* fix(admin): bound IAM import archive expansion
MAX_IAM_IMPORT_SIZE caps the compressed upload at 10 MB, but every member of the
archive was then read with read_to_end into an unbounded Vec. Deflate ratios well
above 100:1 are easy to construct, so a small authorized upload could expand
without limit across the seven members ImportIam reads.
Add a shared expansion budget (MAX_IAM_IMPORT_EXPANDED_SIZE, 10x the compressed
cap) drawn down by every member, and route all seven reads through one helper
that reads a byte past the remaining budget to detect overrun. Sharing the budget
bounds the archive as a whole rather than letting each member spend the full
limit independently.
Covers R03-CAN-024 through R03-CAN-030 plus R04-CAN-077 (backlog #1471) — one
fix rather than seven, since all seven call sites were byte-identical.
* fix(kms): confine local key paths and refuse silent key replacement
Local KMS key identifiers arrive from request input — the `name` tag on CreateKey,
the `keyId` body field or query parameter on DeleteKey — and were joined onto
`key_dir` with no validation. An identifier such as `../../tmp/evil` escaped the
configured directory, making key creation a constrained arbitrary-file write and
`DeleteKey` with `force_immediate` a cross-directory delete.
Validate in `master_key_path` and make it fallible, so every filesystem path in
this backend inherits the guard: decode_stored_key, load_master_key,
save_master_key, create_key and delete_key all derive their paths there. The rule
is containment rather than a character allowlist, so identifiers already in use
keep resolving; only separators, NUL, absolute paths and non-single-component
forms are refused. Note `.` and `..` are contained rather than refused — the
`.key` suffix turns them into the ordinary filenames `..key` and `...key`.
Separately, `LocalKmsBackend::create_key` had no existence check, while the
sibling `KmsClient::create_key` has always had one. Since `save_master_key`
renames over its destination, creating a key under an existing name silently
replaced its material and destroyed the ability to decrypt everything wrapped
under it — and the backend path is the one the admin API uses. It now returns
KeyAlreadyExists, matching StaticKmsBackend.
Covers R03-CAN-072, R03-CAN-073 and R07-CAN-103 (backlog #1475). R03-CAN-073
needed no separate change: delete_key routes both its load and its remove_file
through master_key_path.
* fix(swift): bound SLO manifest reads to the 2 MiB manifest limit
The three Swift SLO handlers that load a stored manifest (handle_slo_get,
handle_slo_get_manifest, handle_slo_delete) read the `<object>.slo-manifest`
object to EOF with AsyncReadExt::read_to_end. That key is predictable and
writable through the ordinary object PUT path, so a tenant can replace the
manifest with an arbitrarily large object and then make the server allocate
its full size on every SLO GET, multipart-manifest=get, or
multipart-manifest=delete request - a memory amplification bounded only by
the stored object size (CWE-400 / CWE-770). The 2 MiB manifest limit that
handle_slo_put enforces was not applied on the read side.
Introduce MAX_SLO_MANIFEST_SIZE (the existing 2 MiB PUT limit, now a named
constant) and a shared read_manifest_bytes helper that reads through a
`take(limit + 1)` and rejects anything larger, so an oversized manifest is
refused instead of being buffered first. All three call sites go through the
helper. handle_slo_put now checks the size before parsing the JSON.
Regression tests: test_read_manifest_bytes_rejects_oversized_manifest and
test_read_manifest_bytes_stops_reading_oversized_manifest (which asserts the
reader is not consumed past the limit), plus a boundary test that a manifest
at exactly 2 MiB is still accepted.
* fix(protocols): authorize every object in FTPS/WebDAV recursive deletes
The FTPS and WebDAV gateways authorized only the container before a
recursive delete and then destroyed everything inside it without a
further check:
- FTPS RMD (and DELE on a bucket path ending in '/') cleared
s3:DeleteBucket, then delete_bucket_recursively listed the bucket and
deleted every object.
- WebDAV DELETE on a bucket did the same via its own
delete_bucket_recursively.
- WebDAV DELETE on a directory cleared s3:DeleteObject for the directory
marker key ("dir/") only, then listed that prefix and deleted every
child under it.
A principal holding s3:DeleteBucket (or s3:DeleteObject on a single
marker key) could therefore erase objects it had no s3:DeleteObject
permission for, and the operation reported success.
