* fix(ilm): reject invalid retention counts and validate lifecycle filters
`NewerNoncurrentVersions` had no lower bound at PUT, and evaluation read a
negative count through `usize::try_from(...).unwrap_or(usize::MAX)`. An
HTTP-accepted rule therefore retained (almost) everything and silently
stopped expiring versions — the one outcome a retention rule must never
produce by accident.
Reject a negative count during validation, and stop reading one as
"retain everything" anywhere it can still arrive from older persistence
or an import: evaluation takes no action for such a rule and says so in a
diagnostic, the batch limit path yields no event, and `Evaluator::eval`
reports a typed corruption error to callers that can surface one.
A count-only noncurrent expiration is a MinIO extension, not an AWS form.
It used to be rejected as an actionless rule and was never executed. It
is now accepted and honoured with the semantics MinIO gives it: the
newest N noncurrent versions are kept and every older one is due as soon
as it became noncurrent. Zero keeps the meaning the batch limit path has
always given it — no count constraint — so a zero-count rule with no age
condition still has no action.
`LifecycleRuleFilter` is an all-`Option` DTO, so the schema constraints
were not checked anywhere: validate at most one top-level predicate, an
`And` that combines at least two, no repeated tag key, tag key/value
limits, non-negative sizes, and `ObjectSizeGreaterThan <
ObjectSizeLessThan`. An empty filter stays valid — AWS documents it as
"every object in the bucket".
Schema-shape violations are reported with a distinct `ErrorKind` so the
S3 boundary answers them with `MalformedXML`; rejected values keep the
`InvalidArgument` this path has always returned.
backlog#2201
* fix(ilm): satisfy lifecycle clippy checks
* fix(ilm): fail closed on invalid lifecycle rules
* fix: initialize optional migration source fields
---------
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
The namespace owner tests decided that ownership had ended when the Weak probe stopped upgrading or when the mutation lease could be reacquired. Both signals fire before the owner guard's Drop decrements the pending counter: Arc releases its strong count before running Drop, and the lease drops its locks before its owner field. The rio-v2 lane hit that window in undo_fresh_version_keeps_physical_namespace_owner_after_timeout.
Extend every drain wait to also require namespace_commits_pending() to be false, so the assertions observe the completed release instead of racing it.
* fix(ecstore): restore odm source contract tests
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* test(ci): initialize replication evidence in chain test
Run the replication workflow's evidence initialization before the chain handoff self-test executes the suite step. This keeps the test model aligned with the workflow-provided LOG_FILE and TMPDIR values.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
* fix(odm): distinguish missing GCS buckets from object misses (#7221)
---------
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* feat(ecstore): add a native azure blob odm source backend
* feat(ecstore): add a native gcs odm source backend and one backend contract
* fix(ecstore): refuse an empty azure account key at client build
* fix(ecstore): probe gcs sources with the listing permission
* fix(app): drop a redundant match guard on the sse config lookup
* fix(ecstore): drop stale rename commit duplicates from local.rs
* test(ecstore): use the sanctioned placeholder key in the gcs fixture
* fix(ecstore): correct sealed-credential test helper parameter type
The helper took a HashMap that nothing imports, so the ecstore test target did not compile.
* fix(ecstore): fail closed on an unreadable bucket-targets blob
An undecodable bucket-targets.json was replaced by an empty BucketTargets,
so every replication target of that bucket disappeared, replication stopped,
and no caller saw an error. A missing secretKey alone triggers it, because
Credentials has no struct-level serde(default).
parse_all_configs now retains the failure instead: the raw bytes stay and the
typed field stays None, which BucketMetadata::bucket_targets_unreadable reads
as "exists but cannot be read" — the same distinction the fabricated marker
draws for bucket metadata as a whole. One corrupt sub-config still never fails
the metadata load, so an unreadable bucket cannot take down its neighbours or
the node.
