chore(agents): add Rust code quality rules and skill (#3144)

* docs: update security advisory lessons * chore(agents): add Rust code quality rules and skill Add rules derived from full-project code review (48 findings across 7 dimensions) to prevent recurring issues in agent-generated code. AGENTS.md changes: - crates/AGENTS.md: error type design, concurrency, recursion safety, type casting, test quality rules - root AGENTS.md: serde safety, naming conventions - crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md: allocation discipline, lock ordering, recursion safety, dead code policy - crates/notify/AGENTS.md: lock ordering for runtime_view/facade Skill changes: - code-change-verification: add Rust-specific checks (unwrap, as cast, clone, lock order, recursion, error types, test assertions) - security-advisory-lessons: add serde deserialization safety pattern - NEW rust-code-quality: automated scan + manual review checklist
2026-08-19 11:06:17 +00:00 · 2026-05-31 22:19:36 +08:00
parent 8577bd825e
commit b5e565c0ce
9 changed files with 272 additions and 2 deletions
@@ -41,6 +41,19 @@ Use this skill to review code changes consistently before merge, before release,
  - hidden coupling to shared helpers/constants/features
 - If a point is uncertain, mark it as an open question instead of guessing.

+#### Rust-specific checks (apply to all Rust changes)
+
+- **unwrap/expect in production**: Search changed files for `.unwrap()` and `.expect(` outside test modules. Every `unwrap()` in production code must have a justification comment or be replaced with `?`.
+- **Silent type truncation**: Search for `as u8/u16/u32/u64/usize/i8/i16/i32/i64/isize` casts. Every `as` cast must be justified; negative-to-unsigned and large-to-small are bugs by default. Use `try_into()` or explicit clamping.
+- **Unnecessary cloning**: Check `.clone()` calls in loops, per-request paths, and on structs with >5 heap-allocated fields. Consider `Arc`, references, or `Cow<str>`.
+- **Lock ordering**: If the change acquires multiple locks, verify the order matches all other call sites. Document the order in a comment.
+- **Locks across .await**: Flag any `tokio::sync::RwLock`/`Mutex` guard held across an `.await` point without bounded hold time.
+- **Recursion depth**: If the change adds or modifies a recursive function, verify it has a depth limit or uses iterative traversal with an explicit stack.
+- **Error types**: Flag `Result<_, String>`, `Box<dyn Error>`, and missing `Error::source()` implementations in public APIs.
+- **Test assertions**: Every test function must have at least one `assert!`. Flag tests that only call code without verifying results.
+- **println/eprintln**: Search changed files for `println!`/`eprintln!` outside test modules. Production code must use `tracing` macros.
+- **Serde safety**: Structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API, user config) should have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]`.
+
 ### 4) Findings-first output
 - Order findings by severity:
  - P0: critical failure, security breach, or data loss risk
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+name: rust-code-quality
+description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every code change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
+---
+
+# Rust Code Quality Gate
+
+Use this skill on every Rust code change to enforce quality rules that `cargo clippy` does not catch.
+
+## Quick Start
+
+1. Identify changed `.rs` files.
+2. Run automated checks on changed files.
+3. Run manual review checklist on the diff.
+4. Report findings; block merge if P0/P1 issues exist.
+
+## Automated Checks
+
+Run these on every changed `.rs` file (excluding test modules):
+
+```bash
+# 1. unwrap/expect in production code
+rg -n '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' <changed-files> | grep -v '#\[cfg(test)\]' | grep -v 'test' | grep -v 'bench'
+
+# 2. Silent type truncation via `as` cast
+rg -n ' as (u8|u16|u32|u64|usize|i8|i16|i32|i64|isize)\b' <changed-files>
+
+# 3. String as error type
+rg -n 'Result<.*String>' <changed-files> | grep -v test
+
+# 4. Box<dyn Error> in public APIs
+rg -n 'Box<dyn.*Error' <changed-files> | grep -v test
+
+# 5. println/eprintln in production
+rg -n 'println!\|eprintln!' <changed-files> | grep -v test
+
+# 6. Ordering::Relaxed usage (verify each is intentional)
+rg -n 'Ordering::Relaxed' <changed-files>
+```
+
+## Manual Review Checklist
+
+For every Rust code change, verify:
+
+### Error Handling
+- [ ] No `unwrap()` or `expect()` in production code without justification comment
+- [ ] No `Result<_, String>` in public API signatures
+- [ ] No `Box<dyn Error>` in public trait/struct methods
+- [ ] `Error::source()` is overridden when inner error is stored
+- [ ] Error messages are actionable (what failed, with what input)
+
+### Type Safety
+- [ ] No silent `as` truncation (negative→unsigned, large→small)
+- [ ] `try_into()` or explicit clamping used for numeric conversions
+- [ ] No `f64 as usize` without prior clamping
+
+### Concurrency
+- [ ] Lock acquisition order is documented when multiple locks are used
+- [ ] No `tokio::sync` write guards held across `.await` without bounded hold time
+- [ ] Concurrent counters use `compare_exchange` loops, not load-then-store
+- [ ] `std::sync::Mutex` in async context is held only briefly, never across `.await`
+
+### Memory and Performance
+- [ ] No `.clone()` on structs with >5 heap-allocated fields in hot paths
+- [ ] `HashMap::with_capacity()` / `Vec::with_capacity()` used when size is known
+- [ ] Large buffers wrapped in `Arc` rather than cloned
+- [ ] Temporary string computations use `&str` or `Cow<str>` instead of `String`
+
+### Recursion Safety
+- [ ] Recursive functions have a depth limit or use iterative traversal
+- [ ] Tree/cache traversals handle corrupted/cyclic input safely
+
+### Testing
+- [ ] Every test function has at least one `assert!`
+- [ ] Tests use `.expect("context")` not bare `.unwrap()`
+- [ ] No `println!`/`eprintln!` in production code (use `tracing`)
+
+### Serde
+- [ ] Structs from untrusted input have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]`
+- [ ] `#[serde(default)]` not used on security-critical fields without validation
+
+### Code Hygiene
+- [ ] No `#![allow(dead_code)]` at crate root
+- [ ] No camelCase statics or Hungarian notation
+- [ ] New string literals don't duplicate existing constants
+
+## Severity Classification
+
+- **P0 (Block merge)**: `unwrap()` in request hot path, silent truncation on user input, lock ordering violation, recursion without depth limit
+- **P1 (Must fix)**: `Result<_, String>` in public API, unnecessary clone in hot path, `Box<dyn Error>` in trait method
+- **P2 (Should fix)**: Missing `assert!` in test, `println!` in production, missing `with_capacity`
+- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: Naming convention violation, missing doc comment, `as_ptr()` vs `Arc::ptr_eq`
+
+## Output Template
+
+```
+## Rust Code Quality Report
+
+### Automated Scan
+- unwrap/expect in production: N found
+- as casts: N found
+- String errors: N found
+- println/eprintln: N found
+
+### Findings
+- [P1] `path:line` — description
+  - Fix: ...
+  - Validation: ...
+
+### Verdict
+PASS / BLOCKED (list blocking findings)
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# Rust Code Quality Checklist
+
+Use this as a quick pre-merge checklist for every Rust code change.
+
+## Critical (P0 — block merge)
+
+| Check | Command |
+|-------|---------|
+| No `unwrap()` in request/storage hot path | `rg '\.unwrap\(\)' <files> \| grep -v test` |
+| No `as` truncation on user input | `rg ' as (u32\|usize\|i32)' <files>` |
+| Lock order consistent across call sites | Manual: trace all lock acquisitions |
+| Recursive functions have depth limit | Manual: check for `max_depth` or iterative pattern |
+| No `panic!`/`unwrap_or_else(panic!)` in production | `rg 'panic!\|unwrap_or_else.*panic' <files> \| grep -v test` |
+
+## High (P1 — must fix)
+
+| Check | Command |
+|-------|---------|
+| No `Result<_, String>` in public API | `rg 'Result<.*String>' <files> \| grep -v test` |
+| No `Box<dyn Error>` in public trait | `rg 'Box<dyn.*Error' <files> \| grep -v test` |
+| No unnecessary `.clone()` in hot path | Manual: check loops and per-request paths |
+| `Error::source()` implemented when inner error stored | Manual: check `impl Error` |
+| No `eprintln!`/`println!` in production | `rg 'println!\|eprintln!' <files> \| grep -v test` |
+
+## Medium (P2 — should fix)
+
+| Check | Command |
+|-------|---------|
+| Tests have assertions | Manual: check for `assert` in test functions |
+| `HashMap`/`Vec` use `with_capacity` when size known | Manual: check `::new()` in loops |
+| No `#![allow(dead_code)]` at crate root | `rg 'allow.dead_code' <files> \| grep 'lib.rs'` |
+| Serde structs from untrusted input have `deny_unknown_fields` | Manual: check `#[derive(Deserialize)]` |
+
+## Low (P3 — nice to fix)
+
+| Check | Command |
+|-------|---------|
+| No camelCase statics | `rg 'static ref [a-z]' <files>` |
+| `Arc::ptr_eq` instead of `as_ptr + ptr::eq` | `rg 'as_ptr\|ptr::eq' <files>` |
+| Public functions have doc comments | `rg 'pub fn' <files> \| grep -v '///'` |
+
+## Quick One-Liner
+
+```bash
+# Run all automated checks on changed files
+CHANGED=$(git diff --name-only HEAD~1 -- '*.rs' | grep -v test | grep -v bench)
+echo "=== unwrap/expect ===" && rg -c '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
+echo "=== as casts ===" && rg -c ' as (u8|u16|u32|u64|usize|i8|i16|i32|i64|isize)\b' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
+echo "=== String errors ===" && rg -c 'Result<.*String>' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
+echo "=== println ===" && rg -c 'println!|eprintln!' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
+echo "=== Ordering::Relaxed ===" && rg -c 'Ordering::Relaxed' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
+```
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
 - Never join untrusted bucket/object/RPC path strings onto filesystem roots without normalization and boundary checks.
 - Reject or safely handle `..`, absolute paths, URL-encoded traversal, platform separators, empty components, and paths that canonicalize outside the intended root.
 - Validate both S3 object-key paths and internode/RPC disk paths; storage helpers can bypass S3 authorization if they trust already-parsed paths.
+- Archive auto-extract paths are object keys too. Validate tar/zip entry names before IAM checks and before storage writes, and prove cleaned paths cannot cross bucket or prefix boundaries.

