diff --git a/rustfs/src/storage/minio_generated_read_test.rs b/rustfs/src/storage/minio_generated_read_test.rs
index dc51e985e..69d55516a 100644
--- a/rustfs/src/storage/minio_generated_read_test.rs
+++ b/rustfs/src/storage/minio_generated_read_test.rs
@@ -260,6 +260,57 @@ async fn reads_minio_generated_sse_kms_multipart_fixture() {
     assert_fixture_round_trip("sse-kms-multipart-8m", 8 * 1024 * 1024).await;
 }
 
+/// Read an SSE-C fixture, supplying the customer key the way a client does.
+///
+/// SSE-C needs no KMS at all — the key arrives on the request — so this path
+/// shares nothing with the managed-SSE reads above beyond the fixture loader.
+async fn read_ssec_fixture_plaintext(
+    encrypted: Vec<u8>,
+    object_info: ObjectInfo,
+    customer_key_b64: &str,
+    customer_key_md5_b64: &str,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
+    let object_size = object_info.size;
+    reset_sse_dek_provider();
+
+    let mut headers = http::HeaderMap::new();
+    headers.insert(
+        http::HeaderName::from_static("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-algorithm"),
+        http::HeaderValue::from_static("AES256"),
+    );
+    headers.insert(
+        http::HeaderName::from_static("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-key"),
+        http::HeaderValue::from_str(customer_key_b64).expect("fixture customer key is a header value"),
+    );
+    headers.insert(
+        http::HeaderName::from_static("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-key-md5"),
+        http::HeaderValue::from_str(customer_key_md5_b64).expect("fixture customer key md5 is a header value"),
+    );
+
+    let resolver = SseObjectEncryptionResolver;
+    let (mut reader, offset, length) = GetObjectReader::new_with_resolver(
+        Box::new(Cursor::new(encrypted)),
+        None,
+        &object_info,
+        &ObjectOptions::default(),
+        &headers,
+        Some(&resolver),
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|err| format!("construct GetObjectReader from MinIO SSE-C fixture: {err:?}"))?;
+
+    if offset != 0 || length != object_size {
+        return Err(format!("unexpected fixture range offset={offset} length={length} size={object_size}"));
+    }
+
+    let mut plaintext = Vec::new();
+    reader
+        .read_to_end(&mut plaintext)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|err| format!("read plaintext from MinIO SSE-C fixture: {err}"))?;
+    Ok(plaintext)
+}
+
 /// The interop claim must hold on the production key entry point, not only on
 /// the test-only injection channel every other case here uses.
 #[tokio::test]
@@ -274,6 +325,53 @@ async fn reads_minio_generated_sse_s3_fixture_through_production_master_key_env(
     assert_eq!(sha256_hex(&plaintext), expected_sha256);
 }
 
+/// SSE-C is the one managed shape needing no KMS: the customer supplies the key
+/// on every request, so this measures the read path alone.
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore = "requires generated MinIO fixture data"]
+async fn reads_minio_generated_sse_c_multipart_fixture() {
+    // The fixture lab's fixed SSE-C key; recorded in the case's request.json.
+    const SSEC_KEY_B64: &str = "AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8=";
+    const SSEC_KEY_MD5_B64: &str = "tP/LI3N87DFaSk0aoqYgzg==";
+
+    let (object_info, encrypted, expected_sha256) = load_fixture_reader_input("sse-c-multipart-8m").await;
+
+    let plaintext = read_ssec_fixture_plaintext(encrypted, object_info, SSEC_KEY_B64, SSEC_KEY_MD5_B64)
+        .await
+        .expect("MinIO SSE-C fixture must restore with the customer key");
+
+    assert_eq!(sha256_hex(&plaintext), expected_sha256);
+}
+
+/// The read path skips the stored-MD5 comparison for MinIO SSE-C objects,
+/// which store no MD5. This holds the line that made that safe: the customer
+/// key is still proven by the object-key unseal, so a wrong key must fail even
+/// with nothing to compare it against.
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore = "requires generated MinIO fixture data"]
+async fn sse_c_wrong_customer_key_still_fails_without_a_stored_md5() {
+    // A well-formed 32-byte key that is not the one the fixture was sealed
+    // with, sent with its own correct MD5 so the request itself is valid.
+    const WRONG_KEY_B64: &str = "AQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQE=";
+    const WRONG_KEY_MD5_B64: &str = "0YB4bMPPCf9SNlqiKmM0uQ==";
+
+    let (object_info, encrypted, expected_sha256) = load_fixture_reader_input("sse-c-multipart-8m").await;
+
+    let result = read_ssec_fixture_plaintext(encrypted, object_info, WRONG_KEY_B64, WRONG_KEY_MD5_B64).await;
+
+    match result {
+        Err(_) => {}
+        // Never reached today, and asserted rather than assumed: if a future
+        // change let a wrong key through, returning the real plaintext would be
+        // the worst possible outcome.
+        Ok(plaintext) => assert_ne!(
+            sha256_hex(&plaintext),
+            expected_sha256,
+            "a wrong SSE-C customer key must never restore the original plaintext"
+        ),
+    }
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 #[ignore = "requires generated MinIO fixture data and a local static KMS key"]
 async fn rejects_minio_generated_sse_s3_fixture_with_wrong_kms_key() {
diff --git a/rustfs/src/storage/sse.rs b/rustfs/src/storage/sse.rs
index eda06a7dd..e08606aa5 100644
--- a/rustfs/src/storage/sse.rs
+++ b/rustfs/src/storage/sse.rs
@@ -2061,10 +2061,20 @@ pub async fn sse_prepare_encryption(request: PrepareEncryptionRequest<'_>) -> Re
 /// }
 /// ```
 pub async fn sse_decryption(request: DecryptionRequest<'_>) -> Result<Option<DecryptionMaterial>, ApiError> {
-    // Check for SSE-C encryption
+    // Check for SSE-C encryption.
+    //
+    // The stored customer-algorithm marker is what RustFS writes, but a
+    // MinIO-written object has only the internal sealed-key slot: MinIO keeps
+    // the customer algorithm on the request and synthesizes it back onto the
+    // response, never persisting it. Recognizing that slot as well is what lets
+    // a migrated SSE-C object be read at all; the customer key still has to be
+    // supplied, and is still checked against the stored MD5 below.
     if request
         .metadata
         .contains_key("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-algorithm")
+        || request
+            .metadata
+            .contains_key(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER)
     {
         let (key, key_md5) = match (request.sse_customer_key, request.sse_customer_key_md5) {
             (Some(k), Some(md5)) => (k, md5),
@@ -2078,7 +2088,21 @@ pub async fn sse_decryption(request: DecryptionRequest<'_>) -> Result<Option<Dec
 
         // Verify that the provided key MD5 matches the stored MD5 for security
         let stored_md5 = request.metadata.get("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-key-md5");
-        verify_ssec_key_match(key_md5, stored_md5)?;
+        // MinIO stores no customer-key MD5 — it keeps that header on the request
+        // and returns it on the response — so requiring one would make every
+        // migrated SSE-C object unreadable. Skipping the comparison when there is
+        // nothing to compare against does not weaken the check it performs: the
+        // stored MD5 is an early, friendlier rejection, while the key itself is
+        // proven by the object-key unseal below, whose AEAD fails on a wrong key.
+        // `sse_c_wrong_customer_key_still_fails_without_a_stored_md5` holds that
+        // line. Objects that *do* carry a stored MD5 are unaffected.
+        let minio_ssec_without_stored_md5 = stored_md5.is_none()
+            && request
+                .metadata
+                .contains_key(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER);
+        if !minio_ssec_without_stored_md5 {
+            verify_ssec_key_match(key_md5, stored_md5)?;
+        }
 
         let mut material = apply_ssec_decryption_material(request.bucket, request.key, request.metadata, key, key_md5).await?;
         material.customer_key_md5 = Some(key_md5.clone());
@@ -4739,6 +4763,43 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
+    /// A stored customer-key MD5 must still be compared against the one the
+    /// request presents.
+    ///
+    /// The read path skips that comparison for MinIO SSE-C objects, which store
+    /// no MD5. Nothing pinned the check for objects that *do* store one —
+    /// disabling it outright left this file's 115 tests green — so a later
+    /// widening of that skip would have gone unnoticed. The mismatch has to be
+    /// refused here, at the request boundary, rather than surfacing later as a
+    /// decryption failure.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ssec_stored_md5_mismatch_is_refused_when_an_md5_is_stored() {
+        let key = SSECustomerKey::from(BASE64_STANDARD.encode([0x11u8; 32]));
+        let provided_md5 = SSECustomerKeyMD5::from(md5_base64(&[0x11u8; 32]));
+
+        let metadata = HashMap::from([
+            (SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
+            // A stored MD5 that belongs to a different key.
+            ("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-key-md5".to_string(), md5_base64(&[0x22u8; 32])),
+        ]);
+
+        let error = sse_decryption(DecryptionRequest {
+            bucket: "bucket",
+            key: "object",
+            metadata: &metadata,
+            sse_customer_key: Some(&key),
+            sse_customer_key_md5: Some(&provided_md5),
+            principal: None,
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect_err("a stored MD5 that does not match the request must be refused");
+
+        assert!(
+            format!("{error:?}").contains("did not match"),
+            "expected the parameter-mismatch refusal, got {error:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_sse_kms_roundtrip_persists_and_uses_minio_context() {
         use rustfs_kms::types::{CreateKeyRequest, KeyUsage};