* fix(ecstore): fence pool metadata replica updates
* fix(ecstore): block decommission on unsafe pool metadata
* fix(ecstore): block writes after pool metadata save errors
* fix(ecstore): latch pool metadata writes before await
* fix(scanner): bootstrap pristine usage baseline
* fix(replication): tolerate orphaned resync intents at startup
Since #5215 (1.0.0-beta.12) startup reconciles every pending/started
resync intent in resync.bin against the bucket's configured targets and
aborts the whole server when an intent has no matching target ARN. A
resync whose remote target was later removed leaves exactly such an
orphan on disk, so every later start fails with "accepted replication
resync target ... is not configured" regardless of the binary version.
Skip orphaned intents with a warning instead of failing startup; the
resync routine already settles them to ResyncFailed. Cancel the intent
when its remote target is removed so the orphan is not created again.
Fixes#4784
* fix(replication): cancel removed-target resync under the admission lock
Canceling through this node's cached whole-bucket status map could
persist a map that predates another node's admission, erasing that
node's durable restart intent. Reload resync.bin under the bucket
admission lock, publish the fresh map, and only then mark the removed
target's intent canceled. Two-node regression covers the clobber.
* fix(replication): persist resync status via ETag CAS merge
mark_status, the periodic saver, admission, and removed-target
cancellation all persisted their node's cached whole-bucket map, so any
one node's stale cache could resurrect states another node had already
finalized (a canceled intent flipping back to Pending, an admission
vanishing). All resync.bin writers now go through update_resync_status_cas:
load the freshest document with its ETag, apply a per-target mutation
with staleness and canceled-is-terminal guards re-checked against the
persisted entry, and save conditionally, retrying on concurrent writes.
The periodic saver merges per target, letting terminal states and newer
admissions recorded elsewhere win. Cache convergence stays per-target so
locally running resyncs keep their authoritative progress counters.
Regressions: stale_peer_status_write_cannot_resurrect_canceled_intent
(node B's pre-cancel cache marking its own run Started must not revive
node A's canceled intent) plus unit coverage for the periodic-save merge.
* test(ecstore): rename resync test helper off the guarded contract name
fn resync_target is on the architecture guard's reserved list for
crates/replication operation contracts; the merge-test helper now reads
resync_target_state.
* fix(replication): serialize resync status updates
---------
Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): fence pool metadata replica updates
* fix(ecstore): block decommission on unsafe pool metadata
* fix(ecstore): block writes after pool metadata save errors
* fix(ecstore): latch pool metadata writes before await
* fix(ecstore): persist unresolved decommission entries
* fix(ecstore): type decommission completion result
* fix(ecstore): allow intentional decommission listing signatures under strict clippy
The sftp/swift feature-matrix clippy gates run with -D warnings and
flag the unresolved-entry resolver (large Err payload by design, 8
context parameters) and the decommission listing driver (9 args).
Document why and align with the existing decommission_entry precedent.
cargo fmt --check has been failing since #6410 landed: the merged
decommission import groups in core/pools.rs were not canonical
rustfmt output. Apply formatting verbatim, no code changes.
A single object's SourceChanged during decommission cleanup no longer
cancels the shared worker token and fails the whole pool operation.
Cleanup preflight and source-cleanup outcomes now retry per entry with
bounded attempts and cancellation-aware backoff, applied uniformly to
ordinary versions, delete markers, and tiered copies (removing the
try-once-only branches); every retry re-lists the entry and redoes
version multiset validation before touching the source. Only quorum
loss, unrecoverable system errors, or exceeding a pool-level
SourceChanged exhaustion threshold still fails the decommission, and
exhausted entries never delete their source versions.
Retry attempts, backoff, and deferred/exhausted reasons are logged per
entry for observability. Heavy regression tests spawn on dedicated
32MiB stacks following the existing store-test pattern.
Fixesrustfs/backlog#1913
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
* fix(replication): deny non-owner replication config edits under site replication
Under site replication a user holding only bucket-scoped
s3:PutReplicationConfiguration could rewrite or erase the operator-managed
site-repl-* rules, with the change broadcast to every peer (backlog#1948,
audit A1/P2-17).
- Gate PutBucketReplication/DeleteBucketReplication in the S3 handlers:
when site replication is enabled and the requester is not the owner,
return MinIO-parity XMinioReplicationDenyEdit (HTTP 400). The gate runs
after policy authorization and only on the external S3 path; the
reconciler and peer bucket-meta ingestion are unaffected.
- Defense in depth in the bucket usecase: PUT merges the incoming config
with the stored site-repl-* rules (same merge as peer ingestion) instead
of overwriting verbatim; DELETE keeps the site-repl-* rules and never
garbage-collects a bucket target a surviving site-replication rule still
references.
