fix(replication): send an integrity header on Object Lock PUTