Bring the dormant Resource::Kms variant to life: arn:aws:kms:::key/<key_id>
patterns (empty-account form, wildcards allowed in the id, alias/<name>
reserved as parse-only) now parse, validate, serialize back, and are matched
by KMS statements against the requested key id carried in Args::object.
Statements without KMS resources keep the legacy match-every-key behaviour,
as do call sites that pass no key resource, so nothing changes until the
admin/SSE authorization paths start passing key ids.
Statement validation rejects KMS resources on non-KMS statements, and bucket
policy validation rejects KMS actions and resources outright while stored
policies keep deserializing; evaluation skips pure-KMS bucket policy
statements with a warning. A kms:Decrypt action is added for the upcoming
SSE-KMS read path.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1582 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
* feat(kms): add key lifecycle operations to the backend contract
Add enable_key/disable_key/rotate_key to KmsBackend with conservative
defaults returning the typed UnsupportedCapability error, mirroring
remove_expired_key. KmsManager gains matching pass-through methods and
drops cached key metadata after every successful state mutation so the
next describe observes backend truth. The local backend overrides
enable/disable, delegating to its state-machine-gated client methods;
rotation stays rejected, matching its advertised capabilities. New
dedicated policy actions kms:EnableKey and kms:DisableKey complete the
KMS action taxonomy alongside the existing kms:RotateKey.
* feat(admin): add KMS key enable/disable/rotate endpoints
POST /v3/kms/keys/enable, /v3/kms/keys/disable and /v3/kms/keys/rotate,
following the existing /v3/kms/keys handler conventions: key_id body
with keyId query fallback, {success, message, key_id, key_metadata}
responses, and 503 JSON while the KMS service is absent. Error mapping
keeps InvalidOperation/ValidationError at 400 like the sibling handlers
and surfaces UnsupportedCapability as 501 so a backend capability gap is
never mistaken for a missing key. Existing /v3/kms/keys handlers are
untouched apart from a visibility change on a private query helper.
* feat(kms): gate scheduled key deletion on bucket encryption references
Implement the DeletionReferenceChecker seam left by the deletion worker:
before any material is destroyed, every bucket's SSE configuration is
checked for a default KMS key reference and a hit blocks the removal.
The gate fails closed - an unpublished object store, a failed bucket
listing or an unreadable per-bucket encryption config all report a
blocking reference - because destroying key material is irreversible
while a blocked removal is simply retried on the next sweep. Registered
during init_kms_system before the service can start, so every worker
spawn observes it. Storage access goes through a new kms section of the
root storage facade.
* fix(policy): quantify negated string conditions per value
ForAllValues:/ForAnyValue: negated string operators computed the positive
quantified match and then negated the aggregate. That yields NOT(all match)
and NOT(any match), which is the semantics of the *other* quantifier, so
ForAllValues:StringNotEquals and ForAnyValue:StringNotEquals were exactly
transposed. The same applied to StringNotEqualsIgnoreCase, StringNotLike,
ArnNotEquals and ArnNotLike.
Introduce an explicit Quantifier and push negation into the per-value
predicate for the qualified forms, so ForAllValues requires every request
value to satisfy the operator and ForAnyValue requires at least one.
Unqualified operators keep negating the aggregate, preserving AWS
single-valued-key semantics. Absent keys now follow AWS: ForAllValues is
vacuously satisfied, ForAnyValue is not.
A request value set that is fully contained in or fully disjoint from the
policy set cannot distinguish the two quantifiers, which is why the existing
cases missed this; the new tests use partially overlapping sets.
* fix(auth): keep request headers out of server-derived condition keys
get_condition_values folded every remaining request header into the policy
condition map. HeaderMap lowercases header names, and the server-derived keys
userid, username, principaltype, versionid and signatureversion are lowercase
too, so a header of the same name collided with them. The collision branch used
extend(), and non-quantified string operators match if ANY value in the vector
matches, so sending `userid: admin` was enough to satisfy a condition on
aws:userid. The jwt:/ldap: claim keys were reachable the same way whenever the
credential carried no such claim.
groups was worse than an append: the header loop ran before the cred.groups
block, which is gated on !args.contains_key("groups"), so a `groups:` header
both injected a value and suppressed the credential's real group list.
Resolve claims and group membership before merging headers, then skip any header
naming a key the server already derived or a well-known identity/context key.
The reserved set comes from KeyName so it tracks the key registry; s3:x-amz-*
keys stay mergeable because they mirror request headers by design.
* fix(access): gate the ListBucketVersions fallback on public-access checks
An anonymous request for ListObjectVersions that the bucket policy does not
grant directly falls back to re-checking the grant as s3:ListBucket. That
fallback returned Ok(()) straight away, skipping the two gates the direct grant
passes through: deny_anonymous_table_data_plane_if_needed and the
RestrictPublicBuckets check on the bucket's public-access block.
So a bucket whose policy allows anonymous s3:ListBucket kept serving anonymous
version listings after an operator enabled RestrictPublicBuckets, even though
the equivalent GetObject was correctly denied.
Fold the fallback into policy_allowed so both routes reach the same gates.
* fix(ftps): authorize MKD against the CreateBucket boundary
FTPS MKD creates a bucket but ran no authorization check, so any principal that
could open an FTPS session could create buckets regardless of policy. Every
other operation in this driver authorizes first — LIST, RETR, STOR, DELE and
RMD all call authorize_operation — and the WebDAV gateway checks
S3Action::CreateBucket on the equivalent path.
Add the matching check so MKD clears the same boundary as an S3 CreateBucket.
Statement equality drives merge/dedup of policy statements. Omitting NotResource let semantically-distinct statements be treated as duplicates and dropped, which can shrink Deny coverage and escalate privileges. Compare not_resources too and add regression tests.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1028
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