Deletion stays recursive - that is the expected behaviour for these
protocols - but each object now clears s3:DeleteObject on its own key
before it is removed, and the enumeration clears s3:ListBucket. A denial
aborts the whole operation with access denied rather than being skipped,
so the caller can never be told the delete succeeded while objects were
left behind or removed without authorization.
The test double gained shared-state cloning, delete_object/delete_bucket
call logs, and list/delete queue helpers so the regression tests can
observe that nothing is deleted once a deny lands.
* fix(server,ecstore): bound TLS handshakes and remote volume RPC waits
Three call sites let an unauthenticated client or a misbehaving peer hold
server resources with no deadline.
TLS listener (R03-CAN-035): process_connection awaited
`acceptor.accept(socket)` with no bound. A client that opens a TCP
connection and never finishes the handshake parks a Tokio task and a socket
forever, and the connection cap (RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS) is unlimited by
default, so nothing else sheds it. The handshake now runs under
accept_tls_with_deadline(), reusing the existing HTTP/1 header-read budget —
the established slow-client bound for the pre-request phase — and the
expiry is recorded through the same log/metric path as a handshake error,
under a new TIMEOUT failure kind.
Remote disk RPCs (R03-CAN-049, R03-CAN-050): list_volumes and delete_volume
passed Duration::ZERO, which execute_with_timeout treats as "no deadline",
so a peer that accepts the request and never answers stalls the coordinator
(and, for delete_volume, the bucket-deletion workflow). Both now pass
get_max_timeout_duration(), matching every sibling method in the file.
Regression tests: a silent TLS peer must be shed by the handshake deadline;
list_volumes/delete_volume against a peer that completes the TCP connect and
then goes silent must fail with DiskError::Timeout instead of hanging.
* fix(security): stop leaking signed headers and bound OIDC/KMS credentials
Three independent hygiene fixes found by the security review.
R03-CAN-018 (crates/signer): try_get_canonical_headers and get_signed_headers
logged the complete header map at DEBUG before signing. Runtime callers pass
session credentials and SSE-C key material through these headers, so anyone
able to raise the log level (or read DEBUG logs) recovered
X-Amz-Security-Token and SSE-C keys verbatim. The statements were debugging
leftovers with no operational value and are deleted rather than redacted.
R03-CAN-014 (crates/iam): the OIDC HTTP adapter buffered provider responses
with an unbounded Response::bytes(), so a configured, compromised or
attacker-pointed IdP endpoint could stream an arbitrarily large or endless
body into memory (the ValidateOidcConfig admin handler lets a ServerInfo
caller choose the endpoint). Responses are now read incrementally and fail
closed past MAX_OIDC_RESPONSE_SIZE, and the already SSRF-hardened client
builder gains request and connect timeouts so a stalled provider cannot pin
the calling task indefinitely.
R07-CAN-105 (helm): the Vault KMS token was serialized into the chart
ConfigMap, exposing it to every subject allowed to get ConfigMaps in the
namespace. It now renders into a dedicated Secret that the Deployment and
StatefulSet consume via envFrom; the Secret is separate from the main
credentials Secret so it also works when secret.existingSecret is set.
Regression tests:
- rustfs-signer: signing_never_logs_signed_header_material
- rustfs-iam: oidc_response_body_past_the_limit_is_rejected,
oidc_response_body_at_the_limit_is_accepted
- scripts/test_helm_templates.sh: KMS token must never render in plaintext
* fix(webdav): enforce body limit, request timeout and connection cap
The configured WebDAV maximum body size was enforced from Content-Length, so a
chunked request declared no length and bypassed it entirely. The configured
request timeout was never applied to the connection at all, and the accept loop
spawned a task per connection with no bound, so an unauthenticated client could
hold resources indefinitely and in unbounded number.
Enforce the limit on bytes actually read rather than the declared length, apply
the configured timeout to the request, and bound accepted connections with a new
RUSTFS_WEBDAV_MAX_CONNECTIONS (default 1024) surfaced in the config report.
Covers R03-CAN-051, R03-CAN-052, R03-CAN-067, R04-CAN-089, R05-CAN-094 and
R05-CAN-097 (backlog #1471, #1474).
* fix(security): stop STS credentials from crossing the parent trust boundary
Two related credential-boundary holes let a short-lived STS credential act
with the full, unrestricted authority of the long-term user it was minted
from.
