType::XXHASH3),
("XXHASH64", ChecksumType::XXHASH64),
("XXHASH128", ChecksumType::XXHASH128),
("SHA512", ChecksumType::SHA512),
("MD5", ChecksumType::MD5),
];
for (name, ty) in cases {
let checksum = Checksum::new_from_data(ty, payload).expect("compute checksum");
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
checksum: Some(checksum.to_bytes(&[])),
..Default::default()
};
let (opts, _is_multipart) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("build replication put options");
assert_eq!(
opts.user_metadata.get(name),
Some(&checksum.encoded),
"replication must forward the {name} checksum into user_metadata identically to the classic algorithms"
);
}
}
}