feat(policy): parse and match KMS key resources with a kms:Decrypt action

Bring the dormant Resource::Kms variant to life: arn:aws:kms:::key/<key_id>
patterns (empty-account form, wildcards allowed in the id, alias/<name>
reserved as parse-only) now parse, validate, serialize back, and are matched
by KMS statements against the requested key id carried in Args::object.
Statements without KMS resources keep the legacy match-every-key behaviour,
as do call sites that pass no key resource, so nothing changes until the
admin/SSE authorization paths start passing key ids.

Statement validation rejects KMS resources on non-KMS statements, and bucket
policy validation rejects KMS actions and resources outright while stored
policies keep deserializing; evaluation skips pure-KMS bucket policy
statements with a warning. A kms:Decrypt action is added for the upcoming
SSE-KMS read path.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1582 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
This commit is contained in:
overtrue
2026-08-01 00:40:17 +08:00
parent db8039dece
commit 83ed028eea
6 changed files with 751 additions and 15 deletions
+153
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
//! policy is also allowed by the widened policy;
//! (c) an empty policy denies every non-owner request (default deny).
//!
//! Properties (d)-(g) extend the same invariants to KMS key resources
//! (`arn:aws:kms:::key/<key_id>`, backlog#1582): Deny-first over key scopes,
//! wildcard/resource-less supersets implying concrete key grants, exact key
//! scoping without cross-key leaks, and the legacy resource-less
//! match-every-key compatibility pin.
//!
//! Pure evaluation: no IO, no global state, parallel-safe. Statements are built
//! from JSON exactly like production policies arriving via PutPolicy. Generated
//! bucket/key/action pools avoid wildcard metacharacters so resource patterns
@@ -47,10 +53,23 @@ const OBJECT_ACTIONS: &[&str] = &[
"s3:PutObjectTagging",
];
/// Key-scoped KMS actions safe to pair with an `arn:aws:kms:::key/<id>` resource.
const KMS_KEY_ACTIONS: &[&str] = &[
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:DisableKey",
"kms:RotateKey",
"kms:DescribeKey",
];
fn statement_json(effect: &str, action: &str, resource: &str) -> String {
format!(r#"{{"Effect":"{effect}","Action":["{action}"],"Resource":["{resource}"]}}"#)
}
fn resourceless_statement_json(effect: &str, action: &str) -> String {
format!(r#"{{"Effect":"{effect}","Action":["{action}"]}}"#)
}
fn policy_from_statements(statements: &[String]) -> Policy {
let json = format!(r#"{{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{}]}}"#, statements.join(","));
serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("generated policy JSON should parse")
@@ -88,6 +107,22 @@ fn action_strategy() -> impl Strategy<Value = &'static str> {
proptest::sample::select(OBJECT_ACTIONS)
}
/// Strategy: a KMS key id without wildcard metacharacters or separators.
fn key_id_strategy() -> impl Strategy<Value = String> {
"[a-z][a-z0-9-]{2,11}"
}
/// Strategy: one action name from the key-scoped KMS action pool.
fn kms_action_strategy() -> impl Strategy<Value = &'static str> {
proptest::sample::select(KMS_KEY_ACTIONS)
}
/// KMS evaluation contract: the requested key id travels in `args.object` with an
/// empty bucket (see `Statement::kms_key_scope_matches`).
fn is_allowed_for_key(policy: &Policy, action: &str, key_id: &str) -> bool {
is_allowed(policy, action, "", key_id)
}
proptest! {
/// (a) Deny anywhere wins: a Deny statement matching the request denies it,
/// no matter how many broad Allow statements surround it or at which index
@@ -205,4 +240,122 @@ proptest! {
"Policy::default() must deny {action} on {bucket}/{key}"
);
}
/// (d) KMS Deny anywhere wins: a Deny scoped to the exact key (or `key/*`)
/// denies the request no matter how many broad KMS Allow statements
/// (resource-less or `key/*`-scoped) surround it.
#[test]
fn kms_explicit_deny_anywhere_denies(
key_id in key_id_strategy(),
action in kms_action_strategy(),
allow_count in 0usize..4,
deny_pos_seed in 0usize..16,
broad in proptest::bool::ANY,
wildcard_deny in proptest::bool::ANY,
) {
let mut statements: Vec<String> = (0..allow_count)
.map(|_| {
if broad {
resourceless_statement_json("Allow", "kms:*")
} else {
statement_json("Allow", "kms:*", "arn:aws:kms:::key/*")
}
})
.collect();
let deny_resource = if wildcard_deny {
"arn:aws:kms:::key/*".to_string()
} else {
format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{key_id}")
};
let deny = statement_json("Deny", action, &deny_resource);
let deny_pos = deny_pos_seed % (statements.len() + 1);
statements.insert(deny_pos, deny);
let policy = policy_from_statements(&statements);
if allow_count > 0 {
let mut allows_only = statements.clone();
allows_only.remove(deny_pos);
let allow_policy = policy_from_statements(&allows_only);
prop_assert!(
is_allowed_for_key(&allow_policy, action, &key_id),
"sanity: the KMS Allow statements alone should permit {action} on key {key_id}"
);
}
prop_assert!(
!is_allowed_for_key(&policy, action, &key_id),
"explicit KMS Deny at index {deny_pos} of {} statements must deny {action} on key {key_id}",
statements.len()
);
}
/// (e) KMS wildcard superset implies the concrete key grant: whatever an
/// exact `key/<id>` Allow permits is also permitted by `key/*`, by a bare
/// `arn:aws:kms:::*`, and by the legacy resource-less statement form.
#[test]
fn kms_wildcard_superset_implies_concrete_match(
key_id in key_id_strategy(),
action in kms_action_strategy(),
) {
let narrow = policy_from_statements(&[statement_json(
"Allow",
action,
&format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{key_id}"),
)]);
let widened = policy_from_statements(&[statement_json("Allow", "kms:*", "arn:aws:kms:::key/*")]);
let star = policy_from_statements(&[statement_json("Allow", "kms:*", "arn:aws:kms:::*")]);
let resourceless = policy_from_statements(&[resourceless_statement_json("Allow", "kms:*")]);
prop_assert!(is_allowed_for_key(&narrow, action, &key_id), "narrow KMS policy must allow its own grant");
prop_assert!(is_allowed_for_key(&widened, action, &key_id), "kms:* on key/* must imply the concrete grant");
prop_assert!(is_allowed_for_key(&star, action, &key_id), "kms:* on arn:aws:kms:::* must imply the concrete grant");
prop_assert!(
is_allowed_for_key(&resourceless, action, &key_id),
"the legacy resource-less KMS statement must imply the concrete grant"
);
}
/// (f) Key scoping is exact: an Allow on `key/<a>` never leaks to a
/// different key id, while the compatibility contract keeps unscoped
/// requests (no key id passed) matching.
#[test]
fn kms_key_scope_does_not_leak_across_keys(
key_a in key_id_strategy(),
key_b in key_id_strategy(),
action in kms_action_strategy(),
) {
prop_assume!(key_a != key_b);
let policy = policy_from_statements(&[statement_json(
"Allow",
action,
&format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{key_a}"),
)]);
prop_assert!(is_allowed_for_key(&policy, action, &key_a), "the granted key must be allowed");
prop_assert!(
!is_allowed_for_key(&policy, action, &key_b),
"an Allow scoped to key {key_a} must not leak to key {key_b}"
);
prop_assert!(
is_allowed_for_key(&policy, action, ""),
"call sites that pass no key resource keep the legacy match-every-key behaviour"
);
}
/// (g) Legacy compatibility pin: resource-less KMS statements match every
/// generated key id, exactly as before KMS resources existed.
#[test]
fn kms_resourceless_statement_matches_every_key(
key_id in key_id_strategy(),
action in kms_action_strategy(),
) {
let policy = policy_from_statements(&[resourceless_statement_json("Allow", action)]);
prop_assert!(
is_allowed_for_key(&policy, action, &key_id),
"resource-less KMS statement must keep matching {action} on key {key_id}"
);
}
}