backlog#1183 tracks flipping the default GET data path from the legacy
tokio::io::duplex double-copy to the zero-duplex codec-streaming fast path.
That flip is gated behind RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_BODY_COMPAT_CONFIRMED /
..._HEADER_COMPAT_CONFIRMED, which need empirical evidence the two paths are
byte- and header-identical.
Add an e2e regression net that runs the same object matrix twice against the
same on-disk EC shards, changing only the codec-streaming env gates: phase A
(default) takes the legacy duplex path, phase B (gates opened) takes codec
streaming. It asserts byte-for-byte (sha256) and header-for-header equality
across inline / small / multi-block (1.5M/3M/5M+) / multipart objects, plus a
ranged GET (which falls back to legacy by gate design). Path confirmation is
not assumed: the legacy path logs "Created duplex pipe ..." per full GET, so
the test counts that marker per phase and asserts the codec phase created zero
duplex pipes, proving the fast path actually ran rather than silently falling
back to the path it is compared against.
To capture the child server's logs for that assertion, add an optional
RustFSTestEnvironment.capture_log_path (default None = inherit stdio,
backward compatible) that redirects the spawned server's stdout+stderr to a file.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
test(e2e): negative presigned-URL SigV4 suite (backlog#1151 sec-2)
Add crates/e2e_test/src/presigned_negative_test.rs, the query-string
SigV4 sibling of the header-SigV4 suite (sec-1, #4708). Presigned URLs
were only exercised on the happy path, so nothing pinned our end-to-end
enforcement of expiry or query-signature verification.
Against a live single-node RustFSTestEnvironment (random port, isolated
temp dir), the suite asserts HTTP status + S3 error <Code> for:
- expired presigned GET -> 403 AccessDenied (Request has expired)
- tampered X-Amz-Signature -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- wrong secret key -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- tampered target key (swapped after signing) -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- tampered presigned PUT -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch + object not stored
- positive controls: valid presigned GET (body match) and PUT (HEAD verify)
Expiry is controlled without real waiting via the AWS SDK presigner's
start_time (sign as of one hour ago with a 60s window). s3s checks
expiry before the signature, so the expired case surfaces AccessDenied.
Wired into the e2e-smoke nextest profile (fast, single-node, no external
deps) so it runs on every PR per the crates/e2e_test/README.md admission
criteria.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1151 (sec-2), rustfs/backlog#1155.
test(admin-auth): unit + e2e coverage for the admin authorization gate
Adds the first tests for the central admin authorization gate
`rustfs/src/admin/auth.rs`, which previously had zero coverage
(backlog#1151 sec-4, master plan #1155).
Unit tests (rustfs/src/admin/auth.rs):
- Refactor the two `validate_admin_request*` entry points to share a
single generic decision core `evaluate_admin_actions<S: Store>` /
`check_admin_request_auth<S: Store>` (removes the duplicated
action-loop and makes the gate testable without a running cluster).
- Cover: owner/root credential allowed; authenticated non-admin
credential denied with AccessDenied; missing credential denied; and
the multi-action loop grants on any permitted action, denies when
none pass. Backed by an in-memory empty IamSys so the owner path
short-circuits to allow and every other principal resolves to deny.
E2E (crates/e2e_test/src/admin_auth_test.rs, raw SigV4 over HTTP, no
awscurl dependency):
- non_admin_credential_denied_on_admin_api: a limited IAM user gets
403 AccessDenied on GET /rustfs/admin/v3/info while root succeeds.
- root_credential_rotation_takes_effect: restart with rotated
--access-key/--secret-key; new credential works and the stale one is
rejected, on both the admin plane and the S3 data plane.
