fix(targets): explain webhook outbound allowlist failures (#5616)

crates/targets/src/config/common.rs

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use rustfs_config::{
     NATS_TLS_CLIENT_KEY, NATS_TOKEN, NATS_USERNAME, PULSAR_AUTH_TOKEN, PULSAR_PASSWORD, PULSAR_QUEUE_DIR, PULSAR_TLS_CA,
     PULSAR_TOPIC, PULSAR_USERNAME,
 };
-use rustfs_utils::egress::OutboundPolicy;
+use rustfs_utils::egress::{ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS, OutboundPolicy, OutboundPolicyError};
 use std::collections::HashSet;
 use std::path::Path;
 use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -223,7 +223,22 @@ pub(super) fn validate_outbound_http_url(value: &Url, field_label: &str) -> Resu
         OutboundPolicy::from_env_cached().map_err(|err| TargetError::Configuration(format!("invalid outbound policy: {err}")))?;
     policy
         .validate_url(value)
-        .map_err(|e| TargetError::Configuration(format!("{field_label} is not allowed: {e}")))
+        .map_err(|err| TargetError::Configuration(format_outbound_http_url_error(field_label, value, &err)))
+}
+
+/// Formats an outbound-policy rejection and adds an exact-origin hint only when that origin can override the rejection.
+pub fn format_outbound_http_url_error(field_label: &str, value: &Url, err: &OutboundPolicyError) -> String {
+    let base = format!("{field_label} is not allowed: {err}");
+    let origin = value.origin().ascii_serialization();
+    let can_allow_origin =
+        OutboundPolicy::from_allowed_origins(&origin).is_ok_and(|allowlisted| allowlisted.validate_url(value).is_ok());
+    if can_allow_origin {
+        format!(
+            "{base}; add {origin} to {ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS} (comma-separated) and restart RustFS to allow this operator-owned endpoint (origin only, no path)"
+        )
+    } else {
+        base
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]

crates/targets/src/config/mod.rs

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ mod instance;
 mod loader;
 mod target_args;
 
+pub use common::format_outbound_http_url_error;
+
 pub use instance::{
     LegacyTargetInstanceDescriptor, TargetInstanceSourceClass, TargetInstanceSourceHints, TargetPluginInstance,
     TargetPluginInstanceCompatDescriptor, TargetPluginInstanceRecord, normalize_legacy_target_instances,

crates/targets/src/config/target_args.rs

@@ -624,6 +624,7 @@ mod tests {
         REDIS_CHANNEL, REDIS_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT, REDIS_MAX_RETRY_DELAY, REDIS_MIN_RETRY_DELAY, REDIS_PIPELINE_BUFFER_SIZE,
         REDIS_RECONNECT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, REDIS_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT, REDIS_TLS_ALLOW_INSECURE, REDIS_URL, WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT,
     };
+    use rustfs_utils::egress::ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS;
 
     fn absolute_test_path(path: &str) -> String {
         std::env::temp_dir().join(path).to_string_lossy().into_owned()
@@ -780,11 +781,29 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn build_webhook_args_rejects_loopback_endpoint() {
         let mut config = webhook_base_config();
-        config.insert(WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT.to_string(), "https://127.0.0.1/hook".to_string());
+        config.insert(WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT.to_string(), "https://127.0.0.1:8443/hook".to_string());
 
         let err = build_webhook_args(&config, "/tmp/webhook-queue", TargetType::NotifyEvent)
             .expect_err("loopback endpoint should be rejected");
-        assert!(err.to_string().contains("not allowed"));
+        let message = err.to_string();
+        assert!(message.contains(&format!("add https://127.0.0.1:8443 to {ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS}")));
+        assert!(message.contains("loopback address"));
+        assert!(message.contains("comma-separated"));
+        assert!(message.contains("restart RustFS"));
+        assert!(!message.contains("/hook"));
+        assert!(message.contains("origin only, no path"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn build_webhook_args_does_not_offer_allowlist_for_metadata_endpoint() {
+        let mut config = webhook_base_config();
+        config.insert(WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT.to_string(), "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data".to_string());
+
+        let err = build_webhook_args(&config, "/tmp/webhook-queue", TargetType::NotifyEvent)
+            .expect_err("metadata endpoint should be rejected");
+        let message = err.to_string();
+        assert!(message.contains("not allowed"));
+        assert!(!message.contains(ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS));
     }
 
     #[test]

rustfs/src/admin/handlers/target_descriptor.rs

@@ -28,13 +28,13 @@ use rustfs_targets::{
     check_postgres_server_available, check_pulsar_broker_available, check_redis_server_available,
     config::{
         TargetPluginInstanceCompatDescriptor, TargetPluginInstanceRecord, build_amqp_args, build_kafka_args, build_mysql_args,
-        build_nats_args, build_postgres_args, build_pulsar_args, build_redis_args, try_normalize_target_plugin_instances,
+        build_nats_args, build_postgres_args, build_pulsar_args, build_redis_args, format_outbound_http_url_error,
-        validate_redis_config,
+        try_normalize_target_plugin_instances, validate_redis_config,
     },
     manifest::builtin_target_manifest,
     target::{TargetType, mqtt::MQTTTlsConfig},
 };
-use rustfs_utils::egress::{ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS, OutboundPolicy};
+use rustfs_utils::egress::OutboundPolicy;
 use s3s::{Body, S3Response, S3Result, header::CONTENT_TYPE, s3_error};
 use serde::Serialize;
 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
@@ -708,16 +708,9 @@ async fn validate_webhook_request(kv_map: &HashMap<String, String>) -> S3Result<
     }
     let outbound_policy =
         OutboundPolicy::from_env_cached().map_err(|e| s3_error!(InvalidArgument, "invalid outbound policy: {}", e))?;
-    outbound_policy.validate_url(&parsed_endpoint).map_err(|e| {
+    outbound_policy
-        s3_error!(
+        .validate_url(&parsed_endpoint)
-            InvalidArgument,
+        .map_err(|err| s3_error!(InvalidArgument, "{}", format_outbound_http_url_error("endpoint", &parsed_endpoint, &err)))?;
-            "endpoint is not allowed by the outbound policy: {}; review {}; private origins must be listed as exact origins such as {}={} and RustFS restarted (metadata and link-local destinations remain blocked)",
-            e,
-            ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS,
-            ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS,
-            parsed_endpoint.origin().ascii_serialization()
-        )
-    })?;
     if let Some(queue_dir) = kv_map.get("queue_dir") {
         validate_queue_dir(queue_dir.as_str()).await?;
     }
@@ -970,24 +963,40 @@ fn to_kvs(kv_map: &HashMap<String, String>) -> rustfs_config::server_config::KVS
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod webhook_request_tests {
     use super::validate_webhook_request;
+    use rustfs_utils::egress::ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS;
     use std::collections::HashMap;
 
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn private_webhook_request_is_rejected_with_operator_action() {
-        let config = HashMap::from([("endpoint".to_string(), "http://127.0.0.1:49173/webhook/rustfs".to_string())]);
+        let config = HashMap::from([("endpoint".to_string(), "http://192.168.1.2:1880/webhook/rustfs".to_string())]);
 
         let err = validate_webhook_request(&config)
             .await
-            .expect_err("a loopback webhook must require an explicit outbound allowlist");
+            .expect_err("a private webhook must require an explicit outbound allowlist");
         let message = err
             .message()
             .expect("the validation error should explain the operator action");
 
-        assert!(message.contains("RUSTFS_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS=http://127.0.0.1:49173"));
+        assert!(message.contains(&format!("add http://192.168.1.2:1880 to {ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS}")));
-        assert!(message.contains("RustFS restarted"), "unexpected message: {message}");
+        assert!(message.contains("private address"));
+        assert!(message.contains("comma-separated"));
+        assert!(message.contains("restart RustFS"), "unexpected message: {message}");
         assert!(!message.contains("/webhook/rustfs"));
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn metadata_webhook_request_does_not_offer_allowlist_override() {
+        let config = HashMap::from([("endpoint".to_string(), "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data".to_string())]);
+
+        let err = validate_webhook_request(&config)
+            .await
+            .expect_err("the metadata endpoint must remain permanently blocked");
+        let message = err.message().expect("the validation error should explain the rejection");
+
+        assert!(message.contains("metadata endpoint"));
+        assert!(!message.contains(ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS));
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn public_webhook_still_passes_outbound_preflight() {
         let config = HashMap::from([("endpoint".to_string(), "https://hooks.example/webhook".to_string())]);