Also replace deprecated Atomic::fetch_update calls with try_update so the
current Rust toolchain keeps lint and CI jobs warning-clean.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
TierAzure.storage_class and .sp_auth round-trip faithfully through the
admin API and on-disk config (ExternalTierAzure encode/decode in
tier.rs), so an operator can configure them, read them back via
ListTier, and never learn they do nothing. They are dropped only at the
WarmBackendAzure construction boundary: the Azure warm backend goes
through the same S3-compatible TransitionClient as every other
provider and has no Azure Blob-native client or Azure AD dependency
(confirmed: no azure_* crate anywhere in the workspace), so neither
field can actually be honored today. MinIO's reference implementation
(cmd/warm-backend-azure.go) treats both as first-class: storage_class
sets the blob access tier on every PUT, and sp_auth is a full
alternative to access/secret-key auth via azidentity, mutually
exclusive with it.
Rather than the larger, riskier options (add a native Azure SDK
dependency and a parallel non-S3 client path, or break the persisted
config format by removing the fields), this closes the silent-failure
gap with the minimal safe fix: TierConfigMgr::add now rejects an Azure
tier config with either field set, before backend construction,
returning ERR_TIER_INVALID_CONFIG with an explicit message instead of
accepting and ignoring. The fields stay in the config type (no format
break); already-persisted tiers with these fields set are grandfathered
in un-rejected (edit does not touch sp_auth or storage_class either).
Full support remains a larger follow-up if ever prioritized.
Also removes TierAzure::is_sp_enabled(), which had zero callers
repo-wide (backlog#2055 flagged this) and would have been misleading
dead weight once this decision was made — reusing it for the new gate
would also have been wrong, since it requires *all three* sp_auth
fields non-empty (&&), while the gate must reject on *any* one being set.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2055
(cherry picked from commit 8d148c4e9b2507a1c5075e3d9513adb8b5851ef5)
Validate lifecycle tier references through the tier reference proof path, preserve S3 list CommonPrefix XML compatibility, and make GetObject audit completion use real S3 error status codes.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
refactor(ecstore): huaweicloud/tencent reuse the shared S3 constructor
Migrates the Huaweicloud and Tencent tier warm backends onto the shared
S3-compatible constructor (backlog#2040). Also makes the shared
constructor's outbound-URL validation injectable per provider
(S3CompatibleWarmBackendParams::validate_endpoint) so it can centralize
rustfs/rustfs#6764's SSRF check for the providers that don't need an
exception, while accommodating rustfs/rustfs#6773's RustFS-specific
debug-only loopback opt-in without weakening the other six providers.
Updates scripts/error-other-format-baseline.txt: the one ::other(format!)
call site moves from the two per-provider files into the new shared
call site in warm_backend.rs (net call-site count unchanged).
Refs rustfs/backlog#2042
WarmBackendS3::new already rejects loopback, private, link-local, and
cloud metadata-service endpoints via validate_outbound_url, but the
Aliyun, Azure, Huaweicloud, Tencent, MinIO, R2, RustFS, and GCS warm
backend constructors built their transition clients directly from
conf.endpoint without the same check.
The endpoint comes from the AddTier admin API, gated only by
SetTierAction, which can be a narrower IAM grant than root. Any
principal holding it could point one of these eight tier types at an
internal address (loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or a cloud metadata
IP) and have the server issue authenticated outbound requests to it, a
server-side SSRF vector that the S3 and Wasabi tier types were already
closed against.
Apply the same validate_outbound_url check at construction time for
all eight providers, before any credentials or network client are
built, mirroring the existing WarmBackendS3 pattern. GCS keeps its
default-endpoint behavior when conf.endpoint is empty and only
validates an explicitly configured endpoint.
Add a regression test per provider asserting that a loopback endpoint
is rejected before any backend/network setup, matching the existing
WarmBackendS3 coverage.
Update the error(format!) ratchet baseline: these are one-shot admin
tier-configuration validation errors returned once per AddTier call,
not per-disk I/O errors that flow through reduce_errs quorum
aggregation (backlog#1845), so the new ::other(format!) call sites do
not introduce a quorum-bucketing hazard. They mirror the pre-existing,
already-baselined warm_backend_s3.rs call site.