 ### Secrets, default credentials, and crypto
 - Do not ship hard-coded shared tokens, HMAC secrets, private keys, or production test keys.
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
 - Treat all RPC payload bytes as attacker-controlled. Replace `unwrap`, `expect`, and panic-prone deserialization with typed errors.
 - Malformed request tests should cover empty bytes, truncated MessagePack/protobuf, invalid enum values, stale timestamps, and invalid signatures.
 - RPC authentication must be independently strong; do not depend on S3 admin credentials unless the fallback is explicit and safe.
+- RPC signatures must bind the exact generated gRPC method path, timestamp, and request method. Service-prefix signatures must not authorize a different concrete NodeService call.

 ### Browser, CORS, and console surfaces
 - Do not reflect arbitrary `Origin` while also allowing credentials. Default CORS should be no CORS unless explicitly configured.
@@ -115,5 +117,6 @@ Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
 - Could a low-privileged authenticated user reach this path with the wrong action, parent, bucket, or source object?
 - Does a public/default/empty config change security behavior from fail-closed to fail-open?
 - Is any attacker-controlled value later used as a path, policy condition, credential identity, log field, URL, Origin, or response body?
+- Is an archive entry, object key, or policy resource normalized differently between authorization and storage?
 - Is the same operation implemented in multiple paths, such as `CopyObject` vs `UploadPartCopy`, and do all paths enforce the same security contract?
 - Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect

 - `GHSA-pq29-69jg-9mxc`: RPC `read_file_stream` joined untrusted paths under a volume directory without canonical boundary checks. Lesson: `PathBuf::join` plus length checks are not path security.
 - `GHSA-8r6f-hmq2-28rg`: object keys containing traversal sequences bypassed bucket/object authorization when mapped to filesystem paths. Lesson: reject traversal at object-key parsing and verify final storage paths remain under the expected bucket/key root.
+- `GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3`: Snowball auto-extract accepted archive entries such as `../victim-bucket/object`, authorized the raw attacker-bucket path, then storage path cleaning crossed bucket boundaries. Lesson: archive entries become object keys and need traversal rejection plus consistent authz/storage normalization before writes.

 ### Secrets, defaults, and cryptographic misuse

@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect

 - `GHSA-gw2x-q739-qhcr`: malformed gRPC `GetMetrics` payloads reached `unwrap()` on deserialization and caused remote DoS. Lesson: every network/RPC deserialization failure returns an error, not a panic.
 - `GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj` and `GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q`: weak RPC auth increased reachability of otherwise internal handlers. Lesson: panic bugs become more severe when internode auth is weak or defaulted.
+- `GHSA-c667-rgrv-99vj`: NodeService authentication signed the service prefix instead of the concrete generated method path, so valid metadata for one RPC could be replayed to another method during the timestamp window. Lesson: RPC HMAC payloads must bind exact gRPC method path, HTTP method surrogate, timestamp, and secret.

 ### Browser, CORS, and console isolation

@@ -69,6 +71,13 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect

 - `GHSA-xrrf-67jm-3c2r`: SSE metadata reported encryption while reader composition bypassed `EncryptReader` and stored plaintext. Lesson: test actual bytes on disk and wrapper order, not only API metadata.

+### Serde deserialization and input validation
+
+- No `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` found across the entire codebase. Lesson: all structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policies, replication configs) should have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` to reject malformed or adversarial payloads.
+- `#[serde(default)]` on security-critical fields silently accepts missing values as zero/empty. Lesson: when a field has security implications (retention days, permissions, limits), validate the deserialized value explicitly rather than relying on defaults.
+- Integer fields deserialized from user input and cast with `as` (e.g., `i32 as u32`) can wrap negative values to large positives. Lesson: validate ranges before casting; use `try_into()` or clamp.
+- XML config typos (e.g., `"NoncurentDays"` instead of `"NoncurrentDays"`) are silently accepted when `deny_unknown_fields` is absent. Lesson: strict deserialization prevents silent misconfiguration that could cause data loss or unexpected retention behavior.
+
 ## Useful Search Seeds

 Use these targeted searches when a diff touches security-sensitive code:
@@ -76,10 +85,12 @@ Use these targeted searches when a diff touches security-sensitive code:
 ```bash
 rg -n "validate_admin_request|check_permissions|AdminAction::|deny_only|is_allowed" rustfs crates
 rg -n "UploadPartCopy|upload_part_copy|CompleteMultipart|PostObject|content-length-range|starts-with" rustfs crates
-rg -n "PathBuf::join|canonicalize|\\.\\.|x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|SourceIp" rustfs crates
+rg -n "normalize_extract_entry_key|Snowball|auto-extract|PathBuf::join|canonicalize|\\.\\.|x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|SourceIp" rustfs crates
 rg -n "DEFAULT_SECRET|DEFAULT_ACCESS|TEST_PRIVATE_KEY|rustfs rpc|RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET" rustfs crates
+rg -n "TONIC_RPC_PREFIX|verify_rpc_signature|check_auth|NodeServiceServer|x-rustfs-signature" rustfs crates
 rg -n "debug!|trace!|info!|error!|\\?resp|\\?merged_config|session_token|secret_key" rustfs crates
 rg -n "HashReader|EncryptReader|SSE|server-side encryption|Access-Control-Allow-Credentials|Origin" rustfs crates
+rg -n "deny_unknown_fields|serde.default|as u32|as usize|as i32" rustfs crates
 ```

 ## Minimum Regression Test Expectations
@@ -87,7 +98,8 @@ rg -n "HashReader|EncryptReader|SSE|server-side encryption|Access-Control-Allow-
 - Authz fixes: include unauthenticated, valid low-privilege, wrong-action, correct-action, owner, non-owner, and root/admin cases as applicable.
 - IAM fixes: include import/update/list service-account cases with attacker-controlled parent, claims, access key, secret key, and policy.
 - Copy/upload fixes: include cross-bucket, cross-user, source-denied, destination-denied, copy-source-condition, and multipart completion cases.
- Path fixes: include encoded traversal, absolute path, nested traversal, valid object keys that resemble traversal text but should be rejected, and canonical boundary checks.
+- Path fixes: include encoded traversal, absolute path, nested traversal, archive entries with `..`, valid object keys that resemble traversal text but should be rejected, and canonical bucket/prefix boundary checks.
 - Logging fixes: assert redacted output for structs and response bodies that may contain credentials.
+- RPC auth fixes: include captured metadata replay across two concrete methods, stale timestamps, wrong path, wrong method surrogate, wrong secret, and valid same-method calls.
 - Browser/CORS fixes: assert no credentials on reflected/default origins, correct behavior for explicit allowlists, and no same-origin script execution for previewed object content.
 - SSE fixes: inspect stored bytes and verify API metadata, read-back behavior, and on-disk ciphertext together.