refactor(replication): move resyncer pure decision logic into rustfs-replication (M2)

Pure-move milestone M2 of the ECStore replication split (backlog#1675
P1-17): relocate the resyncer's IO-free decision helpers, with their unit
tests, into the crates they already belong to by type ownership. No
behavior change.

Moved into crates/replication:
- resync.rs: resync_status_duration
- delete.rs: resync_existing_delete_replication_info,
  replicate_delete_outcome, target_delete_version_id,
  delete_marker_purge_version_id, delete_marker_purge_mrf_entry
- object.rs: version_identity_drifted, is_replication_target_offline_error,
  SsecPassthroughCapability, SsecPassthroughGate, ssec_passthrough_gate,
  ssec_passthrough_evidence_present (param-demoted to the echoed
  customer-algorithm string; ECStore keeps the HeadObjectOutput adapter)
- filemeta.rs: NULL_VERSION_ID wire literal (crate-owned copy per the
  filemeta-independence contract)

ECStore rewiring (Rule #14: imports stay in *_boundary.rs):
- resync/object-decision/target boundaries re-export the moved symbols;
  resyncer call sites are unchanged
- bucket_target_sys keeps only the verdict cache + TTL and re-exports the
  capability enum so existing consumer paths keep compiling

Not moved (signatures carry ECStore or aws-sdk types):
verify_resync_head_result, resync_target_error_detail, the SdkError
classifiers, the replicate_all_* option/info builders, and the env-coupled
bounded_resync_max_jobs admission clamp. README milestone table updated.
This commit is contained in:
唐小鸭
2026-08-18 02:48:29 +08:00
parent d20476a66c
commit daa7435bdf
13 changed files with 518 additions and 455 deletions
@@ -36,12 +36,15 @@ use time::OffsetDateTime;
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::{
AdvancedPutOptions, PutObjectOptions, PutObjectPartOptions, RemoveObjectOptions, SsecPassthroughCapability, TargetClient,
resolve_read_api_version_id,
AdvancedPutOptions, PutObjectOptions, PutObjectPartOptions, RemoveObjectOptions, TargetClient, resolve_read_api_version_id,
};
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::target::BucketTarget;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::target::BucketTargets;
pub use rustfs_replication::SsecPassthroughCapability;
pub(crate) use rustfs_replication::{
SsecPassthroughGate, is_replication_target_offline_error, ssec_passthrough_gate, version_identity_drifted,
};
use super::replication_config_store::ReplicationConfigStore;
use super::replication_error_boundary::{Error, Result};
@@ -149,52 +152,11 @@ pub(crate) fn replication_object_is_ssec_encrypted(user_defined: &HashMap<String
rustfs_replication::is_ssec_encrypted(user_defined)
}
/// Fail-closed decision for an SSE-C passthrough replication attempt, derived
/// from the target's cached [`SsecPassthroughCapability`]. Pure so the policy
/// can migrate with the worker (M2) without dragging the cache along; the
/// caller computes `expired` from the cache record's age (see
/// `SSEC_PASSTHROUGH_CAPABILITY_TTL`).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum SsecPassthroughGate {
/// Not an SSE-C object, or the target has a fresh proof that it preserves
/// the passthrough transport headers: replicate without a HEAD-back audit.
Proceed,
/// No usable verdict — first SSE-C attempt since the target was (re)built,
/// or the recorded verdict (in either direction) aged out: PUT, then HEAD
/// the replica back and require SSE-C evidence before reporting COMPLETED.
ProceedWithAudit,
/// The target was recently proven to drop the passthrough headers: do not
/// send the PUT, report FAILED (the object stays on the normal MRF retry
/// channel and re-audits once the verdict expires).
FailClosed,
}