BucketTargetSys records such buckets and answers every targets query with the
new BucketRemoteTargetsUnreadable, leaving any snapshot from an earlier
readable load in place so in-flight replication is not torn down. The
replication heal queue reports Missed rather than scheduling against an empty
target set, and the admin listing surfaces the fault instead of an empty list.
Refs: rustfs/backlog#2282
* fix(ecstore): report corrupt permissive bucket configs as invalid
Audit of the remaining parse_all_configs branches. Policy, versioning, object
lock and replication already fail closed at their accessors; encryption,
public access block and quota did not, and for those three "absent" is exactly
the state that grants something — plaintext storage, anonymous access,
unbounded capacity. They now report a stored-but-undecodable payload as
invalid rather than as ConfigNotFound, matching the guard the versioning and
object-lock accessors already use. The quota enforcement path already refused
such a payload; only the metadata read path was misreporting it.
The branches left degrading, and the concrete reason each is safe, are
recorded in the table on parse_all_configs.
Refs: rustfs/backlog#2282
SealScope::encryption_context() returned a HashMap whose key order is
non-deterministic. The FakeSealer test round-trips the context through
JSON serialization, and HashMap's random iteration order caused the
prefix comparison to intermittently fail with 'encryption context mismatch'.
Switch to BTreeMap which guarantees stable key ordering.
* feat(ecstore): add the sealed remote credential seam
Replication targets, remote tiers and on-demand migration sources will all
seal their stored secrets through one envelope rather than three
(rustfs/backlog#2168, design in docs/architecture/remote-credential-sealing-adr.md).
Adds the versioned envelope, the seal scope that binds a ciphertext to the
store, owner and field it belongs to, the sealer registration point, and the
fail-closed error type. ECStore still has no rustfs-kms dependency: the binary
installs a sealer the way it installs the event dispatch hook.
Nothing is wired to a consumer yet, so no stored format changes.
* docs(ecstore): name the event dispatch hook by module, not by symbol
The architecture guard keeps EVENT_DISPATCH_HOOK references inside the
event-notification owner module; the module doc cited the symbol only as an
example of the hook shape, so cite its file instead.
* fix(restore): reject SELECT restore and keep typed S3 errors
RestoreObject accepted `Type=SELECT` requests, but the restore path can
only write the retrieved bytes back to the source key: `put_restore_opts`
built SELECT output options and `restore_transitioned_object` then PUT
them over the source bucket/object. On an unversioned bucket that dropped
`x-amz-restore`, user metadata and tags from the live object; on a
versioned bucket it published a bogus latest version. Nothing was ever
written to `OutputLocation.S3`, yet the response still carried a
fabricated `x-amz-restore-output-path`.
Reject SELECT at the API boundary with a typed NotImplemented, before any
guard or metadata write, and fail closed in `put_restore_opts` as the
backstop for any other caller.
Every other RestoreObject failure was collapsed into a `Custom` error
code, which serializes as a generic retryable 500: a missing key or
version, a malformed version-id, an object that was never transitioned,
an illegal `Days`, and authorization or storage failures all looked the
same to a client. Map them to their S3 identities instead — NoSuchKey,
NoSuchVersion, InvalidArgument, InvalidObjectState, InvalidRequest,
MalformedXML — by preserving `StorageError` through `post_restore_opts`
and letting `ApiError` do the mapping. The intentional 409
RestoreAlreadyInProgress and 503 SlowDown behaviour is unchanged, and
request validation now runs before any lock is taken.
backlog#1341, backlog#2205
* test(restore): give the typed-error regression the ecstore test stack
`execute_restore_object_maps_failures_to_typed_s3_errors` builds a real
ECStore fixture, and under nextest each test runs in a spawned thread with
libtest's 2 MiB stack. On Linux CI that overflowed: the test aborted with
SIGABRT / "fatal runtime error: stack overflow" while every other test in
the run passed.
Add it to the `ecstore-base-stack` filter in both the default and ci
profiles, alongside the other `package(rustfs)` tests that drive the same
store fixture. 4 MiB matches what the deeper multipart and access
roundtrips already use.
overtrue