TransitionClient::new() in crates/s3-client/src/transition_api.rs computes
trailing_header_support = opts.trailing_headers && override_signer_type == SignatureV4,
but override_signer_type is hardcoded to SignatureDefault at construction
and never mutated afterwards, so the expression is always false regardless
of opts.trailing_headers. The resulting field also has no live reader: its
only reference is inside PutObjectOptions::validate() in
crates/s3-client/src/api_put_object.rs, which is itself
#[allow(dead_code, reason = "MinIO-parity ... no caller in this port")],
and even there the reference to trailing_header_support is commented out.
So trailing_headers: true in the seven warm_backend_*.rs constructors has
never had any effect on request signing or chunked/trailing-header
behavior (stream_sha256 signing is gated separately by
metadata.stream_sha256 && !self.secure). Remove the misleading dead
configuration from the seven provider constructors so it doesn't look
like intentional, load-bearing behavior to future readers.
Found during adversarial self-check while implementing rustfs/backlog#2040 (out of that issue's scope).
The seven S3-compatible warm backend providers (Aliyun, Azure, Huaweicloud, Tencent, MinIO, R2, RustFS) each carry a byte-identical copy of the same statically-credentialed TransitionClient construction and of the same optimal_part_size helper. Add both to the module that already owns the WarmBackend trait and WarmBackendS3, so the per-provider migrate step can drop its duplicate without redesigning anything.
bucket_lookup is a parameter rather than a constant because the providers split into two families: Aliyun, Azure, Huaweicloud, and Tencent pin BucketLookupDNS, while MinIO, R2, and RustFS leave it at the BucketLookupAuto default. Hardcoding either value would silently change bucket addressing for the other family during the migrate step.
Error texts, validation order, prefix and host/port normalization are reproduced exactly from the Aliyun/MinIO family. No provider file is touched and no production caller exists yet, so the new unit tests are the first callers.
Refs rustfs/backlog#2040
* Revert "perf(ecstore): use AHashMap for FileInfo metadata fields (#6738)"
This reverts commit 13a2ae212e.
* fix(filemeta): restore standard HashMap metadata (#6742)
Remove the direct ahash dependency added for FileInfo metadata and revert the affected filemeta/ecstore call sites back to std::collections::HashMap.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* test(pool): fix warp log path and retry rebalance start
- warp writes now use a unique mktemp log file instead of a fixed
/tmp/rustfs-warp.log: the runner user could not write the stale
root-owned file, which made the background warp process die instantly
(warp never ran). The workflow uploads /tmp/rustfs-warp.*.log.
- rebalance start is retried (6x, 20s apart): nightly builds gate
rebalance activation on a live cross-pool fence fleet capability proof
that takes ~10-20s to re-establish after a pool joins. Verified live:
attempt 1 fails with 500 'pool activation requires a live fleet
capability proof', attempt 2 succeeds.
* test(pool): annotate known server-side issues in failure output
When a node fails to start, grab the rustfs journal tail and match known
server-side error signatures (e.g. the fleet capability proof cold-start
regression, rustfs/backlog#2031), printing a hint with the tracking issue.
Also annotate the rebalance-start retry exhaustion and the rc.3 decommission
metacache-listing failure with actionable guidance.
* fix(ecstore): defer rebalance activation without fleet proof
---------
Co-authored-by: 马登山 <cxymds@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
* refactor(ecstore): drop the client shim, import rustfs-s3-client directly
Completes the migration window opened by the rustfs-s3-client extraction (rustfs/backlog#1842 PR3): every consumer now imports the client crate directly and the crate::client shim is deleted.
- All in-crate crate::client:: paths (tier warm backends, tier core, lifecycle tier_sweeper, replication storage boundary, set_disk) now import rustfs_s3_client::* directly; crates/ecstore/src/client/mod.rs and the lib.rs mod client declaration are gone.
- The two server-side modules historically misfiled under client/ move to their real homes: object_api_utils.rs to crates/ecstore/src/object_api/ (it builds engine-side object readers/writers), and object_handlers_common.rs to crates/ecstore/src/bucket/lifecycle/ (it is the lifecycle noncurrent-version cleanup helper). The latter now routes its replication calls through the lifecycle replication_sink boundary (schedule_delete wrapper and the sink's ReplicationObjectBridge re-export), as the lifecycle guard requires.
- The ecstore public facade drops api::client: object_api_utils is exposed as api::object_api_utils, and the rustfs crate takes admin_handler_utils (AdminError) from rustfs-s3-client directly (new dependency).
- Guard updates: the migration guard no longer pins mod client in ecstore's lib.rs or the admin_handler_utils facade module (it pins the new api::object_api_utils facade instead), and the module-lint register follows object_api_utils.rs to its new path.
Verification: cargo check -p rustfs-ecstore --all-targets and -p rustfs; cargo fmt --all; tier/transition/lifecycle-focused nextest (626 passed) and the decommission/rebalance/heal families in a filtered run (603 passed; the full-suite parallel run only fails on this machine's known decommission/rebalance baseline flakes, which pass in filtered reruns and fail identically on pristine origin/main); layer/migration/s3s/logging/error-format/doc-path guard scripts all pass.
* docs(architecture): record the S3 client extraction and reword invariant 4 (#6669)
Closes the documentation step of rustfs/backlog#1842. ARCHITECTURE.md invariant 4 now states the serving-vs-consuming distinction the adversarial ruling asked for: ecstore must not serve HTTP/S3 wire types, while consuming remote S3 endpoints is a legitimate engine capability that lives in the extracted rustfs-s3-client crate. The violation note is updated from the pre-extraction snapshot (58 files, embedded client) to the current ratcheted state (shrink-only S3S_ECSTORE_FILES_BASELINE in scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh, object_lock converted first), and the crate map gains s3-client. ecstore-module-split-plan.md gets the client-directory entry the plan was missing: a Current Shape row and a completed-extraction section describing the pure-move + shim + direct-import sequence and the re-homing of the two misfiled server-side modules.
The storage engine embedded a ~8.4K-line hand-written S3 HTTP client under crates/ecstore/src/client (rustfs/backlog#1842). That client is a legitimate engine capability — it consumes remote S3-compatible endpoints for ILM tier warm backends and transition targets — but it was misfiled inside the engine, dragging s3s/hyper wire types into ecstore and blocking ARCHITECTURE.md invariant 4.
This PR is the pure-move step: 21 modules move verbatim to the new crates/s3-client crate (rustfs-s3-client), and crates/ecstore/src/client/mod.rs becomes a re-export shim so every in-crate crate::client:: path keeps working. The two server-side modules that were historically misfiled under client/ — object_api_utils.rs and object_handlers_common.rs — stay in ecstore.
Three reverse dependencies from the client into engine internals are severed so the move can be pure:
- transition_api::ReaderImpl::ObjectBody held ecstore's GetObjectReader; the client only ever reads the body, so the variant now holds an ObjectReader newtype over Box<dyn AsyncRead + Send + Sync + Unpin> with the same read_all() surface. The single production construction site (set_disk transition upload) and the two engine-side consumers were adjusted.
- api_list/api_remove used ecstore's storage_api_contracts / object_api types; api_list now imports BucketInfo from rustfs-storage-api directly, and api_remove uses the client's own transition_api::ObjectInfo (only .name/.version_id were read; the error-path bucket name is now threaded as a parameter instead of read from the deleted objects).
- the api_put_object_streaming regression tests built a GetObjectReader by hand; they now wrap the duplex stream in ObjectReader::new.
Guard updates: the s3s footprint ratchet gains an ecstore-scoped counter (42 files, shrink-only, per rustfs/backlog#1842), the ecstore module-lint-blanket register follows the moved files into crates/s3-client so the blanket ratchet keeps covering them, the logging guardrail path pin follows transition_api.rs, and the ::other(format!) baseline is regenerated (moved call sites left ecstore).
Verification: cargo check -p rustfs-s3-client -p rustfs-ecstore; cargo nextest run -p rustfs-s3-client (43 passed) and -p rustfs-ecstore (4515/4523; the 8 failures reproduce identically on pristine origin/main on the same machine); cargo clippy --all-targets; scripts/check_layer_dependencies.sh, check_architecture_migration_rules.sh, check_s3s_footprint.sh, check_logging_guardrails.sh, check_error_other_format_ratchet.sh, check_doc_paths.sh, check_ci_paths_sync.sh all pass.
* fix(ecstore): fence pool metadata replica updates
* fix(ecstore): block decommission on unsafe pool metadata
* fix(ecstore): block writes after pool metadata save errors
* fix(ecstore): latch pool metadata writes before await
Replace every bare `#[allow(dead_code)]` in ecstore with either a deletion or a per-item allow carrying a `reason`. Blanket allows at module, struct, and impl level silence the lint for future members too, so each is narrowed to the members that are actually dead.
