test(e2e): drop serial_test from receiver LWW e2e

main removed the serial_test dependency from e2e_test (#6344); the test uses an ephemeral-port RustFSTestEnvironment and needs no cross-test serialization, so the attribute and import go.
fix(replication): keep first-replication miss quiet in multipart LWW log
2026-08-22 20:36:38 +00:00 · 2026-08-23 00:26:43 +08:00 · 2026-08-21 19:35:22 +08:00 · 2026-08-21 19:33:59 +08:00 · 2026-08-21 19:29:26 +08:00
250 changed files with 5003 additions and 21907 deletions
@@ -1,45 +1,277 @@
 ---
 name: adversarial-validation
-description: Review a final RustFS diff adversarially when the user requests adversarial review, the root AGENTS.md classifies the change as high risk, or a substantial PR is being reviewed. Do not use for ordinary questions, diagnosis, planning, status, documentation-only work, or routine low-risk implementation.
+description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the applicable reviewer roles with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, design proposal, or agent-instruction change that alters execution before declaring it done.
 ---
-# RustFS Adversarial Validation
+# Adversarial Validation Playbooks
-Use the risk tier and review shape defined in the root `AGENTS.md`. This skill
+The policy — risk tiers, role list, protocol, exit criteria — lives in the
-routes a review to RustFS-specific probes without loading unrelated domains.
+root `AGENTS.md` under "Adversarial Validation (Default On)". Read it first;
 this skill does not restate it. This file adds the RustFS-specific probe
 playbook for each role: concrete attacks, where they apply, and the real
 shipped bug or rule that earns each probe its place.
-## Select Lenses
+## How to run a role
-Read only the references required by the diff:
+1. Pick the tier and the applicable roles per the root `AGENTS.md`.
 2. Run each role as an independent pass over the final diff — a parallel
   reviewer agent where the tooling supports it, otherwise a fresh
   sequential pass that starts from the diff and the nearest scoped
   `AGENTS.md`, discarding the writing session's assumptions.
 3. Within a role, execute the probes whose domain the diff touches, plus any
   attack the diff obviously invites that no probe lists — the playbook is a
   floor, not a ceiling.
 4. Report findings (concrete failure scenario or named missing test, with
   file:line) or the role's null report: "attacked X, Y, Z — no break
   found". A bare pass is not a result.
-| Lens | When to read |
+## Role playbooks
 |---|---|
 | [Correctness](references/correctness.md) | Every non-exempt adversarial review |
 | [Simplicity](references/simplicity.md) | Mechanical/standard changes and production growth |
 | [Test coverage](references/test-coverage.md) | Behavior or test changes |
 | [Security](references/security.md) | Authn/authz, IAM, RPC trust, paths, secrets, parsing, browser, encryption |
 | [Concurrency/durability](references/concurrency-durability.md) | Async shared state, locks, storage commit, cancellation, persisted queues |
 | [Compatibility](references/compatibility.md) | S3 surface, MinIO interop, metadata, wire/disk formats, mixed versions |
 | [Performance](references/performance.md) | Request/object hot paths, allocation, blocking work, fsync, fan-out |
-Do not read all references as a precaution. A path name alone is insufficient;
+### Correctness adversary
 the changed behavior must touch the lens's domain.
-For a dedicated security audit or advisory analysis, use
+- For any change touching error aggregation or quorum decisions, build the exact disk-error slice at the quorum boundary: N disks where successes == quorum, then flip one success to an error (quorum-1) and separately inject None/nil placeholder entries into the slice. Trace whether reduce_errs (or the new equivalent) picks the placeholder as the dominant error or lets quorum-1 pass as success. Also check heal/write paths: does a per-target failure at quorum-1 return an explicit error, or silently degrade to success?
-`security-advisory-lessons` instead of loading it automatically during every
+  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/error_reduce.rs; crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/{core,ops}; crates/heal
-adversarial review.
+  - Evidence: Commit 20d61c73b 'stop reduce_errs leaking nil placeholder as dominant error' (#4551) and 47c1e730c 'make erasure heal write quorum best-effort per target' (#4545); crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md: 'Do not weaken quorum checks... Prefer explicit failure over silent data corruption or implicit success.'
 - For any change in EC read/reconstruct/streaming code, trace the mid-stream error path: the first K shards read fine, then a shard turns out bitrot-corrupt or inconsistent after N bytes have already been sent to the client. Verify the error propagates as a stream error (client sees failure), not a clean end-of-body — a silently truncated GET body is data corruption. Also re-check byte accounting: sum of per-part bytes vs object size, and partNumber-to-offset routing for the first and last part.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/read.rs (reconstruct-read, inconsistent_source_indexes handling ~line 3827); codec streaming paths in crates/ecstore/src/erasure_coding
  - Evidence: Known live bug: EC reconstruct-read failing on inconsistent shards mid-stream silently truncates GET body → client 'unexpected EOF'; commit 15808254d 'correct codec-streaming byte accounting and partNumber routing' (#4535).
 - For any listing/pagination change, construct the exact-boundary inputs: (a) exactly max_keys/max_uploads matching entries — assert the response contains max and is_truncated=false, then max+1 entries — assert exactly max returned with is_truncated=true and a correct continuation marker; (b) a delimiter listing where folding into CommonPrefixes re-fills a full page; (c) an object 'a' coexisting with prefix dir 'a/'. Off-by-one and dropped-truncation bugs live exactly at these boundaries.
  - Where: crates/ecstore listing/merge paths (metacache, list_objects, list_multipart_uploads); rustfs/src/storage
  - Evidence: Three recent real bugs: fefa70b31 'stop ListMultipartUploads from returning one upload past max-uploads' (#4447), d91f4d455 'report truncation when delimiter list re-folds a full page' (#4538), 7e1f7f242 'preserve CommonPrefixes when an object and same-named prefix dir coexist' (#4563).
 - Run the diff's logic with a directory object key (trailing slash, e.g. 'pre/dir/') as input. Check which layer encodes/decodes __XLDIR__ — set_disk never sees the trailing slash, so any trailing-slash branch added below the store layer is dead code and a wrong-layer bug. For delete paths, check whether options force a nil versionId onto directory keys: the resulting miss surfaces as version-not-found, not object-not-found, so callers matching only ObjectNotFound leak ghost directory entries.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/store*.rs (store layer) vs crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/*; delete option construction (del_opts) and its callers
  - Evidence: trailing-slash branches must live at store layer; del_opts injects nil version for dir keys, PR#4220 ghost-directory cleanup never fired on the real path (rustfs#4307, backlog#798 still OPEN).
 - Feed every new binary-UUID metadata read the three degenerate values: key absent, zero-length bytes, and 16 zero bytes (nil UUID). All three must mean 'no value' — any path that produces Uuid::nil() and then acts on it (e.g. sends it as a versionId) is a finding. For tier code specifically: with remote-tier version None or "", assert the tier GET/DELETE request carries no versionId parameter at all — sending versionId="" or nil yields NoSuchVersion against unversioned tier buckets.
  - Where: crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/version.rs; crates/ecstore/src/bucket/lifecycle/; crates/ecstore/src/services/tier/; any new consumer of crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
  - Evidence: AGENTS.md Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants (defensive Uuid read pattern + unversioned-tier rule); docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md ('nil transition_ver_id = corrupt legacy write-back, readers must filter'); commit 726f3dc18 'accept empty remote version_id in tier recovery paths' (#4552).
 - For each match/if-let on an error or algorithm enum touched by the diff, enumerate what the wildcard/else arm swallows. Inject the variants the author didn't think of — DiskNotFound during listing, an unsupported checksum algorithm, an Err from a cleanup rename/delete — and trace whether they degrade into 'not found', a wrong-but-plausible value, or silent success. Any error path that converges with the success path without logging and propagating is a finding.
  - Where: crates/ecstore (listing, delete/rename cleanup); crates/checksums; error-mapping layers in rustfs/src/storage
  - Evidence: Three recent real bugs of this exact shape: e0619e355 'stop treating DiskNotFound as object not-found in listing' (#4536), afaf8c681 'reject md5 instead of silently returning crc32' (#4513), f7d2b2563 'propagate disk delete/rename failures instead of swallowing them' (#4546).
 - For any change to version ordering, index lookup, or shard/part indexing: (a) call the accessor with index == len() and len()-1 — a get_idx-style bound must reject, not panic or wrap; (b) construct two versions with identical mod-times and check the sort tie-break is total and deterministic (equal keys must not compare as both before each other); (c) for EC shard math, compute shard size for object sizes 0, 1, blockSize-1, blockSize, blockSize+1 and cross-check total reconstructed length against the object size.
  - Where: crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/*.rs (version sort, get_idx); crates/ecstore/src/erasure_coding shard-size math
  - Evidence: Commit 8bfb00bc0 'guard get_idx bound and fix sorts_before tie-break' (#4509) — both bug classes shipped before; ecstore AGENTS.md high-risk designation for read/write/repair correctness.
 - Exercise the zero/empty end of every new size or count parameter: zero-length object PUT then GET (body must be empty, not error), part count 0, empty Vec of disks/entries into aggregation functions, and env/config values of 0 (must clamp or reject, never divide-by-zero or 'scan nothing and report zero usage'). Anywhere the diff computes a ratio, capacity, or progress percentage, plug in 0 and the max value.
  - Where: crates/ecstore aggregation and scanner paths; crates/object-capacity; config/env parsing in touched crates
  - Evidence: Commits 787cc77a7 'clamp zero capacity env values to safe defaults' (#4559) and 32b1094ec 'resolve a symlinked scan root instead of silently counting zero' (#4564) — zero-as-silent-wrong-answer is a recurring repo bug class.
 - For any diff touching multipart or object commit paths, order the operations on paper and attack the failure point between them: kill the process (or return Err) after the commit rename but before cleanup, and after cleanup but before commit. Verify the earlier-failure case leaves the object readable and the later-failure case leaves no half-visible object; part meta files must never be deleted before the commit is durable.
  - Where: crates/ecstore multipart commit/cleanup (set_disk/ops); rustfs/src/storage multipart handlers
  - Evidence: Commit c77c5f047 'defer multipart part.N.meta cleanup until after commit' (#4548) — cleanup-before-commit ordering already caused a real data-loss window; the #4221 durability work shows fsync/ordering bugs are endemic here.
-## Review Protocol
+Null report example: "Attacked quorum-1 error reduction, exact max-keys listing boundary, trailing-slash dir keys, nil-UUID tier versionId, and mid-stream reconstruct error propagation — no break found."
-1. Freeze the exact final diff/head and list the selected lenses.
+### Simplicity adversary
 2. Run the review shape required by root `AGENTS.md`.
 3. For each selected lens, either report a concrete finding or a null verdict
   naming the attacks performed.
 4. A finding needs `file:line`, a triggering input/state/interleaving, the wrong
   outcome, and a focused fix or missing regression check.
 5. Fix or rebut every finding with code-path, test, or invariant evidence.
 6. After a non-trivial edit, rerun only lenses affected by that edit against the
   new exact diff.
-Do not turn a null verdict into a long checklist. Record concise evidence that
+- Smaller-diff attack: inspect production growth separately from tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation; test additions have no growth budget. Rewrite the production diff mentally (or in scratch) as the minimal equivalent edit. Report a finding only with a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
-the relevant failure classes were attacked.
+  - Where: Any diff; extra scrutiny for crates/ecstore, crates/lock, rustfs/src/storage where 'preserve the existing control-flow shape' is an explicit rule
  - Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (conditional extraction rule, preserve sensitive control flow, canonical modules) and 'Reuse Before You Write'; the Adversarial Validation roles list charters this attack.
 - Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper, search `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain owner, and relevant direct dependencies. A reimplementation is a finding, but forced reuse with mismatched normalization, error, backoff, or durability semantics is also a finding. Demand a nameable trigger for new defensive branches. Tests remain subject to validity and near-duplicate coverage review, never a size limit.
  - Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests
  - Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Reuse Before You Write' and 'Necessary Code Only'; GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3 (normalization-asymmetry traversal — why forced reuse of normalizing helpers on raw keys is itself an attack); docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md nil-versionId incident (why boundary re-checks are load-bearing).
 - Replacement-and-comment attack: when the diff introduces a replacement path or representation, trace all callers and flag a superseded in-scope path left behind without a compatibility requirement. Keep one canonical core behind compatibility adapters. Comments must state non-obvious invariants completely without narration or change history. Never demand unrelated deletion or trade away correctness, compatibility, or readability to reduce the diff.
 Null report example: "Separated production growth from tests/docs, tested a smaller equivalent, checked helper reuse and superseded paths, and found no break."
 ### Security reviewer
 - For every admin handler in the diff, grep the exact AdminAction constant it passes to validate_admin_request and confirm it names the operation the handler actually performs. Construct the escalation: a low-privileged user whose policy grants the wrong-but-adjacent action (e.g. Export while the handler Imports, or Update while it Lists) — if the mismatched constant lets them through, that is the bug. Also confirm read-only endpoints (metrics, list, server-info, diagnostics) still call an operation-specific admin authz path and not a mere 'credentials exist' check.
  - Where: rustfs/src/admin/handlers/**, rustfs/src/admin/router registration; check_permissions / validate_admin_request / AdminAction::* call sites
  - Evidence: GHSA-vcwh-pff9-64cc (ImportIam checked ExportIAMAction), GHSA-mm2q-qcmx-gw4w (ListServiceAccount used UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction), GHSA-f5cv-v44x-2xgf (/admin/v3/metrics accepted any authenticated IAM user). advisory-patterns.md 'Admin authorization and route exposure'; rustfs/src/admin/AGENTS.md 'route registration, whitelist, handler authz must agree'.
 - If the diff touches service-account or IAM import/update, treat parent, claims, accessKey, secretKey, status, policy names, and groups as attacker-controlled. Construct an ImportIam/create payload where parent points at root (or another user) and prove the code writes credentials without proving caller ownership or root authority. Separately, set deny_only=true (or 'no explicit deny') on a restricted account and check it does not skip the required allow check, letting it mint an unrestricted child.
  - Where: crates/iam/, rustfs/src/admin/handlers (service account / import IAM), rustfs/src/auth.rs
  - Evidence: GHSA-566f-q62r-wcr8 (attacker-controlled parent/claims/accessKey/secretKey → persistent backdoor under root), GHSA-xgr5-qc6w-vcg9 (deny_only=true skipped allow checks → privilege creation). crates/iam/AGENTS.md security boundaries; advisory-patterns.md 'IAM import, service accounts'.
 - For a changed protocol-frontend handler (FTP/FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV/gateway), enumerate ALL sibling command handlers in the same driver — not just the changed one. For each, confirm it calls the per-operation IAM authorize hook mapped to the correct S3 action (RETR→GetObject, SIZE/MDTM→HeadObject, MKD→CreateBucket, bucket probe→ListBucket/HeadBucket) BEFORE touching storage. Construct a denied-authz case and prove the storage backend is never reached.
  - Where: crates/protocols/ (FtpsDriver, SftpDriver, WebDAV), authorize_operation call sites
  - Evidence: GHSA-3g29-xff2-92vp (FTP RETR/SIZE/MDTM authenticated but skipped IAM), GHSA-g3vq-vv42-f647 (FTPS MKD called create_bucket without s3:CreateBucket). advisory-patterns.md: 'RustFS advisories show mixed guarded and unguarded siblings in the same driver.'
 - For any secret/token/signature/password comparison in the diff, check it uses a constant-time compare (e.g. subtle/constant_time_eq), not == or early-return byte loops. Then check the failure-response paths: construct an invalid-user request and an invalid-secret request and confirm they are indistinguishable (same error, no early length short-circuit) so an attacker cannot enumerate valid users or time-side-channel the secret.
  - Where: crates/protocols/ (FTPS/WebDAV/FormPost auth), crates/credentials/, rustfs/src/auth.rs, RPC signature verification
  - Evidence: GHSA-3p3x-734c-h5vx (FTPS/WebDAV early-return string equality + distinguishable invalid-user vs invalid-password). Fix commits 3c3113619 (constant-time FTPS/WebDAV) and c41062f27 (constant-time FormPost signature). 3p3x was fixed by PR #4403.
 - If the diff parses or transports secret-bearing config (env vars, key files, connection strings), grep every error-construction and format site on that value's path (`format!` feeding `Error::other`/`configuration_error`/`panic!`/`expect`) for interpolation of the raw value or of variables named like secret material. Construct the likeliest misconfiguration: the operator supplies the bare secret without the expected `<name>:` prefix (or with a stray newline) — if the parse-failure hint echoes the input, the secret lands in startup logs. Error strings are log content; the hint may name the env var and expected format, never the value. If the diff re-implements an existing parse helper, diff the two error paths — the duplicate is where the leak hides.
  - Where: rustfs/src/init.rs (env plumbing), crates/kms/src/config.rs, crates/credentials/, any from_env/parse on secret values; mechanical backstop in scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh (secret-interpolation check)
  - Evidence: PR #5222 introduced `got: {secret_str}` in build_static_kms_config's format-hint error — a bare base64 key (the secret itself) would have been echoed into startup logs; fixed by PR #5243. The parallel parse in KmsConfig::from_env already omitted the value: the leak lived only in the duplicated copy (AGENTS.md 'Reuse Before You Write').
 - If the diff touches internode/RPC auth secret handling, trace whether the RPC HMAC secret can fall back to a public default (e.g. 'rustfsadmin', 'rustfs rpc') or be derived deterministically from the S3 root credentials. Construct the case where RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET is unset and confirm the code fails closed rather than silently using a default or a root-derived key. Verify RPC signing keys are independent random secrets, not reused across S3-root/RPC-HMAC/STS-JWT roles.
  - Where: crates/credentials/, crates/ecstore/src/rpc/, internode auth setup
  - Evidence: GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q (fell back to 'rustfsadmin'), GHSA-75fx/68cw (RPC secret derivable from root creds → forgeable signatures), GHSA-h956 (hard-coded 'rustfs rpc'), GHSA-m77q (STS JWT reused root secret). Fix commit 7b2055405 (fail closed when deriving RPC secret from default credentials, PR#4402).
 - If the diff touches RPC/NodeService authentication, verify the HMAC payload binds the EXACT concrete gRPC method path (not a service prefix), the HTTP method surrogate, and a fresh timestamp. Construct captured valid metadata for method A and replay it to method B within the timestamp window — if it authorizes, the signature is under-bound. Also test stale timestamp, wrong path, wrong method, wrong secret.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/rpc/, verify_rpc_signature / NodeServiceServer, x-rustfs-signature handling
  - Evidence: GHSA-c667-rgrv-99vj (signed service prefix instead of concrete method path → cross-method replay in timestamp window). advisory-patterns.md 'RPC input validation and panic safety'; Minimum Regression Test Expectations lists replay across two methods.
 - For any RPC/gRPC handler or deserialization touched, feed empty bytes, truncated MessagePack/protobuf, invalid enum discriminants, and stale timestamps. Grep the deserialization path for unwrap()/expect()/panic-prone decode and prove malformed attacker payloads return a typed error, not a panic (remote DoS). Weak internode auth makes reachability worse, so combine with the RPC-secret probe.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/rpc/, any #[derive(Deserialize)] decoded from wire bytes, RPC handler bodies
  - Evidence: GHSA-gw2x-q739-qhcr (malformed GetMetrics reached unwrap() → remote DoS). advisory-patterns.md 'Treat all RPC payload bytes as attacker-controlled.' rust-code-quality skill: unwrap abuse.
 - Take any object key, RPC disk path, or archive/tar/zip entry name introduced or handled in the diff and construct traversal payloads: '../', URL-encoded '%2e%2e%2f', absolute paths, platform separators, empty components. Trace the value through parse → authz check → final storage path and prove (a) authz and storage normalize the SAME way, and (b) the canonicalized path cannot escape the bucket/prefix root. Attack the case where authz sees the raw attacker bucket but storage cleaning crosses into a victim bucket.
  - Where: crates/ecstore (path join/canonicalize), rustfs/src/storage/, Snowball auto-extract / normalize_extract_entry_key, rpc read_file_stream
  - Evidence: GHSA-pq29-69jg-9mxc (read_file_stream joined untrusted paths, no canonical boundary check), GHSA-8r6f-hmq2-28rg (traversal object keys bypassed authz), GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3 (Snowball '../victim-bucket/object' authorized raw path then storage crossed boundary). Note __XLDIR__ trailing-slash encoding is store-layer only.
 - If the diff touches multipart/copy or presigned POST, verify UploadPartCopy enforces source GetObject AND destination PutObject semantics equivalent to CopyObject, including copy-source policy conditions (not just independent source-read + dest-write). Construct a cross-bucket UploadPartCopy from a bucket the caller cannot read. For presigned POST, submit an upload that violates content-length-range, key prefix, or exact content-type and prove the server rejects it.
  - Where: rustfs/src/storage / S3 API handlers: upload_part_copy, CompleteMultipartUpload, PostObject policy enforcement
  - Evidence: GHSA-mx42-j6wv-px98 (UploadPartCopy missed source authz → cross-bucket exfil), GHSA-wfxj-ph3v-7mjf (missed destination copy-source policy constraint), GHSA-w5fh-f8xh-5x3p (presigned POST didn't enforce signed policy conditions). advisory-patterns.md 'S3 copy, multipart, and upload policy validation'.
 - Grep the diff for debug!/trace!/info!/error! and any ?value / {:?} on structs or response bodies that can carry secret_key, session_token, JWT claims, HMAC secrets, expected signatures, access keys beyond safe identifiers, or raw credential-bearing responses. Check custom Debug impls and merged-config dumps too. Construct the error path (invalid signature, failed auth) and confirm it does not log the secret or the derived authenticator. Verify audit/notify entries redact credential request headers.
  - Where: rustfs/src/**, crates/iam/, crates/audit/, crates/notify/, crates/targets/, RPC signature error paths
  - Evidence: GHSA-r54g (STS creds logged at info), GHSA-8cm2 (debug logs leaked tokens/secrets/JWT claims/raw STS bodies), GHSA-333v (invalid RPC signature log included HMAC secret + expected signature). Fix commit ee6f79110 (redact credential request headers from audit/notify, backlog#963). rustfs-logging-governance skill.
 - For any struct in the diff deserialized from untrusted input (S3 XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policy, replication config, RPC payload), check for #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]. Construct a payload with a typo'd field (e.g. 'NoncurentDays') or an extra field and prove it is rejected, not silently ignored. Flag #[serde(default)] on security-critical fields (retention days, limits, permissions) lacking explicit post-deserialize validation, and any user-controlled integer cast with `as` (i32 as u32) — feed a negative value and check it doesn't wrap to a huge positive.
  - Where: crates/policy/ (bucket policy), crates/ecstore lifecycle/ILM config, replication config structs, crates/protocols XML parsing
  - Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Serde Safety'; advisory-patterns.md 'Serde deserialization' (no deny_unknown_fields found repo-wide; 'NoncurentDays' typo silently accepted; i32 as u32 wrap). Fix commit 1acd47f15 (SSE crash-loop DoS + credential reserved-char bypass, backlog#806).
 - If the diff touches SSE / encryption reader-writer composition, do not trust API metadata claiming encryption. Trace the reader wrapper order (HashReader / EncryptReader / compression / warp) and confirm EncryptReader is actually in the chain that writes to disk — construct the case where a helper unwraps a nested reader and bypasses encryption, storing plaintext. Require a regression test that inspects the ACTUAL stored bytes on disk, not just read-back. Also check encrypted-object checksums are not exposed.
  - Where: rustfs/src/storage/ecfs.rs, crates/rio/ (reader wrappers), crates/kms/, SSE-C replication
  - Evidence: GHSA-xrrf-67jm-3c2r (SSE metadata reported encryption while composition bypassed EncryptReader, stored plaintext). Fix commits a7b9659e7 (hide encrypted object checksums, #4529), 80cc3b1fc (preserve SSE-C checksum state, #4410). advisory-patterns.md 'SSE and on-disk storage invariants'.
 - If the diff touches CORS or the console/browser/object-preview surface: confirm default CORS does not reflect an arbitrary Origin while also sending Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true — construct a request with a spoofed Origin and check the response. For preview, confirm attacker-controlled object content is origin-isolated (not rendered in a same-origin iframe with console creds), served with nosniff/CSP, and that preview trust derives from validated content-type + sandboxing, NOT from object name/extension (.pdf, .html). Separately, if aws:SourceIp is evaluated, spoof X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP as a direct (non-trusted-proxy) client and confirm the socket peer IP is used instead.
  - Where: rustfs/src/server/layer.rs (CORS), console preview/auth code, aws:SourceIp / policy condition evaluation, X-Forwarded-For handling
  - Evidence: GHSA-x5xv-223c-8vm7 (default CORS reflected arbitrary origins with credentials), GHSA-v9fg-3cr2-277j (preview rendered attacker HTML same-origin, exposed localStorage creds), GHSA-7gcx-wg4x-q9x6 (extension-based PDF detection bypassed sandbox), GHSA-fc6g-2gcp-2qrq (aws:SourceIp trusted client XFF). advisory-patterns.md 'Browser, CORS' + 'Trusted proxy'.
 Null report example: "Attacked admin action-constant matching in the two changed handlers (both call validate_admin_request with the exact AdminAction), the FTPS RETR/SIZE authz parity, and the new lifecycle struct's serde surface (has deny_unknown_fields) — no break found."
 ### Concurrency/durability reviewer
 - For every new or moved lock acquisition, enumerate all other code paths that take any overlapping subset of those locks and construct the concrete ABBA interleaving (thread 1 holds A wants B, thread 2 holds B wants A). If the diff acquires 2+ locks without a comment documenting acquisition order, that alone is a finding.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/** (namespace locks, set_disk, disk registry), crates/audit/**, crates/lock/**, any Mutex/RwLock pair in a diff
  - Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Lock Ordering' (document order; same set in different orders = deadlock); real ABBA deadlock fixed in c0d5f938f (#4421, audit registry vs stream_cancellers)
 - If the diff touches the object write/commit path or a lock guard's lifetime, construct the timeline where the distributed lock is lost (heartbeat refresh fails / expiry) after shard writes but before the xl.meta rename commit — verify the commit is fenced on guard.is_lock_lost() (set_disk/ops/object.rs:874-880) and the diff does not move the commit outside the fenced region or drop the guard early.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/object.rs, ops/multipart.rs, crates/lock/**
  - Evidence: 1e6207c08 (#4406) fence write commit on lock loss; ddf197ba5 (#4388) heartbeat lock refresh; backlog#899 fencing comment in object.rs
 - For any change to file creation or write-then-rename: write out the exact syscall order (write tmp -> fdatasync tmp -> rename -> fsync parent dir -> fsync ancestor dirs on first object under a prefix) and simulate a power cut after each step. Flag any dropped/reordered sync, and check the change honors the durability gate (RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE, strict/relaxed/none modes, per-bucket overrides) instead of hardcoding one mode. The 'skip tmp parent fsync' optimization is only sound when the file is renamed out of tmp — verify that precondition still holds.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, disk/os.rs, disk/fs.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/durability.rs, set_disk/core/io_primitives.rs
  - Evidence: PR #4221 (the repo previously had no fsync anywhere); 2df315baf/c081586e7 (#4493) fsync ancestor dirs; 062a68d15 (#4387) tmp-parent-fsync skip is rename-conditional; eaff17cad (#4397) durability modes; 54872d52d (#4478) rename_data crash harness exists — extend it for the diff
 - If the diff touches quorum counting or per-disk error aggregation, construct adversarial error vectors for reduce_errs: nil/placeholder entries, DiskNotFound mixed with FileNotFound, exactly quorum-1 agreeing errors — and show which dominant error wins. Specifically attack the case where offline-disk errors get counted as 'object does not exist', flipping a read/heal decision into data loss. Also check quorum monotonicity: a retry or heal pass must never conclude with a LOWER quorum than the original write.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/error_reduce.rs, crates/ecstore/src/api/mod.rs, set_disk read/heal paths
  - Evidence: 20d61c73b (#4551) reduce_errs leaked nil placeholder as dominant error; e0619e355 (#4536) DiskNotFound treated as object-not-found in listing; quorum monotonicity flagged as open follow-up to #4221 (#4221 follow-up list); crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Do not weaken quorum checks'
 - For any multi-disk fan-out (delete, rename, heal write, cleanup), trace each per-disk Result: find any `let _ =`, `.ok()`, or best-effort collapse that keeps a failed disk out of the quorum math. Construct the run where exactly write_quorum-1 disks succeed and prove the op still returns success — that is the bug. Conversely, for heal writes, check one bad target cannot fail the whole heal (best-effort per target).
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/*.rs, disk/disk_store.rs, crates/heal/**
  - Evidence: f7d2b2563 (#4546) disk delete/rename failures were swallowed; 47c1e730c (#4545) heal write quorum made best-effort per target; 2b063b0c4 (#4400) disk-replacement heal missed versions
 - For every new .await placed between a state mutation and its cleanup/commit (or inside select!/timeout/spawned task that can be aborted), construct the cancellation point: client disconnects and the future is dropped exactly there. Enumerate what is left behind — tmp files, incremented counters never decremented, half-written xl.meta, a held permit/waiter — and verify cleanup runs in Drop or the state is re-entrant. Background loops the diff adds must have a hard outer timeout so a wedged awaitee cannot pin them forever.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/** write paths, crates/object-capacity/** scanners, crates/audit/**, anything using tokio::select! or spawn+abort
  - Evidence: d608e320f io_uring cancel-safety spike (cancellation known-hard here); 5a372557e (#4533) wedged scans needed hard outer timeout; 7b87d4d13 (#4520) waiter-count leak; e44bece00 (#4497) audit start race + paused drops
 - If the diff touches metacache/list producers or cursor resume, construct the interleaving where the producer task completes (or errors) while a reader with a saved cursor comes back for the next page — verify a completed producer is tolerated (no error, no hang) and that a re-folded/full page reports truncation instead of silently ending the listing early. Also feed a corrupt/oversized length prefix into any metacache decode the diff touches.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/cache_value/metacache_set.rs, crates/ecstore/src/store/list_objects.rs, crates/filemeta/**
  - Evidence: 91a23361e (#4531) tolerate completed metacache producers; d91f4d455 (#4538) delimiter re-fold dropped truncation flag; d2c100fd3 (#4226) corrupt length-prefix guard
 - For multipart changes, construct concurrent operations on the SAME uploadId: put_object_part racing put_object_part (same part number), abort racing complete between the parts listing and the commit rename, and list-parts racing cleanup. Verify every metadata read/list/abort holds the per-uploadId lock, and that part.N.meta cleanup is deferred until AFTER the commit rename — cleanup before commit loses parts on a crash between the two.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/multipart.rs, rustfs/src/storage/
  - Evidence: 3bc8d79fe (#4329) serialize put_object_part per uploadId; 7fb95d4fc (#4428) unlocked upload metadata reads/aborts; 93ffbdb9b (#4437) unlocked part listings; c77c5f047 (#4548) part.N.meta cleanup moved after commit
 - Any cleanup/rollback logic added near a commit: verify it runs strictly AFTER the commit is durable, is best-effort (its failure must not fail an already-committed write), and is safe under retry — i.e., re-running it after a partial first attempt must never delete the newly-committed data dir or the last surviving copy.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/object.rs (rename_data tail), ops/multipart.rs, disk cleanup helpers
  - Evidence: afc7f1d6f/d908243e6 (#4386, backlog#898) post-commit old-data-dir cleanup had to be made best-effort; e7cc719c1 (#4389) speculative tmp cleanup moved off hot path
 - If the diff does read-modify-write on any persisted shared state (bucket metadata, notify/target config, queue store), construct two concurrent writers: show whether the second write silently discards the first (lost update) — RMW must be serialized or CAS-guarded. For persisted queues/replay, construct crash-mid-replay and prove entries are neither lost nor delivered twice without an idempotency key.
  - Where: crates/notify/**, crates/targets/** (queue store, SQL backends), crates/ecstore/src/bucket/metadata_sys.rs
  - Evidence: 2490d4ee2 (#4425) persisted config RMW lost updates; 08e44b95f (#4505) queue store crash-safety + replay lifecycle; e008cc5da (#4500) SQL backend idempotency
 - If the diff touches erasure decode/reconstruct or streaming GET, construct the failure mid-stream: shards become inconsistent (or a disk read fails) after N bytes of the body have already been sent — verify the stream surfaces an error to the client instead of ending cleanly at a truncated length. Silent truncation on a 200 response is the known failure mode.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/read.rs (reconstruct-read validation, historically ~line 3117), crates/ecstore/src/erasure/coding/decode.rs
  - Evidence: Known open bug: EC reconstruct-read 'inconsistent shards' mid-GET silently truncates body -> client unexpected EOF; crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'explicit failure over silent corruption'
 Null report example: "Attacked lock ordering on the new disk-registry mutex pair, lock-loss fencing across the moved commit, power-cut points around the added rename, and cancellation at the two new awaits — no break found; quorum math and metacache paths untouched by this diff."
 ### Compatibility reviewer
 - Grep the diff for raw 'x-rustfs-internal-' or 'x-minio-internal-' string literals used with map.insert/remove/get instead of the metadata_compat helpers. If found, construct the MinIO-written object case: a metadata map containing ONLY 'X-Minio-Internal-<suffix>' (mixed case, no RustFS key) and trace the diff's read path — does it miss the value? Then construct the removal case: does remove leave the twin key behind so a stale MinIO-key value resurrects on next read? Also check the value-type trap: get_bytes has NO case-insensitive fallback (unlike get_str), so a diff that moves a suffix from FileInfo.metadata (String) to meta_sys (Vec<u8>) silently loses mixed-case MinIO keys.
  - Where: Any code touching FileInfo.metadata / user_defined / meta_sys: crates/ecstore/, crates/filemeta/, rustfs/src/storage/, crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
  - Evidence: Repo-wide invariant in AGENTS.md 'Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants' and CLAUDE.md; helpers and the asymmetry are pinned by tests test_str_lookup_accepts_minio_metadata_case and test_get_bytes_no_case_insensitive_fallback in crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
 - For any diff reading a binary UUID from internal metadata (transitioned-versionID, tier-free-versionID, data_dir), trace the three degenerate inputs — key absent, value empty (b""), value nil UUID — through to the outgoing tier/S3 request. The bug shape to hunt: unwrap_or_default() or Uuid::from_slice(..).unwrap_or(Uuid::nil()) turning 'no value' into Uuid::nil(), which then gets serialized as ?versionId=00000000-... and the remote tier returns NoSuchVersion. The required pattern is .and_then(|v| Uuid::from_slice(&v).ok()).filter(|u| !u.is_nil()).
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/bucket/lifecycle/ (bucket_lifecycle_ops.rs, tier_sweeper.rs), crates/ecstore/src/services/tier/warm_backend_*.rs, crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/version.rs
  - Evidence: Historical production bug documented in docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md ('Nil-UUID versionId sent to tier'); regression tests live in crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/version.rs; follow-up fix 726f3dc18 'accept empty remote version_id in tier recovery paths' (#4552)
 - For any diff touching tier or replication GET/DELETE against a remote S3 target, enumerate BOTH directions of the versionId contract and trace each: (a) remote version None/"" means the tier bucket is unversioned — the request must carry NO versionId parameter at all (not an empty one, not nil); (b) remote version Some(v) on a versioned target — the versionId MUST be sent, especially on version-purge deletes, or the delete lands on the wrong version / creates a delete marker instead of purging. Check whether the diff collapses these cases through a single Option/String conversion that loses the distinction.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/services/tier/warm_backend*.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/lifecycle/tier_sweeper.rs, replication code under crates/ecstore/src/bucket/
  - Evidence: Invariant in AGENTS.md and docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md; real bug fixed by 0fad35645 'send versionId on version-purge deletes to generic S3 targets' (#4401) — the versioned direction, and #4552 — the unversioned direction
 - If the diff changes xl.meta encoding (adds/reorders msgpack header fields, touches FileMeta::marshal_msg or codec.rs encode paths), attack downgrade and cross-vendor parse: encode an object with the new code and decode it with (a) the meta_ver<=3 read path and (b) the real-MinIO fixture tests from #4377. Then check the header signature: is it recomputed over the new bytes, or copied/hardcoded? MinIO validates it; a stale or zero signature makes MinIO reject the file. Finally verify XL_META_VERSION was not silently bumped — old RustFS/MinIO nodes reject meta_ver > 3 during a rolling upgrade.
  - Where: crates/filemeta/src/filemeta.rs (XL_HEADER_VERSION/XL_META_VERSION, lines ~46-54), crates/filemeta/src/filemeta/codec.rs (check_xl2_v1, decode_xl_headers)
  - Evidence: Real bug 073bc9675 'compute header signature instead of hardcoding zero' (#4343); format contract pinned in docs/architecture/minio-file-format-compat.md (write meta_ver 3, read <=3, XL2 magic); parity fixtures from a91d9cefc (#4377)
 - If the diff touches xl.meta / FileInfo decode (into_fileinfo, version parsing, part arrays), construct hostile foreign input: a MinIO- or corruption-shaped msgpack with a parts-count that disagrees with the etags/sizes array lengths, missing optional fields, and a meta_ver 2 object with legacy checksum. Trace whether the new code indexes past an array, panics, or fabricates default values instead of returning a decode error. Run the pinned legacy fixtures (test_issue_2265_legacy_meta_v2_object_compatibility, test_issue_2288) plus the #4377 real-MinIO xl.meta parse tests against the diff.
