Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
唐小鸭 1cf0f7af15 feat(replication): split oversized hot-path functions, proxy unreplicated reads, and fail SSE-C passthrough closed (#6170)
* refactor(replication): split four oversized hot-path functions into focused helpers

Pure-move decomposition of the four oversized functions flagged by the
replication compatibility review (P1-18), unblocking migration milestone
M2 which requires resyncer moves to stay mechanical:

- resync_bucket (522 lines -> 61-line step sequence): leader lock,
  target resolution, walk/collector/worker spawning, and dispatch loop
  extracted into focused helpers; pure decision helpers (DTO builders,
  HEAD-result classification) separated from IO orchestration.
- replicate_all (411 lines -> 113-line main body): initial target-info
  seeding, read/stat option builders, skip-path notes, target HEAD
  action resolution, and the multipart/single-put payload transport
  extracted as private free functions.
- start_mrf_processor (306 lines -> 46-line spawn body): recovery guard,
  ledger load, per-entry replay (delete/object/metadata), and retained
  entry resolution extracted; retry bookkeeping semantics preserved
  exactly (inner continue-paths push inside helpers, outer Missed push
  stays in the loop).
- apply_iam_item (255 lines -> match dispatch skeleton): one helper per
  IAM item type.

No behavior change: log texts, error paths, event emissions, and metric
counts are byte-identical; existing tests unchanged and green (238
ecstore replication/mrf/resync + 232 rustfs site-replication).

* feat(replication): proxy GET/HEAD/Tagging for unreplicated objects to replication targets (#6172)

* feat(replication): proxy GET/HEAD/Tagging for unreplicated objects to replication targets

Implements the MinIO active-active read-proxy protocol (P1-5 of the
replication compatibility review): when a GET/HEAD/GetObjectTagging/
PutObjectTagging/DeleteObjectTagging request fails locally with
not-found and the bucket has replication targets, the request is proxied
to the targets in rule order, mirroring bucket-replication.go
proxyGetToReplicationTarget/proxyHeadToRepTarget/proxyTaggingToRepTarget.

Protocol surface:
- Anti-loop: inbound {x-rustfs-,x-minio-}source-proxy-request is parsed
  into ObjectOptions (proxy_request + proxy_header_set, matching MinIO
  ProxyRequest/ProxyHeaderSet); a request carrying the marker with ANY
  value is never re-proxied. Outbound client proxy calls send the marker
  as "true"; replication worker convergence HEADs send it as "false" so
  a peer's proxy layer cannot answer a convergence check by proxying
  back to the source (which would fake Completed without a PUT).
- Target selection: new replication_proxy.rs get_proxy_targets — empty
  when the marker is set, versioning is suspended, or no replication
  config; otherwise filter_target_arns -> TargetClient lookup, skipping
  targets with proxying disabled.
- TargetClient gains head_object_for_proxy/get_object (streaming) and
  the three tagging calls. Proxy calls never send the replication-check
  SSE-C exemption header; customer SSE-C keys are forwarded verbatim so
  the target performs real decryption. Conditional (If-*) headers are
  not forwarded (MinIO parity); Range and part_number are, with
  parts_count/tag_count/storage_class/expiration passed through.
- Metrics: proxy counters now count only real client proxy traffic,
  MinIO-aligned (one total per proxied request, one failed when no
  target served it). The previous misattributed counters — replication
  worker HEAD/PUT (#2672) and local tagging operations (#2682) — are
  removed; ReplProxyMetric now maps the tagging counters instead of
  dropping them.

e2e (fake_s3_target extended with tagging + header journaling): proxied
GET body + outbound header contract (marker present, no
replication-check, SSE-C passthrough), HEAD, anti-loop 404 with zero
outbound requests, GetObjectTagging, and metric mapping unit tests.

Rolling note: proxying only activates for buckets with replication
targets; requests carrying the marker keep pre-upgrade behavior.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1675 (P1-5)

* fix(replication): fail SSE-C passthrough closed on targets that drop transport headers (#6178)

SSE-C ciphertext passthrough replicates via X-Rustfs-Replication-* transport
headers. A MinIO/generic-S3 target silently discards them, storing bare
ciphertext with no decryption material — yet the PUT succeeded, so the object
reported COMPLETED with a silently unreadable replica (backlog#1675 N2).