Delete the dead cluster in `config/heal.rs` (`Config`, its three methods, `RUSTFS_BITROT_CYCLE_IN_MONTHS`, `parse_bitrot_config`) rather than annotate it: it has no callers and is unreachable outside the crate, and `parse_bitrot_config` would panic on its disabled path via `Duration::from_secs_f64(-1.0)`. `DEFAULT_KVS` stays, since the config registry uses it.
Correct two `reason` strings on `Checksum::new` and `PutObjReader::md5_current_hex_string`, which are methods but carried a field-only rationale.
Refs backlog#1823
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Removing the blanket exposes twenty-five items across tier, notification and rebalance. Only eight are deleted — the lowest ratio of this burn-down so far, and the reason is that these subsystems carry heavy test coverage, so the blanket was mostly hiding test-only seams rather than dead weight.
Deleted:
- crates/ecstore/src/services/tier/warm_backend_s3sdk.rs entirely (200 lines). Its WarmBackendS3 is never constructed; the type of the same name in warm_backend_s3.rs is the live one, wrapped by the Azure backend. Two implementations of one S3 warm backend, one of them never wired.
- TierConfigMgr::begin_publish_transition and publish_candidate_inner, thin wrappers whose _with_allowed_mutation_blocks siblings carry every real caller, plus retire_driver.
- The GCS backend's MAX_MULTIPART_PUT_OBJECT_SIZE, MAX_PARTS_COUNT and MIN_PART_SIZE, and its write-only storage_class field.
- mark_started_rebalance_pools_stopped and the RStats alias.
Two deletions were withdrawn after a per-name grep, both because of an inference rather than a check:
AsyncBatchProcessor::new was deleted on the strength of grepping only BATCH_PROCESSOR_OPERATION_CUSTOM, whose two hits are its definition and its use inside new. That looked like a self-contained dead pair; new in fact has seven test callers. The warning listed both items, and only one of them was actually checked.
Deleting the two dead publish wrappers then revealed a second layer — publish_candidate_owned, remove_and_save_with, clear_and_save_with, save_tiering_config_if_current. These are not dead: publish_candidate, their caller, is #[cfg(test)], so a callee that lives in the main body has no caller in the lib build and a live one in the test build. rustc reports the roots of a dead subgraph, and the next layer down can have a different character, so each layer needs its own grep.
Kept with allows: the tier mutation-intent record helpers (asserted by store::init tests), affected_targets, tier_object_blocks_target_rebind, the rebalance snapshot and retry-wait helpers, notification_sys's tier_config_reload_worker_active and call_peer_with_timeout, and active_operation_lease_count, whose only caller sits behind #[cfg(feature = "test-util")].
Also kept, with a module note rather than removal: the ecstore-side EventNotifier. All four of its methods are unreachable and init_bucket_targets logs that it is a no-op in this build; the working stack is rustfs-notify, whose own EventNotifier drives bucket configuration. Removing it means also retiring the InstanceContext slot that holds it (backlog#939 Phase 5), which belongs in its own PR.
Worth a separate issue: MAX_MULTIPART_PUT_OBJECT_SIZE, MAX_PARTS_COUNT and MIN_PART_SIZE are declared independently in eight warm-backend files plus client/constants.rs. Only the GCS copies were dead; the other seven backends each use their own.
Verification, four lanes warning-free: default, --tests, --features rio-v2 --tests, --features test-util --tests. cargo nextest run -p rustfs-ecstore 4041 passed; clippy --lib --tests -D warnings clean; make pre-commit exit 0.
Ref rustfs/backlog#1823 (step 2).
* perf(ecstore): memoize bucket-incarnation fence validation under lifecycle read-lock coverage
The PUT commit fence from #5648 validated the bucket incarnation with an uncached read (a distributed metadata-transaction read lock plus an EC quorum read of bucket metadata) on every PUT commit. Under 64-concurrency 4KiB PUT load this adds two quorum round-trips per PUT and the resulting lock-manager pressure produced ~1,000 client-visible 'Lock acquisition timeout' failures per 5-minute window (see rustfs/backlog#1776).
