Merge branch 'main' into fix/s3-select-error-semantics

crates/config/README.md

@@ -97,6 +97,14 @@ Current guidance:
   - enables minimal payload mode for GET health responses (`status`, `ready` only).
 - `RUSTFS_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS`
   - TTL for readiness cache evaluation.
+- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE`
+  - withdraws readiness when bounded object read/write stages stop completing while requests remain active.
+  - default is `true`.
+- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS`
+  - maximum time without completion in a bounded object stage before readiness is withdrawn.
+  - default is `30000`; `0` uses the default.
+  - the effective value is at least 5 seconds longer than `RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT`.
+  - this readiness SLO is independent of disk read/write failure deadlines and may withdraw traffic before those deadlines expire.
 - `RUSTFS_HEALTH_COMPAT_BUSY_CHECK_ENABLE`
   - enables busy protection behavior for health probes.
   - default is `false`.

crates/config/src/constants/health.rs

@@ -22,6 +22,19 @@ pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_ENDPOINT_ENABLE: bool = true;
 pub const ENV_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS";
 pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS: u64 = 1000;
 
+/// Enable readiness withdrawal when bounded object read/write stages stop
+/// completing while requests remain active.
+pub const ENV_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE";
+pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE: bool = true;
+
+/// Requested time without completion in a bounded object stage before local
+/// readiness is withdrawn (milliseconds). A value of `0` uses the default;
+/// runtime adds a safety floor based on the object-lock acquisition timeout.
+pub const ENV_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS";
+pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 30_000;
+/// Additional time beyond the configured object-lock acquisition deadline.
+pub const HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_LOCK_MARGIN_MS: u64 = 5_000;
+
 /// Timeout for cluster health readiness collectors (milliseconds).
 /// This bounds expensive storage and lock quorum checks used by cluster probes.
 pub const ENV_HEALTH_CLUSTER_TIMEOUT_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_CLUSTER_TIMEOUT_MS";

crates/e2e_test/src/fake_s3_target/mod.rs

@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ use s3s::access::{S3Access, S3AccessContext};
 use s3s::auth::SimpleAuth;
 use s3s::dto::{
     AbortMultipartUploadInput, AbortMultipartUploadOutput, CompleteMultipartUploadInput, CompleteMultipartUploadOutput,
-    CreateMultipartUploadInput, CreateMultipartUploadOutput, DeleteObjectInput, DeleteObjectOutput, ETag,
+    CreateMultipartUploadInput, CreateMultipartUploadOutput, DeleteMarkerEntry, DeleteObjectInput, DeleteObjectOutput, ETag,
     GetBucketVersioningInput, GetBucketVersioningOutput, GetObjectInput, GetObjectOutput, HeadBucketInput, HeadBucketOutput,
-    HeadObjectInput, HeadObjectOutput, PutObjectInput, PutObjectOutput, StreamingBlob, Timestamp, TimestampFormat,
-    UploadPartInput, UploadPartOutput,
+    HeadObjectInput, HeadObjectOutput, ListObjectVersionsInput, ListObjectVersionsOutput, ObjectVersionId, PutObjectInput,
+    PutObjectOutput, StreamingBlob, Timestamp, TimestampFormat, UploadPartInput, UploadPartOutput,
 };
 use s3s::service::{S3Service, S3ServiceBuilder};
 use s3s::validation::{AwsNameValidation, NameValidation};
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ pub enum Operation {
     GetObject,
     HeadObject,
     DeleteObject,
+    ListObjectVersions,
     CreateMultipartUpload,
     UploadPart,
     CompleteMultipartUpload,
@@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ pub enum FaultAction {
     /// already have buffered the rest of the current frame; the journal reports
     /// the threshold, and the backend never receives or stores the request.
     DisconnectAfterBytes(usize),
+    /// Apply the request, then close the connection before returning its response.
+    DisconnectAfterResponse,
     /// Drain a request body in fixed-size slices, sleeping after every slice.
     SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: usize, delay: Duration },
     /// Store the request normally but replace the response ETag.
@@ -142,6 +145,7 @@ struct ControlState {
 #[derive(Default)]
 struct StoreState {
     assign_own_version_ids: bool,
+    assign_own_multipart_version_ids: bool,
     buckets: HashMap<String, BucketState>,
     uploads: HashMap<String, MultipartState>,
     total_bytes: usize,
@@ -390,6 +394,16 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
         lock(&self.backend.store).assign_own_version_ids = enabled;
     }
 
+    /// Mint own version ids for the multipart path only — models a target
+    /// that adopts PutObject version ids but not CreateMultipartUpload ones.
+    pub fn assign_own_multipart_version_ids(&self, enabled: bool) {
+        lock(&self.backend.store).assign_own_multipart_version_ids = enabled;
+    }
+
+    pub fn active_multipart_upload_count(&self) -> usize {
+        lock(&self.backend.store).uploads.len()
+    }
+
     /// Queue `times` copies of a fault for one operation.
     pub fn inject(&self, operation: Operation, action: FaultAction, times: usize) {
         if times == 0 {
@@ -659,6 +673,7 @@ fn parse_request(method: &Method, uri: &Uri) -> ParsedRequest {
     let operation = match (method, key.is_some()) {
         (&Method::HEAD, false) => Operation::HeadBucket,
         (&Method::GET, false) if query.contains_key("versioning") => Operation::GetBucketVersioning,
+        (&Method::GET, false) if query.contains_key("versions") => Operation::ListObjectVersions,
         (&Method::PUT, true) if upload_id.is_some() && part_number.is_some() => Operation::UploadPart,
         (&Method::PUT, true) if upload_id.is_some() || query.contains_key("partNumber") => Operation::Unknown,
         (&Method::POST, true) if query.contains_key("uploads") => Operation::CreateMultipartUpload,
@@ -810,7 +825,10 @@ async fn apply_non_body_fault(fault: Option<&RequestFault>, control: &Mutex<Cont
             update_consumed(control, fault.expect("matched fault").sequence, 0);
             Err(scripted_disconnect_error())
         }
-        Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { .. }) | Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | None => Ok(()),
+        Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { .. })
+        | Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag)
+        | Some(FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse)
+        | None => Ok(()),
     }
 }
 
@@ -851,7 +869,7 @@ async fn collect_stream(
             Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes, delay }) => {
                 return collect_stream_slow(body, capacity, *chunk_bytes, *delay).await;
             }
-            Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | None => {}
+            Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | Some(FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse) | None => {}
         }
 
         let mut output = BytesMut::with_capacity(capacity);
@@ -913,6 +931,9 @@ fn apply_response_fault<T>(mut response: S3Response<T>, fault: Option<&RequestFa
     if fault.is_some_and(|fault| fault.action == FaultAction::WrongEtag) {
         response.headers.insert(ETAG, HeaderValue::from_static(WRONG_ETAG));
     }
+    if fault.is_some_and(|fault| fault.action == FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse) {
+        response.headers.insert(DISCONNECT_HEADER, HeaderValue::from_static("true"));
+    }
     response
 }
 
@@ -1101,6 +1122,63 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
         ))
     }
 
+    /// Prefix + max-keys subset only — enough for the replication-check probe
+    /// key allocation. No pagination markers or delimiter folding.
+    async fn list_object_versions(
+        &self,
+        req: S3Request<ListObjectVersionsInput>,
+    ) -> S3Result<S3Response<ListObjectVersionsOutput>> {
+        let fault = request_fault(&req);
+        apply_non_body_fault(fault.as_ref(), &self.control).await?;
+        let state = lock(&self.store);
+        let Some(bucket_state) = state.buckets.get(&req.input.bucket) else {
+            return Err(s3s::s3_error!(NoSuchBucket, "bucket does not exist"));
+        };
+        let prefix = req.input.prefix.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
+        let max_keys = req.input.max_keys.unwrap_or(1000).max(0) as usize;
+
+        let mut keys: Vec<&String> = bucket_state.objects.keys().filter(|key| key.starts_with(prefix)).collect();
+        keys.sort();
+
+        let mut versions = Vec::new();
+        let mut delete_markers = Vec::new();
+        'keys: for key in keys {
+            for version in bucket_state.objects[key].iter().rev() {
+                if versions.len() + delete_markers.len() >= max_keys {
+                    break 'keys;
+                }
+                if version.delete_marker {
+                    delete_markers.push(DeleteMarkerEntry {
+                        key: Some(key.clone()),
+                        version_id: Some(ObjectVersionId::from(version.version_id.clone())),
+                        last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
+                        ..Default::default()
+                    });
+                } else {
+                    versions.push(s3s::dto::ObjectVersion {
+                        key: Some(key.clone()),
+                        version_id: Some(ObjectVersionId::from(version.version_id.clone())),
+                        last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
+                        e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag.clone())),
+                        size: Some(version.body.len() as i64),
+                        ..Default::default()
+                    });
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        drop(state);
+
+        Ok(apply_response_fault(
+            S3Response::new(ListObjectVersionsOutput {
+                name: Some(req.input.bucket),
+                versions: Some(versions),
+                delete_markers: Some(delete_markers),
+                ..Default::default()
+            }),
+            fault.as_ref(),
+        ))
+    }
+
     async fn put_object(&self, req: S3Request<PutObjectInput>) -> S3Result<S3Response<PutObjectOutput>> {
         let fault = request_fault(&req);
         let _body_permit = timeout(MAX_FAULT_DURATION, Arc::clone(&self.body_limit).acquire_owned())
@@ -1155,7 +1233,7 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
                 content_type: version.content_type,
                 metadata: version.metadata,
                 e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag)),
-                last_modified: Some(version.last_modified),
+                last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
                 version_id: Some(version.version_id),
                 ..Default::default()
             }),
@@ -1177,7 +1255,7 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
                 content_type: version.content_type,
                 metadata: version.metadata,
                 e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag)),
-                last_modified: Some(version.last_modified),
+                last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
                 version_id: Some(version.version_id),
                 ..Default::default()
             }),
@@ -1290,7 +1368,8 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
         let upload_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
         // Read the flag before the mutable borrow of `state.uploads` below
         // (and never re-lock the store: the mutex is not reentrant).
-        let version_id = new_version_id(&headers, state.assign_own_version_ids)?;
+        let mint_own = state.assign_own_version_ids || state.assign_own_multipart_version_ids;
+        let version_id = new_version_id(&headers, mint_own)?;
         state.uploads.insert(
             upload_id.clone(),
             MultipartState {

crates/e2e_test/src/replication_extension_test.rs

@@ -629,6 +629,17 @@ async fn put_bucket_replication_with_delete_statuses(
     target_arn: &str,
     delete_marker_status: &str,
     version_delete_status: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
+    put_bucket_replication_with_statuses(env, bucket, target_arn, delete_marker_status, version_delete_status, "Enabled").await
+}
+
+async fn put_bucket_replication_with_statuses(
+    env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
+    bucket: &str,
+    target_arn: &str,
+    delete_marker_status: &str,
+    version_delete_status: Option<&str>,
+    existing_object_status: &str,
 ) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
     let delete_replication = version_delete_status
         .map(|status| format!("<DeleteReplication><Status>{status}</Status></DeleteReplication>"))
@@ -645,7 +656,7 @@ async fn put_bucket_replication_with_delete_statuses(
     </DeleteMarkerReplication>
     {delete_replication}
     <ExistingObjectReplication>
-      <Status>Enabled</Status>
+      <Status>{existing_object_status}</Status>
     </ExistingObjectReplication>
     <Destination>
       <Bucket>{target_arn}</Bucket>
@@ -2595,6 +2606,9 @@ async fn test_replication_check_succeeds_with_remote_target() -> Result<(), Box<
     assert_eq!(payload["Targets"].as_array().map(Vec::len), Some(1));
     assert_eq!(payload["Targets"][0]["Status"], "OK");
     assert_eq!(payload["Targets"][0]["Phases"]["Put"]["Status"], "OK");
+    // A RustFS target adopts the source version id, so the P1-19
+    // version-identity probe passes.
+    assert_eq!(payload["Targets"][0]["Phases"]["VersionFidelity"]["Status"], "OK");
     assert_eq!(payload["Targets"][0]["Phases"]["DeleteMarker"]["Status"], "OK");
     assert_eq!(payload["Targets"][0]["Phases"]["VersionDelete"]["Status"], "OK");
     assert_eq!(payload["Targets"][0]["Phases"]["Cleanup"]["Status"], "OK");
@@ -7489,6 +7503,334 @@ async fn test_scanner_never_cascades_inbound_replicas() -> TestResult {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// P1-19 review follow-up: multipart fixes the target version at initiate
+/// and only reports it on completion, so a target can adopt PutObject
+/// version ids and still mint its own there — the check must not report OK
+/// while multipart deletes and heals would silently miss.
+#[tokio::test]
+#[serial]
+async fn test_replication_check_flags_multipart_only_version_minting_target() -> TestResult {
+    init_logging();
+
+    let target = FakeS3Target::start().await?;
+    let target_bucket = "multipart-fidelity-dst";
+    target.create_bucket(target_bucket);
+    // PutObject mirrors the source version id; CreateMultipartUpload does not.
+    target.assign_own_multipart_version_ids(true);
+
+    let mut source_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
+    let mut env_vars = replication_fast_env();
+    env_vars.extend_from_slice(LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV);
+    env_vars.extend_from_slice(&[("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost"), ("HTTP_PROXY", ""), ("HTTPS_PROXY", "")]);
+    source_env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &env_vars).await?;
+
+    let source_bucket = "multipart-fidelity-src";
+    let source_client = source_env.create_s3_client();
+    source_client.create_bucket().bucket(source_bucket).send().await?;
+    enable_bucket_versioning(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+
+    let target_arn = set_replication_target_with_options(
+        &source_env,
+        source_bucket,
+        ReplicationTargetOptions {
+            endpoint: &target.address(),
+            access_key: FAKE_ACCESS_KEY,
+            secret_key: FAKE_SECRET_KEY,
+            target_bucket,
+            secure: false,
+            skip_tls_verify: false,
+            ca_cert_pem: None,
+        },
+    )
+    .await?;
+    put_bucket_replication(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_arn).await?;
+
+    let response = run_replication_check(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+    assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    let payload: serde_json::Value = response.json().await?;
+
+    assert_eq!(payload["Status"], "FAILED", "multipart drift must fail the check: {payload}");
+    let target_report = &payload["Targets"][0];
+    let fidelity = &target_report["Phases"]["VersionFidelity"];
+    assert_eq!(fidelity["Status"], "FAILED", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(fidelity["Code"], "BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch", "{payload}");
+    assert!(
+        fidelity["Error"]
+            .as_str()
+            .is_some_and(|error| error.contains("CreateMultipartUpload")),
+        "the failure must name the multipart path: {payload}"
+    );
+    // The PutObject leg mirrored, so it is the multipart probe that failed.
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Phases"]["Put"]["Status"], "OK", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Phases"]["DeleteMarker"]["Status"], "SKIPPED", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Phases"]["Cleanup"]["Status"], "OK", "{payload}");
+
+    let probe_key = target
+        .requests()
+        .into_iter()
+        .find(|record| record.operation == FakeTargetOperation::PutObject)
+        .and_then(|record| record.key)
+        .ok_or("the probe PUT never reached the fake target")?;
+    assert!(
+        target.stored_versions(target_bucket, &probe_key).is_empty(),
+        "both probe versions must be cleaned up on the mismatching target"
+    );
+
+    target.shutdown().await;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[serial]
+async fn test_replication_check_aborts_failed_multipart_probes() -> TestResult {
+    init_logging();
+
+    let target = FakeS3Target::start().await?;
+    let target_bucket = "multipart-cleanup-dst";
+    target.create_bucket(target_bucket);
+
+    let mut source_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
+    let mut env_vars = replication_fast_env();
+    env_vars.extend_from_slice(LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV);
+    env_vars.extend_from_slice(&[("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost"), ("HTTP_PROXY", ""), ("HTTPS_PROXY", "")]);
+    source_env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &env_vars).await?;
+
+    let source_bucket = "multipart-cleanup-src";
+    let source_client = source_env.create_s3_client();
+    source_client.create_bucket().bucket(source_bucket).send().await?;
+    enable_bucket_versioning(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+
+    let target_arn = set_replication_target_with_options(
+        &source_env,
+        source_bucket,
+        ReplicationTargetOptions {
+            endpoint: &target.address(),
+            access_key: FAKE_ACCESS_KEY,
+            secret_key: FAKE_SECRET_KEY,
+            target_bucket,
+            secure: false,
+            skip_tls_verify: false,
+            ca_cert_pem: None,
+        },
+    )
+    .await?;
+    put_bucket_replication(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_arn).await?;
+
+    for failed_operation in [FakeTargetOperation::UploadPart, FakeTargetOperation::CompleteMultipartUpload] {
+        target.clear_faults();
+        target.take_requests();
+        target.inject(failed_operation, FakeTargetFault::Status(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE), 16);
+
+        let response = run_replication_check(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+        assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        let payload: serde_json::Value = response.json().await?;
+        assert_eq!(
+            payload["Status"], "FAILED",
+            "the injected multipart failure must fail the check: {payload}"
+        );
+
+        let requests = target.requests();
+        assert!(
+            requests.iter().any(|request| {
+                request.operation == failed_operation
+                    && request.fault == Some(FakeTargetFault::Status(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE))
+            }),
+            "the check must reach the injected {failed_operation:?} failure: {requests:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            requests
+                .iter()
+                .any(|request| request.operation == FakeTargetOperation::AbortMultipartUpload),
+            "the failed {failed_operation:?} probe must be aborted: {requests:?}"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            target.active_multipart_upload_count(),
+            0,
+            "the failed {failed_operation:?} probe must not leave multipart state"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(payload["Targets"][0]["Phases"]["Cleanup"]["Status"], "OK", "{payload}");
+    }
+
+    target.clear_faults();
+    target.take_requests();
+    target.inject(FakeTargetOperation::CompleteMultipartUpload, FakeTargetFault::DisconnectAfterResponse, 16);
+
+    let response = run_replication_check(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+    assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    let payload: serde_json::Value = response.json().await?;
+    let target_report = &payload["Targets"][0];
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Status"], "FAILED", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Phases"]["VersionFidelity"]["Status"], "FAILED", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        target_report["Phases"]["Cleanup"]["Status"], "OK",
+        "NoSuchUpload after an ambiguous complete means the multipart artifact is gone: {payload}"
+    );
+    let requests = target.requests();
+    let completed_key = requests
+        .iter()
+        .find(|request| {
+            request.operation == FakeTargetOperation::CompleteMultipartUpload
+                && request.fault == Some(FakeTargetFault::DisconnectAfterResponse)
+        })
+        .and_then(|request| request.key.as_deref())
+        .expect("the scripted complete response disconnect must be observed");
+    assert!(
+        requests
+            .iter()
+            .any(|request| request.operation == FakeTargetOperation::AbortMultipartUpload),
+        "the ambiguous complete must still attempt abort: {requests:?}"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(target.active_multipart_upload_count(), 0);
+    assert!(
+        target.stored_versions(target_bucket, completed_key).is_empty(),
+        "outer cleanup must remove the object committed before the response disconnect"
+    );
+
+    target.clear_faults();
+    target.take_requests();
+    target.inject(FakeTargetOperation::UploadPart, FakeTargetFault::Status(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN), 16);
+    target.inject(
+        FakeTargetOperation::AbortMultipartUpload,
+        FakeTargetFault::Status(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE),
+        16,
+    );
+
+    let response = run_replication_check(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+    assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    let payload: serde_json::Value = response.json().await?;
+    let target_report = &payload["Targets"][0];
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Status"], "FAILED", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Phases"]["VersionFidelity"]["Status"], "FAILED", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        target_report["Phases"]["Cleanup"]["Status"], "FAILED",
+        "an unremoved multipart probe must be reported as a cleanup failure: {payload}"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        target_report["Error"], "s3:ReplicateObject permissions missing for replication user",
+        "the primary multipart error must remain the target error: {payload}"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        target_report["Phases"]["VersionFidelity"]["Error"], "s3:ReplicateObject permissions missing for replication user",
+        "{payload}"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        target_report["Phases"]["Cleanup"]["Error"], "failed to abort multipart replication probe",
+        "{payload}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        target.requests().iter().any(|request| {
+            request.operation == FakeTargetOperation::AbortMultipartUpload
+                && request.fault == Some(FakeTargetFault::Status(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE))
+        }),
+        "the abort failure must be observed"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        target.active_multipart_upload_count(),
+        1,
+        "the report must match the retained multipart state"
+    );
+
+    target.shutdown().await;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// P1-19 (backlog#1675): the supported replication contract is targets that
+/// adopt the source version id (RustFS/MinIO semantics). A target that mints
+/// its own version ids silently breaks every version-addressed operation that
+/// follows — version deletes and heal re-drives never match, diverging the
+/// two sides. replication-check must surface this explicitly: a
+/// VersionFidelity phase that compares the probe PUT's response version id
+/// against the sent source version id and fails with
+/// BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch — while still cleaning up the probe
+/// object via the version id the target actually assigned.
+#[tokio::test]
+#[serial]
+async fn test_replication_check_flags_version_minting_target() -> TestResult {
+    init_logging();
+
+    let target = FakeS3Target::start().await?;
+    let target_bucket = "version-fidelity-dst";
+    target.create_bucket(target_bucket);
+    target.assign_own_version_ids(true);
+
+    let mut source_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
+    let mut env_vars = replication_fast_env();
+    env_vars.extend_from_slice(LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV);
+    env_vars.extend_from_slice(&[("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost"), ("HTTP_PROXY", ""), ("HTTPS_PROXY", "")]);
+    source_env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &env_vars).await?;
+
+    let source_bucket = "version-fidelity-src";
+    let source_client = source_env.create_s3_client();
+    source_client.create_bucket().bucket(source_bucket).send().await?;
+    enable_bucket_versioning(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+
+    let target_arn = set_replication_target_with_options(
+        &source_env,
+        source_bucket,
+        ReplicationTargetOptions {
+            endpoint: &target.address(),
+            access_key: FAKE_ACCESS_KEY,
+            secret_key: FAKE_SECRET_KEY,
+            target_bucket,
+            secure: false,
+            skip_tls_verify: false,
+            ca_cert_pem: None,
+        },
+    )
+    .await?;
+    put_bucket_replication(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_arn).await?;
+
+    let response = run_replication_check(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+    assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    let payload: serde_json::Value = response.json().await?;
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        payload["Status"], "FAILED",
+        "a version-minting target must fail the replication check: {payload}"
+    );
+    let target_report = &payload["Targets"][0];
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Status"], "FAILED", "target must be FAILED: {payload}");
+    let fidelity = &target_report["Phases"]["VersionFidelity"];
+    assert_eq!(fidelity["Status"], "FAILED", "VersionFidelity phase must fail: {payload}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        fidelity["Code"], "BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch",
+        "the failure must carry a machine-readable code: {payload}"
+    );
+    // The probe PUT itself succeeded (fidelity is judged from its response);
+    // the later mutation phases are pointless against a drifting target and
+    // must be skipped, but cleanup still runs.
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Phases"]["Put"]["Status"], "OK", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Phases"]["DeleteMarker"]["Status"], "SKIPPED", "{payload}");
+    assert_eq!(target_report["Phases"]["Cleanup"]["Status"], "OK", "{payload}");
+
+    // The probe PUT must carry the source version as `?versionId=` — the
+    // exact shape live replication uses (P0-5), and the only shape MinIO
+    // consumes. The journal records the query value.
+    let probe_put = target
+        .requests()
+        .into_iter()
+        .find(|record| record.operation == FakeTargetOperation::PutObject)
+        .ok_or("the probe PUT never reached the fake target")?;
+    let probe_query_version = probe_put
+        .version_id
+        .as_deref()
+        .ok_or("the probe PUT must carry a versionId query")?;
+    assert!(
+        uuid::Uuid::parse_str(probe_query_version).is_ok(),
+        "the probe versionId query must be the source uuid, got {probe_query_version}"
+    );
+
+    // No probe residue: cleanup must address the version id the target
+    // actually assigned, not the source id (which never matched anything).
+    let probe_key = probe_put.key.ok_or("probe PUT journal record has no key")?;
+    assert!(
+        target.stored_versions(target_bucket, &probe_key).is_empty(),
+        "the probe object must be cleaned up on the mismatching target"
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 // --- P1-21 (backlog#1675): delayed delete-marker purge failure handling ---
 //
 // The fixtures below wire a versioned source bucket to a FakeS3Target with the
@@ -7818,5 +8160,239 @@ async fn test_delayed_delete_marker_purge_exhaustion_persists_to_mrf_and_replays
     );
 