- default_credentials_emit_startup_warning: booting with the default
rustfsadmin credentials emits the default-credentials warning.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1151 (sec-4), #1155.
test(e2e): add negative header-SigV4 rejection suite (backlog#1151 sec-1)
RustFS delegates SigV4 verification to the s3s dependency, so nothing in
this repo pins OUR end-to-end wiring of it. Add negative_sigv4_test.rs
sending REJECTED header-SigV4 requests against a live RustFSTestEnvironment
and asserting the HTTP status plus the S3 error code XML:
- valid_header_sigv4_request_succeeds (positive control so the negatives
cannot pass for the wrong reason)
- tampered_signature_returns_signature_does_not_match -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- wrong_secret_key_returns_signature_does_not_match -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- tampered_payload_is_rejected (body != signed x-amz-content-sha256) -> not 200
- skewed_date_returns_request_time_too_skewed (>15min) -> 403 RequestTimeTooSkewed
- malformed_authorization_header_returns_clean_4xx (present-not-missing) -> 4xx, never 5xx
Signatures are hand-built via rustfs_signer::request_signature_v4 primitives
(get_signing_key/get_signature/get_scope) so the test controls the timestamp,
secret, signed payload hash, and final signature bytes. Missing-credential
negatives are intentionally not duplicated (covered by multipart_auth_test /
anonymous_access_test).
Refs backlog#1151 (sec-1), master plan backlog#1155.
Adds an S3-API-level e2e regression net proving that a large-object GET on a
degraded EC set never returns a silently truncated body under a full
Content-Length -- the historical "unexpected EOF" bug fixed on main by
rustfs#4594 (short-body GetObject stream -> UnexpectedEof), rustfs#4560
(in-place per-part legacy degradation for the lazy multipart reader), and
rustfs#4585 (DARE package-boundary truncation detection). Those fixes each
ship a *unit* regression; this covers the layer they do not -- the full HTTP
GET path streaming a real body reconstructed from real on-disk EC shards.
New file crates/e2e_test/src/degraded_read_eof_regression_test.rs, single-node
4-disk (EC 2+2) DiskFaultHarness, three scenarios:
(a) one disk offline: a 6 MiB single object (>=2 EC stripes) and a 3x5 MiB
multipart object GET back byte-identical with the correct Content-Length.
(b) mid-stream bitrot within quorum: 2 of 4 shards corrupted mid-file on a
large multipart object still reconstructs the full, hash-matching body.
(c) beyond read quorum (the heart of the net): 3 of 4 shards corrupted
mid-file -- the read MUST fail cleanly (non-2xx or a mid-stream body
error), NEVER close with a truncated body under the full Content-Length.
The shared get_checked() helper panics on the forbidden outcome (a clean 2xx
whose collected body is shorter than the advertised Content-Length), so the
truncation bug can never be silently tolerated.
CI placement: these spawn a 4-disk server per test and are resource-heavy, so
they stay OUT of the fast PR e2e-smoke filter. A new e2e-reliability nextest
test-group (max-threads=1) serializes them (and the existing
reliability_disk_fault_test) across nextest's process boundary; ci-7's nightly
full-e2e run picks them up. Visible via `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test`.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1150 (dist-13), rustfs/backlog#1155, rustfs#4594,
rustfs#4560, rustfs#4585, rustfs#2955.
Add crates/e2e_test/src/chaos.rs with in-process fault-injection
primitives for a single-node multi-disk RustFS server: take a disk
offline (rename to <dir>.offline), bring it back online, replace a
disk with a fresh empty directory, corrupt an object's erasure shard
(part.* byte flips, xl.meta untouched), and SIGKILL/restart the server
with the same volumes and port.
Add reliability tests on a 4-disk (EC 2+2) topology, verified via
sha256 manifests recorded at write time:
- degraded read/write with one disk offline (incl. multipart object)
- bitrot read-through with two corrupted shards per object
- fresh-disk replacement healed via admin deep heal after a SIGKILL
restart
Also reuse the shared signed_admin_post helper from chaos.rs in the
heal regression suite instead of a duplicated local copy.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
houseme