- Move is_site_replication_rule / merge_incoming_replication_config /
replication_target_arn_deployment_id from the admin site-replication
handler down to rustfs-replication so the app layer can reuse them
without new layering violations.
* fix(replication): scope site-owned rule detection to reconciler-derived rules
The `site-repl-*` prefix alone classified any rule as site-owned, so on a
bucket outside site replication an owner's `site-repl-user` rule survived
DeleteBucketReplication (rule and target kept, success returned). Rule ids
do not reserve that namespace.
A rule is reconciler-owned only when it matches what the reconciler
derives: id `site-repl-<deployment id>` for a current remote site
replication peer and a destination ARN naming that same deployment id.
The S3 put/delete path reads the remote peer set (empty when site
replication is disabled) and keeps exactly those rules; everything else
is operator state the request replaces or deletes. An incoming rule that
claims a current peer's id is dropped so the reconciler rule's id stays
unique. The peer ingestion path and the reconciler keep their prefix
predicate unchanged.
* fix(replication): keep operator rule priorities across site rule merges
Merging stored site-replication rules into a PutBucketReplication body
renumbered every rule 1..n in list order, rewriting the submitted policy:
overlapping same-target rules submitted as priority 5 then 1 became 1
then 2, so the delete-marker-disabled rule won the replication decision.
The reconciler and the peer-removal prune renumbered the same way.
Operator priorities now stay verbatim everywhere; only the reconciler's
derived rules move, to the lowest priorities no operator rule uses, via
one pure helper shared by the S3 edit merge, the peer ingestion merge,
the reconciler pass and the prune. Being a pure function of the rule
list it is idempotent, so the reconciler's no-op check still holds after
a merged write, and an on-disk config in the historical layout (operator
rules 1..k, site rules k+1..n) yields the same bytes, so nothing is
rewritten on upgrade.
* fix(replication): pass site peer ids into the bucket usecase from the interface layer
The review fix made the bucket usecase read the site-replication peer set
through the admin handlers, an app->interface import the layer guard
rejects. The S3 handlers (interface) now read the peer set and pass it in,
so the usecase stays a pure function of its inputs; a state-read failure
still fails the edit closed, just one layer up.
* fix(replication): classify peer-ingested rules by the derived id/ARN contract
The peer ingestion merge still treated every incoming `site-repl-*` id as
reconciler-owned, so an owner-authored `site-repl-user` rule that the S3
merge now keeps on the editing site was dropped on every peer and the
sites persisted different operator configs.
The ingestion merge now classifies by the same derived contract as the
S3 merge: a rule is the reconciler's only when its `site-repl-<id>` names
the deployment its destination ARN targets and that deployment is a site
of the cluster (the receiver's own id included, since the sender's rule
towards the receiver names it). The reconciler, the peer-removal prune
and the target-online probe switch from the id prefix to the derived
shape as well, so the rule survives their passes too; rules in the
derived shape that name a removed peer or this site are still rebuilt
away.
Regression: a PutBucketReplication merged on site A and ingested on
site B keeps `site-repl-user` on both and the operator rule sets agree.
* fix(replication): keep an operator role target through site rule merges
The S3 and peer-ingestion merges cleared `Role` whenever it parsed as a
site-replication ARN, which an owner-submitted remote target with an
empty region (`arn:minio:replication::<id>:<bucket>`) also does. The
merged config then selected the rule destination ARNs instead of the
validated role target.
Only a role naming a current site of the cluster is the holder's
identity (the reconciler's per-peer target lookup reads it); every other
role passed target validation and stays. The reconciler's repair pass
applies the same rule.
Regression: an owner role target survives both merges and
`filter_target_arns` / `replication_target_arns` select it; a role naming
a current peer is still cleared.
* fix(replication): gate operator priority preservation on a peer contract probe
Keeping operator rule priorities verbatim is not rolling-upgrade safe: a
peer still running the pre-contract code renumbers every rule 1..n in
list order on ingest and on each reconciler pass, so an upgraded site
broadcasting `5,1` leaves that peer on `1,2` — which can select the
other overlapping rule — and the sites never reconverge.
Operator rules now merge under an explicit contract:
- `OperatorRuleContract::Derived`: site rules are the derived id/ARN
shape, operator priorities stay verbatim (the behavior of the previous
commits).
- `OperatorRuleContract::Legacy`: byte-for-byte what a pre-contract peer
does — `site-repl-*` ids are all site rules, a site-replication-shaped
`Role` is dropped, every rule is renumbered 1..n in list order. The S3
merge additionally lists the operator rules in priority order first,
so the renumbering keeps their relative order and the winning rule per
target is the one the operator submitted.