Memoize the validation per node while lifecycle read-lock coverage is continuous: bucket deletion/recreation requires the lifecycle WRITE lock, so while at least one read guard on this node has been held continuously the incarnation cannot have changed. The first fenced PUT in a coverage window performs the exact authoritative disk validation as before; overlapping PUTs reuse its result. The memo clears when the node's last guard drops or any guard observes a lost lock, so the next PUT revalidates from disk. Fence semantics are unchanged; only the redundant re-validations under continuous coverage are elided.
Also right-size the s3s footprint ratchet baselines: -1 s3_error! line from this change's error-path consolidation, and +1 s3s-importing file inherited from #5763 (crates/obs/src/telemetry/filter.rs) which landed on main without the baseline bump.
* fix(ecstore): carry the bucket fence registry through the rebalance test store
The rebalance entry test constructor landed on main after this branch was cut and needs the new field.
* fix: address rc.1 release blockers
* fix: route release guards through architecture boundaries
* fix: close remaining rc.1 regression gaps
* refactor: group multipart listing options
* fix: resolve rc.1 CI regressions
* fix(ecstore): keep bucket-config writes off the caller's stack
A bucket-config write nests incarnation resolution (which can drive legacy
migration and a peer fan-out), a full metadata load, and `save` — itself an
object PUT that pulls in the whole erasure write path. Every request that
mutates bucket config is already several futures deep, so inlining all of
that into one state machine overflows the 2MiB worker stack in debug builds.
Two CI lanes aborted with SIGABRT on this:
ILM Integration (serial)
rustfs app::lifecycle_transition_api_test::
compensation_driven_complete_multipart_upload_still_transitions
Test and Lint (swift)
rustfs-protocols::swift_metadata_persistence::
swift_metadata_writes_are_durable
Neither test file is touched by this branch and both lanes are green on
main. Stack-pointer probing showed ~780KiB consumed between
`metadata_sys::update` and the config read alone, with single hops of
363KiB (`update` -> `acquire_config_write_guard_for_incarnation`), 125KiB
and 105KiB.
Box the deep sub-futures on both read-modify-write paths (`update` /
`update_checked` and `update_config_with` / `update_config_with_checked`)
so each guard's own state machine stays small. Behaviour is unchanged;
`update` -> guard drops to 253KiB and both tests pass on the default stack.
* fix(lifecycle): unbreak restore under the bucket generation fence
The ILM lane aborted on a stack overflow before reaching these, so they
were never reported; with that fixed, four restore tests fail. All four
are green on main and none of their test files are touched by this branch.
1. RestoreObject and ListMultipartUploads hard-required
`opts.expected_bucket_incarnation_id`, but `apply_bucket_generation_guard`
deliberately leaves it unset when no guard extension is present — only the
S3 access layer installs one. Every direct caller therefore got
`InternalError: ... bucket generation guard is missing`. Resolve the
current generation instead, the way the copy path already does. The fence
is unaffected: RestoreObject still re-reads the incarnation from disk and
compares before admitting the restore, and the multipart listing is
filtered by the value it resolves.
2. `restore_expiry_snapshot_matches` (new on this branch) rejected every
restored-copy expiry whose `restore_expires` had not already elapsed.
Whether the restored copy is due to expire is the ILM evaluator's
decision, made when it emitted DeleteRestoredAction; re-deriving it in
the set layer only adds a way for a legitimate action to be rejected.
The stale-event risk it appears to guard is already covered by the
surrounding snapshot match — a re-restore rewrites `restore_expires`,
so a replayed event fails the equality check. Drop the clause; the
fifteen identity clauses are unchanged.
Fixed:
rustfs app::lifecycle_transition_api_test::
restore_object_usecase_accepts_exactly_one_of_two_concurrent_restores
restore_object_usecase_completes_suspended_null_version_in_place
restore_object_usecase_reports_ongoing_conflict
rustfs-scanner::lifecycle_integration_test serial_tests::
test_restore_chain_local_read_expiry_keeps_remote_and_allows_re_restore
Verification: the CI ILM lane filter now runs 53/53 green locally.
* chore: address review follow-ups on this branch
Four items from the adversarial review that were still open.
- Restore the assertion `test_bucket_replication_replayed_delete_marker_
preserves_source_mtime_without_source_restart` is named for. The branch
had replaced the backlog#867 mtime check with `assert_replication_
converged`, which any successful replication satisfies, and deleted the
two helpers it needed — so the regression the test exists to catch would
now pass. This matters here specifically because the branch changes the
flag feeding `replication_delete_remove_options` and routes replay
through a new file and ordering.
- Drop `read_config_no_lock_preserve_empty`: zero production callers (the
one real consumer calls the `_with_metadata` variant directly). Its test
stanza now exercises that variant, so the coverage moves to live code
rather than being deleted.
- Revert the `bytesize` bump. It is a no-op: `Cargo.lock` already pinned
2.7.0 before this branch and is untouched, so the caret range already
resolved there. Nothing in the diff uses the crate.
- Split the AGENTS.md "Adversarial Validation" policy change out of this
branch. The edit is defensible on its own, but it relaxes the review gate
that this branch has to pass, so it should land as its own PR reviewed on
its own merits rather than bundled with the change that benefits from it.
The reverted hunks are unchanged and ready to re-apply.
Not changed, deliberately: the missing-sidecar path still fails closed.
`missing_bucket_incarnation_sidecar_for_new_metadata_fails_closed` pins
that on purpose, and serving a non-authoritative Object Lock state would
be the wrong trade. The residual concern stands and is recorded in review
— a crash between the two writes in `persist_new_and_set` leaves the
bucket unloadable until DeleteBucket+CreateBucket, and the repair branches
in `migrate_legacy_metadata` and `make_bucket` are unreachable dead code
for that case. Resolving it needs the read path and the (transaction-lock
holding) repair path to be separated, which is more than a follow-up edit.
* test(ci): serialize the new bucket-incarnation tests
The five tests this branch adds around the incarnation / lifecycle fence
drive `init_bucket_metadata_sys` and `bucket_metadata_sys_of` — process-global
OnceLock state that `serial_test`'s `#[serial]` cannot protect across
nextest's process boundary — and they delete+recreate buckets, the shape that
raced into InsufficientWriteQuorum in backlog#937.
Add them to the `ecstore-serial-flaky` group in both the default and ci
profiles (nextest evaluates a named profile's own overrides list, so the
ci mirror is required). Preventive serialization only, no retries.
Not a full fix for the review comment: `bucket_delete_waits_for_config_
mutation_fence` still proves liveness with a fixed 200ms sleep plus
`assert!(!delete.is_finished())`. Turning that into readiness polling needs
a production-side signal to wait on — asserting "still blocked" is inherently
a negative. Serializing the group removes the parallel-load pressure that
makes the window fragile; the sleep itself is left for a follow-up.
* test(ecstore): pin that a drained bucket is actually deletable
`DeleteBucket`'s emptiness check is `has_xlmeta_files`, a raw scan of the
bucket directory on local disks — not an S3-level listing. So "the client
drained the bucket" and "the bucket is deletable" are two different
contracts, and only the first one was covered.
That gap is what the `S3 Implemented Tests` lane is failing on: 219 cases,
all `BucketNotEmpty` on `nuke_prefixed_buckets`, with every test body
passing. The first one is `test_versioning_obj_suspend_versions`, reported
by pytest as PASSED followed by ERROR at teardown.
Add the missing assertion for the unversioned path: PUT, client DELETE,
then assert no `xl.meta` survives and `DeleteBucket` succeeds. It passes —
which is itself a result: the plain delete path leaves no residue, so the
s3-tests failure is not there.
The versioning-suspended path is the remaining suspect (the client DELETE
leaves a null delete marker, and draining means purging it by
`versionId=null`). It is not covered here: `BucketVersioningSys` resolves
through the ambient `get_bucket_metadata_sys()` OnceLock, which this unit
env cannot set, so the bucket never actually reports as suspended. That
repro belongs at the e2e layer where a real server owns the versioning
state.
* fix(ecstore): let an explicit null-version delete purge its delete marker
Root cause of the `S3 Implemented Tests` lane: 219 cases, all
`BucketNotEmpty` on `nuke_prefixed_buckets`, every test body passing.
On a versioning-suspended bucket a client DELETE leaves a null delete
marker — correct S3 semantics, and an `xl.meta` on disk. Draining the
bucket therefore means purging that marker as `?versionId=null`, which is
what `nuke_bucket` does before `DeleteBucket`. That purge was rejected:
explicit null-version purge of the null delete marker must succeed,
got [Some(MethodNotAllowed)]
so the marker survived, and `DeleteBucket`'s emptiness check — a raw
`has_xlmeta_files` scan of the bucket directory, not an S3 listing — kept
reporting the bucket as non-empty.