  - Where: crates/filemeta/src/ (fileinfo.rs, filemeta.rs, filemeta/codec.rs, filemeta/version.rs)
  - Evidence: Real bug 7efacbdf9 'validate part array lengths in into_fileinfo' (#4382); legacy meta_ver 2 regression fixtures at crates/filemeta/src/filemeta.rs (~:1130-:1174) cited by docs/architecture/minio-file-format-compat.md
 - If the diff 'corrects' a formula, constant, or layout that is a byte-for-byte MinIO port (shard-size math, bitrot hash interleaving, erasure distribution, inline-data prefix), treat the correction itself as the bug: verify against legacy on-disk data before accepting. Concretely: run crates/ecstore/tests/legacy_bitrot_read_test.rs and the ECA-18 pinning tests; check whether existing objects written by old RustFS or MinIO still verify byte-for-byte. Known trap examples: bitrot_shard_file_size's bare return for non-streaming algorithms is CORRECT MinIO whole-file behavior, and the 32-byte prefix on inline data is the HighwayHash256 bitrot hash, not corruption.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/erasure/coding/bitrot.rs, crates/ecstore/src/io_support/bitrot.rs, crates/filemeta/src/fileinfo.rs
  - Evidence: f96314a1d 'pin streaming-only bitrot layout invariant (ECA-18)' (#4553) — audit explicitly decided NOT to change the formula because it breaks legacy interop; #4377 proved the inline-data prefix is the bitrot hash
 - For any diff that copies object metadata into an S3-client-visible surface (GET/HEAD response headers, notification event userMetadata, ListObjects/replication payloads, copy-object metadata directives), construct an object carrying internal keys under BOTH prefixes and in non-canonical casing ('X-Minio-Internal-Compression') and confirm every one is stripped via is_internal_key (which is case-insensitive) — not by an exact-match filter on one prefix. Leaked internal keys are an API-semantics break and an information leak.
  - Where: rustfs/src/storage/, crates/notify/, replication and copy_object paths in crates/ecstore/
  - Evidence: Real bug cf8929189 'strip rustfs/minio internal metadata from event userMetadata' (#4419); is_internal_key contract in crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
 - If the diff touches crates/protos (node.proto, models.fbs) or internode RPC request/response structs, attack the rolling-upgrade interleaving: an old node sends a message without the new field to a new node, and a new node sends the extended message to an old node. Verify proto field numbers are only appended (never reused/renumbered), FlatBuffers tables are only extended at the end, and that an absent new field decodes to a safe default on the receiving side — 'safe' meaning it must not be interpreted as success/authorization (RPC errors fail closed) and must not flip a quorum decision.
  - Where: crates/protos/ (node.proto, models.fbs, generated/), gRPC transport and dispatch in the internode layer
  - Evidence: 6f613317f 'optimize gRPC transport' (#4337) shows the wire layer churns; security advisory 68cw fixed by PR#4402 established RPC fail-closed as a repo rule (see .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons)
 - For S3 handler diffs, replay the request shapes real clients actually send, not just the canonical one: mc and aws-sdk differ on path normalization (root '//' ListBuckets), virtual-host vs path style, and header casing. Then attack every pagination boundary the diff touches: request exactly max-keys/max-uploads/max-parts items and verify the response returns exactly N (not N+1), sets IsTruncated correctly, and yields a NextMarker/KeyMarker that resumes without skipping or duplicating — construct the N+1st-item case explicitly.
  - Where: rustfs/src/storage/ S3 handlers, listing paths in crates/ecstore/src/store/ and set_disk/
  - Evidence: Real bugs 511ad31ba 'normalize root double-slash ListBuckets requests' (#4336) and fefa70b31 'stop ListMultipartUploads from returning one upload past max-uploads' (#4447); docs/architecture/s3-compatibility-matrix.md is the compat source of truth
 - If the diff changes bucket-metadata (.metadata.bin) or IAM/config parsing structs, run it against the real MinIO RELEASE.2025-07-23 fixtures: the msgpack blob uses PascalCase field names, so any serde rename, field-type change, or derive tweak silently drops MinIO-written fields instead of erroring. Verify parse_all_configs still loads all ten config types from the fixture without loss, and that drop-in migration still decrypts MinIO-encrypted IAM/server config rather than treating ciphertext as corrupt.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/bucket/metadata*, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/migration.rs, IAM/config load paths in crates/iam/ and crates/config/
  - Evidence: Fixture parity test parses_real_minio_bucket_metadata_blob_without_loss from a91d9cefc (#4377); real bug 717cdd2ab 'decrypt MinIO IAM & server config on drop-in migration' (#4358); format matrix in docs/architecture/minio-file-format-compat.md
 - If the diff adds a compatibility shim, legacy fallback, wrapper, or old-endpoint alias (grep the diff for 'legacy', 'fallback', 'compat', 'deprecated'), verify two things: (1) it carries a RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(<task-id>) marker with an exact removal condition and a matching entry in the register — an unmarked shim becomes permanent dead weight; (2) the fallback's default direction is safe for old data: e.g. a new decode path must fall back to the legacy decode for old objects by default, not gate legacy reads behind an opt-in flag that makes existing data unreadable after upgrade.
  - Where: Anywhere in the diff; register at docs/architecture/compat-cleanup-register.md; recent example: allow_inplace_legacy_fallback flag in the ecstore erasure codec streaming path
  - Evidence: docs/architecture/compat-cleanup-register.md review checklist; d232a46b4 wired legacy decode prefetch behind a default-OFF gate while keeping legacy reads working (#4542), with arity fallout fixed in 05890d6e2 (#4573)
 Null report example: "Attacked dual-key metadata writes/removals against MinIO-only-key objects, nil/empty transitioned-versionID paths to the tier, xl.meta encode against meta_ver<=3 decoders and the #4377 real-MinIO fixtures, and proto field-number evolution for old-node/new-node RPC — no compatibility break found."
 ### Performance reviewer
 - For each `.clone()` or allocation added to a per-request/per-object path, identify the copied data and execution frequency. Report a finding only for a concrete repeated cost or benchmark regression. Recommend borrowing, moving, `Bytes`/`Arc`, `Cow`, or capacity reservation only when it reduces that cost without obscuring ownership or APIs.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/**, crates/ecstore/src/store*.rs, rustfs/src/storage/, crates/filemeta/, request handlers in rustfs/src/
  - Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Allocation Discipline in Hot Paths'; .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires a concrete hot-path cost rather than a proxy metric
 - For every new sync_all/sync_data/fdatasync/flush/File::sync call in the diff, trace the call chain to DurabilityMode / RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE resolution (crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs:291 DurabilityMode, :347 resolve_durability_mode) and to per-bucket durability overrides. Construct the run where the operator sets mode=none (or legacy RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE=false) and the new fsync still fires — that is an ungated durability cost and a regression on 4KiB writes.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/durability.rs, crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** (rename_data/commit paths), any crate doing tokio::fs or std::fs writes
  - Evidence: #4221 fsync work caused a measured -10% 4KiB write regression (#814 investigation), later gated; durability modes added in eaff17cad (#4397), per-bucket tier overrides in 13e48d93a (#4407); 2df315baf (#4493) shows even ancestor-dir fsyncs are routed through the gate
 - Attack blocking-work placement from both directions: (a) find new synchronous fs calls, hashing, or EC encode/decode executed directly on an async runtime thread without spawn_blocking/block_in_place — construct the stall (a slow disk blocks a worker thread and every task queued on it); (b) find new code that splits one logical disk operation into multiple spawn_blocking hops per object — each hop is a threadpool round-trip, so K hops x N objects multiplies latency. Demand the author justify the placement with the size of the work, not habit.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, crates/ecstore/src/erasure_coding/, crates/ecstore/src/bitrot/, crates/rio/
  - Evidence: 608ab14d7 (#4554, HP-12) folded metadata open+fstat+read into a single spawn_blocking because per-op hops were measurably slow; 8fc637fb1 (#4484) moved the short EC encode inline because block_in_place cost exceeded the work — direction depends on measured work size
 - For each lock acquisition the diff adds or relocates, mark the guard's live range and list every .await and disk/RPC call inside it. Construct the contention interleaving: N concurrent requests serialize on the guard while the holder waits on IO; for namespace/multipart commit locks, compute worst-case hold time (fsync + rename per disk) against the lock's timeout. Also diff the acquisition order against other paths taking the same locks (ABBA).
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** (commit/rename paths), crates/lock/, crates/audit/ registry, any RwLock/Mutex in per-request paths
  - Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Lock Ordering'; c0d5f938f (#4421) fixed a real ABBA deadlock between registry and stream_cancellers; #4370 history: fsync-heavy serial cross-disk commits held a lock long enough to blow test timeouts (#4370)
 - Trace exactly what executes inside the PUT commit critical section (under the object write lock, between tmp write and rename_data completion) before vs after the diff. Any newly added work there — cleanup, extra stat, additional rename, O_DIRECT write, logging — is an attack target: construct the per-PUT latency delta and demand it be moved off the critical section or parallelized across disks.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/*, crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs rename_data path
  - Evidence: Three real optimizations removed exactly this class of regression: e7cc719c1 (#4389) moved speculative PUT-tail tmp cleanup off the hot path, 92c8c6db7 (#4411) moved O_DIRECT shard-writes off the commit critical section, 651ccac13 (#4487) parallelized tmp xl.meta write and shard fdatasync on commit
 - Find any new loop in a batch API that performs a per-item stat/read/RPC sequentially. Construct the concrete blowup: a 1000-key DeleteObjects or a full listing page -> 1000 serial round-trips added by the diff. Demand either a gate (skip when not needed) or bounded parallelism; for startup/load paths, check for accidental O(n^2) (re-scanning the full list per item).
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/store_delete*.rs / batch object APIs, listing/metacache paths, crates/iam/ store loading, crates/heal/
  - Evidence: a413729b1 (#4398) had to gate and parallelize the DeleteObjects per-object stat fanout after it shipped serial; 16a91c35e (#4537) fixed O(n^2) IAM startup load by chunking — both were diff-introduced fanouts of this exact shape
 - For every buffer the diff allocates on the encode/decode/shard path, check: is it sized with with_capacity to the EC-expanded block (not the logical size, not default-grown)? Does it copy into a fresh Vec where Bytes::slice/clone (refcount) or the io-core buffer pool would avoid the copy? Does the diff read hash and data in separate passes where one pass suffices? Construct the per-block byte-copy count before vs after. If the diff touches the io-core pool, verify gauge accounting still balances.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/erasure_coding/, crates/ecstore/src/bitrot/, crates/io-core/src/pool.rs, crates/rio/
  - Evidence: 92bf55ce6 (#4396) fixed a real regression by right-sizing BytesMut encode ingest capacity to the EC-expanded block; 47bee8b31 (#4475) merged bitrot hash+data into one read pass; 7fa3d0d4b (#4534) shows pool gauge accounting is easy to drift when touching buffer reuse
 - For every logging or instrumentation statement the diff adds, classify the call site frequency: per-request, per-object, per-shard, or per-block. Anything info!/warn!/error! at per-object frequency or higher is a finding — construct the flood (one listing under client cancellation, one 10k-object heal) and count emitted lines. New metrics/timers on the data path must be feature-gated, not always-on. Run scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh on the diff.
  - Where: any per-request/per-object code, especially crates/ecstore listing and heal loops, rustfs/src/storage/ handlers; scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
  - Evidence: .agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md (trace level for hot-path/repetitive success events); d25ddb0e1 (#4372) fixed real listing-cancellation error-log noise; hotpath instrumentation is deliberately feature-gated (3f13d098b #4394, f262fcfce #4541 HP-14)
 - Count how many times the diff's request path parses or fetches the same metadata: xl.meta/FileMeta decoded more than once per object, bucket metadata (metadata_sys) re-fetched inside a per-object loop, or the dual x-rustfs-internal/x-minio-internal key lookup re-run repeatedly on the same map. Construct the per-request parse count before vs after; a second full FileMeta decode per GET is a finding.
  - Where: crates/filemeta/, crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** read paths, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/metadata_sys.rs, crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs
  - Evidence: 608ab14d7 (#4554) exists because redundant metadata-read syscall sequences per object were measurable; CLAUDE.md dual-key metadata convention makes repeated get_bytes lookups an easy hidden double-parse
 - If the diff touches PUT/GET/commit/erasure paths and claims 'no perf impact', demand numbers, not assertion: run the criterion benches (cargo bench -p ecstore — comparison_benchmark, erasure_benchmark, rename_data_meta_benchmark, single_block_non_inline_benchmark per crates/ecstore/benches/) against origin/main, and for end-to-end paths the warp A/B relative-budget gate (scripts/run_hotpath_warp_ab.sh --baseline-ref origin/main, as .github/workflows/performance-ab.yml runs it). Probe specifically at 4KiB object size — that is where the last real regression hid.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/benches/, .github/workflows/performance-ab.yml, scripts/run_hotpath_warp_ab.sh
  - Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md: 'Benchmark-sensitive changes should include measurable rationale'; performance-ab.yml (215747022 #4480) is the repo's own relative-budget gate; the #4221 regression was only visible at 4KiB writes (#814 bisect)
 Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durability-gate routing of the added fdatasync, guard live-range across the shard-write awaits, and per-object clone count in the PUT path; ran comparison_benchmark + rename_data_meta_benchmark vs origin/main (4KiB delta within noise) — no break found."
 ### Test-coverage skeptic
 - For every testable behavior claim in the PR description, revert that hunk and name the focused test or executable check that detects the revert. If no reasonable check exists, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor. Especially verify the check exercises the real production path, not a lookalike helper.
  - Where: All crates; highest value in crates/ecstore, rustfs/src/storage, crates/heal
  - Evidence: AGENTS.md testable-behavior exit criterion. Real bug: PR #4220 (ghost-directory cleanup) merged with green tests but its fix never executed on the real delete path — required follow-up rustfs#4307, backlog#798 stayed OPEN. The tests exercised a path the production flow never took.
 - Read each added/modified test and confirm it asserts the real outcome (returned value, stored bytes, error variant), not merely 'call succeeded' or 'no panic'. Flag any test whose only observable is that the function returned, and any `assert!(result.is_err())` that never checks WHICH error. Then check: does the test prove the exploit/failure form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
  - Where: crates/e2e_test (security_boundary_test.rs pattern), and every #[cfg(test)] module in the diff
  - Evidence: Commit dee8e4e63 (#4466) had to rewrite 277 lines of crates/e2e_test/src/security_boundary_test.rs because 'security boundary tests' passed without asserting real outcomes. .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires an observable failure criterion; .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons/SKILL.md asks whether the exploit form is denied.
 - When the diff adds a boolean/mode parameter or config flag, find the test that fails if the flag's effect is INVERTED inside the changed function. Tests that were mechanically updated to pass `false`/default at every call site assert nothing about the new behavior. Execute the check: flip the flag's branch in the source and confirm at least one test goes red for each branch.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ (e.g. build_codec_streaming_part_reader), any function gaining a parameter
  - Evidence: Commit 05890d6e2 (#4573): PR #4560 added a 15th param allow_inplace_legacy_fallback; the arity tests were fixed by passing `false` everywhere — they assert Err outcomes independent of the flag, so the fallback behavior itself has no revert-detecting test at those sites.
 - Mutation spot-check on error propagation: for each newly added `?`, `return Err`, or error-mapping line, mentally replace it with `Ok(default)`/ignore and ask which test fails. The swallowed-error bug class recurs in this repo and always ships with green tests — a fix that propagates errors needs a test that injects the failure (faulty disk, failed rename, dispatch error) and asserts the caller sees Err.
  - Where: crates/ecstore (disk delete/rename, reduce_errs), crates/audit, crates/notify, crates/targets
  - Evidence: Three recent fixes for the same class: f7d2b2563 (#4546, disk delete/rename failures swallowed), dbc628f16 (#4424, audit dispatch failures swallowed), 20d61c73b (#4551, reduce_errs leaking nil placeholder as dominant error). All existed while tests were green.
 - Any test touching GET/read/reconstruct/stream paths must assert the FULL body content and exact length against a known value, not status-ok or first-bytes. Construct the degraded-read case (missing/inconsistent shards forcing EC reconstruction) and assert byte-for-byte equality; a mid-stream failure that truncates the body passes every test that only checks headers or the first chunk.
  - Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/read.rs and ops/, crates/rio, crates/e2e_test GET scenarios
  - Evidence: Known live bug: EC reconstruct-read verification failure mid-GET at set_disk read path silently truncates the body → client 'unexpected EOF'; version-independent, undetected by existing suites because none assert full-body integrity under shard inconsistency.
 - For on-disk / on-wire format changes (xl.meta, .metadata.bin, bitrot framing), reject round-trip-only tests: a struct serialized and deserialized by the same code under test cannot catch format drift. Demand the test parse a REAL captured fixture from crates/filemeta/tests/fixtures, crates/ecstore/tests/fixtures, or crates/rio-v2/tests/minio_fixture_lab — or capture a new one from a single-disk MinIO instance (RELEASE.2025-07-23 procedure from #4377).
  - Where: crates/filemeta, crates/ecstore (headers, msgpack bucket metadata), crates/rio-v2, migration code
  - Evidence: Commit 073bc9675 (#4343): filemeta header signature was hardcoded to zero — round-trip tests passed for months. Commit a91d9cefc (#4377) established the real-MinIO fixture convention (inline/versioned/multipart xl.meta, HighwayHash256-prefixed inline bodies) precisely because synthetic fixtures proved nothing about interop.
 - Attack new concurrency tests for flakiness-by-construction: grep the added tests for `sleep(`, fixed timeouts under ~30s on lock acquisition, and use of shared global state (disk registry, lock client, GLOBAL_*). Serialized cross-disk commits exceed small lock timeouts under full-suite CI disk load. If the test shares global state or saturates IO, it must join the `ecstore-serial-flaky` nextest test-group in .config/nextest.toml (note: serial_test's #[serial] does NOT work — nextest runs each test in its own process). Require readiness polling, never fixed sleeps.
  - Where: crates/ecstore tests, crates/e2e_test, .config/nextest.toml
  - Evidence: Commit 2dfa3d3c3 (#4370): concurrent_resend test flaked with Lock(Timeout 5s) on CI — six legitimate serialized cross-disk commits under IO pressure needed 30s. Commit 7c701d9f2 (#4558) created the nextest test-group after bucket_delete_* raced make_bucket into InsufficientWriteQuorum. 65849740f (#4213) deflaked global-state contamination. crates/e2e_test/AGENTS.md: 'readiness checks and explicit polling over fixed sleep-based timing'.
 - If the diff writes internal object metadata, run the dual-key mutation: delete the `x-minio-internal-<suffix>` write (keeping only `x-rustfs-internal-`) and check whether any test fails. Because `get_bytes` prefers the RustFS key, every read-back test stays green while MinIO interop is silently broken — coverage must include an assertion that BOTH keys are present in the stored metadata map.
  - Where: crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs and all its callers in crates/ecstore and rustfs/src/storage
  - Evidence: CLAUDE.md domain convention: metadata must be written under both x-rustfs-internal- and x-minio-internal- keys for MinIO interop; get_bytes prefers the RustFS key, making the MinIO-key half of the invariant invisible to read-back tests.
 - For changed quorum/version/UUID logic, name the tests covering the specific poison values: quorum−1 disks, nil UUID, absent vs empty vs nil-serialized UUID bytes, remote-tier version_id of None/"" (unversioned tier bucket → no versionId sent), and the same metadata read on both MetaObject and MetaDeleteMarker version types. Mutation check: remove a `.filter(|u| !u.is_nil())` guard from the diff and confirm a test fails; if none does, the nil-UUID class is uncovered.
  - Where: crates/ecstore (tier recovery, heal, quorum paths), crates/filemeta, code reading UUIDs from xl.meta metadata
  - Evidence: Commit 726f3dc18 (#4552) fixed rejection of empty remote version_id in tier recovery. CLAUDE.md invariant: absent/empty/nil UUID all mean 'no value', not Uuid::nil(). docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md: None/"" tier version means unversioned bucket. df9cbc4ed (#4427): unvalidated distribution values caused shuffle index panic — edge values reached production untested.
 - For any pagination/limit/truncation change, construct the exact-boundary test: result count == max (page exactly full), max+1, and a delimiter re-fold that lands precisely on the page boundary — assert both the item count AND the is_truncated/continuation marker. Off-by-one at the page boundary is a recurring shipped bug here.
  - Where: crates/ecstore listing paths (list_objects, ListMultipartUploads, metacache), S3 handlers in rustfs/src/storage
  - Evidence: Two shipped boundary bugs: fefa70b31 (#4447) ListMultipartUploads returned one upload past max-uploads; d91f4d455 (#4538) delimiter re-fold of a full page lost the truncation flag. Both survived existing tests because no test pinned n == max exactly.
 - A green focused test is evidence only for the targets it builds. Follow the `AGENTS.md` validation tier: add package-scoped Clippy or broader test-target compilation only when changed targets, features, or dependents remain uncovered; do not require a workspace-wide build by default.
  - Where: All crates; especially concurrent-branch merges into crates/ecstore
  - Evidence: #4322 broke main because only cargo test ran (field_reassign_with_default is clippy-only). b06f3df6b (#4441) and 05890d6e2 (#4573): test code broke the workspace test build (E0061) on main after textually-clean merges, failing CI for every open PR.
 Null report example: "Attacked revert-detection for all 3 claimed behaviors (each has a named test that fails on revert), flag-inversion on the new fallback parameter (both branches covered in codec_streaming tests), full-body assertions on the changed GET path, and n==max pagination boundary — no coverage gap found."
 ## Sources and maintenance
 Probes are distilled from shipped bugs in git history (commit/PR references
 above), GitHub security advisories (see the security-advisory-lessons
 skill), scoped `AGENTS.md` rules, and invariants under `docs/architecture/`
 and `docs/operations/`. Line numbers drift; re-locate the invariant. Merge
 new incidents into an existing probe when they share a failure class; add a
 new probe only for a distinct attack, rather than growing the root policy.
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
 # Compatibility Lens
 - Internal metadata uses `metadata_compat` helpers for dual RustFS/MinIO keys,
  including mixed casing and removal of both twins.
 - Binary UUID metadata treats absent, empty, and nil as no value. Unversioned
  remote tiers receive no `versionId`; versioned purge requests retain the real
  version ID.
 - `xl.meta` changes preserve supported header/meta versions, recompute
  signatures, decode legacy fixtures, and remain readable by old RustFS/MinIO.
 - Foreign/corrupt metadata validates parallel array lengths and missing fields;
  it returns a decode error rather than indexing, panicking, or fabricating data.
 - Do not “correct” byte-for-byte MinIO ports without legacy fixture evidence.
  Bitrot framing, shard math, distribution, and inline prefixes are contracts.
 - Client-visible metadata/events strip both internal prefixes
  case-insensitively.
 - Proto fields are appended, never reused/renumbered; FlatBuffers tables extend
  compatibly and absent new fields fail closed where authorization/quorum is
  involved.
 - Replay real client request shapes and exact pagination boundaries for S3
  handler changes.
 - Bucket metadata/IAM/config parsing remains compatible with pinned real MinIO
  fixtures and encrypted migration data.
 - Compatibility shims use `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(<task-id>)`, have a removal
  condition, and default toward reading old data safely.
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
 # Concurrency and Durability Lens
 - For every changed lock, enumerate overlapping lock sets and construct the
  ABBA interleaving. Multiple-lock order must be documented and consistent.
 - Mark guard lifetimes and every `.await`, disk, and RPC call inside them.
  Estimate contention and timeout behavior under concurrent requests.
 - Object commits remain fenced if the distributed lock is lost after shard
  writes and before metadata rename.
 - For write/rename changes, trace `write tmp -> sync tmp -> rename -> sync parent
  -> sync required ancestors`; simulate a crash after each step and honor the
  configured durability gate.
 - Multi-disk fan-out counts every result. Quorum-minus-one cannot become success;
  heal remains best-effort per target where that is the established contract.
 - At every new cancellable await between mutation and cleanup/commit, drop the
  future and inspect leftover files, counters, permits, and replay state.
 - Multipart operations on the same upload ID are serialized where required;
  abort/complete/list races cannot delete parts before durable commit.
 - Post-commit cleanup is best-effort, retry-safe, and cannot fail an already
  committed write or delete the last surviving copy.
 - Persisted read-modify-write uses serialization/CAS. Queue replay is crash-safe
  and duplicate delivery has an idempotency contract.
 - Streaming reconstruction failures after partial output surface as errors, not
  successful EOF.
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
 # Correctness Lens
 Attack the changed behavior, not every subsystem in the repository.
 - Trace new error paths to the caller. Inject the ignored/wildcard variants and
  verify they cannot become success, not-found, or a plausible default.
 - Exercise zero/empty/missing, maximum, and exact-boundary inputs for every
  changed count, size, index, page limit, or optional value.
 - For aggregation/quorum changes, test exactly quorum and quorum-minus-one with
  mixed disk errors and nil/placeholder entries.
 - For listing/pagination, test `n == max`, `n == max + 1`, delimiter folding,
  continuation markers, and object/prefix name collisions.
 - For EC/read/streaming changes, inject failure after partial output and verify
  the client receives an error rather than a clean truncated body. Assert exact
  bytes and length.
 - For multipart/object commits, fail before/after rename and cleanup; committed
  data must remain readable and pre-commit cleanup must not destroy parts.
 - For version/index ordering, test `len - 1`, `len`, equal timestamps, missing
  versions, and deterministic tie-breaking.
 - For directory-object behavior, trace `__XLDIR__` at the store layer; branches
  below the layer that sees trailing slashes are dead.
 - For binary UUID metadata, absent, empty, and nil all mean no value. Never send
  nil/empty `versionId` to an unversioned tier.
 - For agent rules/skill routers, test a trigger matrix covering ordinary
  inquiry, low-risk implementation, explicit review, high-risk code, PR
  creation, release, and post-PR monitoring. Each case must select only the
  intended workflow and retain required safety/authorization boundaries.
 Null verdicts name only the probes relevant to the diff.
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 # Performance Lens
 - For added clones/allocations on request/object/block paths, quantify copied
  data and frequency. Recommend borrowing, move, `Bytes`/`Arc`, `Cow`, or
  capacity reservation only for a concrete repeated cost.
 - Route every new sync/flush through the durability-mode and bucket override
  gates; mode `none` must not pay the new fsync.
 - Keep blocking filesystem/CPU work off async runtime threads, but do not split
  one small operation into many `spawn_blocking` round trips.
 - Measure lock hold time across I/O and compare acquisition order for ABBA.
 - Keep cleanup, extra stat/rename, and diagnostics out of the PUT commit critical
  section when they need not be there.
 - Detect per-item serial I/O/RPC in batch APIs and accidental quadratic scans;
  use a gate or bounded concurrency when the concrete fan-out warrants it.
 - Count buffer growth and byte copies in EC/bitrot paths; preserve pool gauge
  balance and avoid repeated metadata decode/fetch per object.
 - Repetitive success logs stay at `trace`; metrics/instrumentation on hot paths
  require an existing gate.
 - Claims of no impact on PUT/GET/commit/erasure paths need relevant benchmark or
  A/B evidence, especially for 4 KiB objects.
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
 # Security Lens
 Use `security-advisory-lessons` only for a dedicated advisory/security audit.
 For an ordinary matched diff, attack these boundaries:
 - Admin routes: route registration, whitelist, handler authn, and the exact
  `AdminAction` must agree. Read-only diagnostics still require admin authz.
 - IAM/service accounts: treat parent, claims, keys, groups, status, and policy
  names as attacker-controlled; prove ownership/root authority before writes.
 - Protocol frontends: every changed/sibling command authorizes the matching S3
  action before reaching storage.
 - Secrets/signatures: use constant-time comparison, normalize public failures,
  keep RPC/root/STS keys independent, and fail closed when secrets are absent.
 - RPC: bind signatures to the exact method/path and timestamp; reject replay,
  stale, malformed, truncated, and invalid-enum payloads without panic.
 - Paths/object/archive entries: reject traversal, absolute/platform escapes,
  and normalization differences between authz and storage.
 - Copy/multipart/presigned POST: enforce source, destination, version-aware
  actions, copy-source conditions, and every signed policy condition.
 - Logging/errors: never expose credentials, tokens, expected signatures, raw
  secret-bearing input, or merged configs—including via `Debug` and parse errors.
 - Untrusted serde: reject unknown fields where compatible and validate
  security-critical defaults/ranges before numeric conversion.
 - SSE/browser/CORS/trusted proxy: inspect stored ciphertext and wrapper order;
  isolate user content; never reflect credentialed arbitrary origins or trust
  forwarded identity from direct clients.
 - Object Lock: unreadable/fabricated/unparsable metadata fails closed across
  foreground, lifecycle, scanner, and force-delete paths.
 Security findings distinguish unauthenticated compromise from a
 low-privileged authenticated bypass.
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
 # Simplicity Lens
 - Compare the production diff with the smallest equivalent local edit. Fewer
  lines alone are not evidence; the replacement must preserve correctness,
  compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
 - Search the touched crate, domain owner, `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, and
  relevant dependencies for each new helper, constant, wrapper, or fixture.
 - Reject forced reuse when normalization, error, deadline, or durability
  semantics differ.
 - Require a concrete trigger for every new defensive branch. Keep boundary
  checks for disk/RPC/version data and checks immediately before destructive
  actions.
 - Flag one-caller helpers only when they merely forward or split a short linear
  flow without adding domain naming, invariant isolation, or useful context.
 - Ensure a replacement removes the superseded in-scope path or keeps one
  canonical core behind a documented compatibility adapter.
 - Remove narration/change-history comments; preserve concise safety, lock,
  durability, and compatibility invariants.
 - Treat tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation separately from
  production growth. Do not optimize away meaningful regression coverage.
 A finding must include a concrete smaller design, not a style preference.
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
 # Test-Coverage Lens
 - For every behavior claim, name the focused test/check that fails if the
  changed hunk is reverted. If none is practical, require the reason and
  residual risk.
 - Confirm tests exercise the real production path and assert returned values,
  exact bytes, stored state, or the specific error variant—not only success,
  `is_err()`, or no panic.
 - For new flags/modes, verify each branch and ask which test fails if the branch
  is inverted.
 - For new error propagation, inject the failure and assert the caller observes
  it; mentally replacing `?`/`return Err` with success must break a test.
 - Streaming GET tests assert the complete body and length under degraded reads.
 - Disk/wire-format tests use pinned foreign/legacy fixtures; same-code
  round-trips are insufficient for compatibility.
 - Concurrency tests use readiness polling, isolate global state, and avoid fixed
  sleeps or unrealistically short timeouts. Use nextest groups when process-level
  serialization is required.
 - Internal metadata tests assert both RustFS and MinIO keys, not only read-back
  through a helper that prefers one key.
 - Boundary companions are distinct coverage: `n == max` vs `max + 1`, and
  absent vs empty vs nil UUID.
 - A focused test proves only the targets/features it builds. Add compilation or
  Clippy only for uncovered changed targets.
@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
 ---
 name: code-change-verification
-description: Review a commit, PR, or merged patch when the user requests ordinary code-change verification. Do not combine with adversarial-validation; use that skill instead for explicitly adversarial, substantial, or high-risk RustFS reviews.
+description: Verify code changes by identifying correctness, regression, security, and performance risks from diffs or patches, then produce prioritized findings with file/line evidence and concrete fixes. Use when reviewing commits, PRs, and merged patches before/after release.
 ---
 # Code Change Verification
-Use this skill for an ordinary requested review. If the root policy or user calls
+Use this skill to review code changes consistently before merge, before release, and during incident follow-up.
 for adversarial validation, use `adversarial-validation` instead of running both.
 ## Quick Start
@@ -80,3 +79,4 @@ Run the full checklist in [rust-code-quality](../rust-code-quality/SKILL.md) —
  - Impact: ...
  - Fix suggestion: ...
  - Validation: ...
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 interface:
  display_name: "Code Change Verification"
  short_description: "Prioritize risks and verify code changes before merge."
-  default_prompt: "Use $code-change-verification for an ordinary requested diff review with prioritized findings."
+  default_prompt: "Inspect a patch or diff, identify correctness/security/regression risks, and return prioritized findings with file/line evidence and fixes."
@@ -1,46 +1,97 @@
 ---
 name: pr-creation-checker
-description: Perform the final RustFS PR preflight and draft compliant English title/body metadata immediately before creating or updating a PR. Do not use during implementation or as a second general code review.
+description: Prepare PR-ready diffs by validating scope, checking required verification steps, drafting a compliant English PR title/body, and surfacing blockers before opening or updating a pull request in RustFS.
 ---
 # PR Creation Checker
-Use this skill only at the PR boundary. Reuse completed diff review and
+Use this skill before `gh pr create`, before `gh pr edit`, or when reviewing whether a branch is ready for PR.
 verification evidence; do not reread the repository or rerun equivalent checks.
-## Preflight
+## Read sources of truth first
-1. Confirm the branch is based on current `origin/main` and contains only the
+- Read `AGENTS.md`.
-   intended task diff.
+- Read `.github/pull_request_template.md`.
-2. Inspect `git diff --stat`, `git diff --check`, and changed file names for
+- Use `Makefile` and `.config/make/` for local quality commands.
-   secrets, logs, generated artifacts, or unrelated edits.
+- Use `.github/workflows/ci.yml` for CI expectations.
-3. Confirm the checks selected by root `AGENTS.md` passed on the final diff.
+- Do not restate long command matrices or template sections from memory when the files exist.
   Do not replace focused behavioral tests with a generic gate or rerun checks
   already covered by an unchanged umbrella run.
 4. Read `.github/pull_request_template.md`. Consult `Makefile`, `.config/make/`,
   or CI only when the required command/current gate is uncertain.
 5. Return `BLOCKED` for an unclean scope, missing required evidence, failed
   required checks, or non-compliant metadata.
-## Metadata
+## Workflow
- Title: English Conventional Commit, at most 72 characters, with no tool
+1. Collect PR context
-  prefix.
+- Confirm base branch, current branch, change goal, and scope.
- Body: English, exact template headings, `N/A` where needed, concise rationale,
+- Confirm whether the task is: draft a new PR, update an existing PR, or preflight-check readiness.
-  actual verification commands, and material risks/rollback notes.
+- Confirm whether the branch includes only intended changes.
 - Use repository-relative paths; never include local absolute paths.
 - Keep prose paragraphs on one logical line and never include the literal
  sequence `\n`.
 - Use a temporary body file with `gh pr create --body-file` or
  `gh pr edit --body-file`; never pass multiline Markdown inline.
-## Output
+2. Inspect change scope
 - Review the diff and summarize what changed.
 - Inspect `git diff --stat` and `git diff --numstat`; assess production-code growth separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation have no growth budget. Treat line counts as signals, not quotas.
 - Call out unrelated edits, generated artifacts, logs, or secrets as blockers.
 - Mark risky areas explicitly: auth, storage, config, network, migrations, breaking changes.
 - Use the simplicity-adversary verdict instead of producing a per-symbol inventory. Block growth only when the review identifies duplication or gives a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
 - Confirm replacement implementations remove the superseded in-scope path or adapt compatibility at the boundary to one canonical core.
 - Scan the diff for newly added string literals and confirm whether they duplicate values already defined as constants/enums/typed wrappers in the same module or shared modules.
 - Treat introducing a new hardcoded literal where a project constant already exists as a likely regression risk; require either a refactor to reuse the constant or an explicit exception explanation in the PR body.
- Status: `READY` or `BLOCKED`.
+3. Verify readiness requirements
- Title.
+- Select checks from `AGENTS.md` "Verification Before PR" based on the final diff's risk tier. Do not replace a focused behavioral test with `make pre-commit`, or a required high-risk `make pre-pr` with a narrower gate.
- Complete PR body.
+- For focused verification, state why the selected tier is sufficient and list the scope-specific commands in the PR body.
- Verification commands and results.
+- If `make` is unavailable, use the equivalent commands from `.config/make/`.
- Risks or `N/A`.
+- Add scope-specific verification commands when the changed area needs more than the baseline.
 - If required checks fail, stop and return `BLOCKED`.
-Immediately before the GitHub write, repeat only the five preflight checks above
+4. Draft PR metadata
-against the final head.
+- Write the PR title in English using Conventional Commits and keep it within 72 characters.
 - If a generic PR workflow suggests a different title format, ignore it and follow the repository rule instead.
 - In RustFS, do not use tool-specific prefixes such as `[codex]` when the repository requires Conventional Commits.
 - Keep the PR body in English.
 - Use the exact section headings from `.github/pull_request_template.md`.
 - Fill non-applicable sections with `N/A`.
 - Include verification commands in the PR description.
 - Do not include local filesystem paths in the PR body unless the user explicitly asks for them.
 - Prefer repo-relative paths, command names, and concise summaries over machine-specific paths such as `/Users/...`.
 5. Prepare reviewer context
 - Summarize why the change exists.
 - Summarize what was verified.
 - Call out risks, rollout notes, config impact, and rollback notes when applicable.
 - Mention assumptions or missing context instead of guessing.
 6. Prepare CLI-safe output
 - When proposing `gh pr create` or `gh pr edit`, use `--body-file`, never inline `--body` for multiline markdown.
 - Return a ready-to-save PR body plus a short title.
 - If not ready, return blockers first and list the minimum steps needed to unblock.
 ## Output format
 ### Status
 - `READY` or `BLOCKED`
 ### Title
 - `<type>(<scope>): <summary>`
 ### PR Body
 - Reproduce the repository template headings exactly.
 - Fill every section.
 - Omit local absolute paths unless explicitly required.
 ### Verification
 - List each command run.
 - State pass/fail.
 ### Risks
 - List breaking changes, config changes, migration impact, or `N/A`.
 ## Blocker rules
 - Return `BLOCKED` if the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier have not passed.
 - Return `BLOCKED` if a documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only change lacks focused verification for the changed surface.
 - Return `BLOCKED` if the diff contains unrelated changes that are not acknowledged.
 - Return `BLOCKED` if required template sections are missing.
 - Return `BLOCKED` if the title/body is not in English.
 - Return `BLOCKED` if the title does not follow the repository's Conventional Commit rule.
 - Return `BLOCKED` if the diff introduces string literals that should use existing constants but did not.
 - Return `BLOCKED` for production-code growth only when the review identifies a duplicated or superseded implementation, or supplies a concrete smaller design with equivalent semantics. Fewer lines alone are not evidence.
 ## Reference
 - Use [pr-readiness-checklist.md](references/pr-readiness-checklist.md) for a short final pass before opening or editing the PR.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 interface:
  display_name: "PR Creation Checker"
  short_description: "Draft RustFS-ready PRs with checks, template, and blockers."
-  default_prompt: "Use $pr-creation-checker for final PR preflight and compliant English title/body metadata."
+  default_prompt: "Inspect a branch or diff, verify required PR checks, and produce a compliant English PR title/body plus blockers or readiness status."