     target.shutdown().await;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+// --- P1-20 (backlog#1675): scanner existing-object compensation matrix ---
+//
+// Every case below inverts the order used by the rest of this file: objects
+// are written FIRST and the replication rule arrives afterwards, so the only
+// channel that can move the pre-existing objects is the data scanner's
+// existing-object resync pass. Negative cells ("never compensated") are
+// contracts and are asserted over multiple scanner cycles, always next to a
+// replicated control key that proves the scanner and the live path are
+// running — an absent key on a dead scanner proves nothing.
+
+/// Envs + buckets only: versioning, the remote target, and the rule variant
+/// are wired by each test (the null-version case must PUT before the source
+/// bucket becomes versioned). The source runs with FAST_SCANNER_ENV so
+/// existing keys are rescanned within seconds instead of 16 dir cycles.
+async fn build_scanner_compensation_pair(
+    source_bucket: &str,
+    target_bucket: &str,
+) -> Result<(RustFSTestEnvironment, RustFSTestEnvironment), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
+    let mut source_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
+    let mut source_process_env = replication_fast_env();
+    source_process_env.extend_from_slice(LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV);
+    source_process_env.extend_from_slice(FAST_SCANNER_ENV);
+    source_env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &source_process_env).await?;
+
+    let mut target_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
+    target_env.start_rustfs_server_without_cleanup(vec![]).await?;
+
+    source_env
+        .create_s3_client()
+        .create_bucket()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    target_env
+        .create_s3_client()
+        .create_bucket()
+        .bucket(target_bucket)
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+
+    Ok((source_env, target_env))
+}
+
+/// P1-20: objects that already exist when a rule with
+/// ExistingObjectReplication=Enabled arrives are compensated by the scanner's
+/// existing-object resync pass, whatever wrote them — plain PUT, CopyObject,
+/// or Snowball auto-extract. The pinned exception is a null-version object
+/// (written before the bucket became versioned): the scanner heal gate skips
+/// nil-version objects entirely (`scanner_folder.rs` heal_replication), so it
+/// must NEVER be compensated.
+#[tokio::test]
+#[serial]
+async fn test_scanner_compensates_existing_objects_across_write_paths() -> TestResult {
+    init_logging();
+    let source_bucket = "scanner-comp-src";
+    let target_bucket = "scanner-comp-dst";
+    let (source_env, target_env) = build_scanner_compensation_pair(source_bucket, target_bucket).await?;
+    let source_client = source_env.create_s3_client();
+    let target_client = target_env.create_s3_client();
+
+    // Null-version cell: PUT before versioning; the object keeps the nil
+    // version id forever.
+    let null_key = "pre-versioning-null.txt";
+    source_client
+        .put_object()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .key(null_key)
+        .body(ByteStream::from_static(b"null version payload"))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+
+    enable_bucket_versioning(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+    enable_bucket_versioning(&target_env, target_bucket).await?;
+
+    // Pre-existing objects from three write paths, all before any replication
+    // config exists (their replication status stays Empty).
+    let plain_key = "existing-plain.txt";
+    let plain_payload = "existing plain payload";
+    source_client
+        .put_object()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .key(plain_key)
+        .body(ByteStream::from_static(plain_payload.as_bytes()))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+
+    let copy_key = "existing-copy.txt";
+    source_client
+        .copy_object()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .key(copy_key)
+        .copy_source(format!("{source_bucket}/{plain_key}"))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+
+    let member_key = "snowball/existing-member.txt";
+    let member_payload: &[u8] = b"existing snowball member payload";
+    let mut builder = tokio_tar::Builder::new(std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::new()));
+    let mut header = tokio_tar::Header::new_gnu();
+    header.set_size(member_payload.len() as u64);
+    header.set_mode(0o644);
+    header.set_cksum();
+    builder
+        .append_data(&mut header, member_key, std::io::Cursor::new(member_payload))
+        .await?;
+    let archive = builder.into_inner().await?.into_inner();
+    source_client
+        .put_object()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .key("existing-members.tar")
+        .metadata("Snowball-Auto-Extract", "true")
+        .body(ByteStream::from(archive))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    // The extracted member must exist locally before the rule arrives, or it
+    // would replicate through the live path instead of the scanner.
+    let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10);
+    loop {
+        if source_client
+            .head_object()
+            .bucket(source_bucket)
+            .key(member_key)
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .is_ok()
+        {
+            break;
+        }
+        if tokio::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
+            return Err("snowball member was never extracted on the source".into());
+        }
+        sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
+    }
+
+    // Only now wire the remote target and the Enabled rule.
+    let target_arn = set_replication_target(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_env, target_bucket).await?;
+    put_bucket_replication(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_arn).await?;
+
+    // Control key written after the rule replicates through the live path.
+    let control_key = "control-live.txt";
+    let control_payload = "control live payload";
+    source_client
+        .put_object()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .key(control_key)
+        .body(ByteStream::from_static(control_payload.as_bytes()))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    wait_for_replicated_object(&target_client, target_bucket, control_key, control_payload).await?;
+
+    // Scanner compensation for each pre-existing write path.
+    wait_for_replicated_object(&target_client, target_bucket, plain_key, plain_payload).await?;
+    wait_for_replicated_object(&target_client, target_bucket, copy_key, plain_payload).await?;
+    wait_for_replicated_object(&target_client, target_bucket, member_key, std::str::from_utf8(member_payload)?).await?;
+
+    // Null-version contract: with every sibling compensated (scanner proven
+    // live), the nil-version object must stay absent across further cycles.
+    assert_replication_key_absent(&target_client, target_bucket, null_key, Duration::from_secs(6)).await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// P1-20: ExistingObjectReplication=Disabled is a contract, not a delay — the
+/// scanner must NEVER compensate objects that predate the rule, while objects
+/// written after the rule replicate normally (the setting only gates the
+/// existing-object resync path).
+#[tokio::test]
+#[serial]
+async fn test_scanner_never_compensates_when_existing_object_replication_disabled() -> TestResult {
+    init_logging();
+    let source_bucket = "scanner-disabled-src";
+    let target_bucket = "scanner-disabled-dst";
+    let (source_env, mut target_env) = build_scanner_compensation_pair(source_bucket, target_bucket).await?;
+    let source_client = source_env.create_s3_client();
+    let target_client = target_env.create_s3_client();
+
+    enable_bucket_versioning(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
+    enable_bucket_versioning(&target_env, target_bucket).await?;
+
+    let existing_key = "existing-disabled.txt";
+    source_client
+        .put_object()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .key(existing_key)
+        .body(ByteStream::from_static(b"existing disabled payload"))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+
+    let target_arn = set_replication_target(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_env, target_bucket).await?;
+    put_bucket_replication_with_statuses(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_arn, "Enabled", None, "Disabled").await?;
+
+    // The live path is unaffected by the Disabled existing-object setting.
+    let control_key = "control-live.txt";
+    let control_payload = "control live payload";
+    source_client
+        .put_object()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .key(control_key)
+        .body(ByteStream::from_static(control_payload.as_bytes()))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    wait_for_replicated_object(&target_client, target_bucket, control_key, control_payload).await?;
+
+    // Scanner-only witness. A live-path control key alone would let this test
+    // pass while the existing-object scanner is disabled or wedged, so make
+    // the scanner itself observable: an object whose replication FAILED while
+    // the target was down can only be re-driven by the data scanner's
+    // replication heal pass (see FAST_SCANNER_ENV), and that pass is NOT
+    // gated by ExistingObjectReplication. The witness lives in the same
+    // bucket and prefix as the pre-existing key, so a heal pass that reached
+    // it necessarily walked the pre-existing key in the same scan.
+    let witness_key = "scanner-witness.txt";
+    let witness_payload = "scanner witness payload";
+    target_env.stop_server();
+    source_client
+        .put_object()
+        .bucket(source_bucket)
+        .key(witness_key)
+        .body(ByteStream::from_static(witness_payload.as_bytes()))
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    wait_for_source_replication_status(&source_client, source_bucket, witness_key, "FAILED", false).await?;
+    target_env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &[]).await?;
+    let target_client = target_env.create_s3_client();
+    wait_for_replicated_object(&target_client, target_bucket, witness_key, witness_payload).await?;
+
+    // The scanner demonstrably swept this bucket; the pre-existing key must
+    // still be absent, and stay absent over further cycles.
+    assert_replication_key_absent(&target_client, target_bucket, existing_key, Duration::from_secs(6)).await?;
+
     Ok(())
 }

crates/ecstore/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ pub mod bucket {
     pub mod bucket_target_sys {
         pub use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::{
             AdvancedPutOptions, BucketTargetError, BucketTargetSys, PutObjectOptions, RemoveObjectOptions, S3ClientError,
-            TargetClient,
+            TargetClient, append_version_id_query,
         };
     }
 
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ pub mod config {
     pub mod com {
         pub use crate::config::com::{
             COMMA_SEPARATED_LISTS, CONFIG_PREFIX, ENV_CONFIG_RECOVER_ON_CORRUPTION, STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS,
-            ServerConfigCorruptError, ServerConfigSaveResult, ServerConfigSnapshot, delete_config,
+            ServerConfigCorruptError, ServerConfigSaveResult, ServerConfigSnapshot, delete_config, delete_config_no_lock,
             is_server_config_corrupt_error, lookup_configs, read_config, read_config_no_lock, read_config_with_metadata,
             read_config_without_migrate, read_config_without_migrate_no_lock, read_existing_server_config_no_lock,
             read_server_config_snapshot, save_config, save_config_no_lock, save_config_with_opts, save_server_config,

crates/ecstore/src/bucket/bucket_target_sys.rs

@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ fn resolve_put_api_version_id(source_version_id: &str) -> Option<&str> {
 /// member, so the query is spliced in via `map_request`, which runs at
 /// `modify_before_signing`: the parameter becomes part of the SigV4 canonical
 /// request.
-fn append_version_id_query(uri: &str, version_id: &str) -> String {
+pub fn append_version_id_query(uri: &str, version_id: &str) -> String {
     let separator = if uri.contains('?') { '&' } else { '?' };
     format!("{uri}{separator}versionId={}", urlencoding::encode(version_id))
 }
@@ -1861,6 +1861,9 @@ impl TargetClient {
         }
     }
 
+    /// On success returns the version id the target assigned (from
+    /// `x-amz-version-id`), letting callers audit the version-identity
+    /// contract — a target that adopts the source version echoes it back.
     pub async fn put_object(
         &self,
         bucket: &str,
@@ -1868,7 +1871,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
         size: i64,
         body: ByteStream,
         opts: &PutObjectOptions,
-    ) -> Result<(), S3ClientError> {
+    ) -> Result<Option<String>, S3ClientError> {
         let mut headers = opts.header();
 
         let builder = self.client.put_object();
@@ -1903,7 +1906,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
             .send()
             .await
         {
-            Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+            Ok(output) => Ok(output.version_id().map(ToOwned::to_owned)),
             Err(e) => match e {
                 SdkError::ServiceError(service_err) => {
                     let err = service_err.into_err();

crates/ecstore/src/bucket/replication/replication_resyncer.rs

@@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ use rustfs_utils::http::{
 use rustfs_utils::{DEFAULT_SIP_HASH_KEY, get_env_usize, sip_hash};
 #[cfg(test)]
 use s3s::dto::ReplicationConfiguration;
-use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 use std::fmt::Display;
-use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock, Mutex as StdMutex};
 use time::OffsetDateTime;
 use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
 use tokio::io::AsyncRead;
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ const EVENT_RESYNC_RUNTIME_CHANNEL_FAILED: &str = "replication_resync_runtime_ch
 const EVENT_DELETE_MARKER_PURGE_FAILED: &str = "replication_delete_marker_purge_failed";
 const EVENT_DELETE_MARKER_PURGE_MRF: &str = "replication_delete_marker_purge_mrf";
 const METRIC_DELETE_MARKER_PURGE_TOTAL: &str = "rustfs_replication_delete_marker_purge_total";
+const EVENT_REPLICATION_VERSION_IDENTITY_DRIFT: &str = "replication_version_identity_drift";
 const REPLICATION_TARGET_OFFLINE_ERROR_MARKERS: &[&str] = &[
     "dispatch failure",
     "timeouterror",
@@ -186,6 +187,57 @@ fn is_head_proxy_failure(err: &SdkError<HeadObjectError>) -> bool {
     should_count_head_proxy_failure(is_not_found, code, raw_status)
 }
 
+const METRIC_VERSION_IDENTITY_DRIFT_TOTAL: &str = "rustfs_replication_version_identity_drift_total";
+
+/// Targets that already produced a version-identity-drift warning this
+/// process lifetime, by ARN. Deduping is advisory only (the metric still
+/// counts every drifting PUT), so a reconfigured target re-warning only
+/// after a restart is acceptable.
+static VERSION_IDENTITY_WARNED_ARNS: LazyLock<StdMutex<HashSet<String>>> = LazyLock::new(|| StdMutex::new(HashSet::new()));
+
+/// Runtime half of the P1-19 version-identity contract (the explicit probe
+/// lives in replication-check's VersionFidelity phase): every replication PUT
+/// response reveals whether the target adopted the source version id. A
+/// target minting its own ids silently breaks version-addressed deletes and
+/// heal, so surface it — once per target — instead of letting the divergence
+/// accumulate unseen.
+/// Pure drift judgment: the contract only applies when the source addressed a
+/// real (non-nil) version uuid, and drift means the target answered with
+/// anything else — including nothing at all.
+fn version_identity_drifted(source_version_id: &str, assigned_version_id: Option<&str>) -> bool {
+    if source_version_id.is_empty() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // A nil source uuid travels as the literal "null" (unversioned-source
+    // semantics); no identity contract applies to it.
+    if Uuid::parse_str(source_version_id).map(|uuid| uuid.is_nil()).unwrap_or(true) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    assigned_version_id != Some(source_version_id)
+}
+
+fn audit_target_version_identity(tgt_client: &TargetClient, source_version_id: &str, assigned_version_id: Option<&str>) {
+    if !version_identity_drifted(source_version_id, assigned_version_id) {
+        return;
+    }
+    counter!(METRIC_VERSION_IDENTITY_DRIFT_TOTAL).increment(1);
+    let mut warned = VERSION_IDENTITY_WARNED_ARNS
+        .lock()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner());
+    if warned.insert(tgt_client.arn.clone()) {
+        warn!(
+            event = EVENT_REPLICATION_VERSION_IDENTITY_DRIFT,
+            component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
+            subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_REPLICATION_RESYNC,
+            arn = %tgt_client.arn,
+            endpoint = %tgt_client.endpoint,
+            sent_version_id = %source_version_id,
+            assigned_version_id = assigned_version_id.unwrap_or("<none>"),
+            "Replication target does not adopt source version ids; version-addressed replication cannot converge (run ?replication-check for details)"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
 async fn record_proxy_request(bucket: &str, api: &str, is_err: bool) {
     if let Some(stats) = runtime_sources::replication_stats() {
         stats.inc_proxy(bucket, api, is_err).await;
@@ -2872,6 +2924,13 @@ impl ReplicateObjectInfoExt for ReplicateObjectInfo {
             let result = tgt_client
                 .put_object(&tgt_client.bucket, &object, transfer_size, byte_stream, &put_opts)
                 .await
+                .map(|assigned_version_id| {
+                    audit_target_version_identity(
+                        &tgt_client,
+                        &put_opts.internal.source_version_id,
+                        assigned_version_id.as_deref(),
+                    )
+                })
                 .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()));
             record_proxy_request(&bucket, "PutObject", result.is_err()).await;
             if has_tagging_replication {
@@ -3279,6 +3338,13 @@ impl ReplicateObjectInfoExt for ReplicateObjectInfo {
             let result = tgt_client
                 .put_object(&tgt_client.bucket, &object, transfer_size, byte_stream, &put_opts)
                 .await
+                .map(|assigned_version_id| {
+                    audit_target_version_identity(
+                        &tgt_client,
+                        &put_opts.internal.source_version_id,
+                        assigned_version_id.as_deref(),
+                    )
+                })
                 .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()));
             record_proxy_request(&bucket, "PutObject", result.is_err()).await;
             if has_tagging_replication {
@@ -3470,15 +3536,27 @@ async fn replicate_object_with_multipart<S: ReplicationObjectIO>(ctx: MultipartR
 
     let actual_size = replication_multipart_complete_actual_size(&object_info.user_defined);
 
-    cli.complete_multipart_upload(
-        dst_bucket,
-        object,
-        &upload_id,
-        uploaded_parts,
-        &replication_complete_multipart_options(actual_size, object_info.etag.clone().unwrap_or_default(), object_info.mod_time),
-    )
-    .await
-    .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()))?;
+    let completed = cli
+        .complete_multipart_upload(
+            dst_bucket,
+            object,
+            &upload_id,
+            uploaded_parts,
+            &replication_complete_multipart_options(
+                actual_size,
+                object_info.etag.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
+                object_info.mod_time,
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()))?;
+
+    // Multipart decides the target version at initiate time and only reveals
+    // it on completion, so this is where the identity contract is observable
+    // for this path. A target can mirror PutObject version ids and still mint
+    // its own here, which would leave multipart deletes and heals addressing
+    // a version that never existed.
+    audit_target_version_identity(&cli, &put_opts.internal.source_version_id, completed.version_id());
 
     Ok(())
 }
@@ -3525,6 +3603,27 @@ mod tests {
         ReplicationTargetStore::register_test_target(target).await;
     }
 
+    /// P1-19 runtime spot-check exemption matrix: drift only applies when the
+    /// source addressed a real version uuid.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_version_identity_drift_judgment() {
+        let source = "6fa459ea-ee8a-3ca4-894e-db77e160355e";
+        for (sent, got, expected) in [
+            (source, Some(source), false),
+            (source, Some("0e304ce5-33e9-4b8a-9b12-9e40a53e6ded"), true),
+            (source, None, true),
+            ("", None, false),
+            ("null", Some("anything"), false),
+            ("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000", Some("anything"), false),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                version_identity_drifted(sent, got),
+                expected,
+                "sent {sent:?} got {got:?} must judge drift = {expected}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn resync_admission_configuration_is_bounded() {
         assert_eq!(ENV_REPL_RESYNC_MAX_JOBS, "RUSTFS_REPL_RESYNC_MAX_JOBS");

crates/ecstore/src/cluster/rpc/client.rs

@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@
 #[cfg(test)]
 use crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_VERSION_HEADER;
 use crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::{
-    RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER, RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2, RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_CHALLENGE_HEADER, RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER,
-    RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_HEADER, RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER, TIMESTAMP_HEADER,
-};
-use crate::cluster::rpc::{
-    gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience, verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response,
+    AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities, RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER, RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2, RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_CHALLENGE_HEADER,
+    RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER, RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER, RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER,
+    RollingMutationBodyDigest, TIMESTAMP_HEADER, internode_rpc_body_digest_strict,
+    verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response,
 };
+use crate::cluster::rpc::{gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience};
 #[cfg(test)]
 use crate::cluster::rpc::{tonic_boot_epoch_challenge, tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers};
 use crate::disk::error::{DiskError, Error as DiskErrorType, RpcStatusError};
@@ -233,7 +233,22 @@ pub struct ReplayScopeChannel<S> {
 /// The channel type used by internode clients after v2 authentication and replay-scope handling.
 pub type AuthenticatedChannel = ReplayScopeChannel<Channel>;
 
-static PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, Uuid>>> = LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+enum PeerReplayCapability {
+    Capable { boot_epoch: Uuid },
+    Revoked,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, Eq, PartialEq)]
+struct PeerReplayState {
+    boot_epoch: Option<Uuid>,
+    cache_capability: Option<PeerReplayCapability>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
+struct PeerReplayStateSnapshot(PeerReplayState);
+
+static PEER_REPLAY_STATES: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, PeerReplayState>>> = LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
 
 impl<S> ReplayScopeChannel<S> {
     fn new(inner: S, audience: Option<String>) -> Self {
@@ -241,13 +256,67 @@ impl<S> ReplayScopeChannel<S> {
     }
 }
 
-fn cached_peer_boot_epoch(audience: &str) -> Option<Uuid> {
-    PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS.lock().ok().and_then(|epochs| epochs.get(audience).copied())
+fn peer_replay_state(audience: &str) -> PeerReplayState {
+    PEER_REPLAY_STATES
+        .lock()
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|states| states.get(audience).copied())
+        .unwrap_or_default()
 }
 
-fn remember_peer_boot_epoch(audience: String, epoch: Uuid) {
-    if let Ok(mut epochs) = PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS.lock() {
-        epochs.insert(audience, epoch);
+fn apply_peer_replay_response(
+    audience: String,
+    sent_state: PeerReplayState,
+    response: std::io::Result<AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities>,
+) {
+    if let Ok(mut states) = PEER_REPLAY_STATES.lock() {
+        let current_state = states.get(&audience).copied().unwrap_or_default();
+        let mut next_state = current_state;
+        if let Ok(response) = &response
+            && sent_state.boot_epoch == current_state.boot_epoch
+        {
+            next_state.boot_epoch = Some(response.boot_epoch);
+        }
+
+        if sent_state.boot_epoch == current_state.boot_epoch {
+            let response_capability = response
+                .as_ref()
+                .ok()
+                .filter(|response| response.dynamic_replay_cache)
+                .map(|response| response.boot_epoch);
+            match (sent_state.cache_capability, current_state.cache_capability, response_capability) {
+                (None, None, Some(boot_epoch))
+                | (Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked), Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked), Some(boot_epoch)) => {
+                    next_state.cache_capability = Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch });
+                }
+                (
+                    Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
+                        boot_epoch: sent_boot_epoch,
+                    }),
+                    Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
+                        boot_epoch: current_boot_epoch,
+                    }),
+                    Some(response_boot_epoch),
+                ) if sent_boot_epoch == current_boot_epoch => {
+                    next_state.cache_capability = Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
+                        boot_epoch: response_boot_epoch,
+                    });
+                }
+                (
+                    Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
+                        boot_epoch: sent_boot_epoch,
+                    }),
+                    Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
+                        boot_epoch: current_boot_epoch,
+                    }),
+                    None,
+                ) if sent_boot_epoch == current_boot_epoch => {
+                    next_state.cache_capability = Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked);
+                }
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+        states.insert(audience, next_state);
     }
 }
 
@@ -276,6 +345,11 @@ where
                 == Some(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2)
         });
         let challenge = authenticated.then(Uuid::new_v4);
+        let sent_state = request
+            .extensions()
+            .get::<PeerReplayStateSnapshot>()
+            .map(|snapshot| snapshot.0)
+            .unwrap_or_default();
         if let (Some(audience), Some(challenge)) = (self.audience.as_deref(), challenge) {
             // The challenge is independently HMAC-authenticated by the response proof. It is not
             // part of v2 so old peers ignore it, while a new peer can safely advertise its epoch.
@@ -284,7 +358,7 @@ where
                 challenge.to_string().parse().expect("UUID must be a valid header value"),
             );
             if let (Some(boot_epoch), Some(timestamp), Some(content_sha256)) = (
-                cached_peer_boot_epoch(audience),
+                sent_state.boot_epoch,
                 request.headers().get(TIMESTAMP_HEADER).and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
                 request
                     .headers()
@@ -303,16 +377,21 @@ where
         Box::pin(async move {
             let response = future.await?;
             if let (Some(audience), Some(challenge)) = (audience, challenge) {
-                match verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response(&audience, challenge, response.headers()) {
-                    Ok(epoch) => remember_peer_boot_epoch(audience, epoch),
-                    Err(error)
-                        if response.headers().contains_key(RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER)
-                            || response.headers().contains_key(RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_HEADER) =>
-                    {
-                        debug!(error = %error, "peer boot epoch response proof was rejected")
-                    }
-                    Err(_) => {}
+                let response_state = verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response(&audience, challenge, response.headers());
+                if let Err(error) = &response_state
+                    && (response.headers().contains_key(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER)
+                        || response.headers().contains_key(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER))
+                {
+                    debug!(
+                        event = "internode_rpc_capability_proof_rejected",
+                        component = "ecstore",
+                        subsystem = "rpc_client",
+                        result = "rejected",
+                        error = %error,
+                        "internode RPC capability proof rejected"
+                    )
                 }
+                apply_peer_replay_response(audience, sent_state, response_state);
             }
             Ok(response)
         })
@@ -321,6 +400,7 @@ where
 
 pub struct TonicSignatureInterceptor {
     audience: Option<String>,
+    body_digest_strict: bool,
 }
 
 impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicSignatureInterceptor {
@@ -337,9 +417,31 @@ impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicSignatureInterceptor {
             .metadata()
             .get(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)
             .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok());
+        // RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(disk-mutation-body-digest): use cache-free v2 for peers without an authenticated boot epoch. Remove after every supported peer advertises the authenticated dynamic replay-cache capability and body-digest strict mode is the default.
+        // beta.11 verifies v2 body digests but stores their nonces in a fixed-size cache.
+        let rolling_mutation = req.extensions().get::<RollingMutationBodyDigest>().is_some();
+        let peer_state = PEER_REPLAY_STATES
+            .lock()
+            .map_err(|_| tonic::Status::unauthenticated("RPC peer capability state unavailable"))?
+            .get(audience)
+            .copied()
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+        let content_sha256 = if content_sha256.is_some() {
+            if peer_state.cache_capability == Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked) {
+                return Err(tonic::Status::unauthenticated("RPC peer replay capability changed"));
+            }
+            if rolling_mutation && !self.body_digest_strict && peer_state.boot_epoch.is_none() {
+                None
+            } else {
+                content_sha256
+            }
+        } else {
+            content_sha256
+        };
         let headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers(audience, method.service(), method.method(), content_sha256)
             .map_err(|_| tonic::Status::unauthenticated("No valid auth token"))?;
         req.metadata_mut().as_mut().extend(headers);
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(PeerReplayStateSnapshot(peer_state));
         inject_trace_context_into_metadata(req.metadata_mut());
         inject_request_id_into_metadata(req.metadata_mut());
         Ok(req)
@@ -347,7 +449,10 @@ impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicSignatureInterceptor {
 }
 
 pub fn gen_tonic_signature_interceptor() -> TonicSignatureInterceptor {
-    TonicSignatureInterceptor { audience: None }
+    TonicSignatureInterceptor {
+        audience: None,
+        body_digest_strict: internode_rpc_body_digest_strict(),
+    }
 }
 
 pub struct NoOpInterceptor;
@@ -409,6 +514,7 @@ mod tests {
     #[derive(Clone)]
     struct EpochProofService {
         audience: String,
+        include_capability: bool,
         seen_headers: std::sync::Arc<Mutex<Vec<http::HeaderMap>>>,
     }
 
@@ -430,29 +536,97 @@ mod tests {
                 .expect("client challenge must be syntactically valid")
                 .expect("authenticated client request must carry a boot epoch challenge");
             let mut response = HttpResponse::new(());
-            response.headers_mut().extend(
-                tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers(&self.audience, challenge)
-                    .expect("test server must be able to sign an epoch proof"),
-            );
+            let mut headers = tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers(&self.audience, challenge)
+                .expect("test server must be able to sign an epoch proof");
+            if !self.include_capability {
+                headers.remove(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER);
+                headers.remove(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER);
+            }
+            response.headers_mut().extend(headers);
             std::future::ready(Ok(response))
         }
     }
 
+    #[derive(Clone)]
+    struct MissingProofService;
+
+    impl Service<HttpRequest<()>> for MissingProofService {
+        type Response = HttpResponse<()>;
+        type Error = std::convert::Infallible;
+        type Future = std::future::Ready<Result<Self::Response, Self::Error>>;
+
+        fn poll_ready(&mut self, _cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
+            Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
+        }
+
+        fn call(&mut self, _request: HttpRequest<()>) -> Self::Future {
+            std::future::ready(Ok(HttpResponse::new(())))
+        }
+    }
+
     fn ensure_test_rpc_secret() {
         runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
     }
 
     fn test_request() -> tonic::Request<()> {
+        test_request_for("Ping")
+    }
+
+    fn test_request_for(method: &'static str) -> tonic::Request<()> {
         let mut request = tonic::Request::new(());
         request
             .extensions_mut()
-            .insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", "Ping"));
+            .insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", method));
         request
     }
 
     fn test_interceptor() -> TonicSignatureInterceptor {
+        test_interceptor_for("node-a:9000", false)
+    }
+
+    fn test_interceptor_for(audience: &str, body_digest_strict: bool) -> TonicSignatureInterceptor {
         TonicSignatureInterceptor {
-            audience: Some("node-a:9000".to_string()),
+            audience: Some(audience.to_string()),
+            body_digest_strict,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn clear_peer_capability(audience: &str) {
+        PEER_REPLAY_STATES
+            .lock()
+            .expect("peer capability cache lock must not be poisoned")
+            .remove(audience);
+    }
+
+    fn rolling_mutation_request(method: &'static str) -> tonic::Request<()> {
+        let mut request = tonic::Request::new(rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::GenerallyLockRequest {
+            args: "canonical mutation request".to_string(),
+        });
+        request
+            .extensions_mut()
+            .insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", method));
+        crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_rolling_mutation_body_digest(&mut request).expect("test mutation digest must be attached");
+        request.map(|_| ())
+    }
+
+    fn replay_scope_request(audience: &str, method: &'static str) -> HttpRequest<()> {
+        let mut request = HttpRequest::builder()
+            .uri(format!("/node_service.NodeService/{method}"))
+            .body(())
+            .expect("test RPC request must build");
+        request.headers_mut().extend(
+            gen_tonic_signature_headers(audience, "node_service.NodeService", method, None).expect("v2 test headers must mint"),
+        );
+        request
+            .extensions_mut()
+            .insert(PeerReplayStateSnapshot(peer_replay_state(audience)));
+        request
+    }
+
+    fn authenticated_peer_response(boot_epoch: Uuid, dynamic_replay_cache: bool) -> AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities {
+        AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities {
+            boot_epoch,
+            dynamic_replay_cache,
         }
     }
 
@@ -567,6 +741,431 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn unknown_peer_mutations_use_cache_free_unsigned_v2() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "legacy-body-digest-client-test:9000";
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
+        for method in ["Lock", "WriteAll"] {
+            let request = interceptor
+                .call(rolling_mutation_request(method))
+                .expect("interceptor call should succeed");
+
+            assert_eq!(
+                request
+                    .metadata()
+                    .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+                    .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
+                Some("UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD")
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                request
+                    .metadata()
+                    .get("x-rustfs-rpc-nonce")
+                    .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
+                Some("unsigned")
+            );
+            assert!(
+                crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
+                    audience,
+                    &format!("/node_service.NodeService/{method}"),
+                    request.metadata().as_ref(),
+                )
+                .is_ok(),
+                "the cache-free request must retain valid audience- and method-bound v2 authentication"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unknown_peer_exact_body_contract_remains_body_bound() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "exact-body-contract-client-test:9000";
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
+        let mut request = test_request_for("ScannerActivity");
+        crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, b"exact scanner activity body")
+            .expect("test exact body digest must be attached");
+        let expected_digest = request
+            .metadata()
+            .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+            .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+            .expect("test request must carry its digest")
+            .to_string();
+
+        let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            request
+                .metadata()
+                .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+                .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
+            Some(expected_digest.as_str())
+        );
+        assert!(
+            crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
+                audience,
+                "/node_service.NodeService/ScannerActivity",
+                request.metadata().as_ref(),
+            )
+            .is_ok()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unknown_peer_iam_mutation_helper_remains_body_bound() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "exact-iam-mutation-client-test:9000";
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
+        let mut request = tonic::Request::new(rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::DeleteUserRequest {
+            access_key: "target-access-key".to_string(),
+        });
+        request
+            .extensions_mut()
+            .insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", "DeleteUser"));
+        crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut request).expect("test IAM mutation digest must be attached");
+        let request = request.map(|_| ());
+        let expected_digest = request
+            .metadata()
+            .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+            .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+            .expect("test IAM mutation must carry its digest")
+            .to_string();
+
+        let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            request
+                .metadata()
+                .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+                .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
+            Some(expected_digest.as_str())
+        );
+        assert!(
+            crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
+                audience,
+                "/node_service.NodeService/DeleteUser",
+                request.metadata().as_ref(),
+            )
+            .is_ok(),
+            "IAM mutations must remain body-bound before capability discovery"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn authenticated_replay_cache_capability_enables_body_binding() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "body-digest-capable-client-test:9000";
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+        let seen_headers = std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
+        let service = EpochProofService {
+            audience: audience.to_string(),
+            include_capability: true,
+            seen_headers,
+        };
+        let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(service, Some(audience.to_string()));
+        futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping")))
+            .expect("authenticated capability probe must complete");
+
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
+        let request = rolling_mutation_request("Lock");
+        let expected_digest = request
+            .metadata()
+            .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+            .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+            .expect("test mutation must carry its digest")
+            .to_string();
+
+        let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            request
+                .metadata()
+                .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+                .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
+            Some(expected_digest.as_str())
+        );
+        let nonce = request
+            .metadata()
+            .get("x-rustfs-rpc-nonce")
+            .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(|value| Uuid::parse_str(value).ok())
+            .expect("capable peer body-bound mutation must carry a UUID nonce");
+        assert!(!nonce.is_nil());
+        assert!(
+            crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
+                audience,
+                "/node_service.NodeService/Lock",
+                request.metadata().as_ref(),
+            )
+            .is_ok(),
+            "the body-bound request must retain valid audience- and method-bound v2 authentication"
+        );
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn invalid_capability_proof_does_not_enable_body_binding() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "invalid-capability-client-test:9000";
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+        let service = EpochProofService {
+            audience: "wrong-capability-audience:9000".to_string(),
+            include_capability: true,
+            seen_headers: std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+        };
+        let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(service, Some(audience.to_string()));
+        futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping")))
+            .expect("invalid capability response must still complete");
+
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
+        let request = interceptor
+            .call(rolling_mutation_request("Lock"))
+            .expect("legacy-compatible mutation must still be signed");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            request
+                .metadata()
+                .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+                .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
+            Some("UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn legacy_boot_proof_keeps_mutations_body_bound_and_enables_non_ping_v3() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "legacy-boot-proof-client-test:9000";
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+        let seen_headers = std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
+        let service = EpochProofService {
+            audience: audience.to_string(),
+            include_capability: false,
+            seen_headers: seen_headers.clone(),
+        };
+        let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(service, Some(audience.to_string()));
+        futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping")))
+            .expect("legacy boot proof response must complete");
+
+        let state = peer_replay_state(audience);
+        assert!(state.boot_epoch.is_some(), "authenticated legacy proof must enable replay-scoped v3");
+        assert_eq!(state.cache_capability, None);
+
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
+        let request = rolling_mutation_request("Lock");
+        let expected_digest = request
+            .metadata()
+            .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+            .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+            .expect("test mutation must carry its digest")
+            .to_string();
+        let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("legacy-compatible mutation must be signed");
+        assert_eq!(
+            request
+                .metadata()
+                .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+                .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
+            Some(expected_digest.as_str())
+        );
+        let (metadata, extensions, body) = request.into_parts();
+        let mut request = HttpRequest::new(body);
+        *request.uri_mut() = "/node_service.NodeService/Lock".parse().expect("test RPC URI must parse");
+        *request.headers_mut() = metadata.into_headers();
+        *request.extensions_mut() = extensions;
+        futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(request)).expect("legacy strict-compatible lock request must complete");
+
+        let headers = seen_headers.lock().expect("test header capture lock must not be poisoned");
+        assert!(
+            headers[1].contains_key(RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_VERSION_HEADER),
+            "authenticated legacy boot proof must enable v3 on a non-Ping request"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reordered_capability_responses_cannot_undo_newer_state() {
+        let audience = "reordered-capability-client-test:9000";
+        let epoch_one = Uuid::new_v4();
+        let epoch_two = Uuid::new_v4();
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+
+        let unknown = PeerReplayState::default();
+        apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), unknown, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_one, true)));
+        apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), unknown, Err(std::io::Error::other("delayed legacy response")));
+        let epoch_one_state = PeerReplayState {
+            boot_epoch: Some(epoch_one),
+            cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch: epoch_one }),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(peer_replay_state(audience), epoch_one_state);
+
+        apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), epoch_one_state, Err(std::io::Error::other("rollback response")));
+        apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), epoch_one_state, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_one, true)));
+        assert_eq!(
+            peer_replay_state(audience),
+            PeerReplayState {
+                boot_epoch: Some(epoch_one),
+                cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked),
+            }
+        );
+
+        let revoked = peer_replay_state(audience);
+        apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), revoked, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_two, true)));
+        apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), epoch_one_state, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_one, true)));
+        assert_eq!(
+            peer_replay_state(audience),
+            PeerReplayState {
+                boot_epoch: Some(epoch_two),
+                cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch: epoch_two }),
+            }
+        );
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn stale_capability_response_cannot_cross_a_new_boot_epoch() {
+        let audience = "cross-epoch-capability-client-test:9000";
+        let epoch_one = Uuid::new_v4();
+        let epoch_two = Uuid::new_v4();
+        let epoch_three = Uuid::new_v4();
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+
+        let revoked_epoch_one = PeerReplayState {
+            boot_epoch: Some(epoch_one),
+            cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked),
+        };
+        PEER_REPLAY_STATES
+            .lock()
+            .expect("peer replay state lock must not be poisoned")
+            .insert(audience.to_string(), revoked_epoch_one);
+
+        apply_peer_replay_response(
+            audience.to_string(),
+            revoked_epoch_one,
+            Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_three, false)),
+        );
+        apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), revoked_epoch_one, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_two, true)));
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            peer_replay_state(audience),
+            PeerReplayState {
+                boot_epoch: Some(epoch_three),
+                cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked),
+            },
+            "a stale dynamic-cache proof must not cross a newer authenticated boot epoch"
+        );
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn interceptor_snapshot_prevents_delayed_legacy_response_from_revoking_capability() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "capability-snapshot-client-test:9000";
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+        let boot_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
+        let request = interceptor
+            .call(rolling_mutation_request("Lock"))
+            .expect("legacy-compatible request must pass the interceptor");
+        assert_eq!(
+            request
+                .extensions()
+                .get::<PeerReplayStateSnapshot>()
+                .map(|snapshot| snapshot.0),
+            Some(PeerReplayState::default()),
+            "interceptor must preserve its unknown-state admission snapshot"
+        );
+
+        let capable_state = PeerReplayState {
+            boot_epoch: Some(boot_epoch),
+            cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch }),
+        };
+        PEER_REPLAY_STATES
+            .lock()
+            .expect("peer capability cache lock must not be poisoned")
+            .insert(audience.to_string(), capable_state);
+        let (metadata, extensions, body) = request.into_parts();
+        let mut request = HttpRequest::new(body);
+        *request.uri_mut() = "/node_service.NodeService/Lock".parse().expect("test RPC URI must parse");
+        *request.headers_mut() = metadata.into_headers();
+        *request.extensions_mut() = extensions;
+        let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(MissingProofService, Some(audience.to_string()));
+
+        futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(request)).expect("in-flight request response must complete");
+
+        assert_eq!(peer_replay_state(audience), capable_state);
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strict_mode_keeps_unknown_peer_mutations_body_bound() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "strict-body-digest-client-test:9000";
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, true);
+        let request = rolling_mutation_request("WriteAll");
+        let expected_digest = request
+            .metadata()
+            .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+            .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+            .expect("test mutation must carry its digest")
+            .to_string();
+
+        let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            request
+                .metadata()
+                .get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
+                .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
+            Some(expected_digest.as_str())
+        );
+        let nonce = request
+            .metadata()
+            .get("x-rustfs-rpc-nonce")
+            .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(|value| Uuid::parse_str(value).ok())
+            .expect("strict body-bound mutation must carry a UUID nonce");
+        assert!(!nonce.is_nil());
+        assert!(
+            crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
+                audience,
+                "/node_service.NodeService/WriteAll",
+                request.metadata().as_ref(),
+            )
+            .is_ok()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn missing_capability_after_pin_fails_closed() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let audience = "revoked-capability-client-test:9000";
+        let boot_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
+        PEER_REPLAY_STATES
+            .lock()
+            .expect("peer capability cache lock must not be poisoned")
+            .insert(
+                audience.to_string(),
+                PeerReplayState {
+                    boot_epoch: Some(boot_epoch),
+                    cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch }),
+                },
+            );
+        let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(MissingProofService, Some(audience.to_string()));
+        futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping")))
+            .expect("legacy response must complete before capability rejection");
+
+        let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
+        let error = interceptor
+            .call(rolling_mutation_request("Lock"))
+            .expect_err("a peer that loses its pinned capability must fail closed");
+
+        assert_eq!(error.code(), tonic::Code::Unauthenticated);
+        assert_eq!(error.message(), "RPC peer replay capability changed");
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_signature_interceptor_binds_audience_from_peer_uri() {
         let interceptor = TonicInterceptor::Signature(gen_tonic_signature_interceptor())
@@ -583,27 +1182,15 @@ mod tests {
     fn replay_scope_channel_uses_epoch_proof_before_sending_v3() {
         ensure_test_rpc_secret();
         let audience = "replay-scope-client-test:9000";
-        PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS
-            .lock()
-            .expect("peer epoch cache lock must not be poisoned")
-            .remove(audience);
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
         let seen_headers = std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
         let service = EpochProofService {
             audience: audience.to_string(),
+            include_capability: true,
             seen_headers: seen_headers.clone(),
         };
         let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(service, Some(audience.to_string()));
-        let make_request = || {
-            let mut request = HttpRequest::builder()
-                .uri("/node_service.NodeService/Ping")
-                .body(())
-                .expect("test RPC request must build");
-            request.headers_mut().extend(
-                gen_tonic_signature_headers(audience, "node_service.NodeService", "Ping", None)
-                    .expect("v2 test headers must mint"),
-            );
-            request
-        };
+        let make_request = || replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping");
 
         futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(make_request())).expect("first request must complete");
         futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(make_request())).expect("second request must complete");
@@ -619,10 +1206,7 @@ mod tests {
             headers[1].contains_key(RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_VERSION_HEADER),
             "the second request must carry the replay-scoped v3 signature"
         );
-        PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS
-            .lock()
-            .expect("peer epoch cache lock must not be poisoned")
-            .remove(audience);
+        clear_peer_capability(audience);
     }
 
     #[test]

crates/ecstore/src/cluster/rpc/http_auth.rs

@@ -73,10 +73,14 @@ pub const RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_NONCE_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-replay-nonce";
 pub const RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-boot-epoch";
 pub const RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_CHALLENGE_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-boot-epoch-challenge";
 pub const RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-boot-epoch-proof";
+pub(crate) const RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-replay-cache-capability";
+pub(crate) const RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-replay-cache-capability-proof";
 const RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_VERSION_V3: &str = "3";
 const RPC_RESPONSE_PROOF_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rustfs-rpc-response-proof-v1\0";
 const RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rustfs-rpc-replay-scope-v3\0";
 const RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rustfs-rpc-boot-epoch-proof-v1\0";
+const RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rustfs-rpc-replay-cache-capability-proof-v1\0";
+const RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_V1: &str = "dynamic-replay-cache-v1";
 const HTTP_PUT_FILE_AUTH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rustfs-http-put-file-auth-v1\0";
 const HTTP_PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_AUTH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rustfs-http-put-file-capability-v1\0";
 const UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD: &str = "UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD";
@@ -85,8 +89,9 @@ const SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION: i64 = 300; // 5 minutes
 const REPLAY_CACHE_RETENTION: Duration = Duration::from_secs(601);
 const REPLAY_CACHE_RETENTION_SECS: usize = 601;
 const REPLAY_CACHE_ENTRY_BYTES_ESTIMATE: u64 = 128;
-const REPLAY_CACHE_AUTO_MEMORY_PERCENT: u64 = 8;
-const REPLAY_CACHE_AUTO_RPC_RPS_PER_CPU: usize = 2048;
+// Keep 16 CPU / 32 GiB field nodes at the 32M cap without requiring an env override.
+const REPLAY_CACHE_AUTO_MEMORY_PERCENT: u64 = 13;
+const REPLAY_CACHE_AUTO_RPC_RPS_PER_CPU: usize = 4096;
 const REPLAY_CACHE_AUTO_MAX_CAPACITY: usize = 33_554_432;
 const NS_SCANNER_CAPABILITY_AUTH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rustfs-ns-scanner-capability-v3";
 pub const TONIC_RPC_PREFIX: &str = "/node_service.NodeService";
@@ -102,6 +107,10 @@ static INTERNODE_RPC_BODY_DIGEST_STRICT: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| {
         rustfs_config::DEFAULT_INTERNODE_RPC_BODY_DIGEST_STRICT,
     )
 });
+
+pub(crate) fn internode_rpc_body_digest_strict() -> bool {
+    *INTERNODE_RPC_BODY_DIGEST_STRICT
+}
 static INTERNODE_RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_STRICT: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| {
     get_env_bool(
         rustfs_config::ENV_INTERNODE_RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_STRICT,
@@ -789,6 +798,50 @@ fn verify_boot_epoch_proof(secret: &str, audience: &str, challenge: Uuid, boot_e
         .map_err(|_| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied, "Invalid RPC boot epoch proof"))
 }
 
+fn update_replay_cache_capability_proof(mac: &mut HmacSha256, audience: &str, challenge: Uuid, boot_epoch: Uuid) {
+    mac.update(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_DOMAIN);
+    for part in [
+        audience.as_bytes(),
+        b"|",
+        challenge.as_bytes(),
+        b"|",
+        boot_epoch.as_bytes(),
+        b"|",
+        RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_V1.as_bytes(),
+    ] {
+        mac.update(part);
+    }
+}
+
+fn generate_replay_cache_capability_proof(
+    secret: &str,
+    audience: &str,
+    challenge: Uuid,
+    boot_epoch: Uuid,
+) -> std::io::Result<String> {
+    let mut mac =
+        <HmacSha256 as KeyInit>::new_from_slice(secret.as_bytes()).map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC HMAC key"))?;
+    update_replay_cache_capability_proof(&mut mac, audience, challenge, boot_epoch);
+    Ok(general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes()))
+}
+
+fn verify_replay_cache_capability_proof(
+    secret: &str,
+    audience: &str,
+    challenge: Uuid,
+    boot_epoch: Uuid,
+    proof: &str,
+) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    let proof = general_purpose::STANDARD
+        .decode(proof)
+        .map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC replay cache capability proof"))?;
+    let mut mac =
+        <HmacSha256 as KeyInit>::new_from_slice(secret.as_bytes()).map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC HMAC key"))?;
+    update_replay_cache_capability_proof(&mut mac, audience, challenge, boot_epoch);
+    mac.verify_slice(&proof)
+        .map_err(|_| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied, "Invalid RPC replay cache capability proof"))
+}
+
 fn non_nil_uuid(value: &str, name: &str) -> std::io::Result<Uuid> {
     let value = Uuid::parse_str(value).map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other(format!("Invalid {name}")))?;
     (!value.is_nil())
@@ -871,15 +924,34 @@ pub fn tonic_boot_epoch_challenge(headers: &HeaderMap) -> std::io::Result<Option
 /// Build the authenticated response headers for a client boot-epoch challenge.
 pub fn tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers(audience: &str, challenge: Uuid) -> std::io::Result<HeaderMap> {
     let boot_epoch = tonic_rpc_boot_epoch();
-    let proof = generate_boot_epoch_proof(&get_shared_secret()?, audience, challenge, boot_epoch)?;
+    let secret = get_shared_secret()?;
+    let proof = generate_boot_epoch_proof(&secret, audience, challenge, boot_epoch)?;
+    let capability_proof = generate_replay_cache_capability_proof(&secret, audience, challenge, boot_epoch)?;
     let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
     headers.insert(RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER, header_value(&boot_epoch.to_string(), RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER)?);
     headers.insert(RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_HEADER, header_value(&proof, RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_HEADER)?);
+    headers.insert(
+        RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER,
+        HeaderValue::from_static(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_V1),
+    );
+    headers.insert(
+        RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER,
+        header_value(&capability_proof, RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER)?,
+    );
     Ok(headers)
 }
 
