feat(replication): SSE-C ciphertext passthrough replication (#5898)

Complete the encrypted-object replication series (backlog#1783, PR-C of
3, after #5872 and #5885): SSE-C objects replicate as ciphertext
passthrough — the source holds no customer key, so the stored bytes and
their encryption metadata travel verbatim and the replica decrypts only
with the original customer key, single-part and multipart.

- Sender: SSE-C objects read raw (raw_data_movement_read), transfer at
  ciphertext size, and range multipart parts over stored part sizes.
- Receiver: authorized replication PUTs restore the stored SSE-C keys
  from the transport headers (exact lowercase forms - the read-path
  check is case-sensitive), set ObjectOptions.preserve_ciphertext, and
  skip compression, bucket-default SSE, and sse_encryption behind one
  restore-derived gate. Multipart uses an internal session marker to
  store parts verbatim and strips it on complete.
- Convergence: the replication HEAD sends
  x-rustfs-source-replication-check; the target authorizes it as
  ReplicateObjectAction and skips SSE-C read validation for that
  request only, so keyless convergence HEADs see etag/size/mtime
  instead of 400 and SSE-C replicas stop re-driving forever.
- e2e: SSE-C contract flips to a key-gated readable replica (no-key and
  wrong-key GETs fail - the direct silent-plaintext detector); new
  multipart passthrough contract with ETag/marker/stability assertions.

crates/e2e_test/src/replication_extension_test.rs

@@ -1453,10 +1453,6 @@ where
     }
 }
 
-async fn wait_for_replication_failure_event(response: reqwest::Response, expected_key: &str) -> TestResult {
-    wait_for_replication_failure_event_stream(response.bytes_stream(), expected_key, Duration::from_secs(30)).await
-}
-
 fn target_history_contains_key(output: &ListObjectVersionsOutput, key: &str) -> bool {
     output.versions().iter().any(|version| version.key() == Some(key))
         || output.delete_markers().iter().any(|marker| marker.key() == Some(key))
@@ -1513,29 +1509,6 @@ async fn assert_failed_replication_stays_absent_for(
     }
 }
 
-async fn subscribe_to_replication_failure(
-    env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
-    bucket: &str,
-    key: &str,
-) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
-    let url = format!(
-        "{}/{bucket}?events={}&prefix={}&ping=1",
-        env.url,
-        urlencoding::encode(REPLICATION_FAILED_EVENT),
-        urlencoding::encode(key)
-    );
-    let response = timeout(
-        Duration::from_secs(30),
-        signed_request(http::Method::GET, &url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None, None),
-    )
-    .await
-    .map_err(|_| "replication failure event subscription did not respond within 30 seconds")??;
-    if response.status() != StatusCode::OK {
-        return Err(format!("failed to subscribe to replication failure events: {}", response.status()).into());
-    }
-    Ok(response)
-}
-
 async fn build_sse_replication_pair(
     label: &str,
     source_kms: bool,
@@ -4447,9 +4420,11 @@ async fn test_repl17_failure_observation_helpers() -> TestResult {
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// backlog#1147 repl-17: SSE-C currently fails replication explicitly. Pin the
-/// observed contract: the source remains decryptable with its customer key,
-/// reports FAILED, emits the standard failure event, and leaves no target data.
+/// backlog#1147 repl-17 / backlog#1783: SSE-C objects replicate as ciphertext
+/// passthrough — the source cannot decrypt them (no customer key server-side),
+/// so the stored ciphertext and its encryption metadata travel verbatim and
+/// the replica is decryptable only with the original customer key. The
+/// backlog#1291 property still holds: never a silent plaintext replica.
 #[tokio::test]
 #[serial]
 async fn test_bucket_replication_sse_c_contract() -> TestResult {
@@ -4462,7 +4437,6 @@ async fn test_bucket_replication_sse_c_contract() -> TestResult {
     let body = b"repl-17 SSE-C payload";
     let customer_key = BASE64_STANDARD.encode(REPL17_SSEC_KEY);
     let customer_key_md5 = sse_customer_key_md5_base64(REPL17_SSEC_KEY);
-    let failure_events = subscribe_to_replication_failure(&source_env, &source_bucket, key).await?;
 
     source_client
         .put_object()
@@ -4484,41 +4458,157 @@ async fn test_bucket_replication_sse_c_contract() -> TestResult {
         .sse_customer_key_md5(&customer_key_md5)
         .send()
         .await?;
+    let source_etag = source.e_tag().map(str::to_string);
     assert_eq!(source.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), body);
 
-    wait_for_replication_failure_event(failure_events, key).await?;
-    wait_for_source_replication_status(&source_client, &source_bucket, key, "FAILED", true).await?;
-    assert_failed_replication_stays_absent_for(
-        &source_client,
-        &source_bucket,
-        &target_client,
-        &target_bucket,
-        key,
-        true,
-        Duration::from_secs(5),
-    )
-    .await?;
+    wait_for_source_replication_status(&source_client, &source_bucket, key, "COMPLETED", true).await?;
 
-    target_client
-        .put_object()
+    // The replica is readable only with the original customer key.
+    let replica = target_client
+        .get_object()
         .bucket(&target_bucket)
         .key(key)
-        .body(ByteStream::from_static(b"observer negative-path fixture"))
+        .sse_customer_algorithm("AES256")
+        .sse_customer_key(&customer_key)
+        .sse_customer_key_md5(&customer_key_md5)
         .send()
         .await?;
-    target_client.delete_object().bucket(&target_bucket).key(key).send().await?;
-    let history_error = assert_failed_replication_stays_absent_for(
-        &source_client,
-        &source_bucket,
-        &target_client,
-        &target_bucket,
-        key,
-        true,
-        Duration::ZERO,
-    )
-    .await
-    .expect_err("target history must violate the failed replication contract");
-    assert!(history_error.to_string().contains("created target history"));
+    assert_eq!(replica.sse_customer_algorithm(), Some("AES256"));
+    let replica_etag = replica.e_tag().map(str::to_string);
+    assert_eq!(replica.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), body);
+    assert_eq!(replica_etag, source_etag, "replica ETag must match the source ETag");
+
+    // Without the customer key the replica must not be readable — the direct
+    // detection point for a silent-plaintext replica (backlog#1291).
+    let plain_read = target_client.get_object().bucket(&target_bucket).key(key).send().await;
+    assert!(plain_read.is_err(), "SSE-C replica must not be readable without the customer key");
+
+    // A wrong customer key must fail too.
+    let wrong_key = BASE64_STANDARD.encode("99999999999999999999999999999999");
+    let wrong_key_md5 = sse_customer_key_md5_base64("99999999999999999999999999999999");
+    let wrong_read = target_client
+        .get_object()
+        .bucket(&target_bucket)
+        .key(key)
+        .sse_customer_algorithm("AES256")
+        .sse_customer_key(&wrong_key)
+        .sse_customer_key_md5(&wrong_key_md5)
+        .send()
+        .await;
+    assert!(wrong_read.is_err(), "SSE-C replica must reject a wrong customer key");
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// backlog#1783: SSE-C multipart objects pass through as ciphertext part by
+/// part — part boundaries and the encrypted-multipart marker survive so the
+/// replica decrypts each part with its part-derived nonce.
+#[tokio::test]
+#[serial]
+async fn test_bucket_replication_sse_c_multipart_passthrough() -> TestResult {
+    init_logging();
+
+    const PART_SIZE: usize = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
+    const PART_COUNT: usize = 3;
+
+    let (source_env, target_env, source_bucket, target_bucket) = build_sse_replication_pair("ssec-mp", false, false).await?;
+    let source_client = source_env.create_s3_client();
+    let target_client = target_env.create_s3_client();
+    let key = "ssec-mp-contract.bin";
+    let customer_key = BASE64_STANDARD.encode(REPL17_SSEC_KEY);
+    let customer_key_md5 = sse_customer_key_md5_base64(REPL17_SSEC_KEY);
+
+    let created = source_client
+        .create_multipart_upload()
+        .bucket(&source_bucket)
+        .key(key)
+        .sse_customer_algorithm("AES256")
+        .sse_customer_key(&customer_key)
+        .sse_customer_key_md5(&customer_key_md5)
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    let upload_id = created.upload_id().ok_or("missing multipart upload id")?.to_string();
+
+    let mut completed_parts = Vec::with_capacity(PART_COUNT);
+    let mut payload = Vec::with_capacity(PART_SIZE * PART_COUNT);
+    for part_number in 1..=PART_COUNT {
+        let part = vec![u8::try_from(part_number)?; PART_SIZE];
+        payload.extend_from_slice(&part);
+        let uploaded = source_client
+            .upload_part()
+            .bucket(&source_bucket)
+            .key(key)
+            .upload_id(&upload_id)
+            .part_number(i32::try_from(part_number)?)
+            .body(ByteStream::from(part))
+            .sse_customer_algorithm("AES256")
+            .sse_customer_key(&customer_key)
+            .sse_customer_key_md5(&customer_key_md5)
+            .send()
+            .await?;
+        completed_parts.push(
+            CompletedPart::builder()
+                .part_number(i32::try_from(part_number)?)
+                .set_e_tag(uploaded.e_tag().map(str::to_string))
+                .build(),
+        );
+    }
+    source_client
+        .complete_multipart_upload()
+        .bucket(&source_bucket)
+        .key(key)
+        .upload_id(&upload_id)
+        .multipart_upload(CompletedMultipartUpload::builder().set_parts(Some(completed_parts)).build())
+        .sse_customer_algorithm("AES256")
+        .sse_customer_key(&customer_key)
+        .sse_customer_key_md5(&customer_key_md5)
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+
+    wait_for_source_replication_status(&source_client, &source_bucket, key, "COMPLETED", true).await?;
+
+    let source_head = source_client
+        .head_object()
+        .bucket(&source_bucket)
+        .key(key)
+        .sse_customer_algorithm("AES256")
+        .sse_customer_key(&customer_key)
+        .sse_customer_key_md5(&customer_key_md5)
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    let replica = target_client
+        .get_object()
+        .bucket(&target_bucket)
+        .key(key)
+        .sse_customer_algorithm("AES256")
+        .sse_customer_key(&customer_key)
+        .sse_customer_key_md5(&customer_key_md5)
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    // The replica must carry the SSE-C marker and the source's multipart ETag
+    // (its -N suffix also pins that the part structure survived).
+    assert_eq!(replica.sse_customer_algorithm(), Some("AES256"));
+    assert_eq!(replica.e_tag(), source_head.e_tag(), "replica must keep the source multipart ETag");
+    let replica_version_id = replica.version_id().map(str::to_string);
+    assert_eq!(replica.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), payload.as_slice());
+
+    let plain_read = target_client.get_object().bucket(&target_bucket).key(key).send().await;
+    assert!(
+        plain_read.is_err(),
+        "SSE-C multipart replica must not be readable without the customer key"
+    );
+
+    // Stability across scanner cycles: convergence must hold for passthrough.
+    sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
+    let versions = target_client
+        .list_object_versions()
+        .bucket(&target_bucket)
+        .prefix(key)
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    let replica_versions: Vec<_> = versions.versions().iter().filter(|v| v.key() == Some(key)).collect();
+    assert_eq!(replica_versions.len(), 1, "SSE-C replica must not accumulate versions");
+    assert_eq!(replica_versions[0].version_id().map(str::to_string), replica_version_id);
 