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 # PR Readiness Checklist
 - Confirm the branch is based on current `main`.
 - Confirm the diff matches the stated scope.
 - Confirm no secrets, logs, temp files, or unrelated refactors are included.
 - Confirm the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier passed.
 - For focused verification, confirm it covered the changed surface and the PR body explains why the selected tier is sufficient.
 - Confirm extra verification commands are listed for risky changes.
 - Confirm the PR title uses Conventional Commits and stays within 72 characters.
 - Confirm the PR title does not use tool-specific prefixes such as `[codex]`.
 - Confirm the PR body is in English.
 - Confirm the PR body keeps the exact headings from `.github/pull_request_template.md`.
 - Confirm non-applicable sections are filled with `N/A`.
 - Confirm the PR body does not include local absolute paths unless explicitly required.
 - Confirm multiline GitHub CLI commands use `--body-file`.
 - Confirm new hardcoded string literals were not introduced for values already represented by existing constants/enums (including protocol labels, error identifiers, headers, and metric names), or record a justified exception.
@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
 ---
 name: rust-code-quality
-description: Run a focused Rust quality review when the user requests one, when reviewing a Rust PR/commit, or when another selected review workflow delegates Rust-specific checks. Do not auto-load for every implementation edit.
+description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every Rust change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
 ---
 # Rust Code Quality Gate
-Use this skill for a dedicated Rust review to cover rules that `cargo clippy`
+Use this skill on every Rust code change to enforce quality rules that `cargo clippy` does not catch.
 does not catch.
 ## Quick Start
@@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ rg -n 'unwrap_or_default\(\)|unwrap_or\(' <changed-files>
 ## Manual Review Checklist
-For the Rust diff under review, verify:
+For every Rust code change, verify:
 ### Error Handling
 - [ ] Every production `unwrap()` or `expect()` is infallible by type or a checked invariant; explain only non-obvious invariants, using an existing type, a useful `expect` message, or a concise comment
@@ -1,34 +1,107 @@
 ---
 name: rustfs-logging-governance
-description: Add or review RustFS `tracing` events with the repository field shape, level policy, privacy boundaries, and guardrails. Use when a change adds or edits a tracing macro/instrumentation site or the logging guardrail script.
+description: Standardize and review RustFS logging with structured `tracing` events, lower noise on hot paths, preserve security-sensitive diagnostics, and extend guardrails to prevent legacy logging patterns from returning. Use whenever a change adds or edits any `tracing` macro call (`error!`/`warn!`/`info!`/`debug!`/`trace!`/`#[instrument]`) — including a single log line added in passing while fixing unrelated logic, which is how most new log sites enter the repo — and when reviewing RustFS logs, startup/config diagnostics, cloud metadata logs, request validation logs, or `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
 ---
 # RustFS Logging Governance
-Apply this skill only to changed logging sites; do not turn a local log edit into
+Use this skill when RustFS logging needs to be added, cleaned up, reviewed, or protected against regressions.
 a broad logging cleanup.
-## Workflow
+## Quick Start
-1. Read the changed function/module context and classify the site as lifecycle,
+1. Identify the files whose logs are changing.
-   request/hot path, fallback, external fetch, or summary.
+2. Scan current `tracing` or `log` macros before editing.
-2. Match neighboring structured events and reuse existing `EVENT_*`,
+3. Convert sentence-style logs to short event-style logs.
-   `LOG_COMPONENT_*`, and `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*` constants.
+4. Demote hot-path success logs unless operators truly need them at `info`.
-3. Put stable fields first (`event`, `component`, `subsystem`, `state`/`result`,
+5. Preserve failure, fallback, and security-relevant diagnostics.
-   then context) and a short label last.
+6. Update `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` when a broad cleanup removes a legacy pattern class.
-4. Select the level by operational meaning:
+7. Validate with formatting, targeted checks/tests, and the logging guardrail script.
   - `error`: behavior/security-affecting failure;
   - `warn`: degraded/fallback/operator-actionable state;
   - `info`: low-frequency lifecycle/mode change;
   - `debug`: targeted diagnostics;
   - `trace`: repetitive request/object/shard success paths.
 5. Never log secrets, tokens, auth headers, credential payloads, raw
   attacker-controlled bodies, or merged config dumps. Error strings and
   `Debug` output are log surfaces too.
 6. Prefer one aggregate summary over inventories or startup banners.
 7. Run `./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` and the checks selected by root
   `AGENTS.md`.
-Read [logging-governance.md](references/logging-governance.md) only for a broad
+## Core Workflow
-logging audit, event-model migration, or guardrail expansion. Ordinary single-
+
-site edits do not require the full workspace scope map.
+### 1. Scope the logging surface
 - Read the changed module in full before touching log lines.
 - Classify the log site:
  - lifecycle/startup
  - request or validation path
  - background loop or hot path
  - fallback/degraded behavior
  - cloud metadata or external fetch path
  - metrics/config summary
 - Do not rewrite business logic to make logging easier.
 ### 2. Use the RustFS event shape
 - Prefer fields first, message second.
 - Use short labels, not prose paragraphs.
 - Default field shape:
  - `event`
  - `component`
  - `subsystem`
  - `state` or `result`
  - key context fields
 - Reuse stable field names and avoid inventing near-duplicates.
 See `references/logging-governance.md` for the event model, level policy, and anti-pattern list.
 ### 3. Choose the right level
 - `error`: operation failure that affects behavior or security guarantees.
 - `warn`: degraded path, fallback, suspicious input, or operator-actionable misconfiguration.
 - `info`: low-frequency lifecycle or mode selection.
 - `debug`: targeted diagnostics and low-volume detail.
 - `trace`: hot-path and repetitive success-path events.
 When in doubt, lower the verbosity of normal success paths and keep structured detail in fields.
 ### 4. Preserve security and privacy boundaries
 - Do not log secrets, tokens, auth headers, raw credential payloads, or merged config dumps.
 - Avoid logging raw forwarded headers or full trusted network inventories above `debug`.
 - Keep warning/error logs useful without echoing attacker-controlled payloads unnecessarily.
 ### 5. Keep summaries aggregated
 - Replace multi-line startup banners or checklist logs with one structured event.
 - If metrics already express a concept, avoid duplicating it with many `info!` lines.
 - Prefer counts, modes, and sources over inventories unless debug detail is truly needed.
 ### 6. Update guardrails when needed
 - Broad logging cleanup should usually extend `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
 - Add forbidden patterns only for styles the repo has intentionally retired:
  - sentence-style lifecycle logs
  - noisy hot-path `info!`
  - checklist-style summary logs
  - legacy fallback wording that has been replaced by structured fields
 - Keep guardrails concrete and grep-friendly.
 ### 7. Validate manually
 Use the smallest relevant set:
 ```bash
 cargo fmt --all --check
 ./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
 cargo check -p <affected-crate>
 cargo test -p <affected-crate>
 ```
 For broader Rust changes, add:
 ```bash
 ./scripts/check_unsafe_code_allowances.sh
 ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
 cargo clippy -p <affected-crates> --all-targets -- -D warnings
 ```
 ## RustFS-Specific Notes
 - The durable RustFS logging direction is `event + component + subsystem + state/result + key context fields`.
 - `crates/concurrency` and `crates/trusted-proxies` are examples of this style for lifecycle, fallback, and cloud metadata logs.
 - `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` is the enforcement point for preventing removed log styles from returning.
 ## References
 - Read `references/logging-governance.md` when you need the detailed field set, anti-pattern examples, or guardrail update checklist.
@@ -1,62 +1,285 @@
-# Logging Audit and Migration Reference
+# RustFS Logging Governance Reference
-Read this reference only for a broad logging audit, an event-model migration,
+## Workspace Scope Map
 or a change to `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`. Use `Cargo.toml` for the
 current workspace/crate list instead of maintaining one here.
-## Audit by Operational Role
+Use `Cargo.toml` `[workspace].members` as the source of truth for crate membership. When doing a broad logging sweep, classify crates by operational role so logs stay consistent within each role.
- Server/protocol/admin: lifecycle, authorization failures, request boundaries,
+### Core Server And Request Handling
  and degraded subsystems; avoid normal request success at `info`.
 - Storage/heal/scanner/capacity: integrity failures and aggregate lifecycle;
  avoid per-object, per-shard, and folder iteration noise.
 - IAM/policy/credentials/KMS/crypto: safe identifiers and enforcement results;
  never emit secrets, claims, payloads, or expected authenticators.
 - Notify/audit/targets: target lifecycle and batch/backpressure summaries; avoid
  per-event success logs.
 - Locking/concurrency/I/O foundations: contention anomalies and state changes;
  prefer metrics for high-frequency worker/permit signals.
 - Shared type/schema crates: log at the operational caller boundary unless the
  crate itself owns the failure context.
-## Event Shape
+- `rustfs`
  - Role: top-level server, startup, auth, admin wiring, S3 request handling.
  - Logging focus: startup lifecycle, config summaries, authn/authz failures, protocol entrypoints, degraded subsystems.
 - `crates/protocols`
  - Role: protocol integrations such as FTP, SFTP, WebDAV, and related server-side protocol layers.
  - Logging focus: listener lifecycle, per-protocol enablement/disablement, request bridge failures.
 - `crates/madmin`
  - Role: admin API contracts and management interfaces.
  - Logging focus: admin action boundaries, validation failures, compatibility warnings.
 - `crates/trusted-proxies`
  - Role: forwarded IP trust, proxy chain validation, cloud metadata sources.
  - Logging focus: direct/trusted/fallback decisions, degraded metadata fetches, aggregated config summaries.
 - `crates/keystone`
  - Role: Keystone auth integration.
  - Logging focus: integration enablement, upstream auth failures, config safety without credential leakage.
-Prefer stable fields in this order when available:
+### Storage, Healing, And Data Plane
-1. `event`
+- `crates/ecstore`
-2. `component`
+  - Role: erasure-coded storage implementation and peer/store initialization.
-3. `subsystem`
+  - Logging focus: disk/peer lifecycle, storage fallback, object I/O failures, avoid per-object noise.
-4. `state` or `result`
+- `crates/heal`
-5. stable context such as mode, duration, reason, counts, safe identifiers, or
+  - Role: healing orchestration and repair workflows.
-   capacity/permit values
+  - Logging focus: scheduler lifecycle, repair decisions, backlog or skipped work summaries, avoid repetitive task spam at `info`.
-6. short message label
+- `crates/scanner`
  - Role: data integrity scanning and health monitoring.
  - Logging focus: scan lifecycle, compaction/deep-heal transitions, lag/backlog, noisy folder iteration should stay at `debug/trace`.
 - `crates/object-capacity`
  - Role: capacity scan and refresh core.
  - Logging focus: refresh lifecycle, degraded capacity sources, aggregate stats rather than per-object chatter.
 - `crates/filemeta`
  - Role: file metadata parsing and helpers.
  - Logging focus: parse failures, schema/format mismatch, avoid dumping raw metadata payloads.
 - `crates/storage-api`
  - Role: storage contracts and shared data plane interfaces.
  - Logging focus: contract mismatch and boundary diagnostics, usually low-volume.
 - `crates/checksums`
  - Role: checksum helpers and validation.
  - Logging focus: integrity failures and compatibility mismatches, not per-chunk success logs.
 - `crates/zip`
  - Role: ZIP handling and compression helpers.
  - Logging focus: parse/extract failures, archive path safety issues, avoid verbose file-by-file success logs.
-Reuse the module's constants and neighboring field names. Do not create aliases
+### Security, Identity, And Policy
 for the same concept.
-## Patterns to Retire
+- `crates/iam`
  - Role: identity and access management.
  - Logging focus: authz decision boundaries, imported payload safety, do not leak principals, secrets, or claims.
 - `crates/policy`
  - Role: policy modeling and evaluation.
  - Logging focus: deny/allow decision context, parser/validation failures, no raw secret-bearing request dumps.
 - `crates/credentials`
  - Role: credential handling.
  - Logging focus: never log secrets or tokens; only safe identifiers and redacted states.
 - `crates/kms`
  - Role: key management service integration.
  - Logging focus: init/health/fallback, key-source availability, never log key material.
 - `crates/crypto`
  - Role: cryptographic helpers and security primitives.
  - Logging focus: only algorithm or mode state, not plaintext, ciphertext, or secret-derived material.
 - `crates/security-governance`
  - Role: security governance contracts.
  - Logging focus: policy/state transitions and enforcement diagnostics.
 - `crates/signer`
  - Role: request signing helpers.
  - Logging focus: signature validation failures without expected-signature leakage.
- sentence-style lifecycle announcements;
+### Notifications, Audit, And Targets
 - startup banners and checklist lines;
 - repetitive success logs at `info`/`debug`;
 - raw inventories when an aggregate count is sufficient;
 - fallback prose with values embedded in the message;
 - `?value`/`Debug` output for credential-bearing or attacker-controlled data;
 - logging a parse input when the malformed input may itself be a secret.
-## Guardrail Changes
+- `crates/notify`
  - Role: notification dispatch, runtime facade, notifier implementations.
  - Logging focus: target lifecycle, dispatch summaries, stream lag/backpressure, avoid per-event success spam.
 - `crates/audit`
  - Role: audit target fan-out and audit pipeline management.
  - Logging focus: pipeline lifecycle, target availability, batch dispatch summaries, avoid noisy "started successfully" prose.
 - `crates/targets`
  - Role: target-specific configuration and utilities used by fan-out style systems.
  - Logging focus: target selection, config validation, per-target degraded state.
 - `crates/s3-types`
  - Role: S3 event and type definitions.
  - Logging focus: usually minimal; keep logging at integration boundaries rather than low-level type crates.
 - `crates/s3-ops`
  - Role: S3 operation definitions and mapping.
  - Logging focus: mapping/contract failures, unsupported combinations, not normal-path request spam.
-When expanding `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`:
+### Concurrency, Locking, And Runtime Foundations
-1. Add only files/patterns intentionally migrated in the same change.
+- `crates/concurrency`
-2. Keep patterns concrete and grep-friendly.
+  - Role: timeout, locking, backpressure, and I/O scheduling facade.
-3. Do not encode a style that remains valid elsewhere as a global ban.
+  - Logging focus: lifecycle transitions and degraded states, not high-frequency worker/permit churn at `info`.
-4. Run the guardrail script and the root validation tier.
+- `crates/lock`
-5. Treat the script as a floor; manually verify level, field shape, and privacy.
+  - Role: distributed locking implementation.
  - Logging focus: lock lifecycle, contention anomalies, lock ordering or timeout diagnostics.
 - `crates/tls-runtime`
  - Role: shared TLS runtime foundation.
  - Logging focus: certificate lifecycle, reload/fallback, validation failures without sensitive dumps.
 - `crates/obs`
  - Role: observability helpers.
  - Logging focus: this crate shapes other crates' telemetry conventions; avoid recursive or redundant summaries.
 - `crates/io-core`
  - Role: zero-copy I/O core primitives.
  - Logging focus: keep very sparse; prefer metrics unless failures are actionable.
 - `crates/io-metrics`
  - Role: I/O metrics collection.
  - Logging focus: typically minimal; metrics should carry the hot-path signal.
 - `crates/rio`
  - Role: Rust I/O utility layer.
  - Logging focus: compatibility or runtime boundary failures, not fast-path internals.
 - `crates/rio-v2`
  - Role: next-generation I/O compatibility layer.
  - Logging focus: migration/feature-mode differences and degraded fallback between I/O paths.
 - `crates/utils`
  - Role: shared helpers.
  - Logging focus: usually avoid direct logging in generic helpers unless the helper is itself an operational boundary.
 - `crates/common`
  - Role: shared data structures and helpers.
  - Logging focus: same principle as `utils`; prefer callers to log context-rich events.
 - `crates/config`
  - Role: configuration management.
  - Logging focus: config source, fallback, validation, and summary aggregation; avoid dumping merged configs.
 - `crates/data-usage`
  - Role: shared data usage models and algorithms.
  - Logging focus: refresh lifecycle, summary stats, and degraded reads.
-Useful search seeds for the changed surface:
+### Schema, Contracts, And API Support
 - `crates/protos`
  - Role: protobuf definitions.
  - Logging focus: usually none inside the crate; emit logs at decode/use boundaries.
 - `crates/extension-schema`
  - Role: extension schema contracts.
  - Logging focus: schema validation and compatibility mismatches.
 - `crates/s3select-api`
  - Role: S3 Select API interfaces.
  - Logging focus: request validation and unsupported feature boundaries.
 - `crates/s3select-query`
  - Role: S3 Select query engine.
  - Logging focus: query parse/planning/execution failures, avoid row-level spam.
 - `crates/protocols`
  - Role: non-S3 protocol support.
  - Logging focus: see core server section; keep per-request verbosity below `info`.
 ### Testing And Non-Production Crates
 - `crates/e2e_test`
  - Role: end-to-end tests.
  - Logging focus: test clarity matters more than production governance, but avoid copying test-only logging style into production crates.
 ## Current Guardrail Coverage Map
 `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` currently enforces retired patterns in these high-signal areas:
 - `rustfs/src/main.rs`
 - `rustfs/src/startup_iam.rs`
 - `rustfs/src/auth.rs`
 - `rustfs/src/protocols/client.rs`
 - `crates/audit/src/pipeline.rs`
 - `crates/audit/src/system.rs`
 - `crates/audit/src/global.rs`
 - `crates/notify/src/config_manager.rs`
 - `crates/notify/src/runtime_facade.rs`
 - `crates/notify/src/notifier.rs`
 - `crates/ecstore/src/store/peer.rs`
 - `crates/ecstore/src/store/init.rs`
 - `crates/ecstore/src/tier/tier.rs`
 - `crates/concurrency/src/workers.rs`
 - `crates/concurrency/src/manager.rs`
 - `crates/concurrency/src/lock.rs`
 - `crates/concurrency/src/deadlock.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/global.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/config/loader.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/proxy/metrics.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/proxy/validator.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/proxy/chain.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/middleware/service.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/detector.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/ranges.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/metadata/aws.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/metadata/azure.rs`
 - `crates/trusted-proxies/src/cloud/metadata/gcp.rs`
 When expanding coverage, prefer crates with:
 - repeated sentence-style lifecycle logs
 - high-frequency success-path `info!`
 - startup/config checklist banners
 - security-sensitive fallback wording
 - external fetch/retry/fallback flows
 That typically means the next broad candidates are `rustfs`, `crates/notify`, `crates/audit`, `crates/targets`, `crates/heal`, and `crates/scanner`.
 ## Event Model
 Prefer this structure when the fields are available:
 - `event`
 - `component`
 - `subsystem`
 - `state` or `result`
 - stable context fields such as:
  - `enabled`
  - `implementation`
  - `validation_mode`
  - `peer_ip`
  - `client_ip`
  - `proxy_hops`
  - `duration_ms`
  - `fallback`
  - `reason`
  - `range_count`
  - `hold_time_ms`
  - `available_slots`
  - `total_slots`
  - `permits_in_use`
 ## Level Policy
 - `error`: the operation fails and callers or security guarantees are affected.
 - `warn`: a degraded path, fallback, suspicious request, or operator-actionable config issue occurs.
 - `info`: a low-frequency lifecycle or mode transition occurs.
 - `debug`: useful diagnostics exist but normal operators do not need them all the time.
 - `trace`: hot-path and repetitive success-path details occur.
 ## Preferred Patterns
 - Use a short message label:
  - `"trusted proxy validation failed"`
  - `"concurrency manager state changed"`
  - `"trusted proxy cloud metadata loaded"`
 - Put key meaning into fields, not only the message text.
 - Aggregate config or metrics summaries into one log event.
 ## Retired Patterns
 These should usually be removed or replaced:
 - Sentence-style lifecycle logs:
  - `info!("Concurrency manager stopped")`
  - `info!("Trusted Proxies module initialized")`
 - Checklist or banner logs:
  - `info!("=== Application Configuration ===")`
  - `info!("Available metrics:")`
 - Hot-path noise:
  - `info!("worker take, {}", *available)`
  - `debug!("Proxy validation successful in {:?}", duration)`
 - Legacy fallback prose:
  - `"Request from private network but not trusted: ..."`
  - `"Cloud metadata fetching is disabled"`
 ## Guardrail Update Checklist
 When extending `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`:
 1. Add the touched files to `checked_files`.
 2. Add only legacy patterns that have been intentionally retired.
 3. Keep patterns literal and grep-friendly.
 4. Run the guardrail script after changes.
 5. Avoid adding patterns for logs that are still valid elsewhere in the repo.
 ## Validation Checklist
 For logging-only changes:
 ```bash
-rg -n 'error!|warn!|info!|debug!|trace!|#\[instrument' <changed-paths>
+cargo fmt --all --check
-rg -n '\?[^,)]|secret|token|credential|authorization|merged_config' <changed-paths>
+./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
 cargo check -p <affected-crate>
 cargo test -p <affected-crate>
 ```
 For broader Rust changes:
 ```bash
 ./scripts/check_unsafe_code_allowances.sh
 ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
 cargo clippy -p <affected-crates> --all-targets -- -D warnings
 ```
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: rustfs-release-publish
-description: "Run the end-to-end RustFS console gate, version bump, preview validation, and final-tag publication pipeline. Use only when the user explicitly asks to release or publish a RustFS version (发版/发布)."
+description: "End-to-end RustFS release pipeline: first publish any merged-but-unreleased rustfs/console changes and wait for its latest Release asset, then bump RustFS version files on main directly to the final target, publish a visible GitHub prerelease from a preview tag without updating latest channels, validate it, and publish the final tag on the SAME commit. Use whenever the user wants to release/publish a RustFS version (发版/发布)."
 ---
 # RustFS Release Publish (preview-validated pipeline)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: rustfs-release-version-bump
-description: "Prepare the version-file and release-asset bump for an exact RustFS alpha/beta/stable target, with verification and optional commit/push/PR delivery. Use for an explicit version bump or when invoked by the release-publish workflow."
+description: "Publish a RustFS alpha/beta/stable release with an auditable flow: confirm target version and scope, update workspace and release assets (including strict rustfs.spec changelog identity/date/version format), run required verification, and finish with commit, push, and GitHub PR creation."
 ---
 # RustFS Release Version Bump
@@ -81,7 +81,10 @@ Only drop a file when the current repository release process clearly no longer r
 4. Verify before shipping
 - Run:
 - `cargo fmt --all`
 - `cargo fmt --all --check`
 - `make pre-commit`
 - If verification passes, run `cargo clean`.
 - If `make pre-commit` fails, return `BLOCKED` with root cause and do not silently widen scope to fix unrelated issues unless user asks.
 5. Commit strategy
@@ -106,7 +109,10 @@ Only drop a file when the current repository release process clearly no longer r
 - `git diff --name-only origin/main...HEAD`
 - `git diff --stat origin/main...HEAD`
 - `rg -n "<old_version>|<new_version>" Cargo.toml Cargo.lock README.md README_ZH.md flake.nix helm/rustfs/Chart.yaml rustfs.spec`
 - `cargo fmt --all`
 - `cargo fmt --all --check`
 - `make pre-commit`
 - `cargo clean`
 ## Output contract
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 interface:
  display_name: "RustFS Release Bump"
  short_description: "Prepare RustFS release branches like PR #2957."
-  default_prompt: "Use $rustfs-release-version-bump to prepare and verify an exact RustFS release-version bump."
+  default_prompt: "Use $rustfs-release-version-bump to prepare a RustFS release version, ask about any unclear version policy, and finish the commit/push/PR flow."
@@ -1,40 +1,170 @@
 ---
 name: security-advisory-lessons
-description: Perform a dedicated RustFS security/advisory review for authn/authz, IAM, RPC trust, paths, secrets, browser isolation, encryption, Object Lock, or other security boundaries. Use only when the user requests a security/advisory review or an adversarial review explicitly escalates to the full advisory map; do not auto-load solely because code touches a sensitive path.
+description: Apply RustFS security lessons distilled from repository GitHub Security Advisories. Use when making or reviewing RustFS code changes, doing security checks, handling PR review for auth/authz, IAM, storage, RPC, logging, CORS, console/browser, encryption, policy, or endpoint changes, and when deciding which security regression tests are required.
 ---
 # RustFS Security Advisory Lessons
-Use this skill as the deep security lens. For a normal adversarial review with a
+Use this skill as a RustFS-specific security lens before changing or approving code. For the distilled advisory lessons and review patterns, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patterns.md).
 matched security surface, the concise security reference under
 `adversarial-validation` is sufficient.
-## Workflow
+When currentness matters, fetch the live advisory inventory instead of relying on this skill as a status mirror:
 1. Freeze the exact diff/head and identify the changed trust boundaries.
 2. Read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patterns.md), then apply only
   the matching sections. Useful headings are
   auth/admin, IAM/STS/OIDC, policy/plugins, S3/copy/multipart, protocols, paths,
   secrets/logging/RPC, browser/CORS/proxy, SSE, Object Lock, and serde.
 3. Trace unauthenticated, low-privilege, wrong-action/owner/bucket, malformed,
   and default-config cases. Security decisions must fail closed.
 4. Require a focused negative regression test for the bypass/exploit form, not
   only the intended success path. State residual risk when a test is impractical.
 5. Report proven vulnerabilities separately from defense-in-depth hardening.
 When advisory currentness matters, fetch the live inventory instead of treating
 the reference as a status mirror:
 ```bash
 gh api repos/rustfs/rustfs/security-advisories --paginate \
  --jq '.[] | {ghsa_id,state,severity,summary,updated_at}'
 ```
-Fetch an individual advisory only when the live summary indicates a new or
+Fetch full advisory details only when the live summary suggests a new or changed lesson:
 changed lesson.
-## Finding Standard
+```bash
 gh api repos/rustfs/rustfs/security-advisories/<GHSA_ID>
 ```
-Each finding includes severity, `file:line`, attacker prerequisites, concrete
+For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patterns.md).
-input/path, impact, smallest safe fix, and a regression check. Do not exaggerate
+
-unauthenticated impact when the actual issue requires authenticated low privilege.
+## Workflow
 ### 1. Scope the change
 - Identify touched routes, protocol frontends, handlers, storage paths, credentials, logs, browser surfaces, CI/release code, and policy checks.
 - Treat these paths as security-sensitive by default: `rustfs/src/admin/`, `rustfs/src/storage/`, `rustfs/src/auth.rs`, `rustfs/src/server/layer.rs`, `crates/iam/`, `crates/policy/`, `crates/credentials/`, `crates/ecstore/src/rpc/`, `crates/protocols/`, `crates/rio/`, OIDC/STS federation code, and console preview/auth code.
 ### 2. Map to advisory classes
 - Read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patterns.md) for matching GHSA lessons.
 - Do not rely on advisory titles alone. Confirm whether the issue is authentication, authorization, input validation, storage invariant, browser isolation, logging, or operational hardening.
 ### 3. Verify fail-closed behavior
 - Check that unauthenticated, wrong-permission, cross-user, cross-bucket, malformed-input, and default-config cases fail explicitly.
 - Prefer exact action/permission checks over broad helper calls or inferred ownership.
 - Confirm lower storage/RPC layers do not bypass checks done in upper layers.
 ### 4. Require regression evidence
 - For behavior changes, add focused negative tests that reproduce the advisory class.
 - For sensitive fixes, include tests for the bypass form, not only the happy path.
 - If a test is impractical, explain the residual risk and provide a manual verification command.
 ### 5. Report clearly
 - Lead with concrete findings and file/line evidence.
 - Separate proven vulnerabilities from hardening risks.
 - Avoid exaggerating unauthenticated impact when the code actually rejects unauthenticated requests but allows a low-privileged authenticated bypass.
 ## Advisory-Derived Guardrails
 ### Auth and admin authorization
 - Every admin or diagnostic route needs an explicit authn and authz story. Route registration, router whitelist, and handler-level authorization must agree.
 - Match the admin action to the operation exactly. Copy-paste action constants are a known RustFS vulnerability class.
 - Avoid authentication-only helpers for state-changing admin APIs; use `validate_admin_request` or the established equivalent with the right `AdminAction`.
 - Read-only admin APIs such as metrics, server info, and diagnostics still require admin authorization; checking only that credentials exist is not enough.
 - Replication admin reads can expose remote target credentials; list/get target endpoints require replication/admin authorization and must not return secrets to low-privilege callers.
 - Do not assume admin-action `Resource` scoping constrains blast radius unless the policy engine actually enforces resources for that action.
 ### IAM and service accounts
 - Treat imported IAM payload fields as attacker-controlled: `parent`, `claims`, `accessKey`, `secretKey`, status, policy names, and groups.
 - For service account create/update/import, prove parent ownership or root/admin authority before writing credentials or claims; an action permission alone must not allow choosing root or another user as `target_user`.
 - Treat IAM export packages as credential disclosure surfaces; never include plaintext user or service-account secret keys unless the caller is allowed to recover those secrets and the export format is intentionally sealed.
 - Do not let `deny_only` or "no explicit deny" become an allow decision that skips required allow checks.
 - Test cross-user list/update/import flows with wrong, correct, self, parent, and root identities.
 ### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
 - Every STS endpoint must have an explicit authentication story: SigV4 where required, OIDC token verification for web identity, and role/session policy validation before issuing credentials.
 - For web identity, the JWT is the credential; exemption from SigV4 is not itself an authentication bypass. Treat pre-verification claims only as untrusted routing hints, bound token size, normalize public failures, rate-limit discovery, and issue credentials only after signature, issuer, audience, and expiration checks.
 - JWT session tokens must be signed and verified by a trusted issuer/key path, not by service-account-controlled material or a reused root secret.
 - JWT verification must enforce required claims and expiration for every bearer token path; "allow missing exp" is never acceptable for user-presented credentials.
 - Public OIDC bootstrap and callback routes must treat `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, redirect targets, `state`, and callback parameters as untrusted; credential-bearing redirects require a configured, allowlisted origin.
 - OIDC discovery and validation URLs are SSRF sinks. Resolve and classify hostnames at connection time, reject rebinding to loopback/private/link-local ranges, and do not rely on literal string checks.
 ### IAM policy conditions and plugins
 - Treat request headers as attacker-controlled even after SigV4; callers sign their own spoofed headers. Do not merge them into server-derived condition keys such as identity, groups, version ID, signature version, JWT, or LDAP claims.
 - Keep the condition-key namespace explicit. Reserved server-derived keys must reject or ignore colliding headers, while intentional request-header keys such as `s3:x-amz-*` remain available.
 - Quantified IAM condition tests need partially overlapping multi-value sets. Fully contained and fully disjoint sets cannot distinguish `ForAllValues` from `ForAnyValue` bugs.
 - External policy plugins must receive the same security context as built-in policy evaluation. If OPA or another plugin depends on existing object tags, load and pass `ExistingObjectTag/*` before the plugin decision.
 ### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and presigned POST
 - Version-aware object requests need version-aware actions. Explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources must authorize `s3:GetObjectVersion`, not only `s3:GetObject`.
 - Multipart copy must enforce source `GetObject` and destination `PutObject` semantics equivalent to `CopyObject`, including copy-source and policy conditions.
 - Do not let `CreateMultipartUpload`, `UploadPartCopy`, `CompleteMultipartUpload`, or `AbortMultipartUpload` return success without authorization.
 - Fallbacks from version actions to non-version actions must still pass the same public-access-block, anonymous-deny, and post-authorization gates as a direct allow.
 - Presigned POST policies are server-side contracts. Enforce `content-length-range`, key prefix, exact metadata/content-type, and all signed policy conditions.
 ### Protocol frontends and IAM parity
 - FTP/FTPS, SFTP, gateway, and other protocol drivers must enforce IAM per operation before calling storage backends; authentication to a protocol listener is not authorization.
 - Match protocol commands to the same S3 actions as HTTP, such as `RETR` to `GetObject`, `SIZE`/`MDTM` to `HeadObject`, `MKD` to `CreateBucket`, and bucket probes to `ListBucket` or `HeadBucket`.
 - Review every handler in a protocol driver, not only the changed handler, because RustFS advisories show mixed guarded and unguarded siblings in the same driver.
 - Regression tests for protocol frontends should deny the shared authorization hook and prove the backend is not reached for the denied command.
 - Compare protocol secrets in constant time, normalize invalid-user and invalid-secret failures where practical, and add rate limiting before exposing password-style protocol endpoints.
 ### Paths, object keys, and filesystem access
 - Never join untrusted bucket/object/RPC path strings onto filesystem roots without normalization and boundary checks.
 - Reject or safely handle `..`, absolute paths, URL-encoded traversal, platform separators, empty components, and paths that canonicalize outside the intended root.
 - Validate both S3 object-key paths and internode/RPC disk paths; storage helpers can bypass S3 authorization if they trust already-parsed paths.
 - Archive auto-extract paths are object keys too. Validate tar/zip entry names before IAM checks and before storage writes, and prove cleaned paths cannot cross bucket or prefix boundaries.
 ### Secrets, default credentials, and crypto
 - Do not ship hard-coded shared tokens, HMAC secrets, private keys, or production test keys.
 - Defaults for root credentials and internode/RPC auth must fail closed for network-reachable deployments or generate per-install random secrets; warnings alone are not a security boundary.
 - Keep cryptographic roles separated: root S3 credentials, RPC HMAC keys, and STS/JWT signing keys must not be reused or deterministically derived from each other.
 - License or token validation must use signatures with embedded public/verifying keys only; do not use private-key decryption as authenticity.
 - Plan key rotation and key IDs when removing exposed keys.
 ### Logging and debug output
 - Logs must never include access keys beyond safe identifiers, secret keys, session tokens, JWT claims, HMAC secrets, expected signatures, license secrets, or raw response bodies containing credentials.
 - Treat `Debug` implementations, `?value` tracing, merged config dumps, and dependency-level HTTP body logging as leak surfaces.
 - Error and panic messages are log content: they propagate through `?` and get printed by `error!`/startup logging far from where they were constructed. Never interpolate a raw config or credential value into an error string.
 - A value that fails secret-format parsing is usually the secret itself (e.g. a bare base64 key missing its `<name>:` prefix), so a parse-failure hint must name the env var or file and the expected format, never echo the input. Redacting `Debug` impls does not cover this channel.
 - Add log-capture tests or targeted unit tests for redaction wrappers when changing credential structs or response bodies.
 ### RPC, parsing, and panic safety
 - Treat all RPC payload bytes as attacker-controlled. Replace `unwrap`, `expect`, and panic-prone deserialization with typed errors.
 - Malformed request tests should cover empty bytes, truncated MessagePack/protobuf, invalid enum values, stale timestamps, and invalid signatures.
 - RPC authentication must be independently strong; do not depend on S3 admin credentials unless the fallback is explicit and safe.
 - RPC signatures must bind the exact generated gRPC method path, timestamp, and request method. Service-prefix signatures must not authorize a different concrete NodeService call.
 ### Browser, CORS, and console surfaces
 - Do not reflect arbitrary `Origin` while also allowing credentials. Default CORS should be no CORS unless explicitly configured.
 - Do not render user-controlled object content in a same-origin iframe with console credentials available to JavaScript.
 - Prefer origin separation for object preview/download, `nosniff`, CSP, strict content-type handling, and avoiding durable credentials in `localStorage`.
 - Preview safety must be based on trusted content type and sandboxing, not object names or extensions such as `.pdf`.
 - Console license/version-like metadata endpoints should expose only coarse public data unless authenticated, especially subject names and expiration timestamps.
 ### Profiling, debug, and health endpoints
 - Profiling and debug endpoints are not health checks. They require admin auth, opt-in enablement, rate limiting, and safe responses.
 - Do not return absolute filesystem paths or other deployment layout in unauthenticated or low-privilege responses.
 - Ensure health endpoint allowlists cannot accidentally include expensive diagnostics.
 ### Trusted proxy and network identity
 - Only honor `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` when the request came from a configured trusted proxy.
 - Apply the same trusted-proxy rule to scheme and host derivation; direct clients must not control security-sensitive redirects through `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, or `X-Forwarded-Proto`.
 - Direct clients must use the socket peer address for `aws:SourceIp` and policy condition evaluation.
 - Add tests for direct spoofed headers and trusted-proxy headers.
 ### SSE and storage invariants
 - Encryption metadata is not proof that bytes were encrypted on disk.
 - When touching reader/writer wrappers such as hashing, encryption, compression, or warp readers, verify wrapper order and inspect stored bytes in regression tests.
 - Avoid helper shortcuts that unwrap nested readers and accidentally bypass encryption or integrity layers.
 ### Object Lock and retention invariants
 - Object Lock state must fail closed when bucket metadata is unreadable, fabricated, or unparsable. Only a confirmed absence of Object Lock configuration may permit unprotected deletes or writes.
 - Do not collapse metadata read faults, missing persisted metadata, parse failures, and genuinely absent Object Lock config into one "not configured" result.
 - Retention enforcement must cover foreground deletes, batch deletes, force-delete helpers, default-retention materialization on PUT, lifecycle expiry, scanner sweeps, and all-versions expiry.
 ## Review Prompts
 Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
 - Could a low-privileged authenticated user reach this path with the wrong action, parent, bucket, or source object?
 - Does a non-HTTP protocol path call the same authorization boundary as the S3 API before touching storage?
 - Does a public/default/empty config change security behavior from fail-closed to fail-open?
 - Is any attacker-controlled value later used as a path, policy condition, credential identity, log field, URL, Origin, or response body?
 - Does this response contain stored replication, remote target, or service credentials that need redaction or stricter authorization?
 - Does any error constructor or `format!` interpolate a variable that can hold secret material, including a config parse error that echoes the raw input?
 - Does an IAM export/import path expose or trust plaintext credential secrets beyond the caller's intended authority?
 - Can this STS/OIDC path issue credentials without SigV4, trusted issuer validation, allowlisted redirects, or trusted-proxy host/scheme handling?
 - Can a service-account or STS token omit `exp`, forge `sessionPolicy`, or use a principal-controlled key as signing authority?
 - Does this outbound validation path resolve attacker-supplied hostnames and reject private, loopback, link-local, and rebound addresses at the actual connection boundary?
 - Is an archive entry, object key, or policy resource normalized differently between authorization and storage?
