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refactor(ecstore): shared remote S3 client builder and ODM source client (#7067)
* refactor(ecstore): extract shared remote S3 client builder Move the aws_sdk_s3 client construction out of bucket_target_sys into bucket/remote_s3_client.rs: endpoint assembly, credential provider, path-style selection, custom CA / skip-TLS transports and the outbound SSRF gate now build from a neutral RemoteS3EndpointSpec so replication targets and the upcoming on-demand migration source client share one policy. Replication builds its client through From<&BucketTarget>; the gate keeps its relaxed semantics (private allowed, loopback only behind RUSTFS_REPLICATION_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_TARGET) verbatim. The builder also gains optional connect/read timeouts and a User-Agent suffix interceptor, both unset for replication. Refs rustfs/backlog#2149 * feat(ecstore): add on-demand migration SourceClient Add bucket/on_demand_migration/source_client.rs on top of the shared remote S3 builder: HEAD, ranged streaming GET, ListObjectsV2 with source-prefix mapping, GetObjectTagging and an admin probe. Every request carries the x-rustfs-/x-minio-source-proxy-request anti-loop markers and a RustFS-OnDemandMigration/<version> User-Agent suffix; SSE-C source objects are rejected as unsupported. SourceError classifies SDK failures (not found, access denied, throttled, timeout, connect, server error) with retryability and a stable metrics label. Debug output redacts credentials. Refs rustfs/backlog#2149 * docs(operations): point outbound policy at shared remote S3 client builder
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ RustFS validates every operator-configured outbound destination to close a serve
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| Target configuration validation (startup and admin API) | Full policy | `crates/targets/src/config/common.rs` `validate_outbound_http_url`; `rustfs/src/admin/handlers/target_descriptor.rs` |
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| OIDC discovery, JWKS, and token requests | Full policy | A blocked provider logs `OIDC provider discovery blocked by outbound policy` naming the origin to allowlist (`crates/iam/src/oidc.rs`) |
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| Object Lambda targets | Full policy | `rustfs/src/admin/router.rs` `outbound_policy` |
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| Bucket replication targets | Literal check, relaxed | Private addresses are always allowed; loopback only with `RUSTFS_REPLICATION_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_TARGET=true` (`crates/ecstore/src/bucket/bucket_target_sys.rs` `validate_replication_target_endpoint`) |
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| Bucket replication targets | Literal check, relaxed | Private addresses are always allowed; loopback only with `RUSTFS_REPLICATION_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_TARGET=true` (`crates/ecstore/src/bucket/remote_s3_client.rs` `validate_remote_endpoint`, shared with on-demand migration sources) |
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| Site replication peers | Literal check | `rustfs/src/site_replication/mod.rs` |
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| Tiering warm backends (S3, MinIO, RustFS, Azure, GCS, Aliyun, Tencent, Huawei, R2) | Literal check | `crates/ecstore/src/services/tier/warm_backend.rs` `validate_endpoint`; the RustFS provider adds a debug-only, env-gated loopback exception for e2e tests |
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| Keystone `auth_url` | Literal check | `crates/keystone/src/config.rs` |
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