AddUser (R03-CAN-021, CWE-269/863): should_check_deny_only relaxes the admin
policy check to deny-only when a Console/STS session targets the IAM user it
represents. Nothing then stopped that session from calling AddUser with its
own parent's access key, so the handler wrote an attacker-chosen secret key
and status over the parent's stored Credentials via create_user ->
save_user_identity. A session that expires in minutes became permanent
control of the account. AddUser now rejects any temp or service-account
requester whose resolved parent equals the target access key, resolving the
parent the same way should_check_deny_only does (parent_user field, else the
JWT `parent` claim, since some stores persist the parent only in the token).
FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV password auth (R04-CAN-086, CWE-287/862): these protocols
looked the access key up with check_key, which falls back to the STS account
cache, and then compared only the stored secret. An STS access key plus
secret therefore authenticated with no session token presented and no
session-policy claims applied - the holder got the parent's full permissions.
Password authentication now rejects temporary credentials before the secret
comparison. The discriminator is is_temp() && !is_service_account(), the same
one IamCache::update_user_with_claims uses to route an identity into the STS
cache, so service accounts - which resolve policy from stored IAM state
rather than a client-presented token - keep working over these protocols.
Regression tests cover both predicates and pin the guards to their call
sites so neither can be dropped without a test failure.
scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh flags any lowercase secret-named
identifier interpolated into a format string. The static-secret-file test
added in #5245 interpolates two fixture bindings (file_secret, env_secret)
into format! when constructing the secret file and env var, tripping the
heuristic and breaking make pre-commit on every branch based on main.
Rename the bindings to file_key_b64 / env_key_b64 so they no longer match
the heuristic. The fixtures are dummy base64 key material written to a
temp file and env var, not log output, and the test coverage is unchanged.
The guard script itself is untouched.
Restore the workspace reqwest default feature stack for RustFS outbound HTTPS clients, while keeping per-crate extra APIs such as json, stream, and multipart explicit. Lazily initialize the notification runtime from admin target access when RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE=true is already effective, and add regression coverage for HTTPS webhook custom CA handling and target-list visibility.
Fixes#5052.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* chore(deps): remove redundant dependency features
Remove manifest feature entries that are implied by other requested features in the same dependency declaration.
Verified that the resolved Cargo feature graph is unchanged after the cleanup.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* chore(deps): narrow tokio and reqwest features
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Move workspace-level dependency feature lists into the member crates that consume each dependency while keeping required default-features flags at the workspace root.
Also refresh starshard to 2.2.2 via cargo update and cargo upgrade --exclude ratelimit.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Drop the [target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies] tokio
"io-uring" feature from 6 crates and the rustfs binary. Because
.cargo/config.toml enables --cfg tokio_unstable globally, this feature
switched every Linux build's file I/O onto tokio's io_uring runtime
backend. Restricted Linux environments (Docker default seccomp, gVisor,
proot, old kernels) reject io_uring_setup with EACCES/ENOSYS, which
tokio surfaced as PermissionDenied and RustFS reported as
DiskAccessDenied at startup.
Add scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh so the feature cannot silently
return: it fails on any tokio dependency line enabling "io-uring", while
still allowing a future application-level io-uring crate dependency.
Wire it into make pre-commit/pre-pr/dev-check and CI.
Tracking: rustfs/backlog#890 (parent rustfs/backlog#897)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* fix(rio): reject corrupted short compressed/encrypted blocks instead of panicking
DecompressReader::poll_read and DecryptReader::poll_read sliced the block
body with a fixed `[0..16]` index to read the length varint. The body length
comes from an untrusted 24-bit header field, so a corrupted/truncated block
shorter than 16 bytes made the slice panic and crash the request task — a
read-path DoS on GET of tiered/corrupted data.
Pass the whole (arbitrary-length-safe) slice to uvarint and reject a
non-positive or out-of-range length prefix with InvalidData. Adds a repro
test for each reader; all existing round-trip tests still pass.
Refs rustfs/backlog#812
* fix(utils): close SSRF bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
validate_outbound_ip branched on the IpAddr variant, and the V6 branch's
is_loopback/is_unicast_link_local/is_unique_local checks never inspect the
embedded IPv4 of an IPv4-mapped address (::ffff:a.b.c.d). The metadata guard
also only matched the plain V4 169.254.169.254. So ::ffff:127.0.0.1,
::ffff:10.0.0.5 and ::ffff:169.254.169.254 all passed the outbound guard,
letting an attacker reach loopback/private/metadata endpoints.
Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 to its embedded IPv4 (via to_ipv4_mapped, which
matches only the true mapped form) before classification. Adds reject tests
for mapped loopback/private/metadata and an allow test for public IPv6.
Refs rustfs/backlog#813
* fix(ecstore): streaming last-part loss, GCS tier Range/remove, stat_all_dirs alignment
Four confirmed data-reliability defects:
- put_object_multipart_stream: the CompleteMultipartUpload part-collection loop
used exclusive `1..total_parts_count`, dropping the final part (and collecting
zero parts for a single-part object) — silently truncating the completed object.
Extracted collect_complete_parts (1..=total_parts_count) with unit tests.
- GCS warm backend get() ignored the requested byte range, returning the whole
object for a Range GET; now applies ReadRange::segment like the other backends.
- GCS warm backend remove() was an empty stub, so deleting a tiered object left
it on GCS forever; now deletes via StorageControl (added a control-plane client),
and in_use() actually lists (prefix-scoped) instead of always returning false.
- stat_all_dirs skipped None disk slots and dropped JoinErrors, returning a
compressed, misaligned error vector; heal_object_dir then zipped it against the
full disks array and could make_volume on the WRONG disk. Now returns one
index-aligned entry per slot (None -> DiskNotFound), and heal no longer
pre-fills the drive report (which would double it). Added an alignment test.
Refs rustfs/backlog#807
* fix(kms): stop Vault backend from destroying/reviving keys on failure
Two confirmed key-safety defects in the Vault KV2 backend:
- get_key_material() 'self-healed' a decrypt or wrong-length failure by minting a
fresh random master key and overwriting the stored value. That destroys the
original key material, making every DEK ever wrapped by it permanently
undecryptable. Decryption must never mutate the stored key: both branches now
return a cryptographic_error instead. (The empty-material bootstrap path, which
only fills a never-initialized key, is intentionally left intact.)
- cancel_key_deletion() reset key_state to Enabled only in the returned response
and never persisted it, so the key stayed PendingDeletion in storage and would
still be reaped. It now writes the state back via update_key_metadata_in_storage
and fails the request if the write fails.
Adds ignored (Vault-requiring) integration tests documenting both behaviours.
The third item (VaultTransit key state only in memory -> revived as Enabled after
restart) is deferred: a fail-closed guard would break restart availability for all
transit keys; the correct fix needs a persistent metadata store + Vault integration
testing. Tracked in rustfs/backlog#808.
Refs rustfs/backlog#808
* fix(admin): clamp STS AssumeRole duration; persist ImportBucketMetadata to disk
Two confirmed admin-API defects:
- Standard AssumeRole used the raw client-supplied DurationSeconds with no upper
bound, so a caller could mint near-permanent temporary credentials. Clamp it to
the AWS/MinIO STS window [900, 43200] (with 0 -> default 3600) via a shared
clamp_assume_role_duration helper, and build the exp claim with saturating_add.
This matches the existing AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity path.
- ImportBucketMetadata only mutated an in-memory map and returned 200, silently
dropping every imported config. It now persists each non-empty config via
metadata_sys::update (which merges onto existing on-disk metadata) and returns
InternalError if a write fails. Mapping extracted to imported_configs_to_persist
with unit tests.
Refs rustfs/backlog#809
* fix(heal): enqueue displacing request in release builds
push_displacing_lower_priority folded the real enqueue call into
debug_assert_eq!(self.push(request), Accepted). In release builds
(debug_assertions off) the whole macro — including its argument — is compiled
out, so after evicting a lower-priority queued item the new high-priority
request was silently dropped and never healed. Hoist self.push(request) out of
the assertion so the side effect runs in all builds. Adds a --release regression
test.
Refs rustfs/backlog#811
* fix(iam): propagate real delete_policy backend errors instead of swallowing them
delete_policy's is_from_notify path had its error handling inverted: a real
backend failure (disk IO / insufficient quorum) evicted the cache and returned
Ok(()), reporting a phantom success while policy.json survived on disk (to be
reloaded on the next full IAM reload); NoSuchPolicy — which should be idempotent
success — returned Err. Propagate real errors and let NoSuchPolicy fall through
to the idempotent cache-evict + Ok, matching delete_user / the notification
handler in the same file. Adds a backend-error-injection regression test.
Refs rustfs/backlog#810
* fix(utils): also normalize IPv4-compatible IPv6 in the SSRF guard
The initial fix only unwrapped IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) addresses; the
deprecated IPv4-compatible form (::a.b.c.d, e.g. ::127.0.0.1 / ::169.254.169.254)
still bypassed the guard. Reject pure-IPv6 specials (::, ::1, fe80::, fc00::)
first, then normalize BOTH embedded-IPv4 forms before the IPv4 rules. Adds tests
for compatible-form loopback/metadata and confirms ::1 / :: stay rejected.
Found by adversarial review of the initial fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#813
* fix(ecstore): fix the same last-part loss in the parallel streaming path
put_object_multipart_stream_parallel had the identical off-by-one
(1..total_parts_count) that truncated the last part / produced zero parts for a
single-part upload — reachable when concurrent stream parts are enabled. Reuse
collect_complete_parts, which now returns an error instead of panicking on a gap
in the parts map. Adds a missing-part error test.
Found by adversarial review of the initial fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#807
* fix(kms): local backend must preserve key material on status change
LocalKmsClient (the default KMS backend) regenerated the master key material on
enable_key/disable_key/schedule_key_deletion/cancel_key_deletion — a pure status
change. A single disable+enable cycle therefore destroyed the original key,
making every DEK ever wrapped by it permanently undecryptable (silent data loss,
no network needed). Preserve the existing material via get_key_material and
re-save with only the status changed. Adds a hermetic regression test that wraps
a DEK, cycles all four status methods, and asserts the DEK still decrypts.
Found by adversarial review of the Vault fix. Refs rustfs/backlog#808
* test(rio): cover the length-prefix guard; correct its comment
Add a DecompressReader test that feeds an unterminated length varint so uvarint
returns 0 and the new guard (not the downstream codec) produces the InvalidData
error, and reword the guard comment which overclaimed that the > len bound
prevents a reachable panic (it is belt-and-suspenders). No behavior change.
Found by adversarial review. Refs rustfs/backlog#812
* test(rio): build test block headers via vec! to satisfy clippy
The new corrupted-block tests built the header with Vec::new() + repeated push,
tripping clippy::vec_init_then_push (-D warnings in CI). Construct the fixed
header bytes with vec![] instead. No behavior change.
---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
The session watchdog now selects its detection method per
platform. It previously probed kernel TCP state through a
Linux-only procfs path, so on macOS every healthy idle session
was killed within a minute, and on Windows the watchdog never
spawned at all, leaving wedged sessions with no cleanup. Linux
keeps its fast-kill watchdog unchanged. Other platforms get a
silence-only backstop that kills a session only at the
documented 30-minute idle ceiling.
The host-key loader now has a Windows arm. It loads OpenSSH
format host keys from the configured directory and logs a
one-time warning to restrict NTFS ACLs on the key directory,
the same operator-managed approach FTPS, WebDAV, KMS, and IAM
already use on Windows. Startup previously aborted with
UnsupportedPlatform because the Unix mode-bit permission check
has no Windows equivalent. tokio's io-uring feature is now
enabled only in Linux builds. io-uring is a Linux kernel
interface and enabling it unconditionally broke the Windows
build.
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
* fix
* chore: upgrade cryptography libraries to RC versions
- Upgrade aes-gcm to 0.11.0-rc.2 with rand_core support
- Upgrade chacha20poly1305 to 0.11.0-rc.2
- Upgrade argon2 to 0.6.0-rc.2 with std features
- Upgrade hmac to 0.13.0-rc.3
- Upgrade pbkdf2 to 0.13.0-rc.2
- Upgrade rsa to 0.10.0-rc.10
- Upgrade sha1 and sha2 to 0.11.0-rc.3
- Upgrade md-5 to 0.11.0-rc.3
These upgrades provide enhanced security features and performance
improvements while maintaining backward compatibility with existing
encryption workflows.
* add
* improve code
* fix
* fix: remove code
* improve code for tokio runtime config
* improve code for main
* fix: add tokio enable_all
* upgrade version
* improve for Cargo.toml
* feat(kms): implement key management service with local and vault backends
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
* feat(kms): enhance security with zeroize for sensitive data and improve key management
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
* remove Hashi word
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
* refactor: remove unused request structs from kms handlers
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: junxiang Mu <1948535941@qq.com>
Zhengchao An