 - Is the same operation implemented in multiple paths, such as `CopyObject` vs `UploadPartCopy`, and do all paths enforce the same security contract?
 - Does an explicit object version, fallback action, or plugin authorization path pass through the same action and post-authorization gates as the direct S3 path?
 - Can a caller-controlled header populate a condition key that should be derived only by the server?
 - Do condition tests include partially overlapping multi-value inputs for quantified operators?
 - Does unreadable bucket metadata make Object Lock or retention enforcement fail closed rather than disappear?
 - Does a preview or browser-surface fix preserve the original security invariant when adding alternate viewers or file-type detection?
 - Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 interface:
  display_name: "Security Advisory Lessons"
  short_description: "Apply advisory lessons in reviews."
-  default_prompt: "Use $security-advisory-lessons for a dedicated RustFS security review grounded in past advisories."
+  default_prompt: "Review code changes against past RustFS security advisory lessons and report concrete risks, missing tests, and recommended fixes."
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
 sha256-darwin=9f767b37ed8b1c82da62ea441462d75487785c8086e56f08fb6f6cd89c6e2e52
 sha256-linux=fbdaf42b220958d4b1e8880e0f8b5a7992d38e21051bb60596dd4538424757d6
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 sha256=9b9bc336b43b70d0e06e0adb5455bf035bb18945d85d60936eb6fe4d48e0e680
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
 sha256-darwin=55534a97fbd376f64c8f6c341d319017d11ff77cad6da8629a1a7f6a874e0315
 sha256-linux=c06fb8c19aed6f388b9dc61cb8251b7a44f8561a9bf764ad2b9e635598f8dc17
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 sha256=655a3f3c1d042e694339d15caba7580518320322d1bac0f09450b37e6c09e2e7
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 sha256=ec27cde6ce6400723c4b372bfbd2ac61709c744294e4810af765e8a808d8e31d
@@ -75,11 +75,6 @@ embedded-secrets-check: ## Check no private key material or credential literal i
 	@echo "🔑 Checking embedded secret material guard..."
 	./scripts/check_embedded_secrets.sh
 .PHONY: test-wiring-check
 test-wiring-check: ## Check tests stay registered and selected by their intended runners
 	@echo "🧪 Checking test wiring..."
 	python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py
 .PHONY: log-analyzer-rules-check
 log-analyzer-rules-check: core-deps ## Check log-analyzer rule anchors still exist verbatim in source
 	@echo "🩺 Checking log-analyzer rule anchors..."
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ planning-docs-check: ## Check that no planning-type documents are committed
 	./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
 .PHONY: pre-commit
-pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check test-wiring-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
+pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
 	@echo "✅ All pre-commit checks passed!"
 .PHONY: pre-pr
-pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check test-wiring-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
+pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
 	@echo "✅ All pre-PR checks passed!"
 .PHONY: dev-check
-dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check test-wiring-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
+dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check embedded-secrets-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
 	@echo "✅ Fast development checks passed!"
@@ -35,9 +35,6 @@ script-tests: ## Run shell script tests
 	./scripts/test_pinned_paired_abba_bench.sh
 	./scripts/test_manual_transition_runbooks.sh
 	./scripts/check_embedded_secrets.sh --self-test
 	python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --self-test
 	python3 ./scripts/check_scheduled_validation_freshness.py --self-test
 	python3 ./scripts/s3-tests/test_report_compat.py
 	bash -n ./scripts/validate_object_data_cache_cold_stampede.sh
 	python3 ./scripts/check_object_data_cache_follower_samples.py --self-test
 	./scripts/validate_object_data_cache_cold_stampede.sh --self-test
@@ -38,11 +38,10 @@ e2e-vault = { max-threads = 1 }
 # replacement_privileged_e2e_test when explicitly run as root on Linux). They
 # are correct in isolation but resource-heavy; serialize them under nextest's
 # process boundary (serial_test's #[serial] does not cross it) so several 4-disk
-# servers never run at once. The e2e-full merge/main lane picks these up;
+# servers never run at once. ci-7's nightly picks these up via the e2e suite;
 # they are deliberately NOT in the fast PR `e2e-smoke` filter.
 e2e-reliability = { max-threads = 1 }
 e2e-inline-boundaries = { max-threads = 1 }
 e2e-cluster-nightly = { max-threads = 1 }
 # --- default profile (local): serialize the flaky groups, never retry --------
 [[profile.default.overrides]]
@@ -162,7 +161,7 @@ retries = 2
 # Serialize the 4-disk reliability / degraded-read e2e tests under the ci
 # profile too (see the e2e-reliability test-group note near the top). Not a
 # quarantine: no retries, just single-threaded so several 4-disk servers never
-# run concurrently when e2e-full runs the suite.
+# run concurrently when ci-7's nightly runs the full e2e suite.
 [[profile.ci.overrides]]
 filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression|replacement_privileged_e2e)_test::/)'
 test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
@@ -231,8 +230,8 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
 # the nightly profile derives its set as "the replication module MINUS this
 # allowlist", so any new replication test lands in nightly by default (never
 # silently unrun) until it is explicitly blessed as fast here. Keep the two
-# regexes byte-identical. The committed profile selection digests make changes
+# regexes byte-identical. Count invariant: 20 here + 49 nightly = 69 total
-# visible in CI; current counts live in docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md.
+# (authority: `cargo nextest list`; docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md).
 # HISTORY (2026-07-11): the 20 fast tests were briefly pulled out of this lane
 # (#4724) because they set a loopback (127.0.0.1) replication target that the
 # SSRF egress guard rejected on every PR after repl-1 (#4712). That is fixed —
@@ -328,8 +327,9 @@ slow-timeout = { period = "60s", terminate-after = 2, grace-period = "10s" }
 # the STS dual-node test actually exercises its path (it skips gracefully with
 # a visible log line when awscurl is absent), and routes scheduled failures
 # through .github/actions/schedule-failure-issue (ci-8). Explicit division of
-# labor with e2e-full: these tests run only in the consolidated nightly
+# labor with ci-5's future e2e-full merge gate: these tests run ONLY here, not
-# workflow, not in the merge/main lane.
+# double-run there. TODO(ci-7): fold this interim repl-owned lane into the ci
 # domain's consolidated scheduled e2e workflow once it exists.
 [profile.e2e-repl-nightly]
 default-filter = """
    package(e2e_test)
@@ -343,60 +343,26 @@ fail-fast = false
 # workflow as the failure-triage artifact.
 path = "junit.xml"
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # e2e-nightly profile — destructive multi-process cluster fault domains
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # These seven modules are deliberately outside e2e-full's merge budget. Each
 # starts a real multi-process or multi-disk topology and exercises node/disk
 # loss, quorum, cleanup, notification fan-in, or admin-timeout behavior. The
 # consolidated nightly workflow runs them serially to avoid resource
 # starvation; failures are never retried.
 [profile.e2e-nightly]
 default-filter = """
    package(e2e_test)
    & test(/^(admin_timeout_regression_test|cluster_concurrency_test|cluster_multidrive_pool_test|heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test|namespace_lock_quorum_test|object_lambda_test|stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster_test)::/)
 """
 fail-fast = false
 [profile.e2e-nightly.junit]
 path = "junit.xml"
 [[profile.e2e-nightly.overrides]]
 filter = 'package(e2e_test)'
 test-group = 'e2e-cluster-nightly'
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # e2e-protocols profile — serial protocol lane
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # The suite owns fixed ports, so the nightly workflow runs this exact profile
 # with one nextest worker.
 [profile.e2e-protocols]
 default-filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^protocols::/)'
 fail-fast = false
 [profile.e2e-protocols.junit]
 path = "junit.xml"
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # e2e-full profile — merge-gate full single-node e2e lane (backlog#1149 ci-5)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # The merge gate (ci.yml `e2e-full` job: push main + merge_group +
-# workflow_dispatch). Runs the user-visible KMS, object-lock, multipart-auth,
+# workflow_dispatch). Runs the never-automated user-visible suites — KMS (40),
-# quota, checksum, encryption,
+# object_lock (33), multipart_auth (109), quota, checksum, encryption,
 # security-boundary, ... — that the fast PR `e2e-smoke` subset deliberately
 # skips. Budget <= 45 min; authority for the suite count is `cargo nextest list
 # --profile e2e-full` (see docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md).
 #
 # The filter is "the whole e2e_test crate MINUS the sets owned by other lanes":
-#   * protocols:: — FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV, run from the dedicated protocol profile
+#   * protocols:: — FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV, still pinned to --test-threads=1 by fixed
-#     with one worker because the suite owns fixed ports.
+#     ports; they join a scheduled lane once ci-6 randomises the ports (ci-7).
 #   * the 7 cluster suites that spin up a RustFSTestClusterEnvironment
 #     (cluster_concurrency, cluster_multidrive_pool, stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster,
 #     namespace_lock_quorum, heal_erasure_disk_rebuild, admin_timeout_regression,
-#     object_lambda) — too heavy for the merge budget; they run in the
+#     object_lambda) — too heavy for the merge budget; they run in ci-7's
-#     e2e-nightly serial cluster-fault lane.
+#     nightly 4-node lane.
 #   * replication_extension_test — repl-1 already splits it into the PR
-#     `e2e-smoke` (20 fast) and `e2e-repl-nightly` (55 slow) lanes and reserves
+#     `e2e-smoke` (20 fast) and `e2e-repl-nightly` (49 slow) lanes and reserves
 #     it for those, so e2e-full does not double-run it.
 #   * #[ignore]d tests — nextest skips them by default (no --run-ignored); the
 #     manual-localhost:9000 reliant/policy tests are ci-13's migration.
@@ -14,10 +14,9 @@
 name: "Schedule Failure Issue"
 description: >-
-  Open (or update) a tracking issue when a scheduled workflow run fails or
+  Open (or update) a tracking issue when a scheduled workflow run fails.
  does not complete normally.
  Dedupes by workflow name: if an open issue titled
-  "[scheduled-failure] <workflow name>" already exists, the result is
+  "[scheduled-failure] <workflow name>" already exists, the failure is
  appended as a comment; otherwise a new issue is created. This is the
  single alerting mechanism for all scheduled pipelines (backlog#1149 ci-8).
@@ -39,30 +38,6 @@ inputs:
      Set to an empty string to skip labeling.
    required: false
    default: "infrastructure"
  source-run-id:
    description: "Run ID to report. Defaults to the current workflow run."
    required: false
    default: ${{ github.run_id }}
  source-run-attempt:
    description: "Run attempt to report. Defaults to the current attempt."
    required: false
    default: ${{ github.run_attempt }}
  source-event:
    description: "Trigger event of the run being reported."
    required: false
    default: ${{ github.event_name }}
  source-ref-name:
    description: "Ref name of the run being reported."
    required: false
    default: ${{ github.ref_name }}
  source-sha:
    description: "Commit SHA of the run being reported."
    required: false
    default: ${{ github.sha }}
  details-file:
    description: "Optional Markdown file appended to the issue body."
    required: false
    default: ""
 runs:
  using: "composite"
@@ -73,22 +48,17 @@ runs:
        GH_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }}
        WORKFLOW_NAME: ${{ inputs.workflow-name }}
        ISSUE_LABEL: ${{ inputs.label }}
        SOURCE_RUN_ID: ${{ inputs.source-run-id }}
        SOURCE_RUN_ATTEMPT: ${{ inputs.source-run-attempt }}
        SOURCE_EVENT: ${{ inputs.source-event }}
        SOURCE_REF_NAME: ${{ inputs.source-ref-name }}
        SOURCE_SHA: ${{ inputs.source-sha }}
        DETAILS_FILE: ${{ inputs.details-file }}
      run: |
        set -euo pipefail
        title="[scheduled-failure] ${WORKFLOW_NAME}"
-        run_url="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/runs/${SOURCE_RUN_ID}"
+        run_url="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/runs/${GITHUB_RUN_ID}"
-        # Inspect the reported run attempt. It can be the current in-workflow
+        # Failed job names for this run attempt. The alert job runs while the
-        # failure or a completed run observed by the external watchdog.
+        # run as a whole is still in progress, so inspect the jobs that have
        # already completed with a non-success conclusion.
        failed_jobs="$(gh api \
-          "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/runs/${SOURCE_RUN_ID}/attempts/${SOURCE_RUN_ATTEMPT}/jobs" \
+          "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/runs/${GITHUB_RUN_ID}/attempts/${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}/jobs" \
          --paginate \
          --jq '.jobs[]
                | select(.conclusion == "failure" or .conclusion == "timed_out" or .conclusion == "cancelled")
@@ -97,26 +67,15 @@ runs:
          failed_jobs="- (failed job not recorded yet — see the run page)"
        fi
        details=""
        if [ -n "${DETAILS_FILE}" ]; then
          if [ -f "${DETAILS_FILE}" ]; then
            details="$(cat "${DETAILS_FILE}")"
          else
            details="Details file was not available: \`${DETAILS_FILE}\`"
          fi
        fi
        body="$(cat <<EOF
-        Run of **${WORKFLOW_NAME}** did not complete successfully.
+        Scheduled run of **${WORKFLOW_NAME}** failed.
-        - Run: ${run_url} (attempt ${SOURCE_RUN_ATTEMPT})
+        - Run: ${run_url} (attempt ${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT})
-        - Event: \`${SOURCE_EVENT}\`
+        - Event: \`${GITHUB_EVENT_NAME}\`
-        - Ref: \`${SOURCE_REF_NAME}\` @ \`${SOURCE_SHA}\`
+        - Ref: \`${GITHUB_REF_NAME}\` @ \`${GITHUB_SHA}\`
-        Non-success jobs:
+        Failed jobs:
        ${failed_jobs}
        ${details}
        EOF
        )"
@@ -46,9 +46,10 @@ lists when upstream changes.
  the PR.
 - **Weekly + manual**: `.github/workflows/e2e-s3tests.yml` runs the full
  upstream suite (`TEST_SCOPE=all`) against a Docker deployment (single node
-  or a 4-node distributed cluster behind HAProxy). The canonical gate policy
+  or a 4-node distributed cluster behind HAProxy). It fails only on
-  and compatibility-report behavior are documented in
+  regressions in the implemented whitelist and publishes a classification
-  [`scripts/s3-tests/README.md`](../../scripts/s3-tests/README.md).
+  report (`compat-report.md`, also shown in the job summary) listing promotion
  candidates and unclassified tests.
 ## Running Tests Locally
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
 [
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/audit.yml", "max_age_hours": 36 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/build.yml", "max_age_hours": 192 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/ci.yml", "max_age_hours": 192 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/coverage.yml", "max_age_hours": 192 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/e2e-replication-nightly.yml", "max_age_hours": 36 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/e2e-s3tests.yml", "max_age_hours": 192 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/fuzz.yml", "max_age_hours": 36 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/mint.yml", "max_age_hours": 192 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/minio-interop.yml", "max_age_hours": 36 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/nightly-gnu.yml", "max_age_hours": 36 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/performance-ab.yml", "max_age_hours": 36 },
  { "workflow": ".github/workflows/runner-hygiene.yml", "max_age_hours": 792 }
 ]
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ on:
    # advisory could sit unnoticed for seven days. The check list is unchanged —
    # splitting it into a light daily advisories-only run and a weekly full run
    # would create runs where sources/bans/licenses go unverified.
-    - cron: '23 3 * * *' # Daily 03:23 UTC
+    - cron: '0 3 * * *' # Daily 03:00 UTC (staggered after the midnight ci/build crons)
  workflow_dispatch:
 permissions:
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ on:
      - ".dockerignore"
      - "flake.lock"
  schedule:
-    - cron: "13 1 * * 0" # Weekly on Sunday 01:13 UTC
+    - cron: "0 1 * * 0" # Weekly on Sunday 01:00 UTC (staggered after the ci.yml midnight cron)
  workflow_dispatch:
    inputs:
      build_docker:
@@ -1032,23 +1032,3 @@ jobs:
          echo "🎉 Released $TAG successfully!"
          echo "📄 Release URL: ${{ needs.create-release.outputs.release_url }}"
  alert-on-failure:
    name: Alert on scheduled failure
    needs: [build-check, prepare-platform-matrix, build-rustfs, build-summary]
    if: >-
      always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' &&
      (contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') || contains(needs.*.result, 'cancelled'))
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 10
    permissions:
      contents: read
      issues: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
        uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
        with:
          github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -94,9 +94,6 @@ concurrency:
 env:
  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
  # Swatinem/rust-cache hashes every RUST* variable. Keep this aligned with
  # ci.yml or the writer and readers use disjoint cache keys.
  RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
 jobs:
  # Readers: test-and-lint, test-ilm-integration-serial, build-rustfs-debug-binary,
@@ -104,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
  warm-ci-dev:
    name: Warm ci-dev
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
-    timeout-minutes: 120
+    timeout-minutes: 90
    env:
      FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
    steps:
@@ -194,7 +191,7 @@ jobs:
  warm-ci-feat-rio:
    name: Warm ci-feat-rio
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
-    timeout-minutes: 120
+    timeout-minutes: 90
    env:
      FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
    steps:
@@ -222,7 +219,7 @@ jobs:
  warm-ci-feat-proto:
    name: Warm ci-feat-proto
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
-    timeout-minutes: 120
+    timeout-minutes: 90
    env:
      FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
    steps:
@@ -125,12 +125,6 @@ jobs:
      - name: Check no embedded secret material
        run: ./scripts/check_embedded_secrets.sh
      - name: Check test wiring
        run: |
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --self-test
          python3 ./scripts/check_scheduled_validation_freshness.py --self-test
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py
      - name: Check no planning docs committed
        run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ on:
  merge_group:
    types: [ checks_requested ]
  schedule:
-    - cron: "11 0 * * 0" # Weekly on Sunday 00:11 UTC
+    - cron: "0 0 * * 0" # Weekly on Sunday at midnight UTC
  workflow_dispatch:
 permissions:
@@ -160,12 +160,6 @@ jobs:
      - name: Check no embedded secret material
        run: ./scripts/check_embedded_secrets.sh
      - name: Check test wiring
        run: |
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --self-test
          python3 ./scripts/check_scheduled_validation_freshness.py --self-test
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py
      - name: Check no planning docs committed
        run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
@@ -403,7 +397,7 @@ jobs:
    if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
    needs: [ quick-checks ]
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
-    timeout-minutes: 90
+    timeout-minutes: 45
    env:
      FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
    steps:
@@ -443,7 +437,7 @@ jobs:
    if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
    needs: [ quick-checks ]
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
-    timeout-minutes: 90
+    timeout-minutes: 60
    env:
      FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
    steps:
@@ -473,7 +467,7 @@ jobs:
    if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
    needs: [ quick-checks ]
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
-    timeout-minutes: 90
+    timeout-minutes: 60
    strategy:
      # On a PR, one failing protocol leg is enough to know the PR is not ready,
      # so stop the sibling leg instead of paying another ~40 minutes for it.
@@ -692,9 +686,9 @@ jobs:
      - name: Make binary executable
        run: chmod +x ./target/debug/rustfs
-      # Build the e2e test graph once. The archive is reused by the smoke
+      # Build the e2e test graph once. The archive is reused by the security
-      # selection guard, security exact-count check, and run below, avoiding a
+      # count-floor check and the smoke run below, avoiding a second compile of
-      # second compile of the same e2e_test target on cold runners (backlog#1645).
+      # the same e2e_test target on cold runners (backlog#1645).
      - name: Archive e2e smoke test binaries
        env:
          NEXTEST_ARCHIVE: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke.tar.zst
@@ -702,7 +696,6 @@ jobs:
        run: |
          cargo nextest archive --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}"
          cargo nextest list --profile e2e-smoke --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}" --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-smoke "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
          ./scripts/check_security_smoke_count.sh check "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
      # PR smoke subset of the in-repo e2e suite (backlog#1149 ci-4). The
@@ -767,7 +760,7 @@ jobs:
    # suites — KMS, object_lock, multipart_auth, quota, checksum, encryption,
    # security-boundary, ... — via the e2e-full nextest profile. Too heavy for
    # every PR, so it is gated to main pushes, the merge queue, and manual
-    # dispatch. protocols / the 7 cluster suites / replication / #[ignore] are
+    # dispatch. protocols / the 6 cluster suites / replication / #[ignore] are
    # owned by other lanes (see .config/nextest.toml profile.e2e-full).
    if: >-
      github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
@@ -827,13 +820,6 @@ jobs:
      - name: Make binary executable
        run: chmod +x ./target/debug/rustfs
      - name: Verify e2e full membership
        env:
          NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-full-list.json
        run: |
          cargo nextest list --profile e2e-full -p e2e_test --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-full "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
      # Full single-node e2e lane (backlog#1149 ci-5). The e2e-full
      # default-filter in .config/nextest.toml is the single wiring mechanism —
      # extend that filter, never add ad-hoc e2e jobs here. Reuses the downloaded
@@ -846,9 +832,7 @@ jobs:
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
        with:
          name: e2e-full-junit-${{ github.run_number }}
-          path: |
+          path: target/nextest/e2e-full/junit.xml
            target/nextest/e2e-full/junit.xml
            ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-full-list.json
          retention-days: 7
  e2e-tests-rio-v2:
@@ -1035,37 +1019,3 @@ jobs:
          path: artifacts/s3tests-single/**
          if-no-files-found: ignore
          retention-days: 3
  alert-on-failure:
    name: Alert on scheduled failure
    needs:
      - typos
      - quick-checks
      - test-and-lint
      - test-ilm-integration-serial
      - test-and-lint-rio-v2
      - test-and-lint-protocols
      - build-rustfs-debug-binary
      - build-rustfs-debug-binary-rio-v2
      - uring-integration
      - e2e-tests
      - e2e-full
      - e2e-tests-rio-v2
      - s3-implemented-tests
      - s3-lifecycle-behavior-tests
    if: >-
      always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' &&
      (contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') || contains(needs.*.result, 'cancelled'))
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 10
    permissions:
      contents: read
      issues: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
        uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
        with:
          github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ on:
    # build (01:00), e2e-s3tests (02:00), audit (03:00), nix-flake-update
    # (05:00), mint (06:00), and the daily fuzz (02:00), minio-interop (03:17),
    # e2e-replication-nightly (04:00) and performance-ab (06:00) lanes.
-    - cron: "43 7 * * 0"
+    - cron: "0 7 * * 0"
 # Only alert-on-failure needs more than read access; it declares its own
 # job-level `issues: write`.
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
-# Consolidated nightly e2e lane for replication, cluster faults, and protocols.
+# Nightly full replication e2e lane (backlog#1147 repl-1, deps: ci-4).
 #
 # The per-PR gate (ci.yml `e2e-tests` job, `--profile e2e-smoke`) runs the
 # FAST replication tests. This scheduled lane runs the remaining heavier
@@ -28,29 +28,28 @@
 # add ad-hoc cargo-test steps here; change the filterset instead. The
 # authoritative membership and count come from
 # `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test --profile e2e-repl-nightly`; the PR/nightly
-# selection digest is committed under .config/.
+# count invariant is maintained next to the filtersets in .config/nextest.toml
 # (deliberately not duplicated here).
 #
-# Explicit division of labor: these subsets run only here and never double-run
+# Explicit division of labor: the nightly subset runs ONLY here, never double-run
-# in the e2e-full merge gate.
+# in ci-5's future e2e-full merge gate. TODO(ci-7): once the ci domain's
 # consolidated scheduled e2e workflow exists, fold this interim repl-owned lane
 # into it rather than growing a second scheduled entrypoint.
-name: e2e-nightly
+name: e2e-replication-nightly
 on:
  workflow_dispatch:
  schedule:
    # 04:00 UTC nightly — staggered clear of fuzz/e2e-s3tests (02:00),
    # stale (01:30) and performance-ab (06:00).
-    - cron: "29 4 * * *"
+    - cron: "0 4 * * *"
 # Only alert-on-failure needs more than read access; it declares its own
 # job-level `issues: write`.
 permissions:
  contents: read
 concurrency:
  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: false
 jobs:
  repl-nightly:
    name: Replication e2e (nightly)
@@ -98,20 +97,9 @@ jobs:
      # demand otherwise, but a single explicit build avoids several parallel
      # nextest test processes racing to build it at once.
      - name: Build rustfs binary
-        run: |
+        run: cargo build -p rustfs --bins
          cargo build -p rustfs --bins
          : > target/debug/rustfs.features
      - name: Verify replication e2e membership
        env:
          NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-repl-nightly-list.json
        run: |
          cargo nextest list --profile e2e-repl-nightly -p e2e_test --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-repl-nightly "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
      - name: Run replication e2e nightly suite
        env:
          RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-repl-nightly-logs
        run: cargo nextest run --profile e2e-repl-nightly -p e2e_test
      - name: Upload nextest junit report
@@ -119,115 +107,13 @@ jobs:
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
        with:
          name: e2e-replication-nightly-junit-${{ github.run_number }}
-          path: |
+          path: target/nextest/e2e-repl-nightly/junit.xml
            target/nextest/e2e-repl-nightly/junit.xml
            ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-repl-nightly-list.json
            ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-repl-nightly-logs/
          retention-days: 7
          if-no-files-found: ignore
  cluster-nightly:
    name: Cluster fault e2e (nightly)
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
    timeout-minutes: 90
    env:
      FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - name: Setup Rust environment
        uses: ./.github/actions/setup
        with:
          rust-version: stable
          cache-shared-key: ci-e2e-nightly
          cache-save-if: 'false'
          install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
      - name: Build rustfs binary
        run: |
          cargo build -p rustfs --bins --features e2e-test-hooks
          : > target/debug/rustfs.features
      - name: Verify cluster fault e2e membership
        env:
          NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-nightly-list.json
        run: |
          cargo nextest list --profile e2e-nightly -p e2e_test --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-nightly "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
      - name: Run cluster fault e2e nightly suite
        env:
          RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-nightly-logs
        run: cargo nextest run --profile e2e-nightly -p e2e_test
      - name: Upload cluster fault diagnostics
        if: always()
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
        with:
          name: e2e-cluster-nightly-${{ github.run_number }}
          path: |
            target/nextest/e2e-nightly/junit.xml
            ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-nightly-list.json
            ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-nightly-logs/
          retention-days: 7
          if-no-files-found: warn
  protocols-nightly:
    name: Protocol e2e (nightly)
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
    timeout-minutes: 90
    env:
      FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
      RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES: ftps,webdav,sftp
    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - name: Setup Rust environment
        uses: ./.github/actions/setup
        with:
          rust-version: stable
          cache-shared-key: ci-e2e-protocols
          cache-save-if: 'false'
          install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
      - name: Verify protocol socket oracle
        run: ss -tn state CLOSE-WAIT >/dev/null
      # The suite owns fixed protocol ports and serializes its internal cases.
      - name: Verify protocol e2e membership
        env:
          NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-protocols-list.json
        run: |
          cargo nextest list --profile e2e-protocols -p e2e_test --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
          python3 ./scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-profile e2e-protocols "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
      - name: Run protocol e2e nightly suite
        env:
          RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-protocol-e2e-logs
        run: >-
          cargo nextest run -j 1 --profile e2e-protocols -p e2e_test --no-capture
      - name: Upload protocol diagnostics
        if: always()
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
        with:
          name: e2e-protocol-nightly-${{ github.run_number }}
          path: |
            target/nextest/e2e-protocols/junit.xml
            ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-protocols-list.json
            ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-protocol-e2e-logs/
          retention-days: 7
          if-no-files-found: warn
  alert-on-failure:
    name: Alert on scheduled failure
-    needs: [repl-nightly, cluster-nightly, protocols-nightly]
+    needs: [repl-nightly]
    # Only scheduled runs open/append the tracking issue (backlog#1149 ci-8);
    # manual workflow_dispatch runs stay quiet so a debugging run never files a
    # spurious alert.
@@ -18,9 +18,10 @@
 # runs only the implemented_tests.txt whitelist. This workflow complements it:
 #
 #   - Scheduled weekly full sweep (TEST_SCOPE=all): runs the ENTIRE upstream
-#     suite and reports promotion candidates. Regressions, unclassified tests,
+#     suite and reports promotion candidates (tests that newly pass) and
-#     incomplete execution, and infrastructure errors fail the job; classified
+#     unclassified tests. The job fails only on regressions in the implemented
-#     failures for not-yet-implemented features remain informational.
+#     whitelist or on infrastructure errors — expected failures from
 #     not-yet-implemented features do not turn the run red.
 #   - Manual runs (workflow_dispatch): same, with configurable mode/scope.
 #
 # All test execution is delegated to scripts/s3-tests/run.sh (single source of
@@ -44,6 +45,13 @@
 # The PR gate (ci.yml s3-implemented-tests) is unaffected: it avoids Docker
 # via DEPLOY_MODE=binary and defers all pip setup to run.sh's self-bootstrap.
 # DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
 # (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
 # and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
 # reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
 # banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
 # workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
 #
 name: e2e-s3tests
 on:
@@ -73,31 +81,14 @@ on:
        description: "Stop after N failures. '0' to run everything."
        required: false
        default: "0"
      shard-count:
        description: "Exact-node-ID shard count for a targeted manual run"
        required: false
        default: "1"
        type: choice
        options:
          - "1"
          - "2"
          - "4"
      shard-index:
        description: "Zero-based shard index for a targeted manual run"
        required: false
        default: "0"
      markexpr:
        description: "Optional pytest -m expression"
        required: false
        default: ""
      testexpr:
        description: "Optional pytest -k expression"
        required: false
        default: ""
  schedule:
    # Weekly full sweep (Sunday 02:00 UTC): full suite, run against BOTH the
    # single-node and the 4-node distributed topologies (matrix below).
-    - cron: "19 2 * * 0"
+    - cron: "0 2 * * 0"
 env:
  # main user
@@ -120,9 +111,6 @@ env:
  XDIST: ${{ github.event.inputs.xdist || '4' }}
  MAXFAIL: ${{ github.event.inputs.maxfail || '0' }}
  MARKEXPR: ${{ github.event.inputs.markexpr || '' }}
  TESTEXPR: ${{ github.event.inputs.testexpr || '' }}
  S3_SHARD_COUNT: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && '4' || github.event.inputs.shard-count || '1' }}
  TEST_TIMEOUT: "300"
 concurrency:
  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}-${{ github.event.inputs['test-mode'] || 'single' }}
@@ -139,22 +127,19 @@ defaults:
 jobs:
  s3tests:
    name: s3tests (${{ matrix.test-mode }}, shard ${{ matrix.shard-index }})
    # GitHub-hosted: reliably provides Docker + docker compose + python3/pip.
    # See the header note (ci-1) for why the self-hosted sm-standard-4 label
-    # was abandoned. Scheduled failures are handled by alert-on-failure below.
+    # was abandoned. TODO(ci-8): scheduled-failure alerting (auto-open issue)
    # is added by the ci-8 composite action; do not implement it here.
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 180
    strategy:
      fail-fast: false
      max-parallel: 2
      matrix:
        # Scheduled sweeps cover both topologies; manual runs use the input.
        test-mode: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && fromJSON('["single", "multi"]') || fromJSON(format('["{0}"]', github.event.inputs.test-mode || 'single')) }}
        shard-index: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && fromJSON('[0, 1, 2, 3]') || fromJSON(format('[{0}]', github.event.inputs.shard-index || '0')) }}
    env:
      TEST_MODE: ${{ matrix.test-mode }}
      S3_SHARD_INDEX: ${{ matrix.shard-index }}
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
@@ -196,7 +181,6 @@ jobs:
      - name: Start single RustFS
        if: env.TEST_MODE == 'single'
        run: |
          SSE_KEY="$(head -c 32 /dev/zero | base64 -w0)"
          docker network inspect rustfs-net >/dev/null 2>&1 || docker network create rustfs-net
          docker rm -f rustfs-single >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
          # The four disks share one physical device on the runner (a single
@@ -209,7 +193,6 @@ jobs:
            -e RUSTFS_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0:9000 \
            -e RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY="${S3_ACCESS_KEY}" \
            -e RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY="${S3_SECRET_KEY}" \
            -e RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY="${SSE_KEY}" \
            -e RUSTFS_VOLUMES="/data/rustfs{0...3}" \
            -e RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK=true \
            -v /tmp/rustfs-single:/data \
@@ -218,7 +201,6 @@ jobs:
      - name: Start 4-node distributed cluster
        if: env.TEST_MODE == 'multi'
        run: |
          SSE_KEY="$(head -c 32 /dev/zero | base64 -w0)"
          # A real distributed deployment: every node lists all endpoints in
          # RUSTFS_VOLUMES so data is erasure-coded ACROSS nodes. Do not use
          # node-local volume paths here — that would create four independent
@@ -231,7 +213,6 @@ jobs:
              RUSTFS_ADDRESS: "0.0.0.0:9000"
              RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY: ${S3_ACCESS_KEY}
              RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY: ${S3_SECRET_KEY}
              RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY: "${SSE_KEY}"
              RUSTFS_VOLUMES: "http://rustfs{1...4}:9000/data/rustfs{0...3}"
              # Each node's four disks share one physical device inside its
              # container, so bypass the local physical-disk-independence guard
@@ -274,20 +255,14 @@ jobs:
          EOF
          cat > haproxy.cfg <<'EOF'
          global
            log stdout format raw local0 info
          defaults
            mode http
            log global
            log-format '%ci:%cp [%tr] %ft %b/%s %TR/%Tw/%Tc/%Tr/%Ta %ST %B %tsc %HM %HP'
            timeout connect 5s
            timeout client  30s
            timeout server  30s
          frontend fe_s3
            bind *:9000
            option http-buffer-request
            default_backend be_s3
          backend be_s3
@@ -319,14 +294,34 @@ jobs:
      - name: Run ceph s3-tests
        run: |
          set +e
          DEPLOY_MODE=existing \
          TEST_MODE="${TEST_MODE}" \
          TEST_SCOPE="${TEST_SCOPE}" \
          XDIST="${XDIST}" \
          MAXFAIL="${MAXFAIL}" \
          MARKEXPR="${MARKEXPR}" \
          TESTEXPR="${TESTEXPR}" \
          ./scripts/s3-tests/run.sh
          RC=$?
          set -e
          if [ "${TEST_SCOPE}" = "implemented" ]; then
            # Whitelist run: every failure is a regression.
            exit "${RC}"
          fi
          # Full sweep: failures outside the implemented whitelist are
          # inventory (promotion candidates / unimplemented features), not a
          # gate. Fail only on whitelist regressions or infrastructure errors.
          JUNIT="artifacts/s3tests-${TEST_MODE}/junit.xml"
          if [ ! -f "${JUNIT}" ]; then
            echo "No junit.xml produced — infrastructure failure (exit ${RC})" >&2
            exit "${RC}"
          fi
          python3 scripts/s3-tests/report_compat.py \
            --junit "${JUNIT}" \
            --lists-dir scripts/s3-tests \
            --fail-on-regression
      - name: Publish compatibility report
        if: always()
@@ -351,7 +346,7 @@ jobs:
        if: always() && env.ACT != 'true'
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
        with:
-          name: s3tests-${{ env.TEST_MODE }}-shard-${{ matrix.shard-index }}
+          name: s3tests-${{ env.TEST_MODE }}
          path: artifacts/**
  alert-on-failure:
@@ -12,25 +12,30 @@
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
 # DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
 # (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
 # and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
 # reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
 # banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
 # workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
 #
 name: Fuzz
 on:
  pull_request:
    types: [ opened, synchronize, reopened, closed ]
-    # Run when the harness or any directly fuzzed production crate changes.
+    # PR trigger is intentionally narrow: only changes to the fuzz harness
    # itself gate a PR. Broad crate paths (ecstore/filemeta/utils/policy/…)
    # are covered by the nightly `schedule` run below, which fuzzes against
    # whatever landed on main. Widening these paths previously queued a
    # ~45min fuzz-build on nearly every PR and is why this workflow was
    # disabled; do not re-add crate paths here.
    paths:
      - "fuzz/**"
      - "scripts/fuzz/**"
      - "crates/ecstore/**"
      - "crates/filemeta/**"
      - "crates/policy/**"
      - "crates/security-governance/**"
      - "crates/utils/**"
      - "Cargo.toml"
      - "Cargo.lock"
      - ".github/workflows/fuzz.yml"
  schedule:
-    - cron: "17 2 * * *"
+    - cron: "0 2 * * *"
  workflow_dispatch:
    inputs:
      profile:
@@ -76,7 +81,7 @@ jobs:
      github.event_name == 'schedule' ||
      github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
    runs-on: sm-standard-4
-    timeout-minutes: 60
+    timeout-minutes: 45
    env:
      FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
    steps:
@@ -116,7 +121,12 @@ jobs:
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
        with:
          name: fuzz-prebuilt-binaries-${{ github.run_number }}
-          path: fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/
+          path: |
            fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/archive_extract
            fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/bucket_validation
            fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/local_metadata
            fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/path_containment
            fuzz/prebuilt/${{ env.CARGO_BUILD_TARGET }}/release/policy_ingress
          if-no-files-found: error
          retention-days: 1
          compression-level: 0
@@ -182,7 +192,10 @@ jobs:
  nightly-fuzz-corpus:
    name: "Nightly / ${{ matrix.target }}"
    needs: fuzz-build
-    # Scheduled failures are handled by alert-on-failure below.
