mirror of
https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs.git
synced 2026-09-06 20:19:14 +00:00
fix(admin): preserve metadata during export and target repair (#7258)
* fix(admin): reject incomplete metadata backups * fix(admin): repair remote targets from locked disk state * test(admin): fence target repair against source changes * fix(admin): report unreadable XML in metadata exports * test(admin): enable loopback in target repair fixtures * refactor(admin): remove unused metadata getter forwards * test(admin): box direct target repair futures * test(admin): box target repair scenarios at env boundary
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ pub mod bucket {
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pub mod bucket_target_sys {
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pub use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::{
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AdvancedPutOptions, BucketTargetError, BucketTargetSys, PutObjectOptions, RemoveObjectOptions, S3ClientError,
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SsecPassthroughCapability, TargetClient, UnreadableTargetsPolicy, append_version_id_query,
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SsecPassthroughCapability, TargetClient, append_version_id_query,
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};
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}
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@@ -369,26 +369,6 @@ struct SsecPassthroughRecord {
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recorded_at: Instant,
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}
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/// What a target write does when the bucket's persisted target set exists but
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/// cannot be decoded.
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///
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/// `docs/architecture/remote-credential-sealing-adr.md` forbids rewriting a
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/// configuration that could not be fully read, because re-serializing a
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/// partial in-memory view is the one mechanism by which a configured target
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/// really disappears. That rule guards against an *unintentional* overwrite,
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/// so an operator who names the hazard keeps a repair path
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/// (rustfs/backlog#2309); everything that does not name it stays refused.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
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pub enum UnreadableTargetsPolicy {
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/// Refuse the write with [`BucketTargetError::BucketRemoteTargetsUnreadable`].
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#[default]
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FailClosed,
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/// Discard the unreadable set; the target being written becomes the whole
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/// configuration. Reachable only from an admin request that asked for it
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/// explicitly, and audited by the caller.
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Replace,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Default)]
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pub struct BucketTargetSys {
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pub arn_remotes_map: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, ArnTarget>>>,
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@@ -811,41 +791,23 @@ impl BucketTargetSys {
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bucket: &str,
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target: &BucketTarget,
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update: bool,
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unreadable_policy: UnreadableTargetsPolicy,
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) -> Result<BucketTargets, BucketTargetError> {
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self.validate_target(bucket, target).await?;
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let mut bucket_targets = self.targets_base_for_write(bucket, unreadable_policy).await?;
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let mut bucket_targets = self.targets_base_for_write(bucket).await?;
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Self::upsert_target_entry(&mut bucket_targets.targets, target, update)?;
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Ok(bucket_targets)
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}
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/// The persisted target set a write merges into.
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///
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/// An absent configuration starts from the empty set. An unreadable one is
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/// refused, because re-serializing a partial view of a set this node could
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/// not decode is how a configured target disappears for good — unless the
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/// caller carries the operator's explicit
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/// [`UnreadableTargetsPolicy::Replace`] opt-in, which discards it
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/// deliberately (rustfs/backlog#2309).
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async fn targets_base_for_write(
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&self,
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bucket: &str,
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unreadable_policy: UnreadableTargetsPolicy,
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) -> Result<BucketTargets, BucketTargetError> {
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/// Ordinary writes must not turn an unreadable cached snapshot into an
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/// empty configuration. Explicit repair belongs to the metadata transaction
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/// that can inspect the current persisted state.
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async fn targets_base_for_write(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<BucketTargets, BucketTargetError> {
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match self.list_bucket_targets(bucket).await {
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Ok(targets) => Ok(targets),
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Err(BucketTargetError::BucketRemoteTargetNotFound { .. }) => Ok(BucketTargets::default()),
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// The opt-in discards only a set this node genuinely cannot read.
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// A readable set still merges through the arm above, so the policy
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// can never drop a target that was visible here.
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Err(BucketTargetError::BucketRemoteTargetsUnreadable { .. })
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if unreadable_policy == UnreadableTargetsPolicy::Replace =>
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{
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Ok(BucketTargets::default())
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}
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Err(err) => Err(err),
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}
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}
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@@ -908,7 +870,9 @@ impl BucketTargetSys {
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Ok(())
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}
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fn upsert_target_entry(
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/// Merge a validated target into a caller-owned snapshot. The caller must
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/// protect that snapshot through persistence.
