fix(storage): harden ODM and scanner publication (#7187)

* fix(storage): harden ODM and scanner publication

* fix(app): simplify absent SSE configuration matching

* test(heal): settle PUT rename tails before disk-wipe fixtures

* fix(ecstore): remove duplicate local rename implementation

Keep the canonical commit module after concurrent storage changes merged.
The control-write and rollback changes are already present there.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(ci): satisfy new clippy lints

* style(scanner): order merged test imports

* fix(scanner): invalidate bucket work after namespace completion

* fix(scanner): fence cached snapshots by scan execution

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Zhengchao An
2026-09-05 21:47:12 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 447f3c704b
commit e2a921bc16
35 changed files with 2252 additions and 274 deletions
+47 -1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,30 @@ therefore has three identities:
If any identity changes before commit, the result is a candidate for retry or
observation, not an authoritative baseline.
Ordinary PUT rename fanouts also track instance-scoped in-flight work. A quorum
ACK does not release it: the actual disk tasks retain ownership until their
rename work ends, including when the request caller is cancelled. Scan admission
remains movement-only so sustained PUTs do not stop namespace walks and
scanner-driven lifecycle discovery. The post-walk local publication check and
remote publication leases reject pending fanouts. Begin/end namespace generations
invalidate scans and cached plans across the fanout; after acquiring remote
leases, the coordinator rechecks the full activity digest before publishing an
authoritative aggregate. This catches a tail that finishes between the scan's
last probe and lease acquisition.
This adds no namespace or movement lock. An already-verified older snapshot may
still precede a newly started write. Sustained or stalled PUT tails can delay
authoritative usage publication, which resumes through the existing retry
schedule rather than a new immediate-wakeup protocol. Intermediate per-set and
prefix cache readers retain their existing approximate-cache semantics. A
prolonged pending tail with no generation changes can also delay cycle advancement
and fresh rescans of already-current caches; this is not a guarantee of lifecycle
progress under indefinitely stalled storage I/O.
This PUT-tail protection requires every writer node to be upgraded. It does not
prove that a failed tail replica has healed, and it does not extend the same
in-flight tracking to multipart or other namespace mutation paths.
## Fences
The protocol uses separate fences because they exclude different stale inputs.
@@ -33,7 +57,7 @@ They must not be collapsed unless the replacement proves the same exclusions.
| Scanner leadership claim | scanner | competing scanner leaders and stale cycle writers |
| Storage publication epoch | ECStore | usage computed across rebalance, decommission, or other data-movement generations |
| Publication lease | scanner peers through ECStore-facing activity probes | remote dirty-usage or maintenance state that has not acknowledged the candidate |
| CAS revision | backing config object store | lost updates to `.usage.v2.json`, `.usage.json`, or cycle-state objects |
| CAS revision | backing config object store | lost updates to usage snapshots, scanner caches, or cycle-state objects |
| Per-set freshness | scanner aggregation | a merged usage snapshot that combines stale and current set results |
| Tier registry generation | scanner tier accounting | bytes classified against a different warm-tier registry |
| Usage floor identity | scanner publication and ECStore quota fallback | empty or legacy values becoming plausible authoritative quota input |
@@ -42,6 +66,28 @@ A reader that cannot prove the required fence for its surface must fail closed
or use the documented observed path below. It must not synthesize an empty usage
snapshot for a missing or corrupt authoritative object.
## Cache Execution Identity
The structural scan-plan digest can remain stable across ordinary bucket writes
so a scoped scan can retain unaffected baseline buckets. It is not sufficient
proof for reusing a completed result within the same cycle. Bucket work uses an
execution digest combining the structural plan and the full activity snapshot,
with the bucket's dirty generation included in its cache identity. Completed set
caches carry the same execution digest separately from their structural plan.
The persisted set-root fast path requires equal execution identities as well as
the existing source, cycle, leader, tier, and cache-structure checks.