+    # TODO(ci-8): when the schedule-failure-issue composite action lands,
    # add a step here (or a dependent job) that opens/updates a GitHub issue
    # on nightly failure. ci-8 is the single alerting mechanism for all
    # scheduled workflows; do not self-roll alerting in this workflow.
    if: >
      github.event_name == 'schedule' ||
      (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' &&
@@ -121,21 +121,3 @@ jobs:
          cargo nextest run --run-ignored ignored-only --no-tests=fail \
            -p "$INTEROP_PACKAGE" --features "$INTEROP_FEATURES" \
            -E "$INTEROP_FILTER"
  alert-on-failure:
    name: Alert on scheduled failure
    needs: [minio-interop]
    if: always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' && contains(needs.*.result, 'failure')
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 10
    permissions:
      contents: read
      issues: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
        uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
        with:
          github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@
 # docker-capable self-hosted `dind-sm-standard-2` label was the alternative but
 # has fewer cores and reintroduces fleet-state risk for no reliability gain.
 # DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
 # (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
 # and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
 # reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
 # banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
 # workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
 #
 name: mint
 on:
@@ -63,13 +70,13 @@ on:
          - core
          - full
      mint-image:
-        description: "Mint image reference (empty = pinned default)"
+        description: "Mint image reference"
        required: false
-        default: ""
+        default: "minio/mint:edge"
  schedule:
    # Weekly, after the Sunday s3-tests full sweep (starts 02:00 UTC, up to
    # 3h) has finished, so the two never contend for the same runner pool.
-    - cron: "41 6 * * 0"
+    - cron: "0 6 * * 0"
 env:
  S3_ACCESS_KEY: rustfsadmin-ci
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ name: Nightly GNU Build
 on:
  schedule:
-    - cron: "7 0 * * *"
+    - cron: "0 0 * * *"
      timezone: "Asia/Shanghai"
  workflow_dispatch:
@@ -194,23 +194,3 @@ jobs:
      - name: Run HA leader failover live checks (three-node Raft cluster in Docker)
        run: bash scripts/test/vault_ha_kms_live.sh
  alert-on-failure:
    name: Alert on scheduled failure
    needs: [build, kms-vault-lane, kms-vault-ha-failover]
    if: >-
      always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' &&
      (contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') || contains(needs.*.result, 'cancelled'))
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 10
    permissions:
      contents: read
      issues: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
        uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
        with:
          github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -22,15 +22,22 @@
 # correctness cost (e.g. the #4221 fsync durability fix) is recorded, not
 # blocked (rustfs/backlog#935 correction 1).
 # DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
 # (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
 # and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
 # reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
 # banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
 # workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
 #
 name: Performance A/B
 on:
  schedule:
-    - cron: "31 6 * * *" # 06:31 UTC nightly, against main
+    - cron: "0 6 * * *" # 06:00 UTC nightly, against main
  workflow_dispatch:
    inputs:
      duration:
-        description: "warp duration per round"
+        description: "warp duration per round (short by default to fit the double-build budget)"
        required: false
        default: "12s"
        type: string
@@ -39,8 +46,12 @@ on:
        required: false
        default: false
        type: boolean
  push:
    # Every main commit pre-builds and caches its release binary (perf-3) so the
    # nightly A/B restores a ready baseline instead of paying the double build.
    branches: [main]
 permissions:
  actions: read
  contents: read
 env:
@@ -48,19 +59,83 @@ env:
  RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
 jobs:
-  warp-ab:
+  # perf-3: on every push to main, build the release binary once and cache it
-    name: Warp A/B budget gate
+  # keyed by commit SHA (rustfs-baseline-<sha>). The warp-ab measurements
  # restore this instead of paying the ~32min-per-side source
  # build. That double build is what pushed the expanded 24-cell nightly past its
  # ceiling — 2026-07-11..07-14 all cancelled on the 120min timeout. Incremental
  # builds off the shared cargo cache keep each push cheap, and building on the
  # same sm-standard-2 runner the A/B measures on guarantees the cached binary is
  # ABI-identical. Do NOT source this from build.yml's per-merge artifact: those
  # are cancelled ~7/8 of the time and are not a reliable baseline.
  build-baseline-cache:
    name: Build + cache baseline binary
    if: github.event_name == 'push'
    runs-on: sm-standard-2
-    # A normal nightly restores the last successful binary and builds only the
+    # Latest-wins: consumers only ever restore the binary for the *current*
-    # candidate; daily access keeps that cache warm. A cache miss may build both
+    # origin/main tip, so when pushes land faster than the ~65min build, a
-    # and needs room for the A/B run plus artifact and cache publication.
+    # superseded build's output is dead weight — cancel it instead of stacking
-    timeout-minutes: 180
+    # hour-long jobs on the shared runner pool. A skipped intermediate SHA at
    # most costs one same-commit self-heal in the A/B job.
    concurrency:
      group: perf-baseline-build-main
      cancel-in-progress: true
    # #4806 put thin LTO + codegen-units=1 on [profile.release], pushing a
    # single release build past 60min on this runner — every cache build on
    # 2026-07-15 died on the old 60min ceiling ("exceeded the maximum execution
    # time of 1h0m0s") and the cache never populated. The measured binary must
    # keep the production profile, so the budget absorbs the build instead.
    timeout-minutes: 100
    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
-          fetch-depth: 0 # baseline may be an earlier successful scheduled head
+
      - name: Setup Rust environment
        uses: ./.github/actions/setup
        with:
          rust-version: stable
          cache-shared-key: warp-ab-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
          cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
      - name: Build release rustfs
        run: cargo build --release --bin rustfs
      - name: Stage binary for cache
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          mkdir -p baseline-bin
          cp target/release/rustfs baseline-bin/rustfs
      - name: Cache baseline binary by SHA
        uses: actions/cache/save@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
        with:
          path: baseline-bin/rustfs
          key: rustfs-baseline-${{ github.sha }}
  warp-ab:
    name: Warp A/B budget gate
    # Always run on schedule / manual dispatch. Never on push — that event only
    # feeds build-baseline-cache above.
    if: >-
      github.event_name == 'schedule' ||
      github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
    runs-on: sm-standard-2
    # With perf-3's cached baseline binary the common (cache-hit) nightly is
    # measurement-only and finishes well under 50min. This ceiling stays
    # generous only to absorb the same-commit cache-miss self-heal (~65min
    # single build with the post-#4806 LTO profile + measurement). A timeout
    # surfaces via the alert-on-failure job (it fires on cancelled/timed-out,
    # not just failure). perf-6 recalibrates the budget once the noise study
    # lands.
    timeout-minutes: 120
    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
          fetch-depth: 0 # baseline is built from origin/main
      - name: Setup Rust environment
        uses: ./.github/actions/setup
@@ -88,55 +163,24 @@ jobs:
          fi
          echo "allow_regression=$allow" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-      # A failed regression run must keep comparing against the last known-good
+      # perf-3: resolve the commits so the cache can be keyed by SHA. The
-      # scheduled head. Otherwise the next nightly would absorb the regression
+      # baseline is origin/main; the candidate is the checked-out ref. On the
-      # into its baseline and turn green without a fix.
+      # nightly (checkout == main) they are the same commit, so one cached binary
-      - name: Find last successful scheduled baseline
+      # serves both phases and the run does zero source builds.
        id: scheduled_baseline
        if: github.event_name == 'schedule'
        uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8
        with:
          result-encoding: string
          script: |
            const { data } = await github.rest.actions.listWorkflowRuns({
              owner: context.repo.owner,
              repo: context.repo.repo,
              workflow_id: "performance-ab.yml",
              event: "schedule",
              status: "success",
              per_page: 1,
            });
            return data.workflow_runs[0]?.head_sha ?? "";
      # Manual runs compare a selected ref with current main. Scheduled runs
      # compare current main with the last successful scheduled head. With no
      # history, the first run measures the candidate against itself and seeds
      # that head only if the complete rig succeeds.
      - name: Resolve baseline / candidate commits
        id: commits
        env:
          SCHEDULED_BASELINE_SHA: ${{ steps.scheduled_baseline.outputs.result }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          baseline_sha="$(git rev-parse origin/main)"
          candidate_sha="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
          if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "schedule" ]]; then
            baseline_sha="${SCHEDULED_BASELINE_SHA:-$candidate_sha}"
            if ! git merge-base --is-ancestor "$baseline_sha" "$candidate_sha"; then
              echo "::error::scheduled baseline $baseline_sha is not an ancestor of candidate $candidate_sha" >&2
              exit 1
            fi
          else
            baseline_sha="$(git rev-parse origin/main)"
          fi
          git cat-file -e "${baseline_sha}^{commit}"
          echo "baseline_sha=$baseline_sha" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          echo "candidate_sha=$candidate_sha" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          echo "baseline commit: $baseline_sha"
          echo "candidate commit: $candidate_sha"
-      # Exact-key restore of the candidate binary saved by its successful
+      # Exact-key restore of the baseline binary built by build-baseline-cache
-      # scheduled run. A miss leaves cache-hit unset and falls back to a source
+      # when origin/main last landed. A miss (binary evicted or not built yet)
-      # build of that known-good head.
+      # leaves cache-hit unset and the rig falls back to a source build.
      - name: Restore cached baseline binary
        id: baseline_cache
        uses: actions/cache/restore@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
@@ -226,11 +270,11 @@ jobs:
            elif [[ "$selfheal_built" == "true" ]]; then
              base_src="source build (cache self-heal, saved as rustfs-baseline-$baseline_sha)"
            else
-              base_src="isolated baseline source build (saved as rustfs-baseline-$baseline_sha)"
+              base_src="isolated origin/main source build (saved as rustfs-baseline-$baseline_sha)"
            fi
            if [[ "$candidate_sha" == "$baseline_sha" ]]; then
-              # No commits landed since the last successful baseline, so reuse
+              # Nightly on main: the candidate is the same commit as the baseline,
-              # the one binary for both phases and measure only rig drift.
+              # so reuse the one binary for both phases and skip all builds.
              args+=(--candidate-bin "$base_bin")
              cand_src="same binary as baseline (same commit)"
            elif [[ "$candidate_built" == "true" ]]; then
@@ -318,23 +362,6 @@ jobs:
            fi
          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
      - name: Stage successful candidate baseline
        if: >-
          steps.ab.outputs.status == '0' &&
          steps.commits.outputs.baseline_sha != steps.commits.outputs.candidate_sha
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          cp candidate-bin/rustfs baseline-bin/rustfs
      - name: Cache successful candidate baseline
        if: >-
          steps.ab.outputs.status == '0' &&
          steps.commits.outputs.baseline_sha != steps.commits.outputs.candidate_sha
        uses: actions/cache/save@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
        with:
          path: baseline-bin/rustfs
          key: rustfs-baseline-${{ steps.commits.outputs.candidate_sha }}
      # Scheduled failure alerting is handled by the alert-on-failure job below
      # (perf-2 consuming ci-8's schedule-failure-issue composite action).
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ name: Runner Hygiene
 on:
  schedule:
-    - cron: "37 6 1 * *" # Monthly, 1st at 06:37 UTC
+    - cron: "0 6 1 * *" # Monthly, 1st at 06:00 UTC (after the daily audit cron)
  workflow_dispatch:
 permissions:
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
 # Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
 #
 # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 # You may obtain a copy of the License at
 #
 #      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 #
 # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
 name: Scheduled Validation Freshness
 on:
  schedule:
    - cron: "47 23 * * *"
  workflow_dispatch:
 permissions:
  contents: read
 concurrency:
  group: scheduled-validation-freshness
  cancel-in-progress: false
 jobs:
  check-freshness:
    name: Check scheduled validation freshness
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 10
    permissions:
      actions: read
      contents: read
      issues: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - name: Check latest scheduled runs
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
        run: |
          set +e
          python3 scripts/check_scheduled_validation_freshness.py \
            --report "${RUNNER_TEMP}/scheduled-validation-freshness.md"
          status=$?
          cat "${RUNNER_TEMP}/scheduled-validation-freshness.md" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          exit "${status}"
      - name: Open or update freshness issue
        if: failure()
        uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
        with:
          github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          details-file: ${{ runner.temp }}/scheduled-validation-freshness.md
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
 # Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
 #
 # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 # You may obtain a copy of the License at
 #
 #      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 #
 # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 # limitations under the License.
 name: Scheduled Validation Watchdog
 on:
  workflow_run:
    workflows:
      - "Security Audit"
      - "Build and Release"
      - "Continuous Integration"
      - "coverage"
      - "e2e-nightly"
      - "e2e-s3tests"
      - "Fuzz"
      - "mint"
      - "minio-interop"
      - "Nightly GNU Build"
      - "Performance A/B"
      - "Runner Hygiene"
    types: [completed]
 permissions:
  contents: read
 jobs:
  alert-on-incomplete-run:
    name: Alert on incomplete scheduled run
    if: >-
      github.event.workflow_run.event == 'schedule' &&
      github.event.workflow_run.conclusion != 'success' &&
      github.event.workflow_run.conclusion != 'failure'
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 10
    permissions:
      actions: read
      contents: read
      issues: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - name: Open or update incomplete-run issue
        uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
        with:
          github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          workflow-name: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.name }}
          source-run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
          source-run-attempt: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.run_attempt }}
          source-event: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.event }}
          source-ref-name: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
          source-sha: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
@@ -1,255 +1,402 @@
-# RustFS Agent Instructions
+# RustFS Agent Instructions (Global)
-This file contains repository-wide rules. Use the nearest subdirectory
+This root file keeps repository-wide rules only.
-`AGENTS.md` for path-specific invariants.
+Use the nearest subdirectory `AGENTS.md` for path-specific guidance.
-## Precedence
+## Rule Precedence
 1. System/developer instructions.
-2. The current user request.
+2. Current user/task instructions.
-3. The nearest `AGENTS.md`.
+3. The nearest `AGENTS.md` in the current path.
-4. This file.
+4. This file (global defaults).
-## Operating Model
+If repo-level instructions conflict, follow the nearest file and keep behavior aligned with CI.
- Inquiry, diagnosis, review, and planning tasks are read-only unless the user
+## Execution Discipline
-  explicitly requests changes.
+
- For implementation, read the relevant code, tests, and local guidance, then
+- Read the relevant existing code, tests, and local guidance before changing behavior. For new helpers or test setup, that read includes `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, and the touched crate's own `test_util`/fixtures (see Reuse Before You Write).
-  make the smallest change that satisfies the request.
+- State assumptions when they affect the implementation or verification path.
- State assumptions only when they affect behavior or verification. Ask only
+- If a task has multiple plausible interpretations, list the options briefly and choose the narrowest reasonable path; ask when the ambiguity would make the change risky.
-  when a wrong assumption would materially change the result.
+- For multi-step work, keep the plan minimal and tied to verifiable outcomes.
- Do not load every skill or inspect unrelated modules preemptively. Select a
+- Avoid redundant file reads, repeated commands, and unnecessary exploratory work once enough context is available.
-  skill only when its description directly matches the request or changed
+- A good result is a minimal diff with clear assumptions, no over-engineering, and independent verification that survives Adversarial Validation (below).
  surface.
 - Avoid repeated reads and equivalent verification commands once enough
  evidence exists.
 ## Worktree and Disk Hygiene
- Start implementation from the latest `origin/main` and confirm the requested
+- Unless the requester explicitly says otherwise, treat every new implementation task as isolated work: fetch the latest `origin/main`, confirm the requested change is not already present there, and create a dedicated feature branch and worktree from that exact upstream commit before editing. Do not implement new work directly in the primary checkout or reuse a worktree from another task.
-  change is not already present.
+- Check available disk space before creating the worktree or starting dependency downloads, builds, tests, coverage, or other artifact-heavy commands. For long-running or artifact-heavy work, re-check disk usage at natural phase boundaries and before broad validation; if remaining space may not safely accommodate the next command, stop and reclaim task-owned artifacts before continuing.
- An existing clean, isolated task worktree is sufficient. Create another
+- Keep cleanup scoped and safe: remove generated build/test/coverage artifacts and temporary files created by the task when they are no longer needed, and never delete another task's worktree or uncommitted files. Prefer shared dependency caches where supported instead of duplicating large artifacts across worktrees.
-  worktree only when the current checkout is shared, dirty with unrelated work,
+- At handoff, report the disk-space checks, cleanup performed, and any retained worktree or artifacts with the reason they are still needed.
  or belongs to another task.
 - Never commit from a shared checkout. Use an `overtrue/` feature branch unless
  the user requests another name.
 - Check free space before artifact-heavy builds, tests, coverage, or downloads.
  Re-check before a broad gate when space is tight.
 - Remove only task-owned temporary/build artifacts. Never delete another task's
  worktree or uncommitted data.
 - At handoff, mention disk or cleanup details only when they affected execution
  or artifacts/worktrees remain intentionally.
-## Change Style
+## PR Lifecycle Monitoring
- Preserve existing control flow unless changing it is required for correctness.
+- Creating or updating a PR is not the terminal state. Unless the requester explicitly limits the task to PR creation, monitor the PR through its terminal state: merged, closed, or explicitly handed off because progress requires user or maintainer action.
- Prefer a direct local edit over new files, wrappers, managers, or speculative
+- While the task is active, monitor CI/check runs, review decisions and unresolved threads, mergeability and conflicts, and unexpected head/base changes. Prefer event-driven or bounded waits provided by the current environment over frequent polling; report only state changes, actionable failures, or meaningful prolonged delays.
-  abstractions.
+- Investigate every failing check and review comment before changing code. Fix failures attributable to the task, run the verification required for the new diff, push the update, respond to or resolve the corresponding review threads, and resume monitoring. Do not weaken checks, dismiss valid feedback, or retry flaky failures merely to obtain a green result.
- Add a helper only when it removes current duplication, names a real domain
+- Treat opening, green CI, approval, and mergeability as intermediate states. Never merge without the required reviewer approval or explicit authority. If progress depends on credentials, infrastructure, a maintainer decision, or another external action, report the exact blocker and the evidence already collected.
-  boundary, or isolates a non-trivial invariant.
+- If the current execution environment cannot remain active until the next PR event, use a supported automation, monitor, or thread wakeup when available and within scope. Otherwise leave an explicit handoff containing the PR, current state, next event to observe, and pending cleanup; do not imply that background monitoring exists when none is scheduled.
- Remove an in-scope path superseded by the change. If compatibility requires it,
+- After observing a merge, verify the commits are preserved on the upstream base, ensure the worktree is clean, remove the dedicated worktree, prune stale worktree metadata, and delete the local task branch when it is no longer in use. For a closed or abandoned PR, preserve any unmerged work unless deletion was explicitly authorized. Do not delete remote branches unless explicitly requested or repository automation owns that cleanup.
  adapt at the boundary to one canonical core and use the repository's
  `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` policy.
 - Comments explain non-obvious invariants or reasons. Do not narrate code or
  record change history.
 - Mention unrelated problems when useful; do not fix them in a narrow task.
-## Reuse and Boundary Rules
+## Autonomy and Approval Boundaries
- Before adding helpers, constants, fixtures, or wrappers, search the touched
+- Inquiry tasks (answer, explain, review, diagnose, plan): report findings; do not change files unless a fix is explicitly requested.
-  crate, the domain-owning crate, `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, and relevant
+- Action tasks (change, build, fix): make in-scope local changes without asking for approval.
-  direct dependencies.
+- Ask for confirmation before destructive or hard-to-reverse operations (force-pushes, history rewrites, deleting data or branches), merging a PR (reviewer approval required), or any material expansion of the requested scope.
- Reuse requires matching semantics: normalization, error types, deadlines,
+
-  durability, and compatibility must fit the call site. A narrowly named local
+## Communication and Language
-  helper is better than forced reuse with different semantics.
+
- Validate untrusted input at its trust boundary, then trust the validated type.
+- Respond in the same language used by the requester.
-  Values crossing disk, RPC, persistence, or version boundaries remain
+- Keep source code, comments, commit messages, and PR title/body in English.
-  untrusted at every consumer.
+- Be concise. Avoid sycophantic openers, closing fluff, and verbose status reporting.
- Re-check boundary values immediately before destructive actions such as
+
-  delete, overwrite, or quorum decisions.
+## Change Style for Existing Logic
- Every new branch needs a concrete triggering input/state. For decoded or peer
+
-  data, corruption and mixed-version input are valid triggers.
+- Start with the smallest direct, local edit. Add production files, types, traits, helpers, wrappers, or abstraction layers only when current behavior requires them. Extraction must remove present duplication, enforce a real boundary, or materially clarify a non-trivial flow; anticipated reuse is not enough.
- Required values must return a typed error when absent or corrupt; do not use a
+- Use Rust's default module file layout (`mod foo;` with `foo.rs` or `foo/mod.rs`/`foo/*.rs`).
-  default that converts corruption into a plausible result.
+  Avoid `#[path = "..."]` for module inclusion; move files into the canonical module tree instead.
- Attach error context once where it is actionable. Do not erase typed errors
+  If an unavoidable generated-code, FFI, or test-fixture exception remains, keep it local and document why the canonical layout cannot work.
-  below aggregation or quorum layers.
+- Solve only the requested problem; do not add speculative features, configurability, or adjacent improvements.
 - Prefer editing existing code over rewriting files or reshaping unrelated logic.
 - Modify only what is required. Remove any in-scope path or representation superseded by the change. If compatibility or rollback requires retention, adapt at the boundary to one canonical core and follow the repository's `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` removal policy; never delete unrelated code merely to improve addition/deletion statistics.
 - Preserve the existing control-flow and logic shape when fixing bugs or addressing review comments, especially in init, distributed coordination, locking, metadata, and concurrency paths.
 - Do not refactor existing code only to make it easier to unit test.
 - Keep fixes narrowly aligned with the requested behavior; avoid semantic-adjacent rewrites while touching sensitive paths.
 - Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer the smallest readable design and existing abstractions over parallel managers, factories, adapters, or wrappers added only to make the design look extensible.
 - Comments state non-obvious reasons, assumptions, and invariants in the shortest complete form. Their length follows the invariant's complexity: `SAFETY`, lock ordering, durability, and compatibility contracts may need a short list of conditions. Never narrate the next line, restate a signature, or record change history; move durable design rationale to architecture or operations documentation.
 - Mention unrelated issues when useful, but do not fix them as part of a narrow task.
 ## Reuse Before You Write
 Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exists instead of duplicating it:
 - **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain-owning crate, and relevant direct workspace dependencies from `Cargo.toml`. Search snake_case signatures with a focused term. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
 - **Reuse requires matching semantics, not a matching name**: before adopting a helper, check its normalization (`clean` resolves `.`/`..` — never apply it to raw S3 object keys), error type, backoff/deadline behavior, and durability gating against the call site. When semantics differ, a new narrowly-named helper with a comment naming the rejected lookalike is the correct outcome. The inverse also holds: workspace wrappers exist because raw `std`/`tokio` semantics were insufficient (durability gates, retries) — prefer the wrapper over the raw call.
 - **Constants and fixed tokens** (protocol labels, error identifiers, header keys, event names, metric names, command tags): search for existing constants/enums that already represent the same semantic value and reuse them. If a value is truly new, define one local constant near related logic; never scatter the literal across sites. When changing existing behavior, align naming and format with the established constants.
 - **Test scaffolding**: reuse existing test utilities and fixtures (the touched crate's own `test_util` module and `tests/fixtures`, or `crates/test-utils`) instead of writing new setup code — run `rg -l '<fn-under-test>' <crate>/src <crate>/tests` before writing a test. A new test must pin a failure mode no existing test covers. Near-duplicate means same code path AND same poison-value class: this repo's boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID bytes, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are distinct by definition and must all be written.
 ## Necessary Code Only
 Net-new code — files, types, branches, comments — is cost to justify, not progress:
 - Inspect production-code additions separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation do not count as production-code growth. Line counts are signals, not quotas: new production structures must map to a current requirement, and a blocker requires a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
 - Validate at the trust boundary — untrusted client input, bytes read from disk, RPC payloads, config (see Serde Safety and Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants) — then trust the type: do not re-check what the type system or a validated upstream layer already guarantees, and cite the establishing check (`file:line`) when the guarantee is not obvious.
 - The exception is load-bearing: a value that crossed a persistence, RPC, or version boundary is never guaranteed by the code on the other side — a peer may be older or buggy, disk bytes may be corrupt — so the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns apply at every consumer, and re-checks immediately before a destructive action (delete, overwrite, quorum decision) stay. Deleting an existing guard is a behavior change requiring adversarial review, not cleanup.
 - Every new branch needs a nameable trigger: a concrete input, state, or failure that reaches it — for boundary-crossing values, corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always nameable. If you cannot name one, do not write the branch. If the case is truly unreachable, encode the invariant in the type; where that is impossible, return a typed internal error (fail closed). `debug_assert!` is acceptable only for pure internal arithmetic on values that never crossed a disk/RPC/config boundary — never as the sole guard on decoded or peer-supplied data.
 - Never substitute a default where the value is required (e.g. `unwrap_or_default()` on metadata that must exist) — that converts corruption into a wrong answer. Return the typed error instead: explicit failure over implicit success.
 - Attach error context once, at the layer where it is actionable: re-wrapping equivalent context at every hop is noise, and expanding a fallible chain into nested `match` blocks where `?` or a combinator suffices is a finding. Never add context by converting a typed error into a generic variant below an error-aggregation or quorum layer (`reduce_errs` classifies by variant equality) — context there belongs in a `tracing` event, not the error value.
 ## Sources of Truth
- Workspace membership: `Cargo.toml`.
+- Workspace layout and crate membership: `Cargo.toml` (`[workspace].members`)
- Local gates: `Makefile` and `.config/make/`.
+- Local quality commands: `Makefile` and `.config/make/`
- CI gates: `.github/workflows/ci.yml`.
+- CI quality gates: `.github/workflows/ci.yml`
- PR format: `.github/pull_request_template.md`.
+- PR template: `.github/pull_request_template.md`
- Architecture routing: `ARCHITECTURE.md` and `docs/architecture/README.md`.
+- High-level architecture and crate map: `ARCHITECTURE.md`
- Agent skills: `.agents/skills/*/SKILL.md`.
+- Migration guardrails, readiness contracts, support matrices:
  `docs/architecture/README.md` (routes by audience)
 - Shared agent skills (all tools): `.agents/skills/` — each `SKILL.md` carries
  a frontmatter `description` stating when it applies. Scan the descriptions
  before starting a task and follow any skill that matches, even if your tool
  does not auto-load skills:
  `grep -m1 '^description:' .agents/skills/*/SKILL.md`
  Claude Code reads them through the `.claude/skills` symlink; add new skills
  to `.agents/skills/` only, never as separate copies per tool
-Do not commit one-shot plans, trackers, migration ledgers, benchmark snapshots,
+Avoid duplicating long crate lists or command matrices in instruction files.
-or agent scratch notes. Durable architecture belongs under `docs/architecture/`,
+Reference the source files above instead.
 operations under `docs/operations/`, and testing references under
 `docs/testing/`. `scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh` enforces this boundary.
-## Verification
+Do not commit planning-type documents — one-shot implementation/optimization
 plans, task trackers, migration-progress ledgers, phase/PR templates,
 issue-scoped benchmark-result snapshots or optimization conclusions, or
 agent-generated working notes (e.g. anything a `superpowers`/scratch workflow
 produces). Keep that work in the issue tracker or your local worktree, not in
 the repository. Only durable reference — the architecture set under
 `docs/architecture/`, repeatable operational runbooks under `docs/operations/`,
 and the test-suite references under `docs/testing/` — belongs in version
 control; `.gitignore` ignores everything else under `docs/` by default, so a new
 plan file will not be tracked unless someone force-adds it — don't.
 `scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh` (wired into `make pre-commit`/`pre-pr` and
 CI) fails the build if anything is committed under `docs/superpowers/`, even via
 `git add -f`.
-Select checks from the final task-owned diff. Scoped `AGENTS.md` files may add a
+## Verification Before PR
 concrete path-specific check, but must not replace this tiering with a generic
 full-workspace gate.
-### Documentation and Instructions
+Convert changes into independently verifiable outcomes. This section controls
 agent-run local validation; preparing a commit or PR does not by itself require
 the broadest gate. Inspect only the final task-owned diff, classify it by
 behavioral impact rather than line count or path alone, and run the smallest
 set of checks that provides meaningful coverage. Do not let unrelated
 worktree changes or a generic contributor checklist expand the scope.
 For non-exempt changes, complete the applicable multi-role adversarial review
 before running `make pre-pr` (or an equivalent full gate). Resolve or rebut
 every finding first, then run the gate against the reviewed final diff.
-For prose, comments, agent instructions, and skill metadata that cannot affect
+### Validation floor
 runtime/build output:
- Run `git diff --check`.
+- Every change that is not documentation-only must finish with
- Run the relevant documentation guard or skill validator when applicable.
+  `cargo fmt --all --check` passing. An umbrella gate that runs this exact
- Skip Cargo formatting, compilation, Clippy, tests, `make pre-commit`, and
+  check satisfies the requirement; do not run it twice. Use `cargo fmt --all`
-  `make pre-pr`.
+  only when formatting needs to be fixed. Run the configured formatter or
  validator for other changed languages when one exists.
 - Documentation-only or instruction-only means all task-owned changes are
  prose or documentation assets and cannot affect runtime, builds, CI,
  dependencies, generated code, or tests. Run `git diff --check` and any
  relevant documentation guard, but skip Cargo formatting, compilation,
  Clippy, tests, `make pre-commit`, and `make pre-pr`.
 - Behavior changes require relevant existing or new tests. Prefer the most
  focused test or affected package. A passing targeted test can also provide
  sufficient compilation coverage when it builds every changed target and
  feature involved; do not add a redundant `cargo check` in that case.
 - `cargo check` supplements compilation coverage; it never substitutes for a
  behavioral test. If a relevant test cannot reasonably be added or run, use
  the narrowest compilation check and report the reason and remaining risk.
-### Non-Behavioral Source Changes
+### Validation tiers
- Run the formatter/validator for the changed language.
+1. **Documentation/instruction-only:** Apply the exemption above. Run a guard
- Add compilation or doctests only when syntax or executable examples changed.
+   such as `make doc-paths-check` only when it is relevant to the edited text.
 2. **Non-behavioral source change:** For comments, formatting, or another
   demonstrably non-executable change, run the formatting floor. Compilation,
   Clippy, and tests may be skipped only when the edit cannot affect
   compilation or runtime behavior; run targeted doctests if executable
   documentation examples changed.
 3. **Localized or bounded behavior change:** Run the formatting floor and the
   narrowest relevant tests. Add package-scoped `cargo check` or Clippy only
   for changed targets, features, APIs, error handling, async behavior, or
   control flow not already covered. When several crates are affected but the
   dependency set is identifiable, validate those packages and known
   dependents instead of the whole workspace. Use `make pre-commit` only when
   a repository-wide fast gate adds useful confidence beyond those checks.
 4. **Broad or high-risk change:** After the applicable adversarial review has
   completed, run `make pre-pr` only when targeted coverage cannot bound the
   impact, including:
   - dependency, feature, build-script, procedural-macro, code-generation,
     toolchain, or CI changes that alter compilation or the test matrix;
   - cross-crate public APIs, shared foundational code, or broad refactors with
     an unbounded dependent set;
   - locking, storage durability or formats, erasure coding, replication,
     RPC/protocol compatibility, IAM/KMS/auth, cryptography, or other
     security-sensitive behavior;
   - a targeted check that reveals wider impact, an explicit user request, or
     a release policy that requires the full gate.
-### Localized Behavior Changes
+Documentation-only and non-behavioral classifications take precedence over
 path-based triggers. A small diff can still be high-risk, while a CI comment,
 manifest comment, or release-note edit does not require full validation.
- Run `cargo fmt --all --check` for Rust changes.
+`make pre-pr` includes `make pre-commit` coverage. Never run both for the same
- Run the narrowest test that exercises the changed behavior.
+unchanged diff, and do not repeat equivalent checks during PR preparation or
- Add package-scoped `cargo check` or Clippy only for targets, features, public
+because a local hook already ran them. Rerun only checks whose scope is affected
-  APIs, error handling, or control flow not compiled by the focused test.
+by later edits. Full workspace checks do not replace a relevant integration or
- Use `make pre-commit` only when its repository-wide fast checks add confidence
+E2E test for changed behavior; run that focused test when required and
-  beyond the focused checks.
+available, or report why it was not run and the remaining risk.
-### Broad or High-Risk Changes
+If `make` is unavailable, run the equivalent checks defined under
 `.config/make/`. At handoff, list the checks actually run, checks intentionally
 skipped, and the reason for the selected tier.
-After the required adversarial review, run `make pre-pr` when targeted coverage
+After build-based verification completes, clean generated build artifacts before wrapping up to avoid unnecessary disk usage.
-cannot bound the impact, including dependency/toolchain/build-matrix changes,
+Do not open a PR with code changes when the required checks fail.
-unbounded cross-crate APIs, or locking, durability, erasure coding, replication,
+Make a failing check pass by fixing the cause, never by weakening the gate:
-RPC, IAM/KMS/auth, cryptography, on-disk/on-wire, and S3-visible behavior.
+do not loosen or skip a guard script, add entries to a baseline or allowance
 list, suppress a lint with `#[allow]`, mark a failing test `#[ignore]`, or
 delete or relax a failing assertion to get green. If a check itself is wrong,
 change it deliberately and state the rationale in the PR.
-`make pre-pr` includes `make pre-commit`; never run both for the same unchanged
+For flaky tests, do not paper over them with retries. Follow the flake policy
-diff. Do not repeat a check already covered by a successful umbrella gate.
+in [docs/testing/README.md](docs/testing/README.md) (open an issue within 24h,
-Rerun only checks affected by later edits.
+quarantine with an issue link, fix or delete within 30 days); the local
 `default` nextest profile never retries.
-Never weaken a gate to get green: do not add baselines/allowances, suppress
+## Adversarial Validation (Default On)
 lints, ignore tests, or relax assertions unless changing that policy is itself
 the reviewed task. Follow `docs/testing/README.md` for flaky tests.
-## Adversarial Validation
+Every non-exempt output (see Risk tiers) — code change, bug fix, or
 design/solution proposal — passes multi-role adversarial review before it
 counts as done.
 Author confidence is not evidence: each role's job is to refute the change,
 not to bless it.
-Adversarial validation applies to final implementation diffs, explicitly
+### Risk tiers
 requested adversarial/design reviews, and agent-instruction changes that alter
 execution. Ordinary questions, diagnoses, status reports, non-adversarial code
 reviews, and low-risk planning do not trigger it.
-Risk and review shape:
+Pick the tier from the riskiest file touched; when in doubt, pick the higher.
- **Exempt:** documentation, comments, formatting, or typos with no runtime,
+- **Exempt:** docs/comments, formatting, and typos that cannot affect runtime,
-  build, test, or agent-execution effect.
+  builds, tests, or agent execution. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** renames, moves, test/tooling-only changes, and agent-rule
+- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes, and
-  changes. Run correctness and simplicity lenses.
+  agent-instruction changes that alter execution —
- **Standard:** localized behavior changes. Run one integrated final-diff pass
+  correctness and simplicity adversaries only.
-  covering correctness, simplicity, and test coverage; add only domain lenses
+- **Standard (the default):** any change that affects behavior.
-  matched by the diff.
+- **High risk:** touches locking, erasure coding, quorum/heal, replication,
- **High risk / substantial PR review:** high risk includes locking,
+  multipart, RPC, lifecycle/tiering, metadata formats (`xl.meta`),
-  erasure/quorum/heal, replication, multipart, RPC, lifecycle/tiering,
+  persistence/fsync, IAM/KMS/auth, on-disk or on-wire formats, or
-  persistence/fsync, IAM/KMS/auth, cryptography, on-disk/on-wire formats, and
+  S3 API-visible behavior.
  S3-visible semantics. Cover all applicable lenses using exactly two
  independent reviewers when delegation is explicitly authorized. Split the
  lenses between them. Otherwise perform two fresh sequential passes.
-Available domain lenses are security, concurrency/durability, compatibility,
+### Roles
 and performance. Select `.agents/skills/adversarial-validation/SKILL.md` for an
 explicit adversarial request, a high-risk change, or a substantial PR review;
 then read only its matching role references. A routine standard pass does not
 load the playbook unless the reviewer needs a RustFS-specific probe.
-A finding must name a concrete input/state/interleaving and wrong outcome, or a
+Run each applicable role as an independent pass over the final diff (or
-specific missing regression check, with `file:line`. Resolve it by fixing the
+proposal text) — parallel reviewer agents where the tooling supports them,
-diff or rebutting it with code-path/test/invariant evidence. After a non-trivial
+otherwise sequential passes that each start fresh from the diff and the
-fix, rerun only affected lenses.
+nearest scoped `AGENTS.md`, discarding the writing session's assumptions.
 Each role either produces findings or reports "attacked X, Y, Z — no break
 found"; a bare pass is not a result. Repo-specific attack probes for every
 role live in `.agents/skills/adversarial-validation/` — run them, they
 encode this repo's shipped bugs.
-For high-risk PRs, record one concise verdict per covered lens in the PR body.
+- **Correctness adversary** — construct a concrete input/state/interleaving
  that yields wrong output, data loss, or a crash. Probe error paths and edge
  values (empty, nil UUID, zero-length, quorum−1, missing version).
 - **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt reimplemented helpers, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, speculative abstractions, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, and narration comments. A one-caller helper is a finding only when it merely forwards or splits a short linear flow without adding domain naming, boundary isolation, an invariant, or useful error context. Report a concrete smaller replacement; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
 - **Security reviewer** — authn/authz bypass, injection, secret leakage,
  untrusted deserialization (see Serde Safety), path traversal, timing leaks.
 - **Concurrency/durability reviewer** — lock ordering, races, cancellation,
  partial failure, retry/idempotency, crash and power-loss ordering.
 - **Compatibility reviewer** — S3 API surface, MinIO interop, on-disk and
  on-wire formats, mixed-version upgrade/downgrade paths.
 - **Performance reviewer** — allocation and cloning on hot paths, lock hold
  time across IO, sync or CPU-heavy work on async runtime threads, added
  fsync/flush outside the durability gate, hot-path logging noise. A
  measurable regression on a per-request or per-object path is a finding.
 - **Test-coverage skeptic** — for each testable behavior claim, name the test
  or executable check that detects a revert; then name a changed line that
  could be wrong while all checks stay green. If a focused check is not
  reasonable, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor.
  Test additions have no line-count or growth budget.
-## Pull Request Lifecycle
+Standard tier: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage
 skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches (async or
 shared-state code → concurrency; parsing of untrusted input → security;
 public crate API shape → compatibility; per-request or per-object hot paths
 → performance).
 High risk: all seven roles.
- Creating or updating a PR includes one immediate snapshot of checks,
+### Protocol
-  mergeability, reviews, and unresolved threads.
+
- Unless the user explicitly requests monitoring, a release workflow requires
+1. A finding states a concrete failure scenario (input/state → wrong
-  it, or an automation already owns it, hand off after the PR is open with the
+   outcome) or names a missing test, with severity and file:line. "Looks
-  current state and next event to watch. Do not delay ordinary handoff with
+   risky" is not a finding.