     Ok(())
 }

crates/ecstore/src/bucket/bucket_target_sys.rs

@@ -1832,12 +1832,27 @@ impl TargetClient {
         object: &str,
         version_id: Option<String>,
     ) -> Result<HeadObjectOutput, SdkError<HeadObjectError>> {
+        // Announce the replication check so a RustFS target returns SSE-C
+        // object metadata (etag/size) without the customer key the replication
+        // worker cannot hold; otherwise SSE-C replicas never converge on HEAD.
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        insert_header(&mut headers, SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_CHECK, "true");
         match self
             .client
             .head_object()
             .bucket(bucket)
             .key(object)
             .set_version_id(version_id)
+            .customize()
+            .map_request(move |mut req| {
+                for (k, v) in headers.clone().into_iter() {
+                    if let Some(key_str) = k.map(|k| k.as_str().to_string()) {
+                        let value_str = v.to_str().unwrap_or("").to_string();
+                        req.headers_mut().insert(key_str, value_str);
+                    }
+                }
+                Result::<_, std::convert::Infallible>::Ok(req)
+            })
             .send()
             .await
         {

crates/ecstore/src/bucket/replication/replication_resyncer.rs

@@ -2390,6 +2390,9 @@ impl ReplicateObjectInfoExt for ReplicateObjectInfo {
             version_suspended,
             versioned,
             replication_request: true,
+            // SSE-C passthrough reads the stored ciphertext verbatim; the
+            // decrypting reader cannot serve it (no customer key server-side).
+            raw_data_movement_read: self.ssec,
             ..Default::default()
         };
 
