* fix(site-replication): keep reverse direction after config broadcast
`site-repl-*` rules encode the sender's outbound direction: their
destination ARN names the receiver. `apply_bucket_meta_item` wrote an
incoming rule set verbatim over the receiver's, leaving the receiver with
a rule whose ARN is its own deployment ID. `reconcile_site_replication_bucket_targets`
skips the local peer, so no bucket target can back that ARN and every
object was dropped; the follow-up call reconciled targets only, so
nothing rebuilt the lost reverse rule. Replication went one-directional
after any PutBucketReplication broadcast — the console's Save button,
`mc replicate import`, a metadata import, or `/site-replication/repair`.
Only operator-authored rules now travel between sites; each site owns its
`site-repl-*` rules and rebuilds them from the current peer set.
Four defects kept that invisible or unrecoverable:
- `update_all_targets` discarded target-client build errors silently, and
`replicate_object` logged the resulting missing-target drop at debug
while every other failure there logs at error. Both now report.
- `site_replication_rule_complete` never checked that a rule's
destination named a remote site, so two sites holding identical
configs — the post-clobber state — passed as in sync.
- `update_service_account` cannot rewrite `parent_user`, and IAM records
encrypted with a previous root secret decode as "no such account".
Startup now reconciles the account, reseeding from the secret every
site-replication bucket target already stores, and refuses the
delete-then-create sequence when the parent cannot back an account.
Bucket rules are reconciled too, so an already-broken site heals on
upgrade.
- A joined site never verified it could reach the initiator, whose
endpoint is derived from the Host header of the admin request that
created the topology. The join now probes each peer and reports through
`initial_sync_error_message`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(site-replication): report unreachable targets and reconcile on a timer
Rule-shape checking cannot see an unreachable peer. A `site-repl-*` rule
can be perfectly formed while the endpoint recorded for its peer is one
this site cannot reach: `update_all_targets` then builds no client and
`replicate_object` drops every object against that ARN, yet the rule set
still reads as correct and the bucket reports in sync.
Each site now reports whether all of its `site-repl-*` rules resolve to a
live target (`SRBucketInfo.replicationTargetsOnline`, read from the
already-resolved client map so the status path stays cheap), and the
status aggregation treats an offline report as a mismatch. The field is
additive and optional: peers that omit it are "unknown", never a fault,
so a mixed-version topology does not flip every bucket to out of sync.
The reconcilers also run on a 10-minute timer instead of at startup only,
so drift is repaired without waiting for a restart. Both are no-ops when
the wiring already matches — the bucket pass compares serialized targets
and the rule set before writing. The tick takes the site-replication
lifecycle lock with a non-blocking try_acquire and skips the round when
an add/remove/endpoint-refresh holds it: those run in phases, and
rebuilding rules between two of them would resurrect what the operation
just tore down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(site-replication): invert reconcile dependency to satisfy layers
`startup_services.rs` sits in the infra layer and was calling the
reconcilers in `admin::handlers::site_replication`, which is interface —
a reverse dependency that check_layer_dependencies.sh rejects.
Moving the reconcilers down is not viable in this change: they rest on
the site-replication state core (`SiteReplicationState` alone has 107
in-file uses, `load_site_replication_state` 38, the state lock 33), so
relocating it would move ~2000 lines and ~200 call sites through a
bug-fix PR.
Invert the direction instead. A new infra module owns the contract and
the schedule; the admin layer registers its reconciler from
`register_site_replication_route`, which runs while the admin router is
built — `init_startup_http_servers` awaits that before
`init_startup_runtime_services` reconciles, so the hook is always
installed in time. No logic moves and no baseline entry is added: the
dependency genuinely reverses.
The lifecycle guard now wraps both reconcilers in one round rather than
each separately, closing the window between them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(site-replication): harden reconcile per review feedback
Addresses the automated review on #5292.
Security: secret recovery from bucket targets accepted any target carrying
the `site-replicator-0` access key. Bucket targets are writable by anyone
holding `admin:SetBucketTarget`, so such a principal could plant a secret
and have reconciliation recreate the broadly privileged replication
account with it. A target must now name a peer in the persisted state and
point at that peer's recorded endpoint, disagreeing targets abort the
recovery, and only missing/unreadable-account errors may trigger it at
all — a transient store failure no longer rewrites a live account.