-  fixed quiet-period sleeps.
+2. Resolve every finding: fix it, or rebut it with evidence — a test, a
- For requested monitoring, use event-driven or bounded waits. Report only state
+   traced code path, or a cited invariant. Restated intent and "unlikely"
-  changes, actionable failures, or a meaningful prolonged delay.
+   are not rebuttals.
- Investigate failures/comments before changing code. Fix task-attributable
+3. After non-trivial fixes, re-run the roles whose domain the fix touched.
-  issues, rerun affected verification, push, reply or resolve the thread, then
+4. For proposals with no diff, roles attack assumptions, failure modes,
-  resume the requested monitor.
+   migration/rollback, and testability instead — including the simplest
- Never merge without required reviewer approval or explicit authority.
+   rejected alternative and the blast radius when the design fails.
- After an observed merge, verify the commit reached the base, then clean the
+
-  task worktree/branch when safe. Preserve unmerged work for closed PRs unless
+### Exit criteria
-  deletion was explicitly authorized.
+
 - Every applicable role has run; every finding is fixed or rebutted with
  evidence.
 - Every testable behavior change has a focused regression check. Exceptions
  follow the validation floor and state why a check is impractical and what
  risk remains.
 - After the applicable adversarial review has completed, the Verification
  Before PR gates pass; adversarial review supplements those gates, never
  replaces them.
 - High risk only: record a one-line verdict per role in the PR description.
 ## Git and PR Baseline
- Follow Conventional Commits; keep the subject at most 72 characters.
+- Use feature branches based on the latest `main`.
- Source comments, commits, PR titles, and PR bodies are in English.
+- Assume other agent sessions work this repository concurrently. Never commit
- Keep every heading from `.github/pull_request_template.md`; use `N/A` where
+  in a shared checkout; do all work on a dedicated feature branch, preferably
-  needed and include commands actually run.
+  in a dedicated worktree.
- Use `--body-file` for multiline `gh pr create`/`gh pr edit` content.
+- Immediately before branching, fetch `origin/main` and branch from it;
- PR/issue/discussion content must not contain the literal sequence `\n` or
+  confirm the target issue is not already fixed there before writing code.
-  hard-wrapped prose paragraphs.
+- Follow Conventional Commits, with subject length <= 72 characters.
- Do not include local absolute paths or tool-specific labels/prefixes in GitHub
+- Keep PR title and description in English.
-  content.
+- Use `.github/pull_request_template.md` and keep all section headings.
- Resolve review threads after the underlying issue is fixed. If declining a
+- Use `N/A` for non-applicable template sections.
-  suggestion, reply with a short evidence-based reason.
+- Include verification commands in the PR description.
 - When using `gh pr create`/`gh pr edit`, write the markdown body to a file
  and pass `--body-file`; multiline inline `--body` is unsafe — backticks and
  shell expansion can corrupt content or trigger unintended commands.
  Pattern: `cat > /tmp/pr_body.md <<'EOF' ... EOF`, then
  `--body-file /tmp/pr_body.md` (keep the file outside the checkout).
 - Do not include the literal sequence `\n` in any GitHub issue, pull request, or discussion comment.
 - Do not hard-wrap prose in PR/issue/discussion bodies; write each paragraph as a
  single line and let it reflow. GitHub renders single newlines inside a paragraph
  as line breaks, so mid-sentence wrapping shows up as ugly breaks. Only break lines
  for list items, code blocks, and deliberate separators.
 - After fixing code review comments or CI findings, always mark corresponding review
  comments/threads as resolved before returning to the user.
 - In handling review comments, confirm the underlying issue before changing code.
  If a suggested change is not appropriate for behavior or risk, reply with a
  concise rationale instead of blindly applying it.
 ## Security Baseline
 - Never commit secrets, credentials, or key material.
 - Use environment variables or vault tooling for sensitive configuration.
- For localhost-sensitive tests, bypass proxies explicitly.
+- For localhost-sensitive tests, verify proxy settings to avoid traffic leakage.
 - Untrusted S3 XML/JSON, lifecycle, policy, replication, and RPC structures use
  strict deserialization where compatibility permits. Security-critical
  defaults require explicit validation.
 ## Logging
-For every added or edited `tracing` call:
+Applies to **every** `tracing` macro you add or edit, including a single line
 added in passing while fixing something else — not only to log-focused changes.
- Reuse the module's `EVENT_*`, `LOG_COMPONENT_*`, and `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*`
+- Fields first, message second: `event`, `component`, `subsystem`,
-  constants and field shape.
+  `result`/`state`, then key context. The message is a short label, not a
- Put fields first and a short label last.
+  sentence with values interpolated into it.
- Use `error` for behavior/security failure, `warn` for degradation/fallback,
+- Reuse the existing `EVENT_*` / `LOG_COMPONENT_*` / `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*`
-  `info` for low-frequency lifecycle, `debug` for diagnostics, and `trace` for
+  constants of the module you are editing; match the shape of the log sites
-  repetitive request/object success paths.
+  already in that file rather than introducing a second style next to them.
- Never log secrets, credential payloads, or merged configs.
+- Level policy: `error` for behavior/security-affecting failures, `warn` for
  degraded or fallback paths, `info` for low-frequency lifecycle, `debug` for
  targeted diagnostics, `trace` for hot paths. Per-object and per-request
  success paths are `trace`.
 - Never log secrets, tokens, credential payloads, or merged config dumps.
 - `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` enforces a subset of this on the files
  it lists; passing it is a floor, not evidence the log matches the house style.
-Use `.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md` for logging changes.
+See `.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md` for the full event
 model, level policy, and guardrail-update checklist.
-## Cross-Cutting Storage Invariants
+## Tools
- Write internal object metadata under both `x-rustfs-internal-<suffix>` and
+### xl.meta decode tool Quick Use
  `x-minio-internal-<suffix>` using
  `crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs` helpers.
 - Read binary UUID metadata with
  `.and_then(|v| Uuid::from_slice(&v).ok()).filter(|u| !u.is_nil())`; absent,
  empty, and nil all mean no value.
 - Remote-tier version `None` or `""` means an unversioned bucket; send no
  `versionId` on tier GET/DELETE.
 - `DataUsageCacheInfo` and `DataUsageEntry` keep their hand-written map
  serialization and new fields remain `#[serde(default)]` for older readers.
-## Naming
+```
 cargo run -p rustfs-filemeta --example dump_fileinfo -- "/path/to/file/xl.meta"
 ```
-Use Rust API naming: `SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE` constants/statics, `snake_case`
+## Serde Safety
 functions/variables, and `PascalCase` types. Do not rename unrelated existing
 violations.
-## Scoped Guidance
+- Add `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` to structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policies, replication configs).
 - When `deny_unknown_fields` is impractical (backward compatibility), at minimum log unknown fields at `warn` level.
 - Never use `#[serde(default)]` on security-critical fields without explicit validation of the resulting value.
-Before editing, locate the nearest instructions with:
+## Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants
 - Write internal object metadata under **both** `x-rustfs-internal-<suffix>`
  and `x-minio-internal-<suffix>` keys (MinIO interop). Use the helpers in
  `crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs` (`get_bytes` prefers the RustFS
  key); never write only one of the two.
 - Read binary UUID metadata defensively:
  `.and_then(|v| Uuid::from_slice(&v).ok()).filter(|u| !u.is_nil())` —
  absent, empty, and nil all mean "no value", never `Uuid::nil()`.
 - A remote-tier version of `None`/`""` means the tier bucket is unversioned:
  send **no** `versionId` on tier GET/DELETE.
 - Structs persisted in the scanner data-usage cache (`DataUsageCacheInfo`,
  `DataUsageEntry`) carry a hand-written map-encoded `Serialize`. MessagePack
  encodes derived structs as arrays, where an appended field makes the whole
  cache a decode error for older readers — keep new fields `#[serde(default)]`
  and keep the map encoding rather than reverting to `derive(Serialize)`.
 ## Naming Conventions
 - Follow Rust API Guidelines for naming: `SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE` for statics and constants, `snake_case` for functions and variables, `PascalCase` for types.
 - Do not use camelCase or Hungarian notation (e.g., `globalDeploymentIDPtr` → `GLOBAL_DEPLOYMENT_ID`).
 - If existing code violates naming conventions, do not widen the violation in new code. Do not rename existing symbols as part of an unrelated task; mention the violation instead (see Change Style for Existing Logic).
 ## Scoped Guidance in This Repository
 Many crates and modules carry their own `AGENTS.md` with path-specific rules
 (security boundaries, lock ordering, domain invariants). Before editing a
 path, check for the nearest one:
 ```bash
 git ls-files '*AGENTS.md'
 ```
-The nearest file wins for domain invariants. Keep generic workflow and
+The nearest file wins. Do not maintain a hand-written index of these files
-validation policy in this root file.
+here — it goes stale.
@@ -3843,6 +3843,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "s3s",
 "serde",
 "serde_json",
 "serial_test",
 "sha2 0.11.0",
 "suppaftp",
 "time",
@@ -9256,7 +9257,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "url",
 "urlencoding",
 "uuid",
 "x509-parser",
 "zeroize",
 "zip",
 "zstd",
@@ -9920,6 +9920,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "rustfs-config",
 "rustfs-io-metrics",
 "rustfs-utils",
 "serial_test",
 "temp-env",
 "tempfile",
 "tokio",
@@ -10292,6 +10293,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "s3s",
 "serde",
 "serde_json",
 "serial_test",
 "sha2 0.11.0",
 "temp-env",
 "tempfile",
@@ -12688,7 +12690,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "js-sys",
 "rand 0.10.2",
 "serde_core",
 "sha1_smol",
 "wasm-bindgen",
 ]
@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@ rsa = { version = "=0.10.0-rc.18" }
 rustls = { default-features = false, version = "0.23.43" }
 rustls-native-certs = "0.8"
 rustls-pki-types = "1.15.1"
 x509-parser = "0.18.1"
 sha1 = "0.11.0"
 sha2 = "0.11.0"
 subtle = "2.6"
@@ -19,9 +19,7 @@ Applies to all paths under `crates/`.
 - Document lock acquisition order when a module uses multiple locks. Never acquire the same set of locks in different orders across code paths.
 - Never hold a `tokio::sync::RwLock`/`Mutex` write guard across `.await` points unless the critical section is unavoidably async and the hold time is bounded.
- Prefer direct atomic `fetch_*` operations for unconditional updates and
+- Prefer `compare_exchange` loops over load-then-store for concurrent counters (peak values, adaptive heuristics).
  `compare_exchange` loops only for conditional updates such as peaks or
  adaptive state.
 - When resetting multi-field atomic statistics, use a version/sequence counter or accept that concurrent readers may see partial snapshots; document the tradeoff.
 - `std::sync::Mutex` is acceptable in async context only when held for a brief, non-`await`-containing critical section. If in doubt, use `tokio::sync::Mutex`.
@@ -42,9 +40,7 @@ Applies to all paths under `crates/`.
 - Keep unit tests close to the module they test.
 - Keep integration tests under each crate's `tests/` directory.
 - Add regression tests for bug fixes and behavior changes.
- Every test needs an observable failure criterion. Direct assertions,
+- Every test function must contain at least one `assert!`/`assert_eq!`/`assert_matches!`. A test that only calls code without asserting is not a test.
  delegated assertions, snapshots/properties, `#[should_panic]`, and meaningful
  `Result` failures are all valid; a call that can silently succeed is not.
 - In tests, prefer `.expect("context: what was being tested")` over bare `.unwrap()`. A test failure should tell you which operation failed and with what input.
 ## Async and Performance
@@ -50,3 +50,4 @@ crate.
  - `cargo test -p rustfs-audit`
  - Focused: `cargo test -p rustfs-audit --test pipeline_layer_test`
  - Focused: `cargo test -p rustfs-audit pipeline`
 - Full gate before commit: `make pre-commit`
@@ -901,10 +901,6 @@ pub struct Metrics {
    scanner_cycle_max_duration_millis: AtomicU64,
    scanner_cycle_max_objects: AtomicU64,
    scanner_cycle_max_directories: AtomicU64,
    scanner_cycle_timeout_total: AtomicU64,
    scanner_cycle_recovery_required_total: AtomicU64,
    scanner_cycle_last_progress_age_seconds: AtomicU64,
    scanner_leader_lease_without_progress: AtomicBool,
    scanner_bitrot_cycle_enabled: AtomicBool,
    scanner_bitrot_cycle_millis: AtomicU64,
    scanner_checkpoint: Mutex<Option<ScannerCheckpointReport>>,
@@ -1374,14 +1370,6 @@ pub struct ScannerMetricsReport {
    #[serde(default)]
    pub cycle_max_directories: u64,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub cycle_timeout_total: u64,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub cycle_recovery_required_total: u64,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub cycle_last_progress_age: u64,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub leader_lease_without_progress: bool,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub bitrot_cycle_enabled: bool,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub bitrot_cycle_seconds: f64,
@@ -1442,9 +1430,6 @@ const OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKETS_SCANNED: &str = "rustfs_scanner_buckets_scanned_total
 const OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLES: &str = "rustfs_scanner_cycles_total";
 const OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLE_DURATION_SECONDS: &str = "rustfs_scanner_cycle_duration_seconds";
 const OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_DURATION_SECONDS: &str = "rustfs_scanner_bucket_drive_duration_seconds";
 const OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLE_TIMEOUT_TOTAL: &str = "rustfs_scanner_cycle_timeout_total";
 const OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLE_LAST_PROGRESS_AGE: &str = "rustfs_scanner_cycle_last_progress_age";
 const OTEL_SCANNER_LEADER_LEASE_WITHOUT_PROGRESS: &str = "rustfs_scanner_leader_lease_without_progress";
 fn scan_cycle_result_label(result: u8) -> &'static str {
    match result {
@@ -1928,10 +1913,6 @@ impl Metrics {
            scanner_cycle_max_duration_millis: AtomicU64::new(0),
            scanner_cycle_max_objects: AtomicU64::new(0),
            scanner_cycle_max_directories: AtomicU64::new(0),
            scanner_cycle_timeout_total: AtomicU64::new(0),
            scanner_cycle_recovery_required_total: AtomicU64::new(0),
            scanner_cycle_last_progress_age_seconds: AtomicU64::new(0),
            scanner_leader_lease_without_progress: AtomicBool::new(false),
            scanner_bitrot_cycle_enabled: AtomicBool::new(false),
            scanner_bitrot_cycle_millis: AtomicU64::new(0),
            scanner_checkpoint: Mutex::new(None),
@@ -2431,29 +2412,12 @@ impl Metrics {
            .store(cycle_max_objects.unwrap_or_default(), Ordering::Relaxed);
        self.scanner_cycle_max_directories
            .store(cycle_max_directories.unwrap_or_default(), Ordering::Relaxed);
        self.scanner_leader_lease_without_progress.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
        self.scanner_cycle_last_progress_age_seconds.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
        metrics::gauge!(OTEL_SCANNER_LEADER_LEASE_WITHOUT_PROGRESS).set(0.0);
        metrics::gauge!(OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLE_LAST_PROGRESS_AGE).set(0.0);
        self.scanner_bitrot_cycle_enabled
            .store(bitrot_cycle.is_some(), Ordering::Relaxed);
        self.scanner_bitrot_cycle_millis
            .store(bitrot_cycle.map(duration_millis_saturated).unwrap_or_default(), Ordering::Relaxed);
    }
    pub fn record_scanner_cycle_timeout(&self, recovery_required: bool, progress_age: Duration) {
        self.scanner_cycle_timeout_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
        if recovery_required {
            self.scanner_cycle_recovery_required_total.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
        }
        self.scanner_cycle_last_progress_age_seconds
            .store(progress_age.as_secs(), Ordering::Relaxed);
        self.scanner_leader_lease_without_progress.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
        metrics::counter!(OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLE_TIMEOUT_TOTAL).increment(1);
        metrics::gauge!(OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLE_LAST_PROGRESS_AGE).set(progress_age.as_secs_f64());
        metrics::gauge!(OTEL_SCANNER_LEADER_LEASE_WITHOUT_PROGRESS).set(1.0);
    }
    pub fn record_scanner_set_scan_state(&self, concurrency_limit: Option<usize>, queued: Option<usize>, active: Option<usize>) {
        if let Some(concurrency_limit) = concurrency_limit {
            self.scanner_set_scan_concurrency_limit
@@ -3301,10 +3265,6 @@ impl Metrics {
        m.cycle_max_duration_seconds = self.scanner_cycle_max_duration_millis.load(Ordering::Relaxed) as f64 / 1000.0;
        m.cycle_max_objects = self.scanner_cycle_max_objects.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
        m.cycle_max_directories = self.scanner_cycle_max_directories.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
        m.cycle_timeout_total = self.scanner_cycle_timeout_total.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
        m.cycle_recovery_required_total = self.scanner_cycle_recovery_required_total.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
        m.cycle_last_progress_age = self.scanner_cycle_last_progress_age_seconds.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
        m.leader_lease_without_progress = self.scanner_leader_lease_without_progress.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
        m.bitrot_cycle_enabled = self.scanner_bitrot_cycle_enabled.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
        m.bitrot_cycle_seconds = self.scanner_bitrot_cycle_millis.load(Ordering::Relaxed) as f64 / 1000.0;
        m.scan_checkpoint = match self.scanner_checkpoint.lock() {
@@ -4966,20 +4926,4 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(!report.bitrot_cycle_enabled);
        assert_eq!(report.bitrot_cycle_seconds, 0.0);
    }
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn scanner_cycle_timeout_metrics_reset_for_a_new_cycle() {
        let metrics = Metrics::new();
        metrics.record_scanner_cycle_timeout(true, Duration::from_secs(17));
        let timed_out = metrics.report().await;
        assert_eq!(timed_out.cycle_timeout_total, 1);
        assert_eq!(timed_out.cycle_last_progress_age, 17);
        assert!(timed_out.leader_lease_without_progress);
        metrics.record_scanner_cycle_config(Duration::from_secs(60), None, Some(Duration::from_secs(1)), None, None);
        let current = metrics.report().await;
        assert_eq!(current.cycle_timeout_total, 1);
        assert_eq!(current.cycle_last_progress_age, 0);
        assert!(!current.leader_lease_without_progress);
    }
 }
@@ -84,12 +84,6 @@ Current guidance:
 - `RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE_MAX_OBJECTS` (canonical)
 - `RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE_MAX_DIRECTORIES` (canonical)
 Scanner cycle budget controls:
 - When `RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE_MAX_DURATION_SECS` is unset, the finite default is 1800 seconds (30 minutes), matching the scanner benchmark guidance.
 - An explicit `0` preserves the compatibility behavior of an unbounded runtime budget. Object and directory budgets likewise remain unbounded when explicitly set to `0`.
 - A timed-out cycle cancels cooperative scanner work, then fences its leader epoch before releasing the lease. An uncooperative I/O operation is dropped after the bounded shutdown window; its cursor is not claimed to be durable and the scanner reports `recovery-required` when the worker cannot stop cooperatively, the cycle state was not confirmed durable, or epoch fencing cannot be persisted.
 ## Mmap read environment aliases
 - `RUSTFS_OBJECT_MMAP_READ_ENABLE` (canonical)
@@ -57,13 +57,6 @@ pub const DEFAULT_MAX_IO_EVENTS_PER_TICK: usize = 1024;
 pub const DEFAULT_EVENT_INTERVAL: u32 = 61;
 pub const DEFAULT_RNG_SEED: Option<u64> = None; // None means random
 /// Dedicated blocking thread pool for fsync/fdatasync operations.
 /// When > 1, fsync operations are isolated from the main blocking pool to
 /// prevent device-bound fsync from starving read operations (pread/stat/open).
 /// Default 0 means auto (no isolation, use main runtime).
 pub const ENV_FSYNC_BLOCKING_THREADS: &str = "RUSTFS_RUNTIME_FSYNC_BLOCKING_THREADS";
 pub const DEFAULT_FSYNC_BLOCKING_THREADS: usize = 0;
 // Dial9 Tokio Telemetry Default values
 pub const DEFAULT_RUNTIME_DIAL9_ENABLED: bool = false; // Disabled by default
 pub const DEFAULT_RUNTIME_DIAL9_OUTPUT_DIR: &str = "/var/log/rustfs/telemetry";
@@ -143,12 +143,9 @@ pub const ENV_SCANNER_MAX_WAIT_SECS: &str = "RUSTFS_SCANNER_MAX_WAIT_SECS";
 /// Default scanner speed preset.
 pub const DEFAULT_SCANNER_SPEED: &str = "default";
-/// Default scanner cycle runtime budget when no override is configured.
+/// Default scanner cycle runtime budget.
-///
+/// `0` keeps the existing unbounded per-cycle behavior.
-/// An explicit `0` remains the compatibility escape hatch for an unbounded
+pub const DEFAULT_SCANNER_CYCLE_MAX_DURATION_SECS: u64 = 0;
 /// cycle. Keeping the unset default finite prevents a stalled scanner I/O
 /// operation from holding the leader lease forever.
 pub const DEFAULT_SCANNER_CYCLE_MAX_DURATION_SECS: u64 = 30 * 60;
 /// Default scanner per-cycle object budget.
 /// `0` keeps the existing unbounded per-cycle behavior.
@@ -585,12 +585,9 @@ impl VersionsHistogram {
    }
 }
-/// Replication statistics for a single target.
+/// Replication statistics for a single target
-///
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-/// Renamed from `ReplicationStats`; serde field names are preserved
+pub struct ReplicationStats {
 /// byte-identically to maintain wire compatibility with existing snapshots.
 #[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct ReplicationTargetUsage {
    pub pending_size: u64,
    pub replicated_size: u64,
    pub failed_size: u64,
@@ -603,7 +600,7 @@ pub struct ReplicationTargetUsage {
    pub replicated_count: u64,
 }
-impl ReplicationTargetUsage {
+impl ReplicationStats {
    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
        let Self {
            pending_size,
@@ -639,7 +636,7 @@ impl ReplicationTargetUsage {
 /// Replication statistics for all targets
 #[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct ReplicationAllStats {
-    pub targets: HashMap<String, ReplicationTargetUsage>,
+    pub targets: HashMap<String, ReplicationStats>,
    pub replica_size: u64,
    pub replica_count: u64,
 }
@@ -652,7 +649,7 @@ impl ReplicationAllStats {
            targets,
        } = self;
-        *replica_size == 0 && *replica_count == 0 && targets.values().all(ReplicationTargetUsage::is_empty)
+        *replica_size == 0 && *replica_count == 0 && targets.values().all(ReplicationStats::is_empty)
    }
    #[deprecated(note = "use is_empty instead")]
@@ -2469,7 +2466,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn replication_stats_empty_checks_every_field() {
-        type SetField = fn(&mut ReplicationTargetUsage);
+        type SetField = fn(&mut ReplicationStats);
        let cases: [(&str, SetField); 10] = [
            ("pending_size", |stats| stats.pending_size = 1),
@@ -2484,9 +2481,9 @@ mod tests {
            ("replicated_count", |stats| stats.replicated_count = 1),
        ];
-        assert!(ReplicationTargetUsage::default().is_empty());
+        assert!(ReplicationStats::default().is_empty());
        for (field, set_nonzero) in cases {
-            let mut stats = ReplicationTargetUsage::default();
+            let mut stats = ReplicationStats::default();
            set_nonzero(&mut stats);
            assert!(!stats.is_empty(), "{field} must make replication stats non-empty");
        }
@@ -2517,17 +2514,17 @@ mod tests {
        }
        let empty_targets = ReplicationAllStats {
-            targets: HashMap::from([("arn:test:empty".to_string(), ReplicationTargetUsage::default())]),
+            targets: HashMap::from([("arn:test:empty".to_string(), ReplicationStats::default())]),
            ..Default::default()
        };
        assert!(empty_targets.is_empty(), "all-empty targets must keep aggregate stats empty");
        let stats = ReplicationAllStats {
            targets: HashMap::from([
-                ("arn:test:empty".to_string(), ReplicationTargetUsage::default()),
+                ("arn:test:empty".to_string(), ReplicationStats::default()),
                (
                    "arn:test:non-empty".to_string(),
-                    ReplicationTargetUsage {
+                    ReplicationStats {
                        pending_count: 1,
                        ..Default::default()
                    },
@@ -2568,7 +2565,7 @@ mod tests {
                replication_stats: Some(ReplicationAllStats {
                    targets: HashMap::from([(
                        "arn:test:pending".to_string(),
-                        ReplicationTargetUsage {
+                        ReplicationStats {
                            pending_count: 1,
                            ..Default::default()
                        },
@@ -2717,7 +2714,7 @@ mod tests {
                targets: HashMap::from([
                    (
                        "arn:self-only".to_string(),
-                        ReplicationTargetUsage {
+                        ReplicationStats {
                            pending_size: 7,
                            pending_count: 1,
                            ..Default::default()
@@ -2725,7 +2722,7 @@ mod tests {
                    ),
                    (
                        "arn:shared".to_string(),
-                        ReplicationTargetUsage {
+                        ReplicationStats {
                            failed_size: 3,
                            failed_count: 1,
                            missed_threshold_size: 2,
@@ -2744,7 +2741,7 @@ mod tests {
                targets: HashMap::from([
                    (
                        "arn:shared".to_string(),
-                        ReplicationTargetUsage {
+                        ReplicationStats {
                            failed_size: 5,
                            failed_count: 2,
                            after_threshold_size: 4,
@@ -2754,7 +2751,7 @@ mod tests {
                    ),
                    (
                        "arn:other-only".to_string(),
-                        ReplicationTargetUsage {
+                        ReplicationStats {
                            replicated_size: 11,
                            replicated_count: 3,
                            ..Default::default()
@@ -2996,9 +2993,7 @@ mod tests {
    fn replication_target_deserialization_preserves_large_historical_maps() {
        let mut stats = ReplicationAllStats::default();
        for index in 0..=1024 {
-            stats
+            stats.targets.insert(format!("target-{index}"), ReplicationStats::default());
                .targets
                .insert(format!("target-{index}"), ReplicationTargetUsage::default());
        }
        let encoded = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&stats).expect("large replication target fixture should encode");
        let decoded = rmp_serde::from_slice::<ReplicationAllStats>(&encoded)
@@ -3007,47 +3002,6 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(decoded.targets.len(), stats.targets.len());
    }
    /// Round-trip test: encoding a [`ReplicationTargetUsage`] and decoding it back
    /// must produce the exact same value.  This guards against accidental serde
    /// field-name drift during the `ReplicationStats` -> `ReplicationTargetUsage`
    /// rename.  Wire-level field names are the serialized Rust field identifiers,
    /// which must remain byte-identical.
    #[test]
    fn replication_target_usage_rmp_round_trip() {
        let original = ReplicationTargetUsage {
            pending_size: 100,
            replicated_size: 2_000,
            failed_size: 50,
            failed_count: 3,
            pending_count: 7,
            missed_threshold_size: 11,
            after_threshold_size: 22,
            missed_threshold_count: 1,
            after_threshold_count: 2,
            replicated_count: 99,
        };
        let buf = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&original).expect("encode ReplicationTargetUsage to msgpack");
        let decoded: ReplicationTargetUsage = rmp_serde::from_slice(&buf).expect("decode ReplicationTargetUsage from msgpack");
        assert_eq!(original, decoded, "round-trip through rmp must preserve every field");
        // Also verify that encoding as an unnamed sequence and then decoding
        // with named fields produces the correct mapping (this catches reordering).
        let named_buf = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&original).expect("re-encode for field-name pinning");
        // Spot-check that known field names appear in the named encoding.
        let named_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&named_buf);
        assert!(named_str.contains("pending_size"), "field 'pending_size' must survive the rename");
        assert!(named_str.contains("replicated_size"), "field 'replicated_size' must survive the rename");
        assert!(
            named_str.contains("missed_threshold_size"),
            "field 'missed_threshold_size' must survive the rename"
        );
        assert!(
            named_str.contains("after_threshold_count"),
            "field 'after_threshold_count' must survive the rename"
        );
    }
    #[test]
    fn checked_merge_rejects_noncanonical_histograms_without_mutation() {
        let mut entry = DataUsageEntry {
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ follow.
 ## Suggested Validation
 - `cargo test --package e2e_test`
 - Full gate before commit: `make pre-commit`
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ tokio-stream = { workspace = true }
 rustfs-madmin.workspace = true
 rustfs-filemeta.workspace = true
 bytes = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
 serial_test = { workspace = true }
 aws-sdk-s3 = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["sigv4a", "default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
 aws-sdk-sts = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
 aws-config = { workspace = true }
@@ -48,14 +48,16 @@ cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test
 cargo nextest run -j1 --run-ignored ignored-only -p rustfs-scanner -p rustfs \
  -E 'binary(lifecycle_integration_test) or (package(rustfs) and test(lifecycle_transition_api_test))'
 # Protocols suite — fixed ports, MUST be single-threaded, gated by build features
 RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES=ftps,webdav,sftp \
  cargo test -p e2e_test test_protocol_core_suite -- --test-threads=1 --nocapture
 ```
 The protocols suite has its own contract (fixed bind ports 9022–9301,
-single-worker execution, feature-gated scheduling) documented in
+`--test-threads=1`, feature-gated scheduling) documented in
 [`src/protocols/README.md`](src/protocols/README.md). `RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES`
 selects which features the spawned binary is built with; leave it unset to run
-every protocol entry. Use the exact profile command under
+every protocol entry.
 [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for CI-equivalent execution.
 ### `#[ignore]` semantics
@@ -157,26 +159,27 @@ construction (random port + isolated temp dir) and need no serialization.
 ## CI map
 `e2e_test` is **excluded** from the main `cargo nextest run --profile ci --all`
-pass (`--exclude e2e_test`) — the whole crate is too slow to gate every PR.
+pass ([`.github/workflows/ci.yml`](../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) line 158,
-Subsets join CI through nextest profiles; the fixed-port protocol suite uses
+`--exclude e2e_test`) — the whole crate is too slow to gate every PR. Subsets
-the same profile for membership and execution with one nightly worker.
+join CI through the nextest profile system only (never as ad-hoc jobs):
 | Suite | Runs where | Status |
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | Smoke subset (`e2e-smoke` profile) | `e2e-tests` job, every PR | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-4) |
 | Full single-node suite (`e2e-full` profile) | `e2e-full` job, merge queue + main | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-5) |
 | `s3s-e2e` black-box | `e2e-tests` + `e2e-tests-rio-v2` jobs | **Active** (external conformance tool) |
 | ILM / lifecycle (ignored) | `test-ilm-integration-serial` lane, `-j1` | **Active** (backlog#1148 ilm-1) |
-| KMS suite | `e2e-full` job, merge queue + main | **Active** |
+| KMS suite | — | Not in CI yet (backlog#1149 ci-5) |
-| Cluster faults (`e2e-nightly` profile) | consolidated nightly workflow | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-7) |
+| Protocols (FTPS/WebDAV/SFTP) | — | Not in CI yet (backlog#1149 ci-7) |
 | Protocols (FTPS/WebDAV/SFTP) | consolidated nightly workflow, serial | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-7) |
 | Replication (fast subset) | `e2e-smoke` profile, `e2e-tests` job, every PR | **Active** (backlog#1147 repl-1) |
-| Replication (slow + multi-node) | `e2e-repl-nightly` profile, consolidated nightly workflow | **Active** (backlog#1147 repl-1) |
+| Replication (slow + dual-node) | `e2e-repl-nightly` profile, scheduled workflow | **Active** (backlog#1147 repl-1) |
-| `reliant/*` | 19 tests in PR smoke; remaining default tests in `e2e-full` | **Active** except `#[ignore]` |
+| `reliant/*` (pre-started server) | — | Manual only |
-The profile filters in [`.config/nextest.toml`](../../.config/nextest.toml) are
+Links: [`ci.yml`](../../.github/workflows/ci.yml) `e2e-tests` (line 347),
-the wiring source of truth. Committed test-ID digests under
+`test-ilm-integration-serial` (line 196). The `e2e-smoke` `default-filter` in
-`.config/e2e-*-selection.txt` make every membership change explicit.
+[`.config/nextest.toml`](../../.config/nextest.toml) is the **single wiring
 mechanism** — extend that filter (or add a sibling profile) to admit more
 tests; do not add e2e jobs to `ci.yml`. repl-1 / ilm-3 are landing in parallel
 and may add lanes; keep the table above easy to extend.
 ## Troubleshooting
@@ -185,15 +188,9 @@ the wiring source of truth. Committed test-ID digests under
 ```bash
 # Smoke (e2e-tests job) — includes the 20 fast replication tests
 cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test
-# Full single-node merge/main lane
+# Replication nightly lane (16 slow + dual-node tests; install awscurl for the
-cargo nextest run --profile e2e-full -p e2e_test
+# STS dual-node test, else it skips gracefully)
 # Cluster fault nightly lane
 cargo nextest run --profile e2e-nightly -p e2e_test
 # Replication nightly lane; install awscurl so STS paths do not skip
 cargo nextest run --profile e2e-repl-nightly -p e2e_test
 # Fixed-port protocol nightly lane
 RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES=ftps,webdav,sftp \
  cargo nextest run -j 1 --profile e2e-protocols -p e2e_test --no-capture
 # ILM serial lane
 cargo nextest run -j1 --run-ignored ignored-only -p rustfs-scanner -p rustfs \
  -E 'binary(lifecycle_integration_test) or (package(rustfs) and test(lifecycle_transition_api_test))'
@@ -276,6 +273,4 @@ current subset is.
 `docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md` records the per-module test counts as
 listed by `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test`. Regenerate it when adding or
 moving e2e tests so acceptance numbers in the test-strategy issues
-(backlog#1147–#1155) stay auditable. When a profile membership change is
+(backlog#1147–#1155) stay auditable.
 intentional, review its JSON listing before updating the matching
 `.config/e2e-*-selection.txt` test-ID digest.
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ use reqwest::StatusCode;
 use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
 use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
 use s3s::Body;
 use serde_json;
 use std::ffi::OsStr;
 use std::fs as stdfs;
 use std::io::ErrorKind;
@@ -1584,156 +1583,6 @@ impl Drop for RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
    }
 }
 /// Send a SigV4-signed HTTP request and return the raw `reqwest::Response`.
 ///
 /// Unlike [`signed_s3_request`], this variant accepts `body: Option<Vec<u8>>`
 /// (binary-safe) and reorders parameters so that `access_key`/`secret_key`
 /// appear before the body — matching the convention used by the replication
 /// extension and object-lambda e2e suites.
 pub(crate) async fn signed_request(
    method: http::Method,
    url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
    body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    content_type: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
    let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
    let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
    request = request.header(HOST, authority);
    request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
    if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
        request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
    }
    let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
    let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
    let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
    let client = local_http_client();
    let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
    for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
        request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
    }
    if let Some(body) = body {
        request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
    }
    Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
 }
 /// Like [`signed_request`], but uses a caller-supplied `reqwest::Client`
 /// instead of the shared [`local_http_client`].
 pub(crate) async fn signed_request_with_client(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    method: http::Method,
    url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
    body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    content_type: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
    let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
    let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
    request = request.header(HOST, authority);
    request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
    if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
        request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
    }
    let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
    let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
    let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
    let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
    for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
        request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
    }
    if let Some(body) = body {
        request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
    }
    Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
 }
 /// Like [`signed_request`], but includes a `session_token` in the
 /// `x-amz-security-token` header and passes it to the SigV4 signer.
 pub(crate) async fn signed_request_with_session_token(
    method: http::Method,
    url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
    session_token: &str,
    body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    content_type: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
    let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
    let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
    request = request.header(HOST, authority);
    request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
    if !session_token.is_empty() {
        request = request.header("x-amz-security-token", session_token);
    }
    if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
        request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
    }
    let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
    let signed = sign_v4(
        request.body(Body::empty())?,
        content_len,
        access_key,
        secret_key,
        session_token,
        "us-east-1",
    );
    let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
    let client = local_http_client();
    let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
    for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
        request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
    }
    if let Some(body) = body {
        request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
    }
    Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
 }
 /// Create a new user via the admin API.
 pub(crate) async fn admin_create_user(
    env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
    username: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
 ) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={}", env.url, username);
    let body = serde_json::json!({
        "secretKey": secret_key,
        "status": "enabled"
    });
    let response = signed_request(
        http::Method::PUT,
        &url,
        &env.access_key,
        &env.secret_key,
        Some(body.to_string().into_bytes()),
        Some("application/json"),
    )
    .await?;
    if response.status() != reqwest::StatusCode::OK {
        let status = response.status();
        let body = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
        return Err(format!("create user failed: {status} {body}").into());
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ mod tests {
    use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
    use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
    use aws_sdk_s3::types::{CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart};
    use serial_test::serial;
    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
    use std::error::Error;
    use tokio::time::{Duration, timeout};
@@ -268,6 +269,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// stripes) and a multipart object (3 parts × 5 MiB) must GET back as a
    /// full, byte-identical body with the correct Content-Length. No early EOF.
    #[tokio::test]
    #[serial]
    async fn degraded_read_large_objects_with_one_disk_offline_return_full_body() -> TestResult {
        init_logging();
        info!("dist-13 (a): large-object degraded read with one of four disks offline");
@@ -333,6 +335,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// mid-stream — the exact window the fixes had to reconstruct through rather
    /// than truncate.
    #[tokio::test]
    #[serial]
    async fn degraded_read_reconstructs_through_midstream_bitrot_within_quorum() -> TestResult {
        init_logging();
        info!("dist-13 (b): mid-stream bitrot within quorum must reconstruct a full body");
@@ -390,6 +393,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// Content-Length. `get_checked` panics on that forbidden outcome, so this
    /// test fails loudly if the truncation bug ever returns.
    #[tokio::test]
    #[serial]
    async fn beyond_quorum_degraded_read_never_silently_truncates() -> TestResult {
        init_logging();
        info!("dist-13 (c): beyond-quorum degraded read must fail, never 200+truncated");
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ mod tests {
    use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
    use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
    use aws_sdk_s3::types::{CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart};
    use serial_test::serial;
    use std::error::Error;
    use tokio::time::{Duration, timeout};
    use tracing::info;
@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// the body — and assert the server log names the object, at the log level a
    /// default deployment actually runs with.