pub(crate) fn ssec_passthrough_gate(ssec: bool, capability: SsecPassthroughCapability, expired: bool) -> SsecPassthroughGate {
if !ssec {
return SsecPassthroughGate::Proceed;
}
// An expired verdict — Supported or Unsupported — must be re-earned: a
// stale Unsupported would otherwise stick forever after a target upgrade,
// and a stale Supported would fail open after a backend swap behind the
// same endpoint.
if expired {
return SsecPassthroughGate::ProceedWithAudit;
}
match capability {
SsecPassthroughCapability::Supported => SsecPassthroughGate::Proceed,
SsecPassthroughCapability::Unknown => SsecPassthroughGate::ProceedWithAudit,
SsecPassthroughCapability::Unsupported => SsecPassthroughGate::FailClosed,
}
}
/// True when a replication-check HEAD of the replica proves the SSE-C
/// material survived passthrough: a RustFS target restores the transport
/// headers into the stored SSE-C keys and its HEAD echoes
/// `x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-algorithm` (the replication-check
/// exemption skips key validation but not the metadata echo). A target that
/// dropped the headers stored a plain object and echoes nothing.
/// HeadObjectOutput adapter over the pure SSE-C passthrough evidence
/// judgment owned by `rustfs-replication`: extract the echoed
/// customer-algorithm header and let the crate-owned policy decide.
pub(crate) fn ssec_passthrough_evidence_present(head: &HeadObjectOutput) -> bool {
head.sse_customer_algorithm.as_deref().is_some_and(|algo| !algo.is_empty())
rustfs_replication::ssec_passthrough_evidence_present(head.sse_customer_algorithm.as_deref())
}
pub(crate) struct ReplicationTargetStore;
@@ -960,53 +922,9 @@ mod tests {
}
}
/// N2 fail-closed policy: SSE-C replication may only proceed silently
/// against a target with a FRESH proof that it preserves the passthrough
/// transport headers. Unknown targets must be audited; freshly-flagged
/// dropping targets must never receive the PUT; an expired verdict in
/// EITHER direction must be re-earned through the audit — a sticky
/// Unsupported would outlive a target upgrade, and a sticky Supported
/// would fail open after a backend swap behind the same endpoint.
#[test]
fn ssec_passthrough_gate_is_fail_closed_and_ttl_bounded() {
for capability in [
SsecPassthroughCapability::Unknown,
SsecPassthroughCapability::Supported,
SsecPassthroughCapability::Unsupported,
] {
for expired in [false, true] {
assert_eq!(
ssec_passthrough_gate(false, capability, expired),
SsecPassthroughGate::Proceed,
"non-SSE-C objects must never be gated on the passthrough capability"
);
}
}
assert_eq!(
ssec_passthrough_gate(true, SsecPassthroughCapability::Supported, false),
SsecPassthroughGate::Proceed
);
assert_eq!(
ssec_passthrough_gate(true, SsecPassthroughCapability::Unknown, false),
SsecPassthroughGate::ProceedWithAudit
);
assert_eq!(
ssec_passthrough_gate(true, SsecPassthroughCapability::Unsupported, false),
SsecPassthroughGate::FailClosed
);
// Expiry flips both directions back to the audit.
assert_eq!(
ssec_passthrough_gate(true, SsecPassthroughCapability::Unsupported, true),
SsecPassthroughGate::ProceedWithAudit,
"an expired Unsupported verdict must allow a re-audit (upgraded target recovers without operator action)"
);
assert_eq!(
ssec_passthrough_gate(true, SsecPassthroughCapability::Supported, true),
SsecPassthroughGate::ProceedWithAudit,
"an expired Supported verdict must be re-proven (backend swap behind the same endpoint must not fail open)"
);
}
/// Pins the HeadObjectOutput field extraction feeding the crate-owned
/// evidence judgment (the gate/evidence policy matrix itself is pinned in
/// `rustfs-replication`'s object tests).
#[test]
fn ssec_passthrough_evidence_requires_customer_algorithm_echo() {
let with_evidence = HeadObjectOutput::builder().sse_customer_algorithm("AES256").build();