Durability: the repair no longer deletes before creating. A readable
account is rebound in place through a new `parent_user` field on
`UpdateServiceAccountOpts`, gated to `site-replicator-0` under
`allow_site_replicator_account` exactly as the account itself is. The
parent also lives in the session-token claims, and
`prepare_service_account_auth` denies the account when the two disagree,
so both move together.
Availability: the reconcile scheduler no longer requires an inline IAM
bootstrap. Deferred IAM recovers in the background with no callback into
the scheduler, which left a recovered node with self-pointing rules until
the next restart. It now starts unconditionally and returns early while
IAM or the object store are unavailable. Its first pass runs inside the
task, so walking every bucket no longer delays startup.
Correctness: an endpoint refresh commits bucket targets and peer state in
separate steps without holding the lifecycle lock, so a tick landing
between them rewrote targets from the stale endpoint; the reconciler now
also skips while any pending marker is set. Rule repair preserves an
operator-authored `role` and clears only sender-owned site-replication
ARNs, matching the merge path.
Hot path: the per-object missing-target message returns to debug. The
condition is reported once per bucket per reconcile pass instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
* Change Rust toolchain channel to stable
Signed-off-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
* style: apply clippy --fix and cargo fix lint suggestions
Run `cargo clippy --fix --all-targets --all-features` and
`cargo fix --lib --all-targets` across the workspace, then resolve the
remaining warnings by hand:
- collapse needless borrows in `format!` args, prefer `?` over explicit
early returns, and use `.values()` / `.flatten()` iterator adapters
- rewrite the `Md5` scan loop via `manual_flatten` and re-indent the
`select!` macro body (rustfmt skips macro interiors)
- annotate the intentional dead-code `Md5` inherent methods (constructed
only by the test factory) with `#[allow(dead_code)]`
Behavior is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): allow loopback replication targets under an explicit test opt-in
Commit 5c7c757a3 (#4712) activated the previously-dormant replication e2e
suite (they had never run anywhere). All 9 fast tests then failed on main
because the SSRF egress guard rejects the 127.0.0.1 targets the e2e harness
configures: `target endpoint is not allowed: outbound URL host '127.0.0.1'
is not allowed: loopback address`. The whole harness runs on loopback, so
every replication test hit this before reaching its actual assertion.
Loopback is a genuine SSRF vector and must stay rejected in production, so
this does not relax the guard. Instead `validate_replication_target_endpoint`
gains an off-by-default opt-in (`RUSTFS_REPLICATION_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_TARGET`)
that re-enables loopback targets (127.0.0.1 / ::1 / localhost) for single-host
multi-instance dev and the e2e harness. Private addresses stay unconditionally
allowed as before; the opt-in does not widen into link-local or the cloud
metadata endpoint. The e2e harness sets the env for every server it spawns
(single-node and cluster paths), overridable via extra_env.
Verified end-to-end: all 9 previously-failing replication_extension_test
smoke tests pass against a locally built binary. New unit tests in
bucket_target_sys pin the matrix — public/private always allowed, loopback
gated on the opt-in in both IP and hostname forms, and metadata/link-local
still rejected even with the opt-in on.
Refs: backlog#1147
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* test(replication): rename optin -> opt_in to satisfy typos check
Pure rename of three unit-test function names; no behaviour change.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(scanner): scope long walk timeouts
* fix(scanner): bound IAM config walks
---------
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
fix(replication): don't silently swallow resync status persistence failure (backlog#799 B23)
After a resync computes a new replication status, it persists it via
`put_object_metadata` but discarded the `Err` case (`if let Ok(u) = ...`). A
failure left the object's on-disk replication status disagreeing with the resync
result with no signal at all. Log the failure at warn level instead.
Refs backlog#799 (B23), tracked in rustfs/backlog#863.
The resync result verification HEADed the target after replicating and counted
the outcome with inverted error handling:
- for a delete marker, ANY HEAD error (timeout, 5xx, auth, malformed) was
counted as replicated (success);
- for a versioned object against an AWS-style target, HEAD was sent with the
RustFS UUID versionId, which AWS rejects with 400, so a well-replicated
object was counted as failed.
Classify the error before counting:
- delete marker: only a definitive 404/NoSuchKey or 405/MethodNotAllowed
confirms the marker propagated (`is_retryable_delete_replication_head_error`
== false); any retryable/ambiguous error now counts as failed;
- versioned object with a version-id-format rejection: re-verify via
`head_object_fallback` (versionId-less HEAD) before deciding — present ->
replicated, absent/error -> failed;
- all other errors: failed, as before.