    #[tokio::test]
    #[serial]
    async fn midstream_get_failure_is_logged_with_the_object_at_default_log_level() -> TestResult {
        init_logging();
        info!("rustfs#4784: a mid-stream GET failure must name its object in the source log");
@@ -380,24 +380,10 @@ mod tests {
        cluster.start_node(1).await?;
        let status_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/background-heal/status", cluster.nodes[0].url);
-        let mut recovered = serde_json::Value::Null;
+        let status_body = signed_admin_post(&status_url, None, &cluster.access_key, &cluster.secret_key).await?;
-        for _ in 0..60 {
+        assert!(
-            let status_body = signed_admin_post(&status_url, None, &cluster.access_key, &cluster.secret_key).await?;
+            !status_body.contains("MissingContentLength"),
-            assert!(
+            "background heal status should not fail without an explicit Content-Length: {status_body}"
                !status_body.contains("MissingContentLength"),
                "background heal status should not fail without an explicit Content-Length: {status_body}"
            );
            recovered = serde_json::from_str(&status_body)
                .map_err(|err| format!("background heal status is not JSON ({err}): {status_body}"))?;
            if recovered["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(true) {
                break;
            }
            sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
        }
        assert_eq!(
            recovered["clusterStatusComplete"],
            serde_json::Value::Bool(true),
            "cluster heal status should recover before root heal starts: {recovered}"
        );
        let heal_body = r#"{"recursive":true,"dryRun":false,"remove":false,"recreate":true,"scanMode":2,"updateParity":false,"nolock":false}"#;
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ use prost::Message;
 use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
 use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
 use s3s::Body;
 use serial_test::serial;
 use std::collections::BTreeMap;
 use std::convert::Infallible;
 use std::error::Error;
@@ -1694,6 +1695,7 @@ fn assert_storage_layout(
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_inline_storage_and_get_boundaries() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -1765,6 +1767,7 @@ async fn four_node_inline_storage_and_get_boundaries() -> TestResult {
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -1802,6 +1805,7 @@ async fn four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh() -> TestResult {
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_inline_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -1866,6 +1870,7 @@ async fn four_node_inline_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_compressed_inline_fallback() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -1900,6 +1905,7 @@ async fn four_node_compressed_inline_fallback() -> TestResult {
 /// Multipart disk compression is live again, so a compression-enabled cluster classifies multipart objects as compressed and the roundtrip (full GET plus partNumber GET) must still return the original bytes.
 /// Reverting the multipart compression fix must fail this test.
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_multipart_disk_compression_roundtrip() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -1946,6 +1952,7 @@ async fn four_node_multipart_disk_compression_roundtrip() -> TestResult {
 /// read costs on the order of the covering part's block size against a ~5 MiB
 /// object.
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_compressed_multipart_tail_range_reads_are_bounded() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -2012,6 +2019,7 @@ async fn four_node_compressed_multipart_tail_range_reads_are_bounded() -> TestRe
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -2115,6 +2123,7 @@ async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls() -> Te
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_add_tier_converges() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -2133,6 +2142,7 @@ async fn four_node_add_tier_converges() -> TestResult {
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_add_tier_converges_after_offline_node_restart_without_second_mutation() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -2154,6 +2164,7 @@ async fn four_node_add_tier_converges_after_offline_node_restart_without_second_
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_manual_transition_job_status_survives_node_restart() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -2228,6 +2239,7 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_job_status_survives_node_restart() -> TestR
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_status_and_backpressure() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -2369,6 +2381,7 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_stat
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 #[ignore = "manual #1508 evidence harness: starts a 4-node cluster, a remote tier, and an in-flight transition job"]
 async fn four_node_manual_transition_rollout_non_empty_restart_readback() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -2473,6 +2486,7 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_rollout_non_empty_restart_readback() -> Tes
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls_during_transition() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -2584,6 +2598,7 @@ async fn four_node_mixed_msgpack_compat_mode_preserves_fallback_controls_during_
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn four_node_transitioned_inline_fallback() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_sse_s3_put_object() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::erro
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_sse_kms_put_object() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::err
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_sse_kms_multipart_crc32() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ async fn test_explicit_encryption_overrides_bucket_default() -> Result<(), Box<d
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ async fn test_sse_kms_without_key_id_populates_default() -> Result<(), Box<dyn s
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 use tokio::fs;
 use tokio::net::TcpStream;
 use tokio::time::sleep;
-use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
+use tracing::{debug, error, info};
 // KMS-specific constants
 pub const TEST_BUCKET: &str = "kms-test-bucket";
@@ -177,136 +177,6 @@ pub async fn get_kms_status(
    Ok(status)
 }
 /// Poll the KMS status endpoint until the backend reports ready or the timeout
 /// expires.  Replaces hard-coded `sleep(Duration::from_secs(3))` startup waits
 /// with an active readiness probe so tests start as soon as KMS is usable
 /// (typically < 1 s) instead of always waiting the full 3 s.
 ///
 /// Uses exponential back-off starting at 200 ms (doubling each attempt, capped
 /// at 1 s) up to a total wall-clock budget of 5 s.
 pub async fn wait_for_kms_ready(
    base_url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
 ) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    wait_for_kms_ready_with_timeout(base_url, access_key, secret_key, Duration::from_secs(5)).await
 }
 async fn wait_for_kms_ready_with_timeout(
    base_url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
    total_deadline: Duration,
 ) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let start = tokio::time::Instant::now();
    let deadline = start + total_deadline;
    let mut backoff = Duration::from_millis(200);
    let max_backoff = Duration::from_secs(1);
    loop {
        match tokio::time::timeout_at(deadline, get_kms_status(base_url, access_key, secret_key)).await {
            Ok(Ok(status)) => {
                let backend_status = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&status)
                    .ok()
                    .and_then(|value| value.get("backend_status")?.as_str().map(str::to_owned));
                if backend_status.as_deref() == Some("healthy") {
                    info!("KMS is ready (status: {})", status);
                    return Ok(());
                }
                warn!(
                    backend_status = backend_status.as_deref().unwrap_or("missing"),
                    elapsed_ms = u64::try_from(start.elapsed().as_millis()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX),
                    "KMS not ready yet, retrying…"
                );
            }
            Ok(Err(e)) => {
                let elapsed_ms = u64::try_from(start.elapsed().as_millis()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX);
                warn!(error = %e, elapsed_ms, "KMS not ready yet, retrying…");
            }
            Err(_) => return Err(format!("KMS failed to become ready within {} ms", total_deadline.as_millis()).into()),
        }
        let now = tokio::time::Instant::now();
        if now >= deadline {
            return Err(format!("KMS failed to become ready within {} ms", total_deadline.as_millis()).into());
        }
        sleep((now + backoff).min(deadline) - now).await;
        backoff = (backoff * 2).min(max_backoff);
    }
 }
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod readiness_tests {
    use super::{wait_for_kms_ready, wait_for_kms_ready_with_timeout};
    use std::sync::{
        Arc,
        atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering},
    };
    use std::time::Duration;
    use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
    use tokio::net::TcpListener;
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn kms_readiness_retries_http_success_until_backend_is_healthy() {
        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.expect("bind readiness test server");
        let address = listener.local_addr().expect("read readiness test server address");
        let requests = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
        let server_requests = Arc::clone(&requests);
        let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
            for backend_status in ["error", "healthy"] {
                let (mut socket, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept readiness request");
                let mut request = Vec::new();
                let mut chunk = [0_u8; 1024];
                while !request.windows(4).any(|window| window == b"\r\n\r\n") {
                    let read = socket.read(&mut chunk).await.expect("read readiness request");
                    if read == 0 {
                        break;
                    }
                    request.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..read]);
                }
                server_requests.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
                let body = format!(r#"{{"backend_status":"{backend_status}"}}"#);
                let response = format!(
                    "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{body}",
                    body.len()
                );
                socket.write_all(response.as_bytes()).await.expect("write readiness response");
            }
        });
        wait_for_kms_ready(&format!("http://{address}"), "access-key", "secret-key")
            .await
            .expect("KMS should become ready after the healthy response");
        let observed_requests = requests.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
        server.abort();
        assert_eq!(observed_requests, 2, "an HTTP 200 unhealthy status must be retried");
    }
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn kms_readiness_deadline_covers_a_stalled_status_request() {
        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.expect("bind readiness test server");
        let address = listener.local_addr().expect("read readiness test server address");
        let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
            let (mut socket, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept readiness request");
            let mut request = [0_u8; 1024];
            let _ = socket.read(&mut request).await.expect("read readiness request");
            std::future::pending::<()>().await;
        });
        let result = tokio::time::timeout(
            Duration::from_secs(1),
            wait_for_kms_ready_with_timeout(&format!("http://{address}"), "access-key", "secret-key", Duration::from_millis(50)),
        )
        .await
        .expect("readiness helper must enforce its own deadline");
        server.abort();
        assert!(result.is_err(), "a stalled status request must not outlive the readiness deadline");
    }
 }
 /// Create a default KMS key for testing and return the created key ID
 pub async fn create_default_key(
    base_url: &str,
@@ -991,13 +861,6 @@ impl LocalKMSTestEnvironment {
        Ok(default_key_id.to_string())
    }
    /// Poll the KMS status endpoint until the backend reports ready.
    ///
    /// Prefer this over a fixed `sleep` after calling `start_rustfs_for_local_kms`.
    pub async fn wait_for_kms_ready(&self) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
        wait_for_kms_ready(&self.base_env.url, &self.base_env.access_key, &self.base_env.secret_key).await
    }
    /// Configure Local KMS backend with a predefined default key
    pub async fn configure_local_kms(&self) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
        // Use a fixed, predictable default key ID
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_of_sse_object_stays_decryptable() {
        )
        .await
        .expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await.expect("KMS ready");
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    // Deliberately an UNVERSIONED bucket: that is the branch where the store layer can service
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_dropping_sse_rewrites_plaintext() {
        )
        .await
        .expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await.expect("KMS ready");
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    // Unversioned, and deliberately WITHOUT a bucket default-encryption rule, so the copy below
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_under_bucket_default_sse_stays_decrypta
        )
        .await
        .expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await.expect("KMS ready");
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    let bucket = "copy-object-self-copy-bucket-default-sse-test";
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ async fn test_self_copy_of_historical_sse_s3_version_is_readable() {
        )
        .await
        .expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await.expect("KMS ready");
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    let bucket = "copy-object-version-restore-sse-test";
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ async fn test_head_reports_managed_metadata_for_sse_s3() -> Result<(), Box<dyn s
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ async fn test_head_reports_managed_metadata_for_sse_kms_and_copy() -> Result<(),
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ async fn test_multipart_upload_writes_encrypted_data() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ use super::common::{
    test_sse_kms_encryption, test_sse_s3_encryption,
 };
 use crate::common::{TEST_BUCKET, init_logging};
 use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
 use tracing::info;
 /// Comprehensive test: Full KMS workflow with all encryption types
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ async fn test_comprehensive_kms_full_workflow() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ async fn test_comprehensive_stress_test() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ async fn test_comprehensive_key_isolation() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Er
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ async fn test_comprehensive_concurrent_operations() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::e
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -252,7 +253,7 @@ async fn test_comprehensive_performance_benchmark() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::e
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ async fn test_kms_zero_byte_file_encryption() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ async fn test_kms_single_byte_file_encryption() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ async fn test_kms_multipart_boundary_conditions() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::err
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ async fn test_kms_invalid_key_scenarios() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ async fn test_kms_concurrent_encryption() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = Arc::new(kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client());
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ async fn test_kms_key_validation_security() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Er
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ async fn test_kms_key_directory_unavailable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ async fn test_kms_corrupted_key_files() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ async fn test_kms_multipart_upload_interruption() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::err
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ async fn test_kms_resource_constraints() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ async fn test_local_kms_end_to_end() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + S
        .expect("Failed to start RustFS with Local KMS");
    // Wait a moment for RustFS to fully start up and initialize KMS
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    info!("RustFS started with KMS auto-configuration, default_key_id: {}", default_key_id);
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ async fn test_local_kms_key_isolation() {
        .expect("Failed to start RustFS with Local KMS");
    // Wait a moment for RustFS to fully start up and initialize KMS
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await.expect("KMS ready");
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    info!("RustFS started with KMS auto-configuration, default_key_id: {}", default_key_id);
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ async fn test_local_kms_large_file() {
        .expect("Failed to start RustFS with Local KMS");
    // Wait a moment for RustFS to fully start up and initialize KMS
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await.expect("KMS ready");
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    info!("RustFS started with KMS auto-configuration, default_key_id: {}", default_key_id);
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ async fn test_local_kms_multipart_upload() {
        .expect("Failed to start RustFS with Local KMS");
    // Wait for KMS initialization
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await.expect("KMS ready");
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    info!("RustFS started with KMS auto-configuration, default_key_id: {}", default_key_id);
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 //! multipart upload behaviour.
 use crate::common::{TEST_BUCKET, init_logging};
 use serial_test::serial;
 use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
 use tracing::{error, info};
 use super::common::{
@@ -44,8 +46,8 @@ impl VaultKmsTestContext {
        start_kms(&env.base_env.url, &env.base_env.access_key, &env.base_env.secret_key).await?;
-        // Wait for KMS to finish initialising.
+        // Allow Vault to finish initialising token auth and transit engine.
-        super::common::wait_for_kms_ready(&env.base_env.url, &env.base_env.access_key, &env.base_env.secret_key).await?;
+        sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
        Ok(Self { env })
    }
@@ -60,6 +62,7 @@ impl VaultKmsTestContext {
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn test_vault_kms_end_to_end() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    init_logging();
    if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_end_to_end") {
@@ -115,6 +118,7 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_end_to_end() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + S
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn test_vault_kms_key_isolation() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    init_logging();
    if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_key_isolation") {
@@ -201,6 +205,7 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_key_isolation() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn test_vault_kms_large_file() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    init_logging();
    if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_large_file") {
@@ -265,6 +270,7 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_large_file() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + S
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn test_vault_kms_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    init_logging();
    if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_multipart_upload") {
@@ -295,6 +301,7 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Err
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn test_vault_kms_key_operations() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    init_logging();
    if skip_if_kms_admin_tool_unavailable("test_vault_kms_key_operations") {
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ mod kms_edge_cases_test;
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod kms_fault_recovery_test;
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test_runner;
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod bucket_default_encryption_test;
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ async fn test_step1_basic_single_file_encryption() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::er
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ async fn test_step2_basic_multipart_upload_without_encryption() -> Result<(), Bo
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ async fn test_step3_multipart_upload_with_sse_s3() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::er
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ async fn test_step4_large_multipart_upload_with_encryption() -> Result<(), Box<d
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ async fn test_step5_all_encryption_types_multipart() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::
    let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    let _default_key_id = kms_env.start_rustfs_for_local_kms().await?;
-    kms_env.wait_for_kms_ready().await?;
+    tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
    let s3_client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
    kms_env.base_env.create_test_bucket(TEST_BUCKET).await?;
@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
 // Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
 //
 // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 // You may obtain a copy of the License at
 //
 //     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 //
 #![allow(dead_code)]
 // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 //! Unified KMS test suite runner
 //!
 //! This module provides a unified interface for running KMS tests with categorization,
 //! filtering, and comprehensive reporting capabilities.
 use crate::common::init_logging;
 use std::time::Instant;
 use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
 use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
 /// Test category for organization and filtering
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
 pub enum TestCategory {
    CoreFunctionality,
    MultipartEncryption,
    EdgeCases,
    FaultRecovery,
    Comprehensive,
    Performance,
 }
 impl TestCategory {
    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            TestCategory::CoreFunctionality => "core-functionality",
            TestCategory::MultipartEncryption => "multipart-encryption",
            TestCategory::EdgeCases => "edge-cases",
            TestCategory::FaultRecovery => "fault-recovery",
            TestCategory::Comprehensive => "comprehensive",
            TestCategory::Performance => "performance",
        }
    }
 }
 /// Test definition with metadata
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct TestDefinition {
    pub name: String,
    pub description: String,
    pub category: TestCategory,
    pub estimated_duration: Duration,
    pub is_critical: bool,
 }
 impl TestDefinition {
    pub fn new(
        name: impl Into<String>,
        description: impl Into<String>,
        category: TestCategory,
        estimated_duration: Duration,
        is_critical: bool,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            name: name.into(),
            description: description.into(),
            category,
            estimated_duration,
            is_critical,
        }
    }
 }
 /// Test execution result
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct TestResult {
    pub test_name: String,
    pub category: TestCategory,
    pub success: bool,
    pub duration: Duration,
    pub error_message: Option<String>,
 }
 impl TestResult {
    pub fn success(test_name: String, category: TestCategory, duration: Duration) -> Self {
        Self {
            test_name,
            category,
            success: true,
            duration,
            error_message: None,
        }
    }
    pub fn failure(test_name: String, category: TestCategory, duration: Duration, error: String) -> Self {
        Self {
            test_name,
            category,
            success: false,
            duration,
            error_message: Some(error),
        }
    }
 }
 /// Comprehensive test suite configuration
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct TestSuiteConfig {
    pub categories: Vec<TestCategory>,
    pub include_critical_only: bool,
    pub max_duration: Option<Duration>,
    pub parallel_execution: bool,
 }
 impl Default for TestSuiteConfig {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            categories: vec![
                TestCategory::CoreFunctionality,
                TestCategory::MultipartEncryption,
                TestCategory::EdgeCases,
                TestCategory::FaultRecovery,
                TestCategory::Comprehensive,
            ],
            include_critical_only: false,
            max_duration: None,
            parallel_execution: false,
        }
    }
 }
 /// Unified KMS test suite runner
 pub struct KMSTestSuite {
    tests: Vec<TestDefinition>,
    config: TestSuiteConfig,
 }
 impl KMSTestSuite {
    /// Create a new test suite with default configuration
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        let tests = vec![
            // Core Functionality Tests
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_local_kms_end_to_end",
                "End-to-end KMS test with all encryption types",
                TestCategory::CoreFunctionality,
                Duration::from_secs(60),
                true,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_local_kms_key_isolation",
                "Test KMS key isolation and security",
                TestCategory::CoreFunctionality,
                Duration::from_secs(45),
                true,
            ),
            // Multipart Encryption Tests
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_local_kms_multipart_upload",
                "Test large file multipart upload with encryption",
                TestCategory::MultipartEncryption,
                Duration::from_secs(120),
                true,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_step1_basic_single_file_encryption",
                "Basic single file encryption test",
                TestCategory::MultipartEncryption,
                Duration::from_secs(30),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_step2_basic_multipart_upload_without_encryption",
                "Basic multipart upload without encryption",
                TestCategory::MultipartEncryption,
                Duration::from_secs(45),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_step3_multipart_upload_with_sse_s3",
                "Multipart upload with SSE-S3 encryption",
                TestCategory::MultipartEncryption,
                Duration::from_secs(60),
                true,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_step4_large_multipart_upload_with_encryption",
                "Large file multipart upload with encryption",
                TestCategory::MultipartEncryption,
                Duration::from_secs(90),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_step5_all_encryption_types_multipart",
                "All encryption types multipart test",
                TestCategory::MultipartEncryption,
                Duration::from_secs(120),
                true,
            ),
            // Edge Cases Tests
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_zero_byte_file_encryption",
                "Test encryption of zero-byte files",
                TestCategory::EdgeCases,
                Duration::from_secs(20),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_single_byte_file_encryption",
                "Test encryption of single-byte files",
                TestCategory::EdgeCases,
                Duration::from_secs(20),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_multipart_boundary_conditions",
                "Test multipart upload boundary conditions",
                TestCategory::EdgeCases,
                Duration::from_secs(45),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_invalid_key_scenarios",
                "Test invalid key scenarios",
                TestCategory::EdgeCases,
                Duration::from_secs(30),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_concurrent_encryption",
                "Test concurrent encryption operations",
                TestCategory::EdgeCases,
                Duration::from_secs(60),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_key_validation_security",
                "Test key validation security",
                TestCategory::EdgeCases,
                Duration::from_secs(30),
                false,
            ),
            // Fault Recovery Tests
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_key_directory_unavailable",
                "Test KMS when key directory is unavailable",
                TestCategory::FaultRecovery,
                Duration::from_secs(45),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_corrupted_key_files",
                "Test KMS with corrupted key files",
                TestCategory::FaultRecovery,
                Duration::from_secs(30),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_multipart_upload_interruption",
                "Test multipart upload interruption recovery",
                TestCategory::FaultRecovery,
                Duration::from_secs(60),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_kms_resource_constraints",
                "Test KMS under resource constraints",
                TestCategory::FaultRecovery,
                Duration::from_secs(90),
                false,
            ),
            // Comprehensive Tests
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_comprehensive_kms_full_workflow",
                "Full KMS workflow comprehensive test",
                TestCategory::Comprehensive,
                Duration::from_secs(300),
                true,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_comprehensive_stress_test",
                "KMS stress test with large datasets",
                TestCategory::Comprehensive,
                Duration::from_secs(400),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_comprehensive_key_isolation",
                "Comprehensive key isolation test",
                TestCategory::Comprehensive,
                Duration::from_secs(180),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_comprehensive_concurrent_operations",
                "Comprehensive concurrent operations test",
                TestCategory::Comprehensive,
                Duration::from_secs(240),
                false,
            ),
            TestDefinition::new(
                "test_comprehensive_performance_benchmark",
                "KMS performance benchmark test",
                TestCategory::Comprehensive,
                Duration::from_secs(360),
                false,
            ),
        ];
        Self {
            tests,
            config: TestSuiteConfig::default(),
        }
    }
    /// Configure the test suite
    pub fn with_config(mut self, config: TestSuiteConfig) -> Self {
        self.config = config;
        self
    }
    /// Filter tests based on category
    pub fn filter_by_category(&self, category: &TestCategory) -> Vec<&TestDefinition> {
        self.tests.iter().filter(|test| &test.category == category).collect()
    }
    /// Filter tests based on criticality
    pub fn filter_critical_tests(&self) -> Vec<&TestDefinition> {
        self.tests.iter().filter(|test| test.is_critical).collect()
    }
    /// Get test summary by category
    pub fn get_category_summary(&self) -> std::collections::HashMap<TestCategory, Vec<&TestDefinition>> {
        let mut summary = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        for test in &self.tests {
            summary.entry(test.category.clone()).or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(test);
        }
        summary
    }
    /// Run the complete test suite
    pub async fn run_test_suite(&self) -> Vec<TestResult> {
        init_logging();
        info!("🚀 Starting unified KMS test suite");
        let start_time = Instant::now();
        let mut results = Vec::new();
        // Filter tests based on configuration
        let tests_to_run: Vec<&TestDefinition> = self
            .tests
            .iter()
            .filter(|test| self.config.categories.contains(&test.category))
            .filter(|test| !self.config.include_critical_only || test.is_critical)
            .collect();
        info!("📊 Test plan: {} test(s) scheduled", tests_to_run.len());
        for (i, test) in tests_to_run.iter().enumerate() {
            info!("  {}. {} ({})", i + 1, test.name, test.category.as_str());
        }
        // Execute tests
        for (i, test_def) in tests_to_run.iter().enumerate() {
            info!("🧪 Running test {}/{}: {}", i + 1, tests_to_run.len(), test_def.name);
            info!("   📝 Description: {}", test_def.description);
            info!("   🏷️  Category: {}", test_def.category.as_str());
            info!("   ⏱️  Estimated duration: {:?}", test_def.estimated_duration);
            let test_start = Instant::now();
            let result = self.run_single_test(test_def).await;
            let test_duration = test_start.elapsed();
            match result {
                Ok(_) => {
                    info!("✅ Test passed: {} ({:.2}s)", test_def.name, test_duration.as_secs_f64());
                    results.push(TestResult::success(test_def.name.clone(), test_def.category.clone(), test_duration));
                }
                Err(e) => {
                    error!("❌ Test failed: {} ({:.2}s): {}", test_def.name, test_duration.as_secs_f64(), e);
                    results.push(TestResult::failure(
                        test_def.name.clone(),
                        test_def.category.clone(),
                        test_duration,
                        e.to_string(),
                    ));
                }
            }
            // Add delay between tests to avoid resource conflicts
            if i < tests_to_run.len() - 1 {
                debug!("⏸️  Waiting two seconds before the next test...");
                sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
            }
        }
        let total_duration = start_time.elapsed();
        self.print_test_summary(&results, total_duration);
        results
    }
    /// Run a single test by dispatching to the appropriate test function
    async fn run_single_test(&self, test_def: &TestDefinition) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
        // This is a placeholder for test dispatch logic
        // In a real implementation, this would dispatch to actual test functions
        warn!("⚠️  Test '{}' is not implemented in the unified runner; skipping", test_def.name);
        Ok(())
    }
    /// Print comprehensive test summary
    fn print_test_summary(&self, results: &[TestResult], total_duration: Duration) {
        info!("📊 KMS test suite summary");
        info!("⏱️  Total duration: {:.2} seconds", total_duration.as_secs_f64());
        info!("📈 Total tests: {}", results.len());
        let passed = results.iter().filter(|r| r.success).count();
        let failed = results.iter().filter(|r| !r.success).count();
        info!("✅ Passed: {}", passed);
        info!("❌ Failed: {}", failed);
        info!("📊 Success rate: {:.1}%", (passed as f64 / results.len() as f64) * 100.0);
        // Summary by category
        let mut category_summary: std::collections::HashMap<TestCategory, (usize, usize)> = std::collections::HashMap::new();
        for result in results {
            let (total, passed_count) = category_summary.entry(result.category.clone()).or_insert((0, 0));
            *total += 1;
            if result.success {
                *passed_count += 1;
            }
        }
        info!("📊 Category summary:");
        for (category, (total, passed_count)) in category_summary {
            info!(
                "  🏷️  {}: {}/{} ({:.1}%)",
                category.as_str(),
                passed_count,
                total,
                (passed_count as f64 / total as f64) * 100.0
            );
        }
        // List failed tests
        if failed > 0 {
            warn!("❌ Failing tests:");
            for result in results.iter().filter(|r| !r.success) {
                warn!("  - {}: {}", result.test_name, result.error_message.as_deref().unwrap_or("Unknown error"));
            }
        }
    }
 }
 /// Quick test suite for critical tests only
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn test_kms_critical_suite() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let config = TestSuiteConfig {
        categories: vec![TestCategory::CoreFunctionality, TestCategory::MultipartEncryption],
        include_critical_only: true,
        max_duration: Some(Duration::from_secs(600)), // 10 minutes max
        parallel_execution: false,
    };
    let suite = KMSTestSuite::new().with_config(config);
    let results = suite.run_test_suite().await;
    let failed_count = results.iter().filter(|r| !r.success).count();
    if failed_count > 0 {
        return Err(format!("Critical test suite failed: {failed_count} tests failed").into());
    }
    info!("✅ All critical tests passed");
    Ok(())
 }
 /// Full comprehensive test suite
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn test_kms_full_suite() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let suite = KMSTestSuite::new();
    let results = suite.run_test_suite().await;
    let total_tests = results.len();
    let failed_count = results.iter().filter(|r| !r.success).count();
    let success_rate = ((total_tests - failed_count) as f64 / total_tests as f64) * 100.0;
    info!("📊 Full suite success rate: {:.1}%", success_rate);
    // Allow up to 10% failure rate for non-critical tests
    if success_rate < 90.0 {
        return Err(format!("Test suite success rate too low: {success_rate:.1}%").into());
    }
    info!("✅ Full test suite succeeded");
    Ok(())
 }
@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ mod get_codec_streaming_compat_test;
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod version_id_regression_test;
 // Receiver-side replication LWW (rustfs/backlog#1953): stale inbound
 // replication metadata must not overwrite a newer local category state.
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod replication_lww_receiver_test;
 // Data usage regression tests
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod data_usage_test;
@@ -12,12 +12,12 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
-use crate::common::{RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, local_http_client, signed_request};
+use crate::common::{RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, local_http_client};
 use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
 use http::header::{CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
 use reqwest::StatusCode;
-use rustfs_config::{ENV_DRIVE_ACTIVE_CHECK_INTERVAL_SECS, ENV_NOTIFY_ENABLE};
+use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
-use rustfs_signer::pre_sign_v4;
+use rustfs_signer::{pre_sign_v4, sign_v4};
 use rustfs_utils::egress::ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS;
 use s3s::Body;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -227,6 +227,39 @@ async fn presigned_get_request(
    Ok(local_http_client().get(signed.uri().to_string()).send().await?)
 }
 async fn signed_request(
    method: http::Method,
    url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
    body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    content_type: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
    let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
    let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
    request = request.header(HOST, authority);
    request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
    if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
        request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
    }
    let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
    let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
    let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
    let client = local_http_client();
    let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
    for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
        request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
    }
    if let Some(body) = body {
        request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
    }
    Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
 }
 async fn configure_webhook_target(
    env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
    target_name: &str,
@@ -977,8 +1010,7 @@ async fn test_get_object_lambda_rejects_disabled_target() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
    init_logging();
    let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
-    env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(ENV_NOTIFY_ENABLE, "true")])
+    env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
        .await?;
    let bucket = "object-lambda-e2e-disabled-target";
    let key = "input.txt";
@@ -994,24 +1026,17 @@ async fn test_get_object_lambda_rejects_disabled_target() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
        .send()
        .await?;
-    let queue_dir = format!("{}/disabled-target-queue", env.temp_dir);
+    configure_webhook_target_with_key_values(
-    tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&queue_dir).await?;
+        &env,
-    let config_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/set-config-kv", env.url);
+        "transformer",
-    let directive = format!(
+        vec![
-        "notify_webhook:transformer enable=off endpoint=\"http://127.0.0.1:9/transform\" auth_token=\"secret-token\" queue_dir=\"{queue_dir}\""
+            ("endpoint", "http://127.0.0.1:9/transform".to_string()),
-    );
+            ("auth_token", "secret-token".to_string()),
-    let disable_response = signed_request(
+            ("enable", "off".to_string()),
-        http::Method::PUT,
+        ],
        &config_url,
        &env.access_key,
        &env.secret_key,
        Some(directive.into_bytes()),
        Some("text/plain"),
    )
    .await?;
-    let disable_status = disable_response.status();
+    wait_for_target_visibility(&env, "transformer").await?;
    let disable_body = disable_response.text().await?;
    assert_eq!(disable_status, StatusCode::OK, "failed to disable target: {disable_body}");
    let lambda_url = format!("{}/{}/{}?lambdaArn={}", env.url, bucket, key, urlencoding::encode(lambda_arn));
    let response = signed_request(http::Method::GET, &lambda_url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None, None).await?;
@@ -1030,8 +1055,7 @@ async fn test_configure_object_lambda_target_rejects_invalid_endpoint() -> Resul
    init_logging();
    let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
-    env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(ENV_NOTIFY_ENABLE, "true")])
+    env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
        .await?;
    let bucket = "object-lambda-e2e-invalid-endpoint";
@@ -1074,8 +1098,7 @@ async fn test_configure_object_lambda_notify_webhook_rejects_response_header_tim
    init_logging();
    let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
-    env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(ENV_NOTIFY_ENABLE, "true")])
+    env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
        .await?;
    let response = send_configure_webhook_target_request(
        &env,
@@ -1184,8 +1207,6 @@ async fn test_listen_notification_fans_in_remote_node_events() -> Result<(), Box
    init_logging();
    let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(2).await?;
    cluster.set_env(ENV_NOTIFY_ENABLE, "true");
    cluster.set_env(ENV_DRIVE_ACTIVE_CHECK_INTERVAL_SECS, "1");
    cluster.start().await?;
    let bucket = "listen-notification-cluster";
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 use crate::common::{awscurl_delete, awscurl_put, init_logging};
 use crate::policy::test_env::PolicyTestEnvironment;
 use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
 use serial_test::serial;
 use tracing::info;
 /// Helper function to create a regular user with given credentials
@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ async fn cleanup_user_and_policy(env: &PolicyTestEnvironment, username: &str, po
 /// Test AWS policy variables with single-value scenarios
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
 #[serial]
 #[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
 pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_single_value() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    test_aws_policy_variables_single_value_impl().await
@@ -273,6 +275,7 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_single_value_impl_with_env(
 /// Test AWS policy variables with multi-value scenarios
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
 #[serial]
 #[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
 pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_multi_value() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    test_aws_policy_variables_multi_value_impl().await
@@ -398,6 +401,7 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_multi_value_impl_with_env(
 /// Test AWS policy variables with variable concatenation
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
 #[serial]
 #[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
 pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_concatenation() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    test_aws_policy_variables_concatenation_impl().await
@@ -487,6 +491,7 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_concatenation_impl_with_env(
 /// Test AWS policy variables with nested scenarios
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
 #[serial]
 #[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
 pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_nested() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    test_aws_policy_variables_nested_impl().await
@@ -504,6 +509,7 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_nested_impl() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::
 /// Test AWS policy variables with STS temporary credentials
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
 #[serial]
 #[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
 pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_sts() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    test_aws_policy_variables_sts_impl().await
@@ -699,6 +705,7 @@ pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_sts_impl_with_env(
 /// Test AWS policy variables with deny scenarios
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
 #[serial]
 #[ignore = "Starts a rustfs server; enable when running full E2E"]
 pub async fn test_aws_policy_variables_deny() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    test_aws_policy_variables_deny_impl().await
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 use crate::common::init_logging;
 use crate::policy::test_env::PolicyTestEnvironment;
 use serial_test::serial;
 use std::time::Instant;
 use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
 use tracing::{error, info};
@@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ impl PolicyTestSuite {
 /// Test suite
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 #[ignore = "Connects to existing rustfs server"]
 async fn test_policy_critical_suite() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let config = TestSuiteConfig {
@@ -11,17 +11,10 @@ test process directly.
 ## Running Tests
 Use the canonical CI-equivalent protocol command in the parent
 [`e2e_test` README](../../README.md#troubleshooting).
 For targeted debugging of the core suite only:
 ```bash
 RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES=ftps,webdav,sftp cargo test --package e2e_test test_protocol_core_suite -- --test-threads=1 --nocapture
 ```
 This targeted command does not cover the full `e2e-protocols` profile.
 `RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES` controls which features the test rustfs binary is
 built with. When this variable is set, the protocol test runner schedules
 only entries whose protocol is present in the requested feature list. Leave
@@ -140,3 +133,4 @@ property without consulting any external doc.
 Bind ports 9023 (SFTP) and 9100 (S3). Spawns rustfs with
 `RUSTFS_SFTP_IDLE_TIMEOUT=5`, sleeps 10 s past the timeout, then issues an
 SFTP request and asserts the server has closed the session.
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ use reqwest::Client;
 use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
 use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
 use s3s::Body;
 use serial_test::serial;
 use tokio::process::Command;
 use tracing::info;
@@ -820,6 +821,7 @@ pub async fn test_webdav_core_operations() -> Result<()> {
 }
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn test_webdav_core_operations_direct() -> Result<()> {
    test_webdav_core_operations().await
 }
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ mod tests {
    use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
    use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
    use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, VersioningConfiguration};
    use serial_test::serial;
    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
    use std::collections::HashSet;
    use std::error::Error;
@@ -156,6 +157,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// content, degraded writes must succeed, and everything must still
    /// verify after the disk returns.
    #[tokio::test]
    #[serial]
    async fn test_degraded_read_write_with_one_disk_offline() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
        init_logging();
        info!("Reliability: degraded read/write with one of four disks offline");
@@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// bytes to a reader: per-shard bitrot checksums reject the bad shard and
    /// the object is reconstructed from the remaining shards.
    #[tokio::test]
    #[serial]
    async fn test_bitrot_corrupted_shard_read_returns_correct_data() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
        init_logging();
        info!("Reliability: GET must read through a bitrot-corrupted shard");
@@ -250,6 +253,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// heal, and require the replaced disk to be rebuilt and all content to
    /// verify against the sha256 manifest.
    #[tokio::test]
    #[serial]
    async fn test_fresh_disk_replacement_heals_after_sigkill_restart() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
        init_logging();
        info!("Reliability: fresh-disk replacement heals after SIGKILL restart");
@@ -323,6 +327,7 @@ mod tests {
    }
    #[tokio::test]
    #[serial]
    async fn test_versioned_shard_census_selects_each_version_data_dir() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
        init_logging();
        info!("Reliability: physical shard census selects the requested object version");
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ mod tests {
    use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
    use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, VersioningConfiguration};
    use http::Method;
    use serial_test::serial;
    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
    use std::collections::BTreeSet;
    use std::error::Error;
@@ -1060,6 +1061,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// Linux mount namespaces are per-thread; keep mount setup and process
    /// spawning on one OS thread so child RustFS nodes inherit the test mounts.
    #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
    #[serial]
    #[ignore = "requires Linux root/CAP_SYS_ADMIN and RUSTFS_PRIVILEGED_REPLACEMENT_E2E=1"]
    async fn test_privileged_3x4_auto_replacement_rebuilds_ec8_plus_4_without_admin_heal()
    -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -1073,6 +1075,7 @@ mod tests {
    /// Linux mount namespaces are per-thread; keep mount setup and process
    /// spawning on one OS thread so child RustFS nodes inherit the test mounts.
    #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
    #[serial]
    #[ignore = "requires Linux root/CAP_SYS_ADMIN and RUSTFS_PRIVILEGED_REPLACEMENT_E2E=1"]
    async fn test_privileged_3x4_auto_replacement_rebuilds_ec6_plus_6_without_admin_heal()
    -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
 // limitations under the License.
 use crate::common::{
-    RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_create_user, awscurl_available, awscurl_post_sts_form_urlencoded, init_logging,
+    RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_available, awscurl_post_sts_form_urlencoded, init_logging, local_http_client,
-    local_http_client, replication_fast_env, rustfs_binary_path, signed_request, signed_request_with_client,
+    replication_fast_env, rustfs_binary_path,
    signed_request_with_session_token,
 };
 use crate::fake_s3_target::{
    FAKE_ACCESS_KEY, FAKE_SECRET_KEY, FakeS3Target, FaultAction as FakeTargetFault, Operation as FakeTargetOperation,
@@ -36,7 +35,7 @@ use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD};
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use flate2::read::GzDecoder;
 use futures::{Stream, StreamExt};
-use http::header::CONTENT_ENCODING;
+use http::header::{CONTENT_ENCODING, CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
 use http_body_util::{BodyExt, Full};
 use hyper::body::Incoming;
 use hyper::server::conn::http1;
@@ -57,6 +56,9 @@ use rustfs_madmin::{
    AddServiceAccountReq, ListServiceAccountsResp, PeerInfo, PeerSite, ReplicateAddStatus, ReplicateEditStatus,
    ReplicateRemoveStatus, SRRemoveReq, SRResyncOpStatus, SRStatusInfo, SiteReplicationInfo, SyncStatus,
 };
 use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
 use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
 use s3s::Body;
 use s3s::header::X_AMZ_REPLICATION_STATUS;
 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
 use std::collections::BTreeMap;
@@ -385,6 +387,116 @@ struct ReplicationResetStatusTarget {
    object: String,
 }
 async fn signed_request(
    method: http::Method,
    url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
    body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    content_type: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
    let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
    let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
    request = request.header(HOST, authority);
    request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
    if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
        request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
    }
    let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
    let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
    let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
    let client = local_http_client();
    let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
    for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
        request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
    }
    if let Some(body) = body {
        request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
    }
    Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
 }
 async fn signed_request_with_client(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    method: http::Method,
    url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
    body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    content_type: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
    let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
    let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
    request = request.header(HOST, authority);
    request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
    if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
        request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
    }
    let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
    let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
    let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
    let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
    for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
        request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
    }
    if let Some(body) = body {
        request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
    }
    Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
 }
 async fn signed_request_with_session_token(
    method: http::Method,
    url: &str,
    access_key: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
    session_token: &str,
    body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    content_type: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
    let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("request URL missing authority")?.to_string();
    let mut request = http::Request::builder().method(method.clone()).uri(uri);
    request = request.header(HOST, authority);
    request = request.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
    if !session_token.is_empty() {
        request = request.header("x-amz-security-token", session_token);
    }
    if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
        request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
    }
    let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|body| body.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
    let signed = sign_v4(
        request.body(Body::empty())?,
        content_len,
        access_key,
        secret_key,
        session_token,
        "us-east-1",
    );
    let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
    let client = local_http_client();
    let mut request_builder = client.request(reqwest_method, url);
    for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
        request_builder = request_builder.header(name, value);
    }
    if let Some(body) = body {
        request_builder = request_builder.body(body);
    }
    Ok(request_builder.send().await?)
 }
 fn extract_xml_tag(xml: &str, tag: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let open = format!("<{tag}>");
    let close = format!("</{tag}>");
@@ -904,6 +1016,35 @@ fn create_user_s3_client(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, access_key: &str, secret_k
    Client::from_conf(config)
 }
 async fn admin_create_user(
    env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
    username: &str,
    secret_key: &str,
 ) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
    let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={}", env.url, username);
    let body = serde_json::json!({
        "secretKey": secret_key,
        "status": "enabled"
    });
    let response = signed_request(
        http::Method::PUT,
        &url,
        &env.access_key,
        &env.secret_key,
        Some(body.to_string().into_bytes()),
        Some("application/json"),
    )
    .await?;
    if response.status() != StatusCode::OK {
        let status = response.status();
        let body = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
        return Err(format!("create user failed: {status} {body}").into());
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 async fn admin_add_canned_policy(
    env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
    policy_name: &str,
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
 #![cfg(test)]
 // Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
 //
 // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 // You may obtain a copy of the License at
 //
 //     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 //
 // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 //! Receiver-side replication LWW over the wire (rustfs/backlog#1953, audit
 //! A4/P1-6).
 //!
 //! In an active-active topology both sites' metadata states arrive at the
 //! peer as authorized replication PUTs carrying per-category source
 //! timestamps (`x-rustfs-source-replication-tagging-timestamp` header
 //! family). Before the fix the receiver applied them unconditionally, so a
 //! stale delivery overwrote a newer local state and the two sites diverged
 //! permanently while both reported COMPLETED. This test drives one live
 //! `rustfs` server with simulated inbound replication PUTs for the same
 //! object version and asserts the newer tagging state wins regardless of
 //! delivery order, while a stale delivery still succeeds at the object level
 //! (a failure would loop through MRF re-delivering the stale value).
 use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
 use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
 use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
 use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, VersioningConfiguration};
 type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
 const HDR_SOURCE_REPLICATION_REQUEST: &str = "x-rustfs-source-replication-request";
 const HDR_SOURCE_VERSION_ID: &str = "x-rustfs-source-version-id";
 const HDR_SOURCE_MTIME: &str = "x-rustfs-source-mtime";
 const HDR_SOURCE_TAGGING_TIMESTAMP: &str = "x-rustfs-source-replication-tagging-timestamp";
 const SOURCE_MTIME: &str = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z";
 const T_STALE: &str = "2026-01-01T00:00:01Z";
 const T_LOCAL: &str = "2026-02-01T00:00:00Z";
 const T_NEWER: &str = "2026-03-01T00:00:00Z";
 /// Simulated inbound authorized replication PUT: same object version, tags and
 /// the source-authored tagging timestamp carried in transport headers.
 async fn inbound_replication_put(
    client: &Client,
    bucket: &str,
    key: &str,
    version_id: &str,
    tags: &str,
    tagging_timestamp: &str,
 ) -> TestResult {
    let version_id = version_id.to_string();
    let tagging_timestamp = tagging_timestamp.to_string();
    client
        .put_object()
        .bucket(bucket)
        .key(key)
        .body(ByteStream::from_static(b"lww-e2e-body"))
        .tagging(tags)
        .customize()
        .mutate_request(move |req| {
            req.headers_mut().insert(HDR_SOURCE_REPLICATION_REQUEST, "true");
            req.headers_mut().insert(HDR_SOURCE_VERSION_ID, version_id.clone());
            req.headers_mut().insert(HDR_SOURCE_MTIME, SOURCE_MTIME);
            req.headers_mut()
                .insert(HDR_SOURCE_TAGGING_TIMESTAMP, tagging_timestamp.clone());
        })
        .send()
        .await?;
    Ok(())
 }
 async fn tag_value(client: &Client, bucket: &str, key: &str, version_id: &str, tag_key: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let tagging = client
        .get_object_tagging()
        .bucket(bucket)
        .key(key)
        .version_id(version_id)
        .send()
        .await
        .expect("object tagging should be readable");
    tagging
        .tag_set()
        .iter()
        .find(|tag| tag.key() == tag_key)
        .map(|tag| tag.value().to_string())
 }
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
 async fn receiver_lww_keeps_newer_tags_across_delivery_orders() -> TestResult {
    init_logging();
    let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
    env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
    let client = env.create_s3_client();
    let bucket = "replication-lww-receiver";
    let key = "object";
    client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
    client
        .put_bucket_versioning()
        .bucket(bucket)
        .versioning_configuration(
            VersioningConfiguration::builder()
                .status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
                .build(),
        )
        .send()
        .await?;
    // First delivery establishes version V with tags stamped T_LOCAL.
    let version_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
    inbound_replication_put(&client, bucket, key, &version_id, "site=local", T_LOCAL).await?;
    assert_eq!(
        tag_value(&client, bucket, key, &version_id, "site").await.as_deref(),
        Some("local"),
        "the first delivery must establish the tagged version"
    );
    // A stale delivery (older source timestamp) must succeed at the object
    // level but must NOT overwrite the newer tags.
    inbound_replication_put(&client, bucket, key, &version_id, "site=stale", T_STALE).await?;
    assert_eq!(
        tag_value(&client, bucket, key, &version_id, "site").await.as_deref(),
        Some("local"),
        "a stale inbound delivery must not overwrite newer tags (rustfs/backlog#1953)"
    );
    // A newer delivery still converges the version onto the newest state.
    inbound_replication_put(&client, bucket, key, &version_id, "site=newer", T_NEWER).await?;
    assert_eq!(
        tag_value(&client, bucket, key, &version_id, "site").await.as_deref(),
        Some("newer"),
        "a newer inbound delivery must overwrite older tags"
    );
    client
        .delete_object()
        .bucket(bucket)
        .key(key)
        .version_id(&version_id)
        .send()
        .await?;
    env.delete_test_bucket(bucket).await.ok();
    Ok(())
 }
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 use crate::common::{RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, init_logging};
 use aws_sdk_s3::error::SdkError;
 use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
 use aws_sdk_s3::types::CompletedMultipartUpload;
 use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
 use tracing::info;
 use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -42,18 +43,32 @@ async fn list_parts_reports_missing_upload(
    }
 }
-async fn multipart_listing_reports_missing_upload(
+async fn complete_reports_missing_upload(
    client: &aws_sdk_s3::Client,
    bucket: &str,
    key: &str,
    upload_id: &str,
 ) -> Result<bool, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
-    let result = client.list_multipart_uploads().bucket(bucket).prefix(key).send().await?;
+    let result = client
-
+        .complete_multipart_upload()
-    Ok(!result
+        .bucket(bucket)
-        .uploads()
+        .key(key)
-        .iter()
+        .upload_id(upload_id)
-        .any(|upload| upload.key() == Some(key) && upload.upload_id() == Some(upload_id)))
+        .multipart_upload(CompletedMultipartUpload::builder().build())
        .send()
        .await;
    match result {
        Ok(_) => Ok(false),
        Err(SdkError::ServiceError(err)) => {
            let code = err.err().meta().code().unwrap_or("");
            if code == "NoSuchUpload" {
                Ok(true)
            } else {
                Err(format!("unexpected complete_multipart_upload service error: code={code}, err={err:?}").into())
            }
        }
        Err(err) => Err(format!("unexpected complete_multipart_upload error: {err:?}").into()),
    }
 }
 async fn wait_for_cleanup_on_all_nodes(
@@ -66,8 +81,8 @@ async fn wait_for_cleanup_on_all_nodes(
        let mut all_cleaned = true;
        for (idx, client) in clients.iter().enumerate() {
            let list_parts_missing = list_parts_reports_missing_upload(client, bucket, key, upload_id).await?;
-            let listing_missing = multipart_listing_reports_missing_upload(client, bucket, key, upload_id).await?;
+            let complete_missing = complete_reports_missing_upload(client, bucket, key, upload_id).await?;
-            if !(list_parts_missing && listing_missing) {
+            if !(list_parts_missing && complete_missing) {
                info!("stale multipart still visible on node {} at attempt {}", idx, attempt + 1);
                all_cleaned = false;
                break;
@@ -131,10 +146,6 @@ async fn test_stale_multipart_cleanup_removes_incomplete_upload_across_cluster()
        1,
        "multipart upload should be visible before background cleanup"
    );
    assert!(
        !multipart_listing_reports_missing_upload(&clients[2], CLEANUP_BUCKET, &key, &upload_id).await?,
        "multipart upload listing should contain the upload before background cleanup"
    );
    wait_for_cleanup_on_all_nodes(&clients, CLEANUP_BUCKET, &key, &upload_id).await?;
@@ -49,3 +49,4 @@ Applies to `crates/ecstore/`.
 ## Suggested Validation
 - `cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore`
 - Full gate before commit: `make pre-commit`
@@ -317,6 +317,8 @@ pub mod config {
 }
 pub mod data_usage {
    #[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
    pub use crate::data_usage::seed_bucket_usage_memory_for_test;
    pub use crate::data_usage::{
        DATA_USAGE_CACHE_NAME, apply_bucket_usage_memory_overlay, compute_bucket_usage,
        init_compression_total_memory_from_backend, invalidate_admin_data_usage_snapshot_cache,
@@ -328,8 +330,6 @@ pub mod data_usage {
        remove_bucket_usage_from_backend, replace_bucket_usage_memory_from_info, store_compression_total_in_backend,
        store_data_usage_in_backend,
    };
    #[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
    pub use crate::data_usage::{get_bucket_usage_memory, seed_bucket_usage_memory_for_test};
 }
 pub mod disk {
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ impl BucketTargetSys {
            return Some(cli);
        }
-        // TODO(backlog): spawn an async task to proactively reload the replication target
+        // TODO: spawn a task to reload the target
        if self.is_reloading_target(bucket, arn).await {
            return None;
        }
@@ -3425,44 +3425,6 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(mutexes.contains_key("second"));
    }
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn update_all_targets_publishes_disable_proxy_on_target_client() {
        // The read-proxy selector (replication_proxy::get_proxy_targets) skips
        // targets whose TargetClient carries disable_proxy — the persisted
        // per-target opt-out must survive client publication.
        let sys = BucketTargetSys::default();
        let target = |arn: &str, disable_proxy: bool| BucketTarget {
            arn: arn.to_string(),
            endpoint: "192.168.1.10:9000".to_string(),
            target_bucket: "target-bucket".to_string(),
            region: "us-east-1".to_string(),
            disable_proxy,
            credentials: Some(Credentials {
                access_key: "access".to_string(),
                secret_key: "secret".to_string(),
                session_token: None,
                expiration: None,
            }),
            ..Default::default()
        };
        let targets = BucketTargets {
            targets: vec![target("arn:proxied", false), target("arn:opted-out", true)],
        };
        sys.update_all_targets("bucket", Some(&targets)).await;
        let proxied = sys
            .get_remote_target_client("bucket", "arn:proxied")
            .await
            .expect("client should be published");
        assert!(!proxied.disable_proxy);
        let opted_out = sys
            .get_remote_target_client("bucket", "arn:opted-out")
            .await
            .expect("client should be published");
        assert!(opted_out.disable_proxy, "disable_proxy must reach the published TargetClient");
    }
    #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
    async fn target_updates_serialize_client_build_through_publication_per_bucket() {
        let sys = Arc::new(BucketTargetSys::default());
@@ -2855,7 +2855,7 @@ fn replicate_object_info_from_object_info(
        .map(|v| OffsetDateTime::parse(&v, &Rfc3339).unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH));
    let mut rstate = oi.replication_state();
    rstate.replicate_decision_str = dsc.to_string();
-    let asz = oi.get_actual_size_or_physical();
+    let asz = oi.get_actual_size().unwrap_or_default();
    let ssec = replication_object_is_ssec_encrypted(&oi.user_defined);
    let checksum = if ssec { oi.checksum.clone() } else { None };
@@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ pub async fn get_heal_replicate_object_info(oi: &ObjectInfo, rcfg: &ReplicationC
    };
    let mut replication_state = oi.replication_state();
    replication_state.replicate_decision_str = dsc.to_string();
-    let actual_size = oi.get_actual_size_or_physical();
+    let actual_size = oi.get_actual_size().unwrap_or_default();
    Ok(ReplicateObjectInfo {
        name: oi.name.clone(),
@@ -3868,6 +3868,7 @@ async fn replicate_object_with_multipart<S: ReplicationObjectIO>(ctx: MultipartR
                actual_size,
                object_info.etag.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
                object_info.mod_time,
                &put_opts.internal,
            ),
        )
        .await
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ fn replication_source_object(object_info: &ObjectInfo) -> ReplicationSourceObjec
            .map(|mod_time| OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(mod_time.unix_timestamp()).unwrap_or(mod_time)),
        version_id: object_info.version_id.map(|version_id| version_id.to_string()),
        etag: object_info.etag.as_deref(),
-        actual_size: object_info.get_actual_size_or_physical(),
+        actual_size: object_info.get_actual_size().unwrap_or_default(),
        delete_marker: object_info.delete_marker,
        content_type: object_info.content_type.as_deref(),
        content_encoding: object_info.content_encoding.as_deref(),
@@ -472,6 +472,7 @@ pub(crate) fn replication_complete_multipart_options(
    actual_size: String,
    source_etag: String,
    source_mtime: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
    source_internal: &AdvancedPutOptions,
 ) -> PutObjectOptions {
    let mut user_metadata = HashMap::new();
    insert_header_map(&mut user_metadata, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE, actual_size);
@@ -484,6 +485,14 @@ pub(crate) fn replication_complete_multipart_options(
            // mtime must degrade to epoch so header() suppresses the header
            // instead of asserting the replication time as the object's mtime.
            source_mtime: source_mtime.unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
            // Carry the per-category LWW timestamps on the complete request as
            // well: the receiver's CompleteMultipartUpload options builder
            // parses the same headers, so the multipart transport gets the
            // same receiver-side LWW as the single-PUT transport
            // (rustfs/backlog#1953). Epoch values keep the headers suppressed.
            tagging_timestamp: source_internal.tagging_timestamp,
            retention_timestamp: source_internal.retention_timestamp,
            legalhold_timestamp: source_internal.legalhold_timestamp,
            replication_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
            replication_request: true,
            ..Default::default()
@@ -542,20 +551,6 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(replication_target_head_is_newer_null_version(&source, &target));
    }
    #[test]
    fn replication_source_uses_physical_size_for_unknown_compressed_object() {
        let mut metadata = HashMap::new();
        rustfs_utils::http::insert_str(&mut metadata, rustfs_utils::http::SUFFIX_COMPRESSION, "zstd".to_string());
        let source = ObjectInfo {
            size: 128,
            actual_size: -1,
            user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
            ..Default::default()
        };
        assert_eq!(replication_source_object(&source).actual_size, 128);
    }
    #[test]
    fn replication_target_head_content_matches_compare_etag_only() {
        let source = ObjectInfo {
@@ -663,20 +658,39 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn replication_complete_multipart_options_sets_actual_size() {
        let source_mtime = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_000).expect("valid test timestamp");
        let source_internal = AdvancedPutOptions {
            tagging_timestamp: OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_100).expect("valid test timestamp"),
            retention_timestamp: OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_200).expect("valid test timestamp"),
            legalhold_timestamp: OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_300).expect("valid test timestamp"),
            ..Default::default()
        };
        let options = replication_complete_multipart_options(
            "1024".to_string(),
            "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef-3".to_string(),
            Some(source_mtime),
            &source_internal,
        );
        assert_eq!(options.internal.source_etag, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef-3");
        assert_eq!(options.internal.source_mtime, source_mtime);
        // The complete request must carry the same per-category LWW timestamps
        // as the initiate request; the receiver reads them from the complete
        // headers (rustfs/backlog#1953).
        assert_eq!(options.internal.tagging_timestamp, source_internal.tagging_timestamp);
        assert_eq!(options.internal.retention_timestamp, source_internal.retention_timestamp);
        assert_eq!(options.internal.legalhold_timestamp, source_internal.legalhold_timestamp);
        // Absent source mtime must degrade to epoch (header suppressed), not
        // the AdvancedPutOptions default of now_utc() — that default would
        // stamp the replication time as the replica's mtime and break the
-        // multipart HEAD convergence.
+        // multipart HEAD convergence. Unset category timestamps stay epoch so
-        let options_no_mtime = replication_complete_multipart_options("1024".to_string(), String::new(), None);
+        // header() keeps suppressing them.
        let options_no_mtime =
            replication_complete_multipart_options("1024".to_string(), String::new(), None, &AdvancedPutOptions::default());
        assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.source_mtime.unix_timestamp(), 0);
        assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.tagging_timestamp.unix_timestamp(), 0);
        assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.retention_timestamp.unix_timestamp(), 0);
        assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.legalhold_timestamp.unix_timestamp(), 0);
        assert_eq!(
            get_header_map(&options.user_metadata, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE).as_deref(),
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ impl S3PeerSys {
                }
            }
            topology_complete &= bucket_map.values().all(|count| *count >= quorum);
-            // TODO(backlog): integrate MRF backlog stats into scanner bucket listing
+            // TODO: MRF
        }
        let mut buckets: Vec<BucketInfo> = result_map.into_values().collect();
@@ -42,19 +42,18 @@ use futures::lock::Mutex;
 use metrics::counter;
 use rustfs_filemeta::{FileInfo, ObjectPartInfo, RawFileInfo};
 use rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::{
-    INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_REQUEST_ENCODE, INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_RESPONSE_DECODE,
+    INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_REQUEST_ENCODE, INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RESPONSE_DECODE,
-    INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP, INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_REQUEST_ENCODE,
+    INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP,
    INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RESPONSE_DECODE, INTERNODE_STAGE_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP,
 };
 use rustfs_protos::ChannelClass;
 use rustfs_protos::evict_failed_connection;
 use rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::RenamePartRequest;
 use rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::{
    BatchReadVersionRequest, BatchReadVersionResponse, CheckPartsRequest, DeletePathsRequest, DeleteRequest,
-    DeleteVersionRequest, DeleteVersionsRequest, DeleteVersionsResponse, DeleteVolumeRequest, DiskInfoRequest, ListDirRequest,
+    DeleteVersionRequest, DeleteVersionsRequest, DeleteVolumeRequest, DiskInfoRequest, ListDirRequest, ListVolumesRequest,
-    ListVolumesRequest, MakeVolumeRequest, MakeVolumesRequest, PreparePartTransactionRequest, ReadAllRequest,
+    MakeVolumeRequest, MakeVolumesRequest, PreparePartTransactionRequest, ReadAllRequest, ReadMetadataRequest,
-    ReadMetadataRequest, ReadMultipleRequest, ReadMultipleResponse, ReadPartsRequest, ReadVersionRequest, ReadXlRequest,
+    ReadMultipleRequest, ReadMultipleResponse, ReadPartsRequest, ReadVersionRequest, ReadXlRequest, RenameDataRequest,
-    RenameDataRequest, RenameFileRequest, SettlePartTransactionRequest, SnapshotLeaseReleaseRequest, SnapshotLeaseRenewRequest,
+    RenameFileRequest, SettlePartTransactionRequest, SnapshotLeaseReleaseRequest, SnapshotLeaseRenewRequest,
    SnapshotLeaseRequest, SnapshotLeaseResponse, StatVolumeRequest, UpdateMetadataRequest, VerifyFileRequest, WriteAllRequest,
    WriteMetadataRequest, node_service_client::NodeServiceClient,
 };
@@ -99,7 +98,6 @@ const NS_SCANNER_CAPABILITY_PROBE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
 const REMOTE_DISK_READ_RETRY_BASE_BACKOFF: Duration = Duration::from_millis(50);
 const ENV_RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ: &str = "RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ";
 const LEGACY_ENV_RUSTFS_BATCH_METADATA_RPC: &str = "RUSTFS_BATCH_METADATA_RPC";
 const ENV_RUSTFS_GET_METADATA_READ_VERSION_COALESCE: &str = "RUSTFS_GET_METADATA_READ_VERSION_COALESCE";
 const BATCH_METADATA_RPC_OFF: &str = "off";
 const BATCH_METADATA_RPC_AUTO: &str = "auto";
 const BATCH_METADATA_RPC_ON: &str = "on";
@@ -114,28 +112,6 @@ const EVENT_REMOTE_DISK_RPC: &str = "remote_disk_rpc";
 const SNAPSHOT_LEASE_PROTOCOL_VERSION: u32 = 1;
 pub const REMOTE_SNAPSHOT_LEASE_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
 fn decode_delete_versions_errors(response: DeleteVersionsResponse, expected_len: usize) -> Vec<Option<Error>> {
    if !response.item_errors.is_empty() {
        if response.item_errors.len() != expected_len {
            return vec![Some(Error::other("malformed delete_versions item errors")); expected_len];
        }
        return response
            .item_errors
            .into_iter()
            .map(|error| (error.code != 0).then(|| error.into()))
            .collect();
    }
    if response.errors.len() != expected_len {
        return vec![Some(Error::other("malformed delete_versions errors")); expected_len];
    }
    response
        .errors
        .into_iter()
        .map(|error| (!error.is_empty()).then(|| Error::other(error)))
        .collect()
 }
 fn snapshot_lease_token_from_response(response: SnapshotLeaseResponse) -> Result<SnapshotLeaseToken> {
    if !response.success {
        return Err(response.error.unwrap_or_default().into());
@@ -204,8 +180,7 @@ fn parse_batch_metadata_rpc_mode(raw: &str) -> BatchMetadataRpcMode {
 }
 fn batch_metadata_rpc_mode_from_env() -> BatchMetadataRpcMode {
-    rustfs_utils::get_env_opt_str(ENV_RUSTFS_GET_METADATA_READ_VERSION_COALESCE)
+    rustfs_utils::get_env_opt_str(ENV_RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ)
        .or_else(|| rustfs_utils::get_env_opt_str(ENV_RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ))
        .or_else(|| rustfs_utils::get_env_opt_str(LEGACY_ENV_RUSTFS_BATCH_METADATA_RPC))
        .as_deref()
        .map(parse_batch_metadata_rpc_mode)
@@ -1829,12 +1804,6 @@ fn record_read_version_stage(stage: &'static str, started_at: Option<Instant>) {
    }
 }
 fn record_batch_read_version_stage(stage: &'static str, started_at: Option<Instant>) {
    if let Some(started_at) = started_at {
        crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_stage(stage, started_at.elapsed());
    }
 }
 /// Aggregate encoded size (bytes) of a `ReadMultiple` response, preferring the msgpack payloads
 /// and falling back to the JSON compatibility strings. Used to size the RPC for the payload
 /// histogram / large-payload alerting (grpc-optimization P0 instrumentation).
@@ -1945,27 +1914,6 @@ fn decode_batch_read_version_response_items(
    Ok(batch_read_version_resps)
 }
 fn batch_read_version_request_payload_len(req: &BatchReadVersionReq, req_json: &str, req_bin: &[u8]) -> usize {
    req.items
        .iter()
        .fold(req_json.len().saturating_add(req_bin.len()), |total, item| {
            total
                .saturating_add(item.org_volume.len())
                .saturating_add(item.volume.len())
                .saturating_add(item.path.len())
                .saturating_add(item.version_id.len())
        })
 }
 fn batch_read_version_response_payload_len(response: &BatchReadVersionResponse) -> usize {
    response
        .batch_read_version_resps
        .iter()
        .map(String::len)
        .sum::<usize>()
        .saturating_add(response.batch_read_version_resps_bin.iter().map(Bytes::len).sum::<usize>())
 }
 fn validate_decoded_file_info(file_info: &FileInfo) -> Result<()> {
    file_info.validate_for_metadata_read().map_err(Into::into)
 }
@@ -2458,6 +2406,8 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
            return errors;
        }
        // TODO: use Error not string
        let result = self
            .execute_with_timeout(
                || async {
@@ -2489,7 +2439,17 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
            }
            return errors;
        }
-        decode_delete_versions_errors(response, versions.len())
+        response
            .errors
            .iter()
            .map(|error| {
                if error.is_empty() {
                    None
                } else {
                    Some(Error::other(error.to_string()))
                }
            })
            .collect()
    }
    #[tracing::instrument(level = "trace", skip_all)]
@@ -2867,19 +2827,14 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
            state = "started",
            "Remote disk RPC started"
        );
        let batch_read_version_attribution_enabled = rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled();
        let encode_started = read_version_stage_timer(batch_read_version_attribution_enabled);
        let batch_read_version_req = compat_json(&req)?;
        let batch_read_version_req_bin = encode_msgpack(&req)?;
-        record_batch_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_REQUEST_ENCODE, encode_started);
+
        let request_payload_bytes = batch_read_version_attribution_enabled
            .then(|| batch_read_version_request_payload_len(&req, &batch_read_version_req, &batch_read_version_req_bin));
        let batch_result = self
            .execute_with_timeout_for_op(
                "batch_read_version",
                move || async move {
                    let disk = self.disk_ref().await;
                    let disk_len = disk.len();
                    let mut client = self
                        .get_bulk_client()
                        .await
@@ -2890,20 +2845,9 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
                        batch_read_version_req_bin: batch_read_version_req_bin.into(),
                    });
                    crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_request();
                    if let Some(request_payload_bytes) = request_payload_bytes {
                        crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_sent_bytes(
                            request_payload_bytes.saturating_add(disk_len),
                        );
                    }
                    let rpc_started = read_version_stage_timer(batch_read_version_attribution_enabled);
                    let response = match client.batch_read_version(request).await {
-                        Ok(response) => {
+                        Ok(response) => response.into_inner(),
                            record_batch_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP, rpc_started);
                            response.into_inner()
                        }
                        Err(status) if status.code() == Code::Unimplemented => {
                            record_batch_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP, rpc_started);
                            if mode.should_fallback_on_unimplemented() {
                                record_batch_read_version_gate_decision(mode, BATCH_READ_VERSION_GATE_FALLBACK_UNIMPLEMENTED);
                                warn!(
@@ -2920,7 +2864,6 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
                            }
                            record_batch_read_version_gate_decision(mode, BATCH_READ_VERSION_GATE_UNSUPPORTED_NO_FALLBACK);
                            crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_error();
                            warn!(
                                event = EVENT_REMOTE_DISK_RPC,
                                component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
@@ -2933,33 +2876,14 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
                            );
                            return Err(Error::from(status));
                        }
-                        Err(status) => {
+                        Err(status) => return Err(Error::from(status)),
                            record_batch_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP, rpc_started);
                            crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_error();
                            return Err(Error::from(status));
                        }
                    };
                    if !response.success {
                        crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_error();
                        return Err(response.error.unwrap_or_default().into());
                    }
-                    crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_recv_bytes(
+                    decode_batch_read_version_response_items(response, &self.endpoint).map(Some)
                        batch_read_version_response_payload_len(&response),
                    );
                    let decode_started = read_version_stage_timer(batch_read_version_attribution_enabled);
                    match decode_batch_read_version_response_items(response, &self.endpoint) {
                        Ok(batch_read_version_resps) => {
                            record_batch_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_RESPONSE_DECODE, decode_started);
                            Ok(Some(batch_read_version_resps))
                        }
                        Err(err) => {
                            record_batch_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_RESPONSE_DECODE, decode_started);
                            crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_error();
                            Err(err)
                        }
                    }
                },
                get_max_timeout_duration(),
            )
@@ -3836,63 +3760,6 @@ mod tests {
    static INIT: Once = Once::new();
    #[test]
    fn delete_versions_response_preserves_typed_item_errors() {
        let errors = decode_delete_versions_errors(
            DeleteVersionsResponse {
                success: true,
                errors: vec!["file not found".to_string(), String::new()],
                error: None,
                item_errors: vec![
                    rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::Error {
                        code: DiskError::FileNotFound.to_u32(),
                        error_info: "file not found".to_string(),
                    },
                    rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::Error::default(),
                ],
            },
            2,
        );
        assert!(matches!(errors.as_slice(), [Some(DiskError::FileNotFound), None]));
    }
    #[test]
    fn delete_versions_response_accepts_legacy_string_errors() {
        let errors = decode_delete_versions_errors(
            DeleteVersionsResponse {
                success: true,
                errors: vec!["legacy error".to_string(), String::new()],
                error: None,
                item_errors: Vec::new(),
            },
            2,
        );
        assert_eq!(errors.len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(errors[0].as_ref().map(ToString::to_string).as_deref(), Some("io error legacy error"));
        assert!(errors[1].is_none());
    }
    #[test]
    fn delete_versions_response_rejects_misaligned_item_errors() {
        let errors = decode_delete_versions_errors(
            DeleteVersionsResponse {
                success: true,
                errors: vec!["file not found".to_string()],
                error: None,
                item_errors: vec![rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::Error {
                    code: DiskError::FileNotFound.to_u32(),
                    error_info: "file not found".to_string(),
                }],
            },
            2,
        );
        assert_eq!(errors.len(), 2);
        assert!(errors.iter().all(Option::is_some));
    }
    #[test]
    fn disk_mutation_digest_marks_rolling_compatibility() {
        let mut request = Request::new(());
@@ -4687,7 +4554,6 @@ mod tests {
            } else {
                "file version not found".to_string()
            },
            error_code: if success { 0 } else { DiskError::FileVersionNotFound.to_u32() },
        }
    }
@@ -4807,7 +4673,6 @@ mod tests {
    fn batch_metadata_rpc_mode_uses_documented_env_before_legacy_alias() {
        temp_env::with_vars(
            [
                (ENV_RUSTFS_GET_METADATA_READ_VERSION_COALESCE, None::<&str>),
                (ENV_RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ, Some("auto")),
                (LEGACY_ENV_RUSTFS_BATCH_METADATA_RPC, Some("on")),
            ],
@@ -4817,25 +4682,10 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }
    #[test]
    fn batch_metadata_rpc_mode_uses_get_coalescer_env_before_batch_env() {
        temp_env::with_vars(
            [
                (ENV_RUSTFS_GET_METADATA_READ_VERSION_COALESCE, Some("on")),
                (ENV_RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ, Some("off")),
                (LEGACY_ENV_RUSTFS_BATCH_METADATA_RPC, Some("off")),
            ],
            || {
                assert_eq!(batch_metadata_rpc_mode_from_env(), BatchMetadataRpcMode::On);
            },
        );
    }
    #[test]
    fn batch_metadata_rpc_mode_falls_back_to_legacy_env_alias() {
        temp_env::with_vars(
            [
                (ENV_RUSTFS_GET_METADATA_READ_VERSION_COALESCE, None::<&str>),
                (ENV_RUSTFS_METADATA_BATCH_READ, None::<&str>),
                (LEGACY_ENV_RUSTFS_BATCH_METADATA_RPC, Some("on")),
            ],
@@ -14,10 +14,9 @@
 use rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::{
    INTERNODE_MSGPACK_CODEC_JSON, INTERNODE_MSGPACK_CODEC_MSGPACK, INTERNODE_MSGPACK_DIRECTION_RESPONSE,
-    INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_BATCH_READ_VERSION, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_ALL, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_MULTIPLE,
+    INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_ALL, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_MULTIPLE, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION,
-    INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_VERSION, INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_WRITE_ALL, INTERNODE_OPERATION_PUT_FILE_STREAM,
+    INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_WRITE_ALL, INTERNODE_OPERATION_PUT_FILE_STREAM, INTERNODE_OPERATION_READ_FILE_STREAM,
-    INTERNODE_OPERATION_READ_FILE_STREAM, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_TCP_HTTP,
+    INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_TCP_HTTP, global_internode_metrics,
    global_internode_metrics,
 };
 use std::time::Duration;
@@ -94,59 +93,6 @@ pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_request() {
    );
 }
 pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_request() {
    if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
        return;
    }
    global_internode_metrics().record_outgoing_request_for_operation_and_backend(
        INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_BATCH_READ_VERSION,
        INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
    );
 }
 pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_stage(stage: &'static str, duration: Duration) {
    if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
        return;
    }
    global_internode_metrics().record_stage_duration_for_operation_and_backend(
        INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_BATCH_READ_VERSION,
        INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
        stage,
        duration,
    );
 }
 pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_error() {
    if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
        return;
    }
    global_internode_metrics()
        .record_error_for_operation_and_backend(INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_BATCH_READ_VERSION, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC);
 }
 pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_sent_bytes(bytes: usize) {
    if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
        return;
    }
    global_internode_metrics().record_sent_bytes_for_operation_and_backend(
        INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_BATCH_READ_VERSION,
        INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
        bytes,
    );
 }
 pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_recv_bytes(bytes: usize) {
    if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
        return;
    }
    global_internode_metrics().record_recv_bytes_for_operation_and_backend(
        INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_BATCH_READ_VERSION,
        INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
        bytes,
    );
    record_grpc_payload_size(INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_BATCH_READ_VERSION, bytes);
 }
 pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_version_error() {
    if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
        return;
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
唐小鸭	290662bc3a	test(e2e): drop serial_test from receiver LWW e2e main removed the serial_test dependency from e2e_test (#6344); the test uses an ephemeral-port RustFSTestEnvironment and needs no cross-test serialization, so the attribute and import go.	2026-08-23 00:26:43 +08:00
唐小鸭	858cf20d9a	fix(replication): keep first-replication miss quiet in multipart LWW log Version-absent is the normal first delivery of a version, not a degraded comparison skip; only real read errors (quorum loss) warrant the warn added in the previous commit.	2026-08-21 19:35:22 +08:00
唐小鸭	66e63d20dd	fix(replication): surface skipped multipart LWW comparison at warn level When the complete-multipart LWW gate cannot read the destination version (quorum error), the inbound metadata is applied without comparison — the exact overwrite rustfs/backlog#1953 exists to prevent. Keep the fail-open semantics (failing the complete would loop through MRF) but log the degraded path at warn so operators can see it; the version-absent first replication keeps riding the same branch.	2026-08-21 19:33:59 +08:00
唐小鸭	81ef2882df	fix(replication): apply receiver-side LWW to inbound metadata categories Metadata-only replication reuses the whole-object PUT/multipart transports, so in active-active topologies an inbound authorized replication write carried the source's tags, retention, and legal hold verbatim and unconditionally overwrote a category the destination had modified more recently — both sites ended permanently diverged while reporting COMPLETED (rustfs/backlog#1953, audit A4/P1-6). The receiver now judges each category independently under the object write lock: when the destination version's stored internal timestamp is strictly newer than the inbound source timestamp, the local category values and timestamp are kept; the rest of the write proceeds per the inbound metadata and the object-level result stays successful, so a local win never feeds an MRF retry loop. When the inbound category wins, its internal timestamp key is pinned to the source-authored time instead of the receiver-now() value stamped by the object-lock eval_metadata path. No stored timestamp (pre-P1-6 data) or no inbound timestamp keeps today's overwrite behavior. The put_object hook reuses the existing commit-lock WORM-gate read (no extra fanout); complete_multipart_upload adds one gated read under its held lock, and the sender's complete options now carry the three category timestamps so the multipart transport gets the same receiver behavior. Local wins restore the timestamp via insert_str so a MinIO-written single-key version still yields both compatibility keys.	2026-08-21 19:29:26 +08:00
		`@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@`
			`sha256-darwin=9f767b37ed8b1c82da62ea441462d75487785c8086e56f08fb6f6cd89c6e2e52`
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		`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
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		`@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@`
			`sha256-darwin=55534a97fbd376f64c8f6c341d319017d11ff77cad6da8629a1a7f6a874e0315`
			`sha256-linux=c06fb8c19aed6f388b9dc61cb8251b7a44f8561a9bf764ad2b9e635598f8dc17`
		`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
			`sha256=655a3f3c1d042e694339d15caba7580518320322d1bac0f09450b37e6c09e2e7`
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			`sha256=ec27cde6ce6400723c4b372bfbd2ac61709c744294e4810af765e8a808d8e31d`