Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Zhengchao An bd834297da feat(kms): add the data key rewrap primitive (#5607)
* feat(kms): add data key rewrap and wrapping inspection primitives

Rewrap re-protects an existing data key envelope with the master key's
current version without touching the data key itself, which is the
precondition for ever retiring an older version: until every envelope a
version wrapped has been moved off it, destroying that version orphans
every object whose data key it wrapped.

Adds KmsBackend::rewrap_data_key and its read-only counterpart
describe_data_key_wrapping, both gated by a new BackendCapabilities::rewrap
flag and defaulting to UnsupportedCapability. Vault KV2 unwraps with the
frozen version record that wrapped the envelope and re-wraps with the
current material; Vault Transit uses the native transit/rewrap endpoint so
the data key never enters this process.

No read or write path changes: nothing calls these yet.

* test(kms): cover the rewrap primitive against a scripted Vault

* fix(kms): resolve both key materials before the data key is unwrapped

Keeps every fallible step out of the window in which the plaintext data
key exists, so no error path can drop it without zeroizing it first.
2026-08-02 05:51:12 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3c00ad6048 fix(kms): make the deletion waiting window non-bypassable (#5535) 2026-08-01 12:23:28 +00:00
Zhengchao An 76b3c085b5 refactor(kms): fold the KmsClient layer into KmsBackend and complete lifecycle overrides (#5501) 2026-07-31 08:31:21 +00:00
Zhengchao An 2e29c330a9 feat(kms): enforce shared key state machine across backends (#5489)
* feat(kms): enforce shared key state machine across backends

Unify the key state x operation matrix behind a single gate in
backends/mod.rs and wire it into the Local, Vault KV2 and Vault Transit
backends: Disabled keys reject encryption, data key generation and
rotation while still allowing decryption and lifecycle recovery;
PendingDeletion keys reject everything except decryption and
cancellation (including repeated deletion scheduling); cancellation now
requires an actual pending deletion everywhere. This closes the missing
gates on KV2 encrypt/generate and Local generate_data_key, and stops
enable_key from silently reverting a pending deletion.

Decryption is deliberately left ungated in Disabled/PendingDeletion — an
explicit, documented and tested deviation from AWS KMS, since gating it
would break reads of existing objects the moment a key is disabled.

Add shared contract tests driving the full matrix offline for Local (and
via ignored tests against a live Vault for KV2/Transit), a stateless
contract for Static, an SSE-shaped regression proving existing envelopes
stay decryptable after disable, and a pin on the known-risk Enabled
default of Transit's synthesized metadata fallback.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1571 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)

* feat(kms): persist deletion deadlines and run a restartable deletion worker (#5491)
2026-07-30 23:24:39 +00:00