@@ -2451,6 +2454,9 @@ impl ReplicateObjectInfoExt for ReplicateObjectInfo {
                 return rinfo;
             }
         };
+        // SSE-C passthrough sends the stored ciphertext; the wire length is
+        // the stored size while rinfo keeps the logical size for metering.
+        let transfer_size = if self.ssec { object_info.size } else { size };
 
         if tgt_client.bucket.is_empty() {
             debug!(
@@ -2597,7 +2603,7 @@ impl ReplicateObjectInfoExt for ReplicateObjectInfo {
             gr.stream = wrap_with_bandwidth_monitor(gr.stream, &put_opts, &bucket, &rinfo.arn);
             let byte_stream = async_read_to_bytestream(gr.stream);
             let result = tgt_client
-                .put_object(&tgt_client.bucket, &object, size, byte_stream, &put_opts)
+                .put_object(&tgt_client.bucket, &object, transfer_size, byte_stream, &put_opts)
                 .await
                 .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()));
             record_proxy_request(&bucket, "PutObject", result.is_err()).await;
@@ -2682,6 +2688,9 @@ impl ReplicateObjectInfoExt for ReplicateObjectInfo {
             version_suspended,
             versioned,
             replication_request: true,
+            // SSE-C passthrough reads the stored ciphertext verbatim; the
+            // decrypting reader cannot serve it (no customer key server-side).
+            raw_data_movement_read: self.ssec,
             ..Default::default()
         };
 
@@ -2742,6 +2751,9 @@ impl ReplicateObjectInfoExt for ReplicateObjectInfo {
                 return rinfo;
             }
         };
+        // SSE-C passthrough sends the stored ciphertext; the wire length is
+        // the stored size while rinfo keeps the logical size for metering.
+        let transfer_size = if self.ssec { object_info.size } else { size };
 
         if tgt_client.bucket.is_empty() {
             debug!(
@@ -2998,7 +3010,7 @@ impl ReplicateObjectInfoExt for ReplicateObjectInfo {
             gr.stream = wrap_with_bandwidth_monitor(gr.stream, &put_opts, &bucket, &rinfo.arn);
             let byte_stream = async_read_to_bytestream(gr.stream);
             let result = tgt_client
-                .put_object(&tgt_client.bucket, &object, size, byte_stream, &put_opts)
+                .put_object(&tgt_client.bucket, &object, transfer_size, byte_stream, &put_opts)
                 .await
                 .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(e.to_string()));
             record_proxy_request(&bucket, "PutObject", result.is_err()).await;
@@ -3137,10 +3149,17 @@ async fn replicate_object_with_multipart<S: ReplicationObjectIO>(ctx: MultipartR
     let mut header_size = replication_put_object_header_size(&put_opts);
     let mut offset: i64 = 0;
     for part_info in object_info.parts.iter() {
+        // Ciphertext passthrough (raw read) ranges over the stored part
+        // bytes; decrypted reads range over the logical plaintext parts.
+        let part_size = if obj_opts.raw_data_movement_read {
+            part_info.size as i64
+        } else {
+            part_info.actual_size
+        };
         let part_plan = replication_multipart_part_plan(ReplicationMultipartPartInput {
             offset,
             part_number: part_info.number,
-            part_size: part_info.actual_size,
+            part_size,
         })
         .map_err(|err| std::io::Error::other(err.to_string()))?;
         let range_spec = HTTPRangeSpec {

crates/ecstore/src/object_api/types.rs

@@ -253,6 +253,11 @@ pub struct ObjectOptions {
     /// fence avoids recursively acquiring the read lock behind a queued writer.
     pub bucket_lifecycle_lock_fence: Option<NamespaceLockFence>,
     pub replication_request: bool,
+    /// Authorized SSE-C replication passthrough: the body is already
+    /// ciphertext, so the write path must not encrypt or compress it and
+    /// stores the restored encryption metadata verbatim. Only the
+    /// replication-authorized options builders may set this.
+    pub preserve_ciphertext: bool,
     pub delete_marker: bool,
     pub synthetic_version_id: bool,
 

crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/multipart.rs

@@ -1897,6 +1897,13 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::multipart::MultipartOperations for SetDisks {
             }
         }
 