The S3 PutBucketReplication/DeleteBucketReplication path probes every
remote peer through the existing `peer/edit-capabilities` endpoint
(capability `derived-rule-contract`; pre-contract peers answer
`success:false` or 404) and merges under Derived only when every peer
supports it; any refusal or probe failure pins that edit to Legacy.
Every bucket-meta item this site sends (S3 hooks, bootstrap plan, retry
snapshots, tombstones) carries `derivedRuleContract: true`; a receiver
merges a payload without the marker the Legacy way, so an item from a
pre-contract sender is handled exactly as its own peers handle it.
Rolling upgrade: while any site runs the older code every edit is
canonicalized cluster-wide (numbers lost, order kept); once the last
site is upgraded the next edit keeps its priorities. Configs
canonicalized during the mixed period are not renumbered back — the
derived priority assignment is a no-op on the canonical layout — so an
operator who wants the original values re-submits the config after the
upgrade completes. Adding a site that runs the older code after
priorities were preserved is not gated and would desynchronize that
bucket until the next edit.
---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
The peer reload_pool_meta handler blindly replaced in-memory pool
metadata with the persisted snapshot, so a delayed or out-of-order
reload could roll back newer local queued/canceled/failed/complete
decommission state, and a missing pool.bin wiped local state to an
empty default.
Route peer reload through the same monotonic merge used by the admin
status refresh (merge_pool_status_refresh): entries are replaced only
when strictly newer and no local worker is active; missing snapshots
fail closed. The helper now reports whether any entry was replaced or
appended, and rejected stale/missing reloads are logged. The RPC
handler spawns missing decommission workers only after a reload
actually merged newer state, so duplicate deliveries cannot start
workers for an older generation.
Fixesrustfs/backlog#1917
* feat(allocator): replace mimalloc/libmimalloc-sys with rustfs-mimalloc/rustfs-mimalloc-sys
Replace the upstream xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git fork (mimalloc + libmimalloc-sys)
with the published rustfs-mimalloc (v0.5.0) and rustfs-mimalloc-sys (v0.5.0) crates
from crates.io.
The new crates are based on mimalloc V3 (v3.5.0) and provide:
- MiMalloc global allocator with safe API (collect, stats_json, process_info)
- Heap management and arena operations (heap module)
- Full FFI bindings to mimalloc V3
Changes:
- Workspace deps: mimalloc + libmimalloc-sys (git) → rustfs-mimalloc + rustfs-mimalloc-sys (crates.io)
- allocator_reclaim.rs: libmimalloc_sys::mi_collect → rustfs_mimalloc::MiMalloc::collect
- memory_observability.rs: raw FFI mi_stats_get_json → MiMalloc::stats_json()
- main.rs: heap ownership tests use Heap::contains() (V3 API)
- deny.toml: remove xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git from allow-git
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(ecstore): default rename fanout to parallel early-ack path
Switch the default rename_data commit fanout from serial join_all to the
parallel JoinSet early-ack path. The serial path (#5987) was the primary
cause of the 1MiB PUT regression (-71.7%) observed in rc.3 benchmarks.
A/B verification on testing 4-node cluster (c=64, 1MiB PUT, 2min):
- Serial (join_all): 96.99 MiB/s, P50=644ms
- Early ack (JoinSet): 177.46 MiB/s, P50=407ms (+83%)
Also:
- Update rename_data_reclaims_synthetic_inline_rollback_dir_after_commit
to use rename_data_owned and await tail_drain for proper cleanup.
- Update rename_data_waits_for_tail_disk_after_write_quorum to explicitly
test the serial path (now non-default) via env override.
- Add error source chain to HTTP Body stream transport error log
(backlog#2005) so the underlying cause is visible.
Ref: rustfs/backlog#2005
Ref: rustfs/backlog#1792#issuecomment-5384346238
Ref: rustfs/backlog#1792#issuecomment-5384370938
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
SSE and compression wrap the payload so its length is unknown and
advertise HashReader::SIZE_PRESERVE_LAYER (-1). Every layer preserved
that sentinel except create_bitrot_writer, which clamped it to 0 before
calling DiskAPI::create_file. RemoteDisk forwards that size verbatim in
the put_file_stream query, so remote peers were told the body was empty.
Since the authenticated put-file trailer (#5868) the receiver used the
declared size to split body from trailer, turning the clamp into a fatal
"auth trailer has trailing data" failure for every SSE PUT on multi-node
deployments (rc.2). #6320 relaxed the receiver to only trust size > 0;
this change fixes the sender so the sentinel survives end to end and the
wire no longer conflates empty objects with unknown-length streams.
Refs #6331
cxymds