mirror of
https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs.git
synced 2026-08-21 03:46:37 +00:00
feat(heal): add authenticated control RPC contract (#4993)
* fix(rpc): bind internode auth to exact targets * fix(heal): initialize the runtime atomically * fix(heal): aggregate status across cluster nodes * fix(heal): return canonical tokens for duplicate starts * feat(heal): add authenticated control RPC contract * fix(heal): return canonical tokens for duplicate starts (#4992) --------- Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ use crate::disk::error::{DiskError, Error as DiskErrorType};
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use crate::runtime::sources as runtime_sources;
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use http::Uri;
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use rustfs_protos::{
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ChannelClass, create_new_channel, get_channel_for_class, proto_gen::node_service::node_service_client::NodeServiceClient,
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ChannelClass, create_new_channel, get_channel_for_class,
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proto_gen::node_service::{heal_control_service_client::HealControlServiceClient, node_service_client::NodeServiceClient},
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};
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use std::{error::Error, io::ErrorKind};
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use tonic::{service::interceptor::InterceptedService, transport::Channel};
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@@ -37,6 +38,21 @@ pub async fn node_service_time_out_client(
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node_service_time_out_client_for_class(addr, interceptor, ChannelClass::Control).await
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}
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pub async fn heal_control_time_out_client(
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addr: &str,
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interceptor: TonicInterceptor,
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) -> Result<HealControlServiceClient<InterceptedService<Channel, TonicInterceptor>>, Box<dyn Error>> {
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let interceptor = interceptor.with_rpc_audience(addr)?;
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let channel = match runtime_sources::cached_node_channel(addr).await {
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Some(channel) => channel,
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None => create_new_channel(addr).await?,
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};
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let max_message_size = rustfs_protos::HEAL_CONTROL_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE;
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Ok(HealControlServiceClient::with_interceptor(channel, interceptor)
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.max_decoding_message_size(max_message_size)
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.max_encoding_message_size(max_message_size))
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}
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/// Build a `NodeServiceClient` bound to the [`ChannelClass`]-appropriate channel for `addr`.
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///
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/// Bulk `bytes`-carrying RPCs (ReadAll/WriteAll/ReadMultiple/BatchReadVersion) pass
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@@ -1104,12 +1104,13 @@ mod tests {
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.metadata()
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.get(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)
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.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok());
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let headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers("node-a:9000", "node_service.NodeService", "HealControl", content_sha256)
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.expect("body-bound auth headers should build");
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let headers =
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gen_tonic_signature_headers("node-a:9000", "node_service.HealControlService", "HealControl", content_sha256)
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.expect("body-bound auth headers should build");
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request.metadata_mut().as_mut().extend(headers.clone());
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assert!(verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/HealControl", &headers).is_ok());
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let replay = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/HealControl", &headers)
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assert!(verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.HealControlService/HealControl", &headers).is_ok());
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let replay = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.HealControlService/HealControl", &headers)
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.expect_err("reusing a body-bound nonce must fail");
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assert_eq!(replay.to_string(), "RPC request replay detected");
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assert!(verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&request, body).is_ok());
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@@ -12,7 +12,10 @@
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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use crate::cluster::rpc::client::{TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, node_service_time_out_client};
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use crate::cluster::rpc::client::{
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TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, heal_control_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client,
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};
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use crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_canonical_body_digest;
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use crate::error::{Error, Result};
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use crate::{
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disk::disk_store::{get_drive_active_check_interval, get_drive_active_check_timeout},
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@@ -32,11 +35,11 @@ use rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::{
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BackgroundHealStatusRequest, CancelDecommissionRequest, ClearDecommissionRequest, DeleteBucketMetadataRequest,
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DeletePolicyRequest, DeleteServiceAccountRequest, DeleteUserRequest, GetCpusRequest, GetLiveEventsRequest, GetMemInfoRequest,
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GetMetricsRequest, GetNetInfoRequest, GetOsInfoRequest, GetPartitionsRequest, GetProcInfoRequest, GetSeLinuxInfoRequest,
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GetSysConfigRequest, GetSysErrorsRequest, LoadBucketMetadataRequest, LoadGroupRequest, LoadPolicyMappingRequest,
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LoadPolicyRequest, LoadRebalanceMetaRequest, LoadServiceAccountRequest, LoadTransitionTierConfigRequest, LoadUserRequest,
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LocalStorageInfoRequest, Mss, ReloadPoolMetaRequest, ReloadSiteReplicationConfigRequest, ScannerActivityRequest,
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ScannerActivityResponse, ServerInfoRequest, SignalServiceRequest, StartDecommissionRequest, StartProfilingRequest,
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StopRebalanceRequest, node_service_client::NodeServiceClient,
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GetSysConfigRequest, GetSysErrorsRequest, HealControlRequest, LoadBucketMetadataRequest, LoadGroupRequest,
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LoadPolicyMappingRequest, LoadPolicyRequest, LoadRebalanceMetaRequest, LoadServiceAccountRequest,
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LoadTransitionTierConfigRequest, LoadUserRequest, LocalStorageInfoRequest, Mss, ReloadPoolMetaRequest,
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ReloadSiteReplicationConfigRequest, ScannerActivityRequest, ScannerActivityResponse, ServerInfoRequest, SignalServiceRequest,
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StartDecommissionRequest, StartProfilingRequest, StopRebalanceRequest, node_service_client::NodeServiceClient,
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};
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use rustfs_utils::XHost;
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize as _};
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@@ -61,6 +64,8 @@ pub const PEER_RESTDRY_RUN: &str = "dry-run";
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pub const SERVICE_SIGNAL_REFRESH_CONFIG: u64 = 1;
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pub const SERVICE_SIGNAL_RELOAD_DYNAMIC: u64 = 2;
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const BACKGROUND_HEAL_STATUS_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
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const HEAL_CONTROL_FINGERPRINT_MAX_SIZE: usize = 256;
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const HEAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
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const PEER_REST_RECOVERY_MAX_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 60;
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const PEER_REST_RECOVERY_MAX_BACKOFF: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
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const SCANNER_ACTIVITY_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = 1024;
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@@ -167,6 +172,29 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
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})
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}
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async fn get_heal_control_client(
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&self,
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) -> Result<
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rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::heal_control_service_client::HealControlServiceClient<
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InterceptedService<Channel, TonicInterceptor>,
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>,
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> {
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if self.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
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self.mark_offline_and_spawn_recovery();
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return Err(Error::other(format!("peer {} is temporarily offline", self.grid_host)));
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}
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heal_control_time_out_client(&self.grid_host, TonicInterceptor::Signature(gen_tonic_signature_interceptor()))
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.await
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.map_err(|err| {
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let storage_err = Error::other(format!("can not get heal control client, err: {err}"));
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if Self::is_network_like_error(&storage_err) {
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self.mark_offline_and_spawn_recovery();
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}
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storage_err
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})
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}
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/// Evict the connection to this peer from the global cache.
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/// This should be called when communication with this peer fails.
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pub async fn evict_connection(&self) {
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@@ -697,6 +725,43 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
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.await
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}
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pub async fn heal_control(&self, version: u32, topology_fingerprint: String, command: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
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if topology_fingerprint.len() > HEAL_CONTROL_FINGERPRINT_MAX_SIZE {
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return Err(Error::other("heal control topology fingerprint exceeds size limit"));
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}
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if command.len() > HEAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE {
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return Err(Error::other("heal control command exceeds size limit"));
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}
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self.finalize_result(
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async {
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let mut client = self
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.get_heal_control_client()
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.await?
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.max_encoding_message_size(rustfs_protos::HEAL_CONTROL_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE)
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.max_decoding_message_size(rustfs_protos::HEAL_CONTROL_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE);
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let canonical_body = rustfs_protos::canonical_heal_control_request_body(version, &topology_fingerprint, &command)
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.map_err(|_| Error::other("heal control request length cannot be represented"))?;
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let mut request = Request::new(HealControlRequest {
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version,
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topology_fingerprint,
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command: command.into(),
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});
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set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, &canonical_body)?;
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let response = client.heal_control(request).await?.into_inner();
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if !response.success {
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return Err(Error::other(
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response
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.error_info
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.unwrap_or_else(|| "peer heal control failed without an error".to_string()),
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));
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}
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Ok(response.result.to_vec())
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}
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.await,
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)
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.await
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}
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pub async fn load_bucket_metadata(&self, bucket: &str, scanner_maintenance_change: bool) -> Result<()> {
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self.finalize_result(
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async {
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@@ -1297,6 +1362,18 @@ mod tests {
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assert!(err.to_string().contains("temporarily offline"));
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn peer_rest_client_rejects_oversized_heal_control_before_dialing() {
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let client = test_peer_client();
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let err = client
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.heal_control(1, "fingerprint".to_string(), vec![0; HEAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE + 1])
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.await
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.expect_err("oversized heal control payload must fail locally");
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assert!(err.to_string().contains("exceeds size limit"));
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assert!(!client.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire));
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn peer_rest_client_prepare_retry_clears_offline_gate() {
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// finalize_result sets the offline gate on a network error; without
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