The two sides of the version comparison in the batch delete loop are in
different namespaces. `goi.version_id` is the client-facing identity, where
`from_file_info` synthesizes `Some(Uuid::nil())` for a null version on a
versioned *or versioning-suspended* bucket. `version_id` is the storage
identity, where `delete_file_info_version_id` maps an explicit
`?versionId=null` to `None`. Comparing them raw makes the purge look like a
version mismatch, so `explicit_delete_marker` is false and the
`MethodNotAllowed` from the lookup is recorded as a delete failure.
This only became reachable on this branch: previously `check_opts` did not
carry `dobj.version_id`, so `set_disk_delete_creates_delete_marker` was
true, `object_lock_check_required` was false, and the lookup that produces
`MethodNotAllowed` never ran. Adding the version id to `check_opts` lit up
a comparison that was already wrong.
Normalize both sides through `delete_file_info_version_id`.
The regression test injects a real Suspended bucket-config snapshot — the
delete path reads versioned/suspended from that snapshot, not from `opts`,
so without it `from_file_info` never synthesizes the null version id and
the branch is not reached. Mutation-checked: restoring the raw comparison
fails the test with the exact `MethodNotAllowed` above.
* fix(app): drop the now-needless struct update
Reverting `crates/replication` to main removed the extra `MrfReplicateEntry`
fields, so this literal specifies every field again and `..Default::default()`
trips `clippy::needless_update` under `-D warnings`.
Caught by CI, not locally: I had run `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`,
which does not see clippy-only lints. Ran `cargo clippy --workspace
--all-targets -- -D warnings` here — clean.
* test(e2e): assert the fresh-volume classification
four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh only started the cluster and
listed buckets — no assertion, so any classification path that still permits
startup left it green without proving the pre-created empty `.minio.sys`
directories were treated as fresh volumes.
Pin what that classification actually leaves behind: no buckets adopted into
the namespace, `.rustfs.sys/format.json` written on every drive, and the empty
legacy directory left untouched rather than migrated into.
* fix(bucket): apply the requested Object Lock to existing buckets
Site replication replays make-with-versioning against the destination,
carrying the source's `lockEnabled`. When the destination bucket already
exists it takes `force_create`, and the whole option-application block was
gated on `confirmed_missing` — so the call returned success while the replica
stayed unlocked. Replicated versions could then be deleted without the
retention the source enforces.
Object Lock enable is one-way, so applying it to an existing bucket is safe:
move it out of the creation-only gate, keeping `created` and versioning-only
options creation-scoped as before.
An existing authoritative bucket takes the `cache_bucket_metadata_in` branch,
which only caches, so the enable would have been dropped on restart. Persist
instead when the enable actually changed something.
Mutation-checked: restoring the creation-only gate fails the new
`force_create_enables_object_lock_on_an_existing_bucket` with "Object Lock
must be enabled on the existing bucket".
cargo nextest run -p rustfs-ecstore --lib: 3633 passed.
* fix(ecstore): box the generation-checked config mutation paths too
The earlier stack fix boxed `update` and `delete`, but an authorized
bucket-config mutation carrying an incarnation takes `update_if_incarnation`
/ `delete_if_incarnation` instead — which were still inlining the whole
resolve/load/save chain into an already-deep request future. Same overflow,
sibling path.
* fix(restore): keep the nil-version normalization the strip removed
Reverting the replication subsystem to main took `set_disk/replication.rs`
with it, but one line in that file was this branch's own fix rather than
replication work:
- self.version_id.filter(|v| !v.is_nil()) == fi.version_id.filter(|v| !v.is_nil())
+ self.version_id == fi.version_id
For a versioning-suspended object the expected version is `Some(Uuid::nil())`
while the read-back `FileInfo` carries `None`, so the raw compare reports
every suspended restore as "restored object changed before restore metadata
finalization" and the copy-back never commits. Same nil-vs-None mismatch as
the null delete-marker purge fixed earlier on this branch.
Caught by `Test and Lint (rio-v2)`, not by my local runs: the test lives in
`transition_commit_failure_tests`, gated behind `feature = "test-util"`, so
the 3633-test suite I had been running never included it. Re-ran with
`--features rio-v2,test-util`: 3722 passed.
Zhengchao An