+        // The SSE-C passthrough session marker is upload-scoped; drop it from
+        // the completed object's metadata.
+        rustfs_utils::http::metadata_compat::remove_str(
+            &mut fi.metadata,
+            rustfs_utils::http::SUFFIX_REPLICATION_PRESERVE_CIPHERTEXT,
+        );
+
         if checksum_type.is_set() {
             checksum_type
                 .merge(rustfs_rio::ChecksumType::MULTIPART)

crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/object.rs

@@ -1233,6 +1233,16 @@ impl SetDisks {
                 }
             }
 
+            // SSE-C replication carries the source object's sealed checksum
+            // out of band; store it verbatim like the multipart path does.
+            if let Some(cssum) =
+                rustfs_utils::http::get_header_map(&user_defined, rustfs_utils::http::SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC)
+                && !cssum.is_empty()
+            {
+                fi.checksum = base64_simd::STANDARD.decode_to_vec(&cssum).ok().map(bytes::Bytes::from);
+                rustfs_utils::http::remove_header_map(&mut user_defined, rustfs_utils::http::SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC);
+            }
+
             if fi.checksum.is_none()
                 && let Some(content_hash) = data.as_hash_reader().content_hash()
             {

crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ pub const SUFFIX_DATA_MOV: &str = "data-mov";
 /// Transient flag for healing
 pub const SUFFIX_HEALING: &str = "healing";
 pub const SUFFIX_COMPRESSION: &str = "compression";
+/// Session marker for SSE-C replication passthrough multipart uploads: parts
+/// arrive as ciphertext and must be stored without re-encryption.
+pub const SUFFIX_REPLICATION_PRESERVE_CIPHERTEXT: &str = "replication-preserve-ciphertext";
 pub const SUFFIX_COMPRESSION_SIZE: &str = "compression-size";
 pub const SUFFIX_ACTUAL_SIZE: &str = "actual-size";
 pub const SUFFIX_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE: &str = "actual-object-size";

crates/utils/src/http/object_encryption_keys.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,10 @@
 //! ciphertext passthrough; every other encryption key must be stripped from
 //! outbound replication metadata via [`is_replication_stripped_encryption_key`].
 
-use super::headers::{AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_CUSTOMER_ALGORITHM, AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_CUSTOMER_KEY_MD5};
+// The lowercase stored forms, matching exactly what encryption_material_to_metadata
+// persists. The read-path SSE-C check is case-sensitive, so restoring under any
+// other casing would classify the replica as managed-SSE and reject SSE-C GETs.
+use super::headers::{SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER};
 
 pub const INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-encryption-key-id";
 pub const INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-encryption-key";
@@ -56,8 +59,8 @@ pub const REPLICATION_ENCRYPTED_MULTIPART_HEADER: &str = "X-Rustfs-Replication-E
 /// Source keys must match what `encryption_material_to_metadata` persists; the
 /// reconciliation test in `rustfs::storage::sse` pins that correspondence.
 pub const SSEC_REPLICATION_TRANSPORT_HEADERS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
-    (AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_CUSTOMER_ALGORITHM, REPLICATION_SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER),
-    (AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_CUSTOMER_KEY_MD5, REPLICATION_SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER),
+    (SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER),
+    (SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER),
     (SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER),
     (INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER),
     (MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSE_IV_HEADER),
@@ -74,6 +77,41 @@ pub const REPLICATION_SSE_TRANSPORT_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &[
     "x-rustfs-replication-ssec-",
 ];
 