A set scan also captures its starting cache revisions. When the persisted
execution differs, replacement requires those revisions to remain unchanged;
otherwise a slow scan could overwrite a newer completed result. The existing
cache lock, conditional save, and movement admission still fence the commit.
The optional `scan_execution_digest` field is appended to the map-encoded cache
metadata. Legacy caches remain readable but cannot satisfy same-cycle set-root
reuse without this identity. Older readers can ignore the added map key, but
older writers do not enforce its fence; readability is not a mixed-version
publication-safety guarantee.
## Persisted Objects
The persisted objects are part of the compatibility contract. Removing one
+14 -4
View File
@@ -89,9 +89,11 @@ Setting `"enabled": false` in the config has the same read-path effect as deleti
The status endpoint reports **the node that answered the request**. Counters, queue depth and breaker state are per-node runtime state, so in a distributed deployment query every node; the saved configuration and `updated_at` are cluster-wide.
### Backfill (ships with ODM-12)
### Backfill
Read-through only migrates what clients touch. The background backfill job walks the source listing and pulls the remainder, with a persisted checkpoint (`.rustfs.sys/buckets/<bucket>/on-demand-migration-backfill.json`), a single-owner lease, resume after restart, and `POST .../{bucket}/backfill?op=start|cancel` plus `GET .../{bucket}/backfill` admin routes. That slice (rustfs/backlog#2159) is not part of the build this page was written against: the shape above is the agreed design, and the exact request/response bodies must be re-checked against `docs/architecture/admin-route-action-snapshot.md` once it lands.
Backfill waits for the result of every pull, including a pull already queued by an online request. A failed or cancelled shared pull is counted as a failure, never as successful migration. The persisted continuation cursor stays at the first failed page; a takeover replays from there and skips objects already present locally. `completed_with_failures` is not a cutover-ready state.
Read-through only migrates what clients touch. The background backfill job walks the source listing and pulls the remainder, with a persisted checkpoint (`.rustfs.sys/buckets/<bucket>/on-demand-migration-backfill.json`), a single-owner lease, resume after restart, and `POST .../{bucket}/backfill?op=start|cancel` plus `GET .../{bucket}/backfill` admin routes. See `docs/architecture/admin-route-action-snapshot.md` for the route contract.
## Configuration reference
@@ -129,7 +131,7 @@ The persisted blob is `on-demand-migration.json` in the bucket's metadata. Unkno
| `policy.source_timeout.idle_ms` | integer | `30000` | `100..=600000`; enforced per body chunk on both the background pump and the inline tee |
| `policy.bandwidth_limit_bytes_per_sec` | integer \| null | `null` | When set, at least `65536` |
Values that are **not** configurable: the breaker opens after 5 consecutive counted failures inside a 30 s window, stays open for 30 s and then admits one probe (`breaker.rs`); the negative cache holds at most 100 000 keys per bucket with LRU eviction (`negative_cache.rs`); a background pull retries a retryable source failure at most 3 times with 1 s / 4 s / 16 s base delays plus up to 25 % jitter (`pull.rs`). The SDK's own retry policy is disabled on the source client, so one logical source call is exactly one wire request and the retry budget above is the only one.
Values that are **not** configurable: the breaker opens after 5 consecutive counted failures inside a 30 s window, stays open for 30 s and then admits one probe (`breaker.rs`); the negative cache holds at most 100 000 keys per bucket with LRU eviction (`negative_cache.rs`); a background pull retries a retryable source failure at most 3 times with 1 s / 4 s / 16 s base delays plus up to 25 % jitter (`pull.rs`). The SDK's own retry policy is disabled on the source client. Each SDK operation makes one wire request; an ambiguous HEAD 404 additionally probes the bucket, within the same configured first-byte budget.
Validation also rejects two shapes outright: a source whose endpoint and bucket name **this** bucket on this deployment (`SelfReference`), and a source that matches one of the bucket's own replication targets (`ReplicationLoop`) — that pairing would amplify a write-back into a loop.
@@ -160,6 +162,14 @@ No write, delete, ACL or versioning permission is required or used. Scope the po
Behaviour a client can observe. The "Test" column names the case that pins it: `*_test.rs` files live under `crates/e2e_test/src/on_demand_migration/`, and the unit tests live next to the code in `rustfs/src/app/object/get.rs`, `head.rs` and `shared.rs`.
ODM merged continuation tokens use a NUL-prefixed JSON envelope inside the existing base64 encoding. NUL is not valid in a local object key, so a legitimate JSON-shaped key can never be mistaken for a merged cursor. Upgrade every node before using list-through, and restart any in-progress ODM listing issued by an older build: its unframed JSON tokens cannot be distinguished from legitimate local keys. Ordinary local listing tokens remain unchanged. Tokens issued by this build can still resume the local side after list-through is disabled.
Source `HEAD` responses with status 404 require a successful bucket probe before being negative-cached. The source credential therefore needs permission for `HeadBucket` (S3 `ListBucket`); a prefix-restricted ListBucket policy can deny that probe, in which case the response is a source failure rather than a cached miss. A missing/inaccessible source bucket, a missing source version, or an ambiguous GET 404 is not proof that the requested key is absent. Conditional GET validators are checked against the actual source GET metadata as well as the advisory HEAD; a missing required validator fails with 424. Source LIST entries without a key or a non-negative size fail the page rather than fabricating an empty object.
Write-back currently requires namespace locking enabled and exactly one pool with one erasure set. Other topologies fail write-back explicitly as `unsupported`: source reads remain available, but backfill cannot complete successfully or certify cutover. This restriction avoids relying on a set-local condition across distinct pool or lock domains; it does not restrict ordinary S3 writes. Full cross-pool migration requires a globally fenced commit protocol.
On the supported topology, write-back uses a create-only check under the local storage commit lock for both single-part PUT and multipart completion. A client write that commits while ODM is reading the source is preserved. With `respect_local_delete_marker=true`, a concurrent versioned deletion is preserved too. An explicit `respect_local_delete_marker=false` still permits revival; an unversioned deletion has no tombstone and therefore cannot be distinguished from a key that has never existed locally.
| Situation | Behaviour | Test |
|---|---|---|
| GET miss, object at or below `inline_max_bytes` | One source GET, teed: the client streams while the same bytes are written locally. Later reads are local and carry no source marker | `get_basic_test.rs::get_miss_pulls_inline_and_serves_locally_afterwards`, `get.rs::odm_get_inline_streams_to_client_and_commits_the_same_bytes` |
@@ -229,7 +239,7 @@ Five provenance keys are written on every pulled object under both internal pref
| Concurrency limit | Local write amplification | `max_concurrent_pulls` permits shared by inline and background pulls |
| Bounded queue | Unbounded memory on a burst | `pull_queue_capacity` waiting jobs; overflow is counted as `queue_full` and never fails a client response |
| Bandwidth limit | Source and network saturation | `bandwidth_limit_bytes_per_sec` (minimum 64 KiB/s) on the source client |
| Retry budget | Transient source blips | Background pulls retry a retryable failure up to 3 times (1 s / 4 s / 16 s plus jitter). Inline pulls never retry: the bytes are already on their way to the client. The SDK retry policy on the source client is disabled (`RemoteS3RetryPolicy::Disabled`), so this is the only retry budget and one logical source call is exactly one wire request — replication targets keep the SDK's three attempts, declared on their own spec |
| Retry budget | Transient source blips | Background pulls retry a retryable failure up to 3 times (1 s / 4 s / 16 s plus jitter). Inline pulls never retry: the bytes are already on their way to the client. The SDK retry policy is disabled (`RemoteS3RetryPolicy::Disabled`); HEAD 404 also requires one bucket probe. Replication targets keep their separately declared three SDK attempts |
| Idle timeout | A source that answers and then goes quiet mid-body | `source_timeout.idle_ms` per body chunk on both paths. The budget measures the source read, upstream of the inline tee, so a slow client is never mistaken for an idle source; when it fires the client stream ends in an error and the write-back is discarded |
| Anti-loop marker | Migration chains between RustFS/MinIO deployments | Every source request carries `x-rustfs-source-proxy-request` and `x-minio-source-proxy-request`; a request carrying it is always answered locally |
| Outbound endpoint policy | SSRF | See [outbound-connection-policy.md](outbound-connection-policy.md) |