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pub fn upsert_target_entry(
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bucket_targets: &mut Vec<BucketTarget>,
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target: &BucketTarget,
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update: bool,
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@@ -1272,25 +1236,27 @@ impl BucketTargetSys {
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return (String::new(), false);
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};
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{
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let targets_map = self.targets_map.read().await;
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if let Some(targets) = targets_map.get(bucket) {
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for tgt in targets {
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if tgt.target_type == target.target_type
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&& tgt.target_bucket == target.target_bucket
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&& target.endpoint == tgt.endpoint
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&& tgt
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.credentials
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.as_ref()
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.map(|c| {
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let default_creds = Credentials::default();
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c.access_key == target.credentials.as_ref().unwrap_or(&default_creds).access_key
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})
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.unwrap_or(false)
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{
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return (tgt.arn.clone(), true);
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}
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}
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let targets_map = self.targets_map.read().await;
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let targets = targets_map.get(bucket).map(Vec::as_slice).unwrap_or_default();
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Self::remote_arn_for_targets(targets, target, depl_id)
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}
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/// Resolve create idempotency against the snapshot the caller will persist.
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pub fn remote_arn_for_targets(targets: &[BucketTarget], target: &BucketTarget, depl_id: &str) -> (String, bool) {
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for tgt in targets {
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if tgt.target_type == target.target_type
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&& tgt.target_bucket == target.target_bucket
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&& target.endpoint == tgt.endpoint
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&& tgt
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.credentials
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.as_ref()
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.map(|c| {
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let default_creds = Credentials::default();
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c.access_key == target.credentials.as_ref().unwrap_or(&default_creds).access_key
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})
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.unwrap_or(false)
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{
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return (tgt.arn.clone(), true);
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}
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}
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@@ -4371,47 +4337,19 @@ mod tests {
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}
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}
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/// rustfs/backlog#2309: after rustfs/rustfs#7172 an undecodable
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/// `bucket-targets.json` left the bucket with no API repair path at all.
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/// The refusal is the default and stays the default; the operator's
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/// explicit opt-in is the only thing that discards the set, and it starts
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/// the replacement from empty rather than from a partial view of bytes
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/// this node never decoded.
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn an_unreadable_target_set_is_replaced_only_with_the_explicit_opt_in() {
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async fn an_unreadable_target_set_refuses_cached_writes() {
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let sys = BucketTargetSys::default();
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let bucket = "targets-repair-opt-in";
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sys.mark_targets_unreadable(bucket).await;
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assert!(
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matches!(
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sys.targets_base_for_write(bucket, UnreadableTargetsPolicy::FailClosed).await,
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Err(BucketTargetError::BucketRemoteTargetsUnreadable { .. })
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),
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"without the opt-in an unreadable target set must still refuse the write"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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UnreadableTargetsPolicy::default(),
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UnreadableTargetsPolicy::FailClosed,
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"a caller that says nothing must get the refusal"
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);
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let base = sys
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.targets_base_for_write(bucket, UnreadableTargetsPolicy::Replace)
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.await
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.expect("the explicit opt-in must let an operator replace an unreadable set");
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assert!(
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base.is_empty(),
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"the replacement must start from an empty set, never from a partial decode"
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);
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assert!(matches!(
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sys.targets_base_for_write(bucket).await,
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Err(BucketTargetError::BucketRemoteTargetsUnreadable { .. })
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));
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}
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/// The opt-in is not a wipe switch. On a set this node can read, both
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/// policies take the same merge path, so a stray `replace-unreadable=true`
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/// cannot drop a visible target — which is what makes the flag safe to
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/// repeat in an operator's repair script.
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn the_opt_in_never_discards_a_readable_target_set() {
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async fn a_readable_target_set_remains_the_write_base() {
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let sys = BucketTargetSys::default();
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let bucket = "targets-repair-readable";
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let existing = repair_target(bucket, "keep");
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@@ -4419,14 +4357,8 @@ mod tests {
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.write()
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.await
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.insert(bucket.to_string(), vec![existing.clone()]);
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for policy in [UnreadableTargetsPolicy::FailClosed, UnreadableTargetsPolicy::Replace] {
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let base = sys
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.targets_base_for_write(bucket, policy)
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.await
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.expect("a readable target set must be readable under either policy");
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assert_eq!(base.targets.len(), 1, "{policy:?} must keep the persisted target");
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assert_eq!(base.targets[0].arn, existing.arn, "{policy:?} must not rewrite the persisted target");
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}
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let base = sys.targets_base_for_write(bucket).await.expect("read targets");
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assert_eq!(base.targets.len(), 1);
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assert_eq!(base.targets[0].arn, existing.arn);
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}
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}
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