Fail-closed design:
- SsecPassthroughCapability {Unknown, Supported, Unsupported} cached in
  BucketTargetSys per target ARN with a recording timestamp. Entries reset
  whenever the target is rebuilt, edited, or removed (arn_remotes_map
  lifecycle) and expire after SSEC_PASSTHROUGH_CAPABILITY_TTL (10 minutes):
  an expired verdict in either direction is re-earned through the audit, so
  an Unsupported target recovers automatically after an upgrade (at most one
  wasted PUT+HEAD audit per bad target per TTL window) and a Supported
  verdict cannot outlive a backend swapped behind the same endpoint.
- Replication worker (replicate_object and replicate_all): fresh Unsupported
  targets never receive the PUT — the attempt fails immediately into the
  normal MRF retry channel with a "run ?replication-check to re-probe" hint.
  Unknown or expired verdicts are audited: after the PUT the worker HEADs
  the replica back through the replication-check channel (source version id
  mapped through resolve_read_api_version_id, so null-version objects audit
  correctly) and requires SSE-C evidence (the echoed customer-algorithm
  header); missing evidence records Unsupported and fails the attempt.
  Convergence HEADs are audited the same way, so a broken ciphertext replica
  from an earlier attempt can never launder itself into COMPLETED via an
  ETag match. The gate/evidence policy is pure (replication_target_boundary,
  staleness folded in as an input) for the M2 worker migration.
- replication-check grows an SsecPassthrough probe phase: a probe PUT
  carrying the live transport-header shape, HEAD-back for evidence, and a
  machine-readable Code BucketRemoteSsecPassthroughUnsupported on failure.
  The probe verdict is synced into the runtime capability cache. Unlike
  VersionFidelity, a failed SsecPassthrough phase does NOT fail the target
  overall — it is a capability limit, not a broken replication contract,
  and a plaintext-only deployment against such a target must not turn red.
- fake_s3_target: default mode now models a RustFS target (stores the
  transport headers, echoes SSE-C evidence); the new
  drop_unlisted_replication_headers mode models MinIO. The journal records
  whether a request carried transport headers.

Receiver-echo verification: the replication-check HEAD exemption only skips
SSE-C key validation; the response has always built sse-customer-algorithm
from stored metadata (rustfs/src/app/object_usecase.rs), so no receiver
change was needed — pinned end to end by the replication-check e2e against
a real RustFS target.

Rolling-upgrade constraint: RustFS targets older than the replication-check
HEAD exemption (#5898) answer the audit HEAD without SSE-C evidence (or fail
it outright), so SSE-C replication to such targets reports FAILED. This is
deliberate — FAILED-and-retryable beats a silently undecryptable replica —
and self-heals: once the target is upgraded, the next TTL expiry (or a
manual ?replication-check re-probe) re-audits and records Supported.
Plaintext and managed-SSE replication are unaffected. The capability cache
is per-node; each node audits independently.

Known limitations:
- The audit judges evidence from the echoed customer-algorithm header only.
  A hypothetical target that preserves that one header while dropping other
  transport headers (partial-drop) would pass the audit; no known target
  behaves this way — observed targets drop the whole unknown-header family.
- A mixed-version target cluster can flap the verdict between audits routed
  to different target nodes until the rollout completes; the TTL bounds how
  long each stale verdict persists.

New e2e (backlog#1675 C1 + N2, red-first): fail-closed against a
header-dropping fake (FAILED + no second PUT via the capability cache,
journal-asserted; red run showed the old COMPLETED), replication-check
reports the SsecPassthrough phase Code while the target stays OK overall,
SSE-C heal convergence after a real target outage, and SSE-C
existing-object resync landing a REPLICA readable with the customer key.
TTL expiry in both directions is pinned at the cache and gate seams.

* refactor(replication): move resyncer pure decision logic into rustfs-replication (M2) (#6180)

* refactor(replication): move resyncer pure decision logic into rustfs-replication (M2)

Pure-move milestone M2 of the ECStore replication split (backlog#1675
P1-17): relocate the resyncer's IO-free decision helpers, with their unit
tests, into the crates they already belong to by type ownership. No
behavior change.