+/// Returns true when the request carries any SSE-C replication transport
+/// header — the signal that an authorized replication PUT is a ciphertext
+/// passthrough and the receiver must not re-encrypt or compress the body.
+pub fn has_ssec_transport_headers(headers: &http::HeaderMap) -> bool {
+    headers.keys().any(|name| {
+        let name = name.as_str();
+        REPLICATION_SSE_TRANSPORT_PREFIXES
+            .iter()
+            .any(|prefix| super::starts_with_ignore_ascii_case(name, prefix))
+            || name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(REPLICATION_ENCRYPTED_MULTIPART_HEADER)
+    })
+}
+
+/// Restores the stored SSE-C metadata keys from their replication transport
+/// names. Returns None when the request carries no transport headers. When the
+/// customer algorithm is present, the AES256 SSE marker is re-added so the
+/// restored metadata matches the shape `encryption_material_to_metadata`
+/// persists (SSE-C Direct writes both IV twins; each travels under its own
+/// transport name, so the 1:1 reverse mapping restores the dual-key pair).
+pub fn ssec_transport_to_stored_metadata(headers: &http::HeaderMap) -> Option<std::collections::HashMap<String, String>> {
+    let mut restored = std::collections::HashMap::new();
+    for (stored, transport) in SSEC_REPLICATION_TRANSPORT_HEADERS {
+        if let Some(value) = headers.get(*transport).and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()) {
+            restored.insert((*stored).to_string(), value.to_string());
+        }
+    }
+    if restored.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if restored.contains_key(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER) {
+        restored.insert("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), "AES256".to_string());
+    }
+    Some(restored)
+}
+
 /// Maps a stored SSE-C metadata key to its replication transport name.
 pub fn ssec_replication_transport_header(stored_key: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
     SSEC_REPLICATION_TRANSPORT_HEADERS
@@ -100,6 +138,45 @@ pub fn is_replication_stripped_encryption_key(key: &str) -> bool {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn transport_metadata_roundtrip_restores_stored_keys() {
+        let mut headers = http::HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert(
+            http::HeaderName::from_static("x-rustfs-replication-ssec-algorithm"),
+            http::HeaderValue::from_static("AES256"),
+        );
+        headers.insert(
+            http::HeaderName::from_static("x-rustfs-replication-encryption-iv"),
+            http::HeaderValue::from_static("iv-direct"),
+        );
+        headers.insert(
+            http::HeaderName::from_static("x-rustfs-replication-server-side-encryption-iv"),
+            http::HeaderValue::from_static("iv-minio"),
+        );
+
+        assert!(has_ssec_transport_headers(&headers));
+        let restored = ssec_transport_to_stored_metadata(&headers).expect("transport headers must restore");
+        // Restore MUST use the exact lowercase stored key: the read-path SSE-C
+        // check is case-sensitive, so a TitleCase key would classify the
+        // replica as managed-SSE and reject SSE-C GETs.
+        assert_eq!(
+            restored
+                .get("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-algorithm")
+                .map(String::as_str),
+            Some("AES256")
+        );
+        assert!(!restored.keys().any(|k| k != "x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-algorithm"
+            && k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-algorithm")));
+        assert_eq!(restored.get(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER).map(String::as_str), Some("iv-direct"));
+        assert_eq!(restored.get(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER).map(String::as_str), Some("iv-minio"));
+        // The SSE marker is re-added to match the stored SSE-C shape.
+        assert_eq!(restored.get("x-amz-server-side-encryption").map(String::as_str), Some("AES256"));
+
+        let plain = http::HeaderMap::new();
+        assert!(!has_ssec_transport_headers(&plain));
+        assert!(ssec_transport_to_stored_metadata(&plain).is_none());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn transport_lookup_is_case_insensitive() {
         assert_eq!(
@@ -137,7 +214,7 @@ mod tests {
         // SSE intent headers, including the KMS key id.
         assert!(is_replication_stripped_encryption_key("x-amz-server-side-encryption"));
         assert!(is_replication_stripped_encryption_key("x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id"));
-        assert!(is_replication_stripped_encryption_key(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_CUSTOMER_ALGORITHM));
+        assert!(is_replication_stripped_encryption_key(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER));
         // is_sse_header does not cover the SSE-C original-size key; the
         // predicate must add it explicitly.
         assert!(is_replication_stripped_encryption_key(SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER));