The shared module rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys is the single source of truth for encryption metadata key names, but three call sites still carried their own copies or bare literals: crates/kms/src/service.rs (two private constants plus four bare x-rustfs-encryption-* literals on both the write and read path), rustfs/src/app/select_object.rs (six SELECT_* copies), and rustfs/src/storage/options.rs (two private prefix copies now imported from header_compat). All values are unchanged, so the change is a compiler-verified rename.
The reader-only x-rustfs-internal-server-side-encryption- family gets a named constant with the verified judgment recorded on it: no writer emits these keys anywhere in the repo (the SSE writer persists the MinIO-branded keys verbatim for interop), the two comments claiming the dual-key invariant writes this twin were wrong and are corrected, and the defensive redaction/strip readers are kept because removing them is risk-asymmetric.
rustfs-kms's rustfs-utils dependency now declares the http feature it uses instead of relying on feature unification from sibling crates.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1775, rustfs/backlog#1562.
backlog#1833 PR1 prescribed deduplicating crates/replication/src/http.rs onto the canonical rustfs-utils http modules via a re-export facade. That plan conflicts with a standing architecture guard the issue's review missed: check_architecture_migration_rules.sh rejects any rustfs-utils import or dependency from the replication crate ("replication crate HTTP/helper contracts must not import or depend on rustfs-utils"), the same way it bans rustfs-filemeta and rustfs-storage-api — the wire-contract crate deliberately has zero internal dependencies.
So this lands the issue's fallback shape instead (the same bidirectional do-not-merge pattern the issue itself prescribes for the policy path.rs cluster): a module doc on replication/http.rs naming the canonical owners and the guard that forces the local copy, mirror notes on utils' metadata_compat.rs and header_compat.rs, and a new test pinning every duplicated constant to its literal wire value so the two copies cannot drift silently.
No production code changed.
Ref rustfs/backlog#1833 (PR1).
Groundwork for encrypted-object replication (backlog#1783, PR-A of 3):
- classify_replication_source_encryption: accept the AES256 marker that
every stored SSE-C object carries; the SseC arm was unreachable.
- Fail closed on sealed material without an SSE marker (MinIO-written
objects) instead of replicating ciphertext as plaintext.
- Replace the dead VALID_SSE_REPLICATION_HEADERS table with a transport
map keyed by the metadata keys the SSE writer actually persists, shared
via the new rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys module.
- Structurally strip all encryption metadata from outbound replication
(x-rustfs-encryption-* envelopes previously passed the filters).
- Skip decrypt_checksums for encrypted objects at the boundary so its
is_multipart=false (a response-path contract) cannot misroute
encrypted multipart objects once managed replication opens.
- Redact X-Rustfs-Replication-* SSE transport values in FileInfo Debug.
A reconciliation test pins that every key encryption_material_to_metadata
produces is either transport-mapped or stripped. All four SSE replication
e2e contracts still assert FAILED unchanged.
* refactor(sse): decouple encryption from ecstore
* feat(kms): enhance KMS service manager with runtime state and persistence support
* feat(kms): add local key export functionality for SSE-S3 migration tests
* fix(kms): keep local key export narrowly scoped
* fix(sse): validate copy source customer algorithm
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Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Zhengchao An