Reuses the existing, unit-tested classifier helpers. Verified against the
existing resyncer suite (24 tests).
Refs backlog#799 (B13).
During resync against an AWS-style target that rejects RustFS UUID versionIds,
the code retries HEAD without a versionId and compares ETags. On a match it set
`replication_action = None` ("already in sync, nothing to copy") but did not
return, so control fell through to `if replication_action != ReplicationAction::All`
— a branch meant only for the unsupported metadata-only case — and stamped the
object FAILED with "metadata-only replication is not implemented". The target
already held an identical object, yet the source recorded FAILED forever, so
AWS-style targets never converged and the MRF kept re-queuing.
Handle `ReplicationAction::None` explicitly before that branch: record it as
Completed (with the resync timestamp/`replication_resynced` bookkeeping for
ExistingObject + reset_id, mirroring the HEAD-success None path) and return.
Only `ReplicationAction::Metadata` now takes the metadata-unsupported failure
branch; `All` still proceeds to the copy. This path is the only way `None`
reaches that point (the HEAD-success None case already returns earlier).
Refs backlog#799 (B11).
* fix(core-storage): fix critical correctness defects from core-storage audit
Fixes verified defects found in a deep audit of the core storage path
(erasure coding, disk persistence, quorum, heal, replication resync):
- ecstore/disk: rewrite live xl.meta atomically (temp+rename) in
delete_versions_internal and write_metadata instead of in-place
truncate, which exposed torn metadata to concurrent readers and
crashes on the DeleteObjects hot path
- ecstore/erasure: allow heal to reconstruct from exactly data_shards
bitrot-verified sources; requiring data_shards+1 made objects
permanently unhealable after losing parity_shards disks
- ecstore/set_disk: direct-memory inline GET applied the erasure
distribution permutation twice (shuffled inputs re-indexed through
distribution), concatenating wrong shards into the response body in
degraded reads; collect from canonical disk-ordered inputs
- ecstore/set_disk: heal now preserves the committed inline layout
instead of recomputing it with a hardcoded unversioned threshold,
which split quorum identity of healed replicas and caused endless
re-heal churn
- ecstore/replication: resync results channel switched from
broadcast(1) to mpsc; a lagged broadcast receiver ended the stats
collector and every subsequent failure went uncounted, letting
failed resyncs be marked completed
- ecstore/replication: ignore an empty persisted resync checkpoint;
resuming with one skipped every object and marked the resync
completed without replicating anything
- ecstore/replication: fix inverted not-found error classification in
replicate_object/replicate_delete logging paths
- ecstore/erasure: guard decode paths against zero block_size or
data_shards from corrupt on-disk metadata (divide-by-zero panic)
- ecstore/disk: os::read_dir no longer consumes the entry limit on
entries it does not return (is_empty_dir misjudgment); create_file
opens with O_TRUNC to avoid stale trailing bytes
- filemeta: treat Some(nil) version id as a null version in
matches_not_strict; disk-loaded headers never store None, so the
mod_time quorum guard for unversioned overwrites never fired and an
interrupted overwrite could displace the committed version in merge
- filemeta: fix msgpack skip lengths for fixext (missed the ext type
byte) and ext16/32 (over-skipped) unknown fields
- filemeta: return FileCorrupt instead of usize underflow when
xl.meta is truncated inside the CRC trailer
- filemeta: surface delete-marker insertion failure in delete_version
instead of reporting success when the data dir is shared
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(replication): drop duplicate cfg(test) etag import from boundary module
The test module already imports content_matches_by_etag locally, so the
top-level cfg(test) import is unused under -D warnings and fails clippy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(site-replication): Add Docker Compose setup for site replication testing
- Fixed the site replication flag issue and resolved the replication storm.
- Introduced a new directory for site replication tests with Docker Compose.
- Created `docker-compose.yml` to define three RustFS sites and a setup container.
- Added `README.md` to document the purpose, usage, and test flow of the replication setup.
- Implemented `run-object-flow-check.sh` script to verify object replication across sites.
- Configured health checks and volume permissions for the RustFS containers.
- Enabled customization of access keys, bucket names, and other parameters via environment variables.
* fix
* fix
abdullahnah92