Moved into crates/replication:
- resync.rs: resync_status_duration
- delete.rs: resync_existing_delete_replication_info,
  replicate_delete_outcome, target_delete_version_id,
  delete_marker_purge_version_id, delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry
- object.rs: version_identity_drifted, is_replication_target_offline_error,
  SsecPassthroughCapability, SsecPassthroughGate, ssec_passthrough_gate,
  ssec_passthrough_evidence_present (param-demoted to the echoed
  customer-algorithm string; ECStore keeps the HeadObjectOutput adapter)
- filemeta.rs: NULL_VERSION_ID wire literal (crate-owned copy per the
  filemeta-independence contract)

ECStore rewiring (Rule #14: imports stay in *_boundary.rs):
- resync/object-decision/target boundaries re-export the moved symbols;
  resyncer call sites are unchanged
- bucket_target_sys keeps only the verdict cache + TTL and re-exports the
  capability enum so existing consumer paths keep compiling

Not moved (signatures carry ECStore or aws-sdk types):
verify_resync_head_result, resync_target_error_detail, the SdkError
classifiers, the replicate_all_* option/info builders, and the env-coupled
bounded_resync_max_jobs admission clamp. README milestone table updated.

* chore(replication): retire the datatypes.rs relay early

README sanctions retiring datatypes.rs ahead of M4. The module was a
pure relay (resync boundary -> datatypes -> mod.rs facade) with no
external consumer importing it directly, so the facade now re-exports
ResyncStatusType from replication_resync_boundary and the relay file is
deleted. Consumers stay behind the ECStore facade, keeping Migration
Rule #15 intact — the original retirement wording ("consumers import
through rustfs-replication directly") conflicted with that rule and is
corrected in the README.

* chore(arch): extend migration guards to the M2-moved decision contracts

The adversarial review of the M2 move found the per-symbol ratchet in
check_architecture_migration_rules.sh was not extended for the moved
symbols, leaving them free to be redefined in ECStore or imported past
their boundary without CI noticing:

- resync definition pin + boundary fences gain resync_status_duration;
- the object-decision boundary fences gain the five delete-family
  helpers (delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry, delete_marker_purge_version_id,
  replicate_delete_outcome, resync_existing_delete_replication_info,
  target_delete_version_id);
- the target-boundary fence gains the SSE-C gate family, the offline
  classifier, and version_identity_drifted;
- a new definition pin rejects ECStore redefinitions of the M2-moved
  fns/enums (ssec_passthrough_evidence_present deliberately excluded:
  ECStore keeps a thin HeadObjectOutput adapter under that name).

Mutation-verified: a probe fn ssec_passthrough_gate under
crates/ecstore/src/bucket/replication trips the new pin.

Also anchors the intentionally-duplicated NULL_VERSION_ID wire literal
from the filemeta side and tightens the M2 README note on
bounded_resync_max_jobs.
2026-08-18 21:45:38 +08:00
唐小鸭 dcf3e4b9e8 fix(replication): transport and persist LWW timestamps for tag, retention, and legal hold (#6129)
* test(replication): pin missing LWW timestamp header transport

Red-light tests for the replication timestamp three-header contract:

- put_object_headers_carry_replication_timestamp_headers pins that
  PutObjectOptions::header() must emit the
  x-{rustfs,minio}-source-replication-{tagging,retention,legalhold}-timestamp
  headers when the internal timestamps are set (currently missing).
- test_put_opts_from_headers_gates_replication_timestamp_persistence_on_authorization
  and test_complete_multipart_opts_persist_replication_timestamps_when_authorized
  pin that an authorized replication PUT / multipart complete must persist
  the inbound timestamps into the internal metadata keys while unauthorized
  requests must not (currently never persisted).
- fake_s3_target journals the three timestamp headers per request
  (ReplicationTimestampHeaders on RequestRecord) so sender-side e2e
  assertions can observe what a real target receives; self-test included.

* fix(replication): transport and persist LWW timestamps for tag, retention, and legal hold

Active-active conflict resolution for concurrent tag/retention/legal-hold
edits needs the source's per-category modification times on both sides of
the wire; the three AdvancedPutOptions timestamp fields were dead and the
headers were neither sent nor parsed.

- Emit x-{rustfs,minio}-source-replication-{tagging,retention,legalhold}-
  timestamp from PutObjectOptions::header(); names and RFC3339 values
  interoperate with MinIO (minio-go constants.go, object-api-options.go),
  pinned by a header_compat wire-name test.
- Default the three AdvancedPutOptions timestamps to UNIX_EPOCH and skip
  epoch values in header(), so "never modified" is not sent as a
  modification made now.
- Parse the headers only on authorized replication PUTs and multipart
  completes, expose them as Option<OffsetDateTime> on ObjectOptions, and
  persist them into the dual-prefix internal metadata keys so the
  outbound pass (replication_target_boundary) reads the source's
  timestamps instead of the mod_time fallback.
- Record the local tagging timestamp in the PutObjectTagging and
  DeleteObjectTagging eval metadata, mirroring the object-lock handlers;
  without it the sender only ever had the mod_time fallback to offer.

Receiver-side LWW comparison (keep newer stored category metadata over a
stale inbound copy) is left as a TODO at the parse site.

* fix(replication): load the stored tagging timestamp independently of remaining tags

Review: DeleteObjectTagging persists the tagging-timestamp internal key
but leaves the object tagless, and the outbound mapper only loaded the
key inside the user_tags-nonempty branch — the deletion's LWW timestamp
stayed at the epoch and the header was omitted, so the deletion could
never win conflict resolution on the replica. The stored key is now
loaded unconditionally; the mod_time fallback still applies only while
tags exist (MinIO parity), and a tagless object without the key keeps
the epoch default (no header). Deletion-path regression test added.

* fix(storage): reserve replication transport names at metadata ingest

Second review round: a client PUT of
x-amz-meta-x-rustfs-source-replication-tagging-timestamp materialized
the bare transport key as stored user metadata. The outbound
replication header builder forwards user metadata verbatim on a
server-authorized request, so the receiver would persist the
attacker-chosen value as trusted internal LWW state — and for a
tagless object nothing later overwrites it.

The ingest namespacing guard now reserves the whole
x-rustfs-source- / x-minio-source- families (the new timestamps and
their siblings: source-mtime/-etag/-version-id/-replication-request),
folding forged keys back under x-amz-meta-. Forged-ingress regression
covers both prefixes and a sibling.

* fix(replication): harden timestamp replay

* fix(app): route retention helper through facade

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-16 05:56:04 +08:00
唐小鸭 2ecf6b4575 fix(replication): probe the version-identity contract in replication-check (#5881)
* test(replication): pin the version-fidelity probe contract (red)

P1-19 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2): the supported replication contract is
targets that adopt the source version id — a target that mints its own ids
silently breaks every version-addressed operation that follows (version
deletes, heal re-drives never match), diverging the two sides with no
signal. replication-check already captures the probe PUT's response version
id but never compares it.

Red evidence (current main): against a FakeS3Target with
assign_own_version_ids enabled, ?replication-check returns Status "OK" —
the drift is invisible.

test_replication_check_flags_version_minting_target expects a
VersionFidelity phase that fails with the machine-readable code
BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch, skips the later mutation phases, and
still cleans up the probe via the version id the target actually assigned.

Test infra: FakeS3Target gains assign_own_version_ids (models a generic S3
service; validated-but-not-mirrored source version headers) and a
prefix+max-keys ListObjectVersions implementation (the probe key allocation
requires it); stored_versions accessor duplicated from the P1-21 branch
(identical code, resolves clean on merge).

* fix(replication): probe the version-identity contract in replication-check

P1-19 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2, plan B). Replication only converges on
targets that adopt the source version id: version-addressed deletes and
heal re-drives address the source id, so a target that mints its own ids
silently diverges — nothing surfaced this. replication-check already
captured the probe PUT's response version id but never compared it.

- The probe PUT now carries the source version as `?versionId=` (the exact
  shape live replication uses since P0-5, and the only shape MinIO
  consumes; the internal source-version-id header alone would let the
  probe pass against targets the real data path drifts on). Reuses
  ecstore's append_version_id_query through the api facade.
- New VersionFidelity phase: the probe PUT's response version id must
  equal the sent source id. On mismatch the phase fails with the
  machine-readable extension key `"Code": "BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch"`
  (new optional Code field on phase statuses; Go decoders ignore unknown
  keys), the overall target fails, the later version-addressed mutation
  phases are skipped, and cleanup still removes the probe via the id the
  target actually assigned (with the existing list-based sweep as backstop
  when the target returns no version id at all).
- Runtime half: TargetClient::put_object now returns the assigned version
  id (mirroring remove_object), and the replication PUT path audits it —
  every drifting PUT increments
  rustfs_replication_version_identity_drift_total and the first drift per
  target ARN logs a structured warning pointing at ?replication-check.
  The drift judgment is a pure function with an exemption-matrix test
  (empty / literal "null" / nil-uuid sources carry no contract).
- docs/operations/replication-check.md documents the phase and the code.

Red -> green: test_replication_check_flags_version_minting_target (fake
target with assign_own_version_ids; on main the check reported Status
"OK"). The probe's query shape is pinned by a journal assertion (revert
of the query hunk alone fails it), probe-level unit tests cover the
mismatch/mirror matrix including cleanup addressing the minted id, and
the existing success e2e now asserts VersionFidelity OK against a RustFS
target. Adversarial review (seven roles): non-blocking; noted follow-ups
are the multipart runtime audit (the probe phase already pins the
contract) and per-target re-warning after reconfiguration.

* fix(e2e): stop the fake target self-deadlocking on version-id minting

The assign_own_version_ids flag was read with a fresh `lock(&self.store)`
inside two paths that already hold that guard — delete_object's
marker-creation branch and create_multipart_upload — and the store mutex
is not reentrant, so both hung forever (CI: the fake target's own
multipart and delete-marker tests ran >1560s until the job was
cancelled). Read the flag from the live guard instead.

The replication e2e paths did not catch this: a version-addressed purge
DELETE never mints an id, and the probe PUT reads the flag before taking
the guard.

* chore(test): refresh the nextest replication count invariant

The e2e-smoke/e2e-repl-nightly split comment is descriptive metadata
(authority: `cargo nextest list`); refresh it to this branch's
post-rebase total.
2026-08-11 03:04:05 +00:00
唐小鸭 3c31eaf06f fix(replication): retry, persist and replay failed delete-marker purges (#5864)
* test(replication): pin delayed delete-marker purge failure handling (red)

P1-21 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2): two failing e2e tests that pin the missing
failure handling of the delayed delete-marker purge:

- test_delayed_delete_marker_purge_retries_after_transient_target_failure:
  four scripted 503s outlast every existing channel (version-purge
  replication + its in-process MRF fast retries + the watcher's single
  attempt = 3 target DELETEs, all faulted in the recorded run); the
  replicated marker is stranded on the target forever.
- test_delayed_delete_marker_purge_exhaustion_persists_to_mrf_and_replays_on_restart:
  exhausted purge intents never reach the durable MRF journal, so a restart
  replays nothing (recorded run: 3 faulted attempts, zero post-restart).

Red-light evidence (current main):
- Test A: FAILED, journal shows 3x DeleteObject fault=Status(503), no clean
  attempt, target marker still present after 15s.
- Test B: FAILED after 468s, same 3 faulted attempts, no purge DELETE after
  restart, marker still present.

Test infra: FakeS3Target::stored_versions() exposes per-key version state so
purge tests assert target state instead of inferring it from the journal;
nextest count comments 36->38 nightly / 56->58 total.

* fix(replication): retry, persist and replay failed delete-marker purges

P1-21 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2). The delayed delete-marker purge was
fire-and-forget: the target DELETE discarded its result (`let _ =`), a
missing target client was silently skipped, and nothing recorded the intent
— one transient target error stranded the replicated marker on the target
forever. Separately, `replicate_delete_with_outcome` held its outcome
hostage to `!requires_delayed_purge`, pinning every delete-marker MRF entry
to Missed so the durable backlog retained them permanently.

Changes:
- `replicate_delete_marker_purge_to_targets` now reports per-target
  results (warn + metrics on failure, including `target_client_missing`),
  supports retrying only the failed targets, and treats a target-side
  NoSuchKey/NoSuchVersion as purge success (strict-404 targets must not
  retain the intent forever).
- The delayed watcher (`watch_and_purge_source_delete_marker`) retries
  failed targets across its 5x1s watch window; on exhaustion it persists
  the purge intent to the durable MRF journal via the new
  `ReplicationPoolTrait::persist_mrf_entry` (journal-only on purpose: live
  re-dispatch would loop unboundedly against a down target). Intent entries
  are shaped as marker-creation deletes so replay funnels into the stale-
  marker branch.
- The stale-marker branch (source marker already gone) now purges the
  targets instead of silently returning success — closing a latent leak —
  and reports the purge result as the replay outcome. Heal callers retry
  for the full window (the startup MRF processor runs before target
  clients initialize); live callers attempt once and fall back to a fresh
  durable intent, so a down target cannot pin a replication worker.
- The outcome formula (extracted as `replicate_delete_outcome` and pinned
  by a unit test) no longer includes the delayed purge, so successfully
  replayed delete-marker entries are acknowledged instead of retained
  forever.

Verification: red -> green e2e pair (transient-failure retry; exhaustion ->
durable MRF -> restart replay -> second-restart zero-replay ack) plus unit
tests; `make pre-commit`, logging guardrails, clippy (ecstore + e2e_test)
all clean; full ecstore lib suite 3729 passed (3 pre-existing local-DNS
kubernetes endpoint failures reproduce without this change).

Adversarial validation (7 roles): no blocking findings after adding the
outcome-formula guard test. Known residuals recorded in the PR: watcher
shutdown window (intent not yet persisted), rolling-downgrade replay acks
without purging (equals pre-fix behavior), and replay falling back to the
source version id on targets that mint their own version ids (P1-19).

* chore(test): refresh the nextest replication count invariant

The e2e-smoke/e2e-repl-nightly split comment is descriptive metadata
(authority: `cargo nextest list`); refresh it to this branch's
post-rebase total.

* fix(replication): purge the marker version the target actually assigned

Review follow-up (#5864), two real defects:

- The delayed purge watcher was spawned with the pre-merge `dobj`, so the
  per-target marker version ids this round recorded were invisible to it.
  Against a target that mints its own ids the purge fell back to a
  source-derived id, the target answered the versioned DELETE with an
  idempotent 204, and that "success" cleared the retry set while the real
  marker stayed behind. The watcher now receives the merged replication
  state (`drs`), which folds this round's target-assigned ids in.
- A target whose recorded version metadata is inconsistent was skipped
  without entering `failed_arns`, so an empty result made both the watcher
  and the MRF replay treat a purge that issued no DELETE as successful and
  drop the intent. The refusal is now a per-target failure (own metric
  label): the leak stays visible and the intent is retained instead of
  being acknowledged. The version decision also moved ahead of the client
  lookup, so the refusal is decided from metadata alone.

Tests: a new e2e drives a fake target with `assign_own_version_ids`, which
ignores the forwarded source-version header for both objects and delete
markers, and asserts the replicated marker is really gone; a unit test
pins the corrupt-metadata refusal as a failed outcome without any target
client registered. The detached-watcher shutdown window is documented at
the watcher as a known non-durable window with the write-ahead follow-up
spelled out.
2026-08-10 22:16:21 +08:00
cxymds 1be636b914 fix(replication): make resync recovery resilient (#5883)
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 19:42:06 +08:00
唐小鸭 ead419451a fix(replication): send source versionId as query param to remote targets (#5752)
* test(replication): assert remote PUT and multipart initiate carry versionId query

* fix(replication): send source versionId as query param to remote targets
2026-08-06 08:27:23 +08:00
houseme f7c1b13c0f refactor(deps): replace md5 crate with md-5 (#5432)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-29 11:29:37 +00:00
Zhengchao An 7cc92ac93c test(replication): add programmable fake S3 target (#4929) 2026-07-17 01:20:09 +08:00