 /// Verify the server boot-epoch response for a challenge generated by this client.
 pub fn verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response(audience: &str, challenge: Uuid, headers: &HeaderMap) -> std::io::Result<Uuid> {
+    verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response_with_secret(&get_shared_secret()?, audience, challenge, headers)
+}
+
+fn verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response_with_secret(
+    secret: &str,
+    audience: &str,
+    challenge: Uuid,
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+) -> std::io::Result<Uuid> {
     let boot_epoch = headers
         .get(RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER)
         .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
@@ -889,10 +961,47 @@ pub fn verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response(audience: &str, challenge: Uuid, headers
         .get(RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_HEADER)
         .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
         .ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC boot epoch proof"))?;
-    verify_boot_epoch_proof(&get_shared_secret()?, audience, challenge, boot_epoch, proof)?;
+    verify_boot_epoch_proof(secret, audience, challenge, boot_epoch, proof)?;
     Ok(boot_epoch)
 }
 
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities {
+    pub(crate) boot_epoch: Uuid,
+    pub(crate) dynamic_replay_cache: bool,
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response(
+    audience: &str,
+    challenge: Uuid,
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+) -> std::io::Result<AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities> {
+    let secret = get_shared_secret()?;
+    let boot_epoch = verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response_with_secret(&secret, audience, challenge, headers)?;
+    let capability = headers.get(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER);
+    let proof = headers.get(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER);
+    if capability.is_none() && proof.is_none() {
+        return Ok(AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities {
+            boot_epoch,
+            dynamic_replay_cache: false,
+        });
+    }
+    let capability = capability
+        .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+        .ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC replay cache capability"))?;
+    if capability != RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_V1 {
+        return Err(std::io::Error::other("Unsupported RPC replay cache capability"));
+    }
+    let proof = proof
+        .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+        .ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC replay cache capability proof"))?;
+    verify_replay_cache_capability_proof(&secret, audience, challenge, boot_epoch, proof)?;
+    Ok(AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities {
+        boot_epoch,
+        dynamic_replay_cache: true,
+    })
+}
+
 fn valid_content_sha256(value: &str) -> bool {
     value == UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD
         || (value.len() == 64
@@ -1103,6 +1212,23 @@ pub fn set_tonic_mutation_body_digest<T: rustfs_protos::CanonicalMutationBody>(
     set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(request, &canonical_body)
 }
 
+pub fn set_tonic_rolling_mutation_body_digest<T: rustfs_protos::CanonicalMutationBody>(
+    request: &mut tonic::Request<T>,
+) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(request)?;
+    request.extensions_mut().insert(RollingMutationBodyDigest);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn set_tonic_rolling_canonical_body_digest<T>(request: &mut tonic::Request<T>, canonical_body: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(request, canonical_body)?;
+    request.extensions_mut().insert(RollingMutationBodyDigest);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct RollingMutationBodyDigest;
+
 pub fn verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest<T>(request: &tonic::Request<T>, canonical_body: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
     let version = request
         .metadata()
@@ -1139,7 +1265,7 @@ pub fn verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest<T>(request: &tonic::Request<T>, canoni
 /// including v1-downgraded ones. It converges independently of the signature-strict switch
 /// (<https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1327>).
 pub fn verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest<T>(request: &tonic::Request<T>, canonical_body: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
-    verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest_with_strictness(request, canonical_body, *INTERNODE_RPC_BODY_DIGEST_STRICT)
+    verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest_with_strictness(request, canonical_body, internode_rpc_body_digest_strict())
 }
 
 /// [`verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest`] with the strict gate injected as a parameter, so both
@@ -2192,6 +2318,23 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response("node-a:9000", Uuid::new_v4(), &headers).is_err());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn replay_cache_capability_proof_binds_audience_challenge_epoch_and_value() {
+        ensure_test_rpc_secret();
+        let challenge = Uuid::new_v4();
+        let headers = tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers("node-a:9000", challenge).expect("capability headers should build");
+        let capabilities = verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response("node-a:9000", challenge, &headers)
+            .expect("matching capability proof should verify");
+        assert_eq!(capabilities.boot_epoch, tonic_rpc_boot_epoch());
+        assert!(capabilities.dynamic_replay_cache);
+        assert!(verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response("node-b:9000", challenge, &headers).is_err());
+        assert!(verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response("node-a:9000", Uuid::new_v4(), &headers).is_err());
+
+        let mut changed_capability = headers;
+        changed_capability.insert(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER, HeaderValue::from_static("dynamic-replay-cache-v2"));
+        assert!(verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response("node-a:9000", challenge, &changed_capability).is_err());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn tonic_rpc_auth_failure_reason_maps_security_relevant_errors() {
         for (message, reason) in [
@@ -2552,21 +2695,27 @@ mod tests {
 
         assert_eq!(decision.source, ReplayCacheCapacitySource::Auto);
         assert_eq!(decision.memory_basis, Some(MemoryBasis::Host));
-        assert_eq!(decision.memory_based_capacity, 10_737_418);
-        assert_eq!(decision.cpu_based_capacity, 9_846_784);
-        assert_eq!(decision.capacity, 9_846_784);
+        assert_eq!(decision.memory_based_capacity, 17_448_304);
+        assert_eq!(decision.cpu_based_capacity, 19_693_568);
+        assert_eq!(decision.capacity, 17_448_304);
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn replay_cache_capacity_auto_uses_resource_model_on_larger_nodes() {
+    fn replay_cache_capacity_auto_uses_32m_on_field_sized_nodes() {
         let gib = 1024_u64 * 1024 * 1024;
         let decision =
             replay_cache_capacity_decision(rustfs_utils::EnvParseOutcome::Absent, 16, Some(32 * gib), Some(MemoryBasis::Host));
 
         assert_eq!(decision.source, ReplayCacheCapacitySource::Auto);
-        assert_eq!(decision.memory_based_capacity, 21_474_836);
-        assert_eq!(decision.cpu_based_capacity, 19_693_568);
-        assert_eq!(decision.capacity, 19_693_568);
+        assert_eq!(decision.memory_based_capacity, 34_896_609);
+        assert_eq!(decision.cpu_based_capacity, 39_387_136);
+        assert_eq!(decision.capacity, REPLAY_CACHE_AUTO_MAX_CAPACITY);
+
+        let observed_field_node =
+            replay_cache_capacity_decision(rustfs_utils::EnvParseOutcome::Absent, 16, Some(31 * gib), Some(MemoryBasis::Host));
+        assert_eq!(observed_field_node.memory_based_capacity, 33_806_090);
+        assert_eq!(observed_field_node.cpu_based_capacity, 39_387_136);
+        assert_eq!(observed_field_node.capacity, REPLAY_CACHE_AUTO_MAX_CAPACITY);
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -2598,7 +2747,7 @@ mod tests {
         let decision = replay_cache_capacity_decision(rustfs_utils::EnvParseOutcome::Invalid, 8, None, None);
 
         assert_eq!(decision.source, ReplayCacheCapacitySource::AutoInvalidEnv);
-        assert_eq!(decision.capacity, 9_846_784);
+        assert_eq!(decision.capacity, 19_693_568);
     }
 
     fn check_test_nonce_record(cache: &mut RpcNonceCache, record: RpcNonceRecord<'_>) -> std::io::Result<()> {

crates/ecstore/src/cluster/rpc/mod.rs

@@ -34,11 +34,12 @@ pub use client::{
 pub use http_auth::{
     TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, build_auth_headers, build_put_file_auth_trailer, check_and_record_signed_rpc_nonce, gen_signature_headers,
     gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience, set_tonic_canonical_body_digest,
-    set_tonic_mutation_body_digest, sign_ns_scanner_capability, sign_put_file_capability, sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof,
-    tonic_boot_epoch_challenge, tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers, tonic_rpc_auth_failure_reason, verify_ns_scanner_capability,
-    verify_put_file_auth_trailer, verify_put_file_capability, verify_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response,
-    verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest, verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest, verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof,
-    verify_tonic_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_bootstrap,
+    set_tonic_mutation_body_digest, set_tonic_rolling_canonical_body_digest, set_tonic_rolling_mutation_body_digest,
+    sign_ns_scanner_capability, sign_put_file_capability, sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, tonic_boot_epoch_challenge,
+    tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers, tonic_rpc_auth_failure_reason, verify_ns_scanner_capability, verify_put_file_auth_trailer,
+    verify_put_file_capability, verify_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response, verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest,
+    verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest, verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof, verify_tonic_rpc_signature,
+    verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_bootstrap,
 };
 #[cfg(test)]
 pub(crate) use internode_data_transport::TcpHttpInternodeDataTransport;

crates/ecstore/src/cluster/rpc/remote_disk.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ use crate::cluster::rpc::client::{
     AuthenticatedChannel, TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, is_network_like_disk_error,
     node_service_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client_for_class, node_service_time_out_client_no_auth,
 };
-use crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::set_tonic_canonical_body_digest;
 use crate::cluster::rpc::internode_data_transport::{
     InternodeDataTransport, NsScannerCapabilityRequest, NsScannerStreamRequest, ReadStreamRequest, WalkDirStreamRequest,
     WriteStreamRequest,
@@ -123,7 +122,7 @@ fn attach_mutation_body_digest<T>(
     op: &'static str,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let canonical_body = canonical_body.map_err(|_| Error::other(format!("{op} request length cannot be represented")))?;
-    set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(request, &canonical_body).map_err(Error::other)
+    crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_rolling_canonical_body_digest(request, &canonical_body).map_err(Error::other)
 }
 
 fn decode_volume_infos(volume_infos: Vec<String>) -> Result<Vec<VolumeInfo>> {
@@ -3029,6 +3028,22 @@ mod tests {
 
     static INIT: Once = Once::new();
 
+    #[test]
+    fn disk_mutation_digest_marks_rolling_compatibility() {
+        let mut request = Request::new(());
+
+        attach_mutation_body_digest(&mut request, Ok(b"canonical disk mutation".to_vec()), "WriteAll")
+            .expect("disk mutation digest must be attached");
+
+        assert!(
+            request
+                .extensions()
+                .get::<crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::RollingMutationBodyDigest>()
+                .is_some(),
+            "remote-disk mutations must reach the cache-free compatibility gate"
+        );
+    }
+
     // `#[serial(internode_metrics)]` marks every test that observes
     // `global_internode_metrics()`. Those counters are a process-wide singleton:
     // some of these tests snapshot a counter, run one decode, and assert on the

crates/ecstore/src/cluster/rpc/remote_locker.rs

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 use crate::cluster::rpc::client::{
     AuthenticatedChannel, TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, node_service_time_out_client,
 };
-use crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_mutation_body_digest;
+use crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_rolling_mutation_body_digest;
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use bytes::Bytes;
 use rustfs_lock::{
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ use tonic::Request;
 use tonic::service::interceptor::InterceptedService;
 use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
 
+fn attach_lock_mutation_body_digest<T: rustfs_protos::CanonicalMutationBody>(request: &mut Request<T>) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    set_tonic_rolling_mutation_body_digest(request)
+}
+
 /// Remote lock client implementation
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct RemoteClient {
@@ -319,7 +323,7 @@ impl LockClient for RemoteClient {
             args: serde_json::to_string(&request)
                 .map_err(|e| LockError::internal(format!("Failed to serialize request: {e}")))?,
         });
-        set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
 
         let resp = match self.execute_rpc("lock", &resource_summary, client.lock(req)).await {
             Ok(resp) => resp.into_inner(),
@@ -358,7 +362,7 @@ impl LockClient for RemoteClient {
                 })
                 .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?,
         });
-        set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
 
         let resp = match self
             .execute_rpc("lock_batch", &resource_summary, client.lock_batch(req))
@@ -400,7 +404,7 @@ impl LockClient for RemoteClient {
         let mut client = self.get_client().await?;
         let resource_summary = unlock_request.resource.to_string();
         let mut req = Request::new(GenerallyLockRequest { args: request_string });
-        set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
         let resp = self
             .execute_rpc("release", &resource_summary, client.un_lock(req))
             .await?
@@ -427,7 +431,7 @@ impl LockClient for RemoteClient {
                 })
                 .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?,
         });
-        set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
 
         let resp = self
             .execute_rpc("release_batch", &resource_summary, client.un_lock_batch(req))
@@ -450,7 +454,7 @@ impl LockClient for RemoteClient {
             args: serde_json::to_string(&refresh_request)
                 .map_err(|e| LockError::internal(format!("Failed to serialize request: {e}")))?,
         });
-        set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
         let resp = self
             .execute_rpc("refresh", &resource_summary, client.refresh(req))
             .await?
@@ -470,7 +474,7 @@ impl LockClient for RemoteClient {
             args: serde_json::to_string(&force_request)
                 .map_err(|e| LockError::internal(format!("Failed to serialize request: {e}")))?,
         });
-        set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
         let resp = self
             .execute_rpc("force_release", &resource_summary, client.force_un_lock(req))
             .await?
@@ -495,7 +499,7 @@ impl LockClient for RemoteClient {
             args: serde_json::to_string(&status_request)
                 .map_err(|e| LockError::internal(format!("Failed to serialize request: {e}")))?,
         });
-        set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut req)?;
 
         // Try exclusive lock first with very short timeout
         let resp = match self.execute_rpc("check_status", &resource_summary, client.lock(req)).await {
@@ -510,7 +514,7 @@ impl LockClient for RemoteClient {
                 args: serde_json::to_string(&status_request)
                     .map_err(|e| LockError::internal(format!("Failed to serialize request: {e}")))?,
             });
-            set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut release_req)?;
+            attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut release_req)?;
             let _ = self
                 .execute_rpc("check_status_release", &resource_summary, client.un_lock(release_req))
                 .await;
@@ -626,6 +630,31 @@ mod tests {
             .with_priority(LockPriority::Normal)
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn lock_mutation_helper_marks_single_and_batch_requests_for_rolling_auth() {
+        let mut single = Request::new(GenerallyLockRequest {
+            args: "single-lock".to_string(),
+        });
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut single).expect("single lock digest must be attached");
+        assert!(
+            single
+                .extensions()
+                .get::<crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::RollingMutationBodyDigest>()
+                .is_some()
+        );
+
+        let mut batch = Request::new(BatchGenerallyLockRequest {
+            args: vec!["batch-lock".to_string()],
+        });
+        attach_lock_mutation_body_digest(&mut batch).expect("batch lock digest must be attached");
+        assert!(
+            batch
+                .extensions()
+                .get::<crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::RollingMutationBodyDigest>()
+                .is_some()
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     #[serial_test::serial]
     async fn test_remote_client_acquire_lock_uses_rpc_timeout_and_evicts_connection() {

crates/ecstore/src/config/com.rs

@@ -584,6 +584,44 @@ where
     .await
 }
 
+/// `delete_config` with `no_lock` set — for callers already holding the
+/// config object's namespace lock (e.g. inside `with_config_object_write_lock`),
+/// where the locked variant would self-deadlock.
+pub async fn delete_config_no_lock<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str) -> Result<()>
+where
+    S: ObjectOperations<
+            Error = Error,
+            ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
+            ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
+            FileInfo = FileInfo,
+            ObjectToDelete = ObjectToDelete,
+            DeletedObject = DeletedObject,
+        >,
+{
+    match api
+        .delete_object(
+            RUSTFS_META_BUCKET,
+            file,
+            ObjectOptions {
+                delete_prefix: true,
+                delete_prefix_object: true,
+                no_lock: true,
+                ..Default::default()
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+    {
+        Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+        Err(err) => {
+            if err == Error::FileNotFound || matches!(err, Error::ObjectNotFound(_, _)) {
+                Err(Error::ConfigNotFound)
+            } else {
+                Err(err)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[instrument(skip(api))]
 pub async fn delete_config<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str) -> Result<()>
 where

crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs

@@ -7890,6 +7890,11 @@ impl DiskAPI for LocalDisk {
                 std::io::Write::write_all(&mut new_meta, &meta)?;
                 if durability.syncs_commit_metadata() {
                     new_meta.sync_data()?;
+                }
+                // Windows rejects renaming a directory while one of its children is
+                // still open, even when the child handle shares delete access.
+                drop(new_meta);
+                if durability.syncs_commit_metadata() {
                     os::fsync_dir_std(&staging_path)?;
                 }
                 std::fs::rename(&staging_path, &transaction_path)?;
@@ -8096,7 +8101,7 @@ impl DiskAPI for LocalDisk {
         let durability = effective_durability(dst_volume);
         if durability.syncs_data_shards() && !src_is_dir {
             let src = src_file_path.clone();
-            tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || std::fs::File::open(&src)?.sync_data())
+            tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || os::sync_file(&src))
                 .await
                 .map_err(DiskError::from)?
                 .map_err(to_file_error)?;
@@ -11566,6 +11571,116 @@ mod test {
         );
     }
 
+    #[cfg(windows)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[allow(clippy::await_holding_lock)]
+    async fn test_rename_part_commits_realistic_windows_multipart_path() {
+        use crate::disk::RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET;
+        use tempfile::tempdir;
+
+        let _mode = durability_mode_override::set(DurabilityMode::Strict);
+        assert_eq!(effective_durability(RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET), DurabilityMode::Strict);
+        let dir = tempdir().expect("temp dir should be created");
+        let root = dir.path().join("realistic-windows-multipart-root");
+        fs::create_dir_all(&root).await.expect("disk root should be created");
+        let endpoint = Endpoint::try_from(root.to_str().expect("temp dir should be utf8")).expect("endpoint should parse");
+        let disk = LocalDisk::new(&endpoint, false).await.expect("local disk should be created");
+        ensure_test_volume(&disk, RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET).await;
+        ensure_test_volume(&disk, RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET).await;
+
+        let src_path = "upload/part.1";
+        let dst_path = concat!(
+            "6f897928dfe04a87a269ccd9f5a5897d9cbbdf6b55e4d903ef3cbc1125c0cb8f/",
+            "8f897819-2604-4f3d-b843-c32a45d198b2x1786372838834745500/",
+            "58ba822c-06e4-4332-81cc-be2c9d921900/part.1"
+        );
+        let transaction_path = disk
+            .io_get_object_path(RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, &crate::disk::part_transaction_path(dst_path))
+            .expect("transaction path should resolve");
+        let deepest_marker = transaction_path
+            .parent()
+            .expect("transaction path should have a parent")
+            .join(".part-txn-00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
+            .join(PART_TRANSACTION_OLD_DATA_ABSENT);
+        assert!(
+            deepest_marker.as_os_str().len() > 260,
+            "regression path must cross the traditional Windows MAX_PATH boundary: {deepest_marker:?}"
+        );
+        let payload = Bytes::from_static(b"part payload");
+        let meta = Bytes::from_static(b"part metadata");
+        disk.write_all(RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET, src_path, payload.clone())
+            .await
+            .expect("source part should be written");
+
+        disk.prepare_part_transaction(RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET, src_path, RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, dst_path, meta.clone())
+            .await
+            .expect("realistic Windows part transaction should be prepared");
+        disk.rename_part(RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET, src_path, RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, dst_path, meta.clone())
+            .await
+            .expect("realistic Windows part should be committed");
+        disk.settle_part_transaction(RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, dst_path, PartTransactionAction::Commit)
+            .await
+            .expect("realistic Windows part transaction should be settled");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            disk.read_all(RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, dst_path)
+                .await
+                .expect("destination part should be readable"),
+            payload
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            disk.read_all(RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, &format!("{dst_path}.meta"))
+                .await
+                .expect("destination metadata should be readable"),
+            meta
+        );
+
+        let replacement_payload = Bytes::from_static(b"replacement part payload");
+        let replacement_meta = Bytes::from_static(b"replacement part metadata");
+        disk.write_all(RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET, src_path, replacement_payload.clone())
+            .await
+            .expect("replacement source part should be written");
+        disk.prepare_part_transaction(
+            RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET,
+            src_path,
+            RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET,
+            dst_path,
+            replacement_meta.clone(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("replacement Windows part transaction should be prepared");
+        disk.rename_part(
+            RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET,
+            src_path,
+            RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET,
+            dst_path,
+            replacement_meta.clone(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("replacement Windows part should be committed");
+        disk.settle_part_transaction(RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, dst_path, PartTransactionAction::Commit)
+            .await
+            .expect("replacement Windows part transaction should be settled");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            disk.read_all(RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, dst_path)
+                .await
+                .expect("replacement destination part should be readable"),
+            replacement_payload
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            disk.read_all(RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, &format!("{dst_path}.meta"))
+                .await
+                .expect("replacement destination metadata should be readable"),
+            replacement_meta
+        );
+        assert!(
+            matches!(disk.read_all(RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET, src_path).await, Err(DiskError::FileNotFound)),
+            "successful replacement must remove its source part"
+        );
+        assert!(!transaction_path.exists(), "settled replacement must remove its transaction directory");
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_part_transaction_rolls_back_data_published_before_metadata() {
         use tempfile::tempdir;

crates/ecstore/src/disk/os.rs

@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ pub(crate) mod file_sync_probe {
     }
 }
 
-fn sync_file(path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
+pub(crate) fn sync_file(path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
     #[cfg(test)]
     let _probe = file_sync_probe::enter(path);
     #[cfg(test)]

crates/replication/src/operation.rs

@@ -635,6 +635,38 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!should_use_existing_delete_replication_info(false, false));
     }
 
+    /// P1-20 truth-table pin (rustfs/backlog#1675): without any reset in play
+    /// (no per-target reset header on the object, empty reset id on the
+    /// target) the existing-object resync decision compensates exactly the
+    /// never-replicated objects — Empty replicates, any recorded status does
+    /// not.
+    #[test]
+    fn resync_target_without_reset_replicates_only_empty_status() {
+        let user_defined = HashMap::new();
+        let object = ReplicationResyncTargetObject {
+            mod_time: Some(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::seconds(10)),
+            user_defined: &user_defined,
+        };
+
+        for (status, expected) in [
+            (ReplicationStatusType::Empty, true),
+            (ReplicationStatusType::Completed, false),
+            // "COMPLETE" on disk parses to this legacy variant, so objects
+            // written by older versions reach the decision through it.
+            (ReplicationStatusType::CompletedLegacy, false),
+            (ReplicationStatusType::Pending, false),
+            (ReplicationStatusType::Failed, false),
+            (ReplicationStatusType::Replica, false),
+        ] {
+            let label = format!("{status:?}");
+            let decision = resync_target_for_object(&object, "arn:target", "", None, status);
+            assert_eq!(
+                decision.replicate, expected,
+                "existing-object resync without a reset must replicate only never-replicated objects (status {label})"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn resync_target_includes_object_at_reset_before_boundary() {
         let reset_before = OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::seconds(30);

crates/replication/src/queue.rs

@@ -360,6 +360,48 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// P1-20 truth-table pin (rustfs/backlog#1675): when no target replicates
+    /// — the decision is empty because ExistingObjectReplication is Disabled
+    /// for a never-replicated object, or because the object is an inbound
+    /// REPLICA (must_replicate returns an empty decision for those) — the
+    /// heal pass must skip entirely, whatever the recorded status says. The
+    /// scanner never compensates these objects.
+    #[test]
+    fn heal_queue_action_skips_when_no_target_replicates() {
+        for status in [
+            ReplicationStatusType::Empty,
+            ReplicationStatusType::Failed,
+            ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
+        ] {
+            let mut roi = ReplicateObjectInfo {
+                bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
+                name: "object".to_string(),
+                replication_status: status,
+                dsc: ReplicateDecision::new(),
+                ..Default::default()
+            };
+
+            let action = replication_heal_queue_action(&mut roi);
+
+            assert!(
+                matches!(action, ReplicationHealQueueAction::Skip),
+                "an empty replicate decision must skip heal queueing (status {:?})",
+                roi.replication_status
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// P1-20 truth-table pin: a Completed object with no resync decision has
+    /// nothing left to heal — the scanner must not requeue it.
+    #[test]
+    fn heal_queue_action_skips_completed_object_without_resync() {
+        let mut roi = replicate_object_info(ReplicationStatusType::Completed);
+
+        let action = replication_heal_queue_action(&mut roi);
+
+        assert!(matches!(action, ReplicationHealQueueAction::Skip));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn heal_queue_action_routes_failed_objects_to_heal_queue() {
         let mut roi = replicate_object_info(ReplicationStatusType::Failed);

crates/scanner/src/scanner_io.rs

@@ -3881,7 +3881,7 @@ impl ScannerIODisk for Disk {
         Ok(size_summary)
     }
 
-    #[tracing::instrument(skip(self, budget, updates, cache))]
+    #[tracing::instrument(skip(self, budget, updates, cache, set_disks))]
     async fn nsscanner_disk(
         self: Arc<Self>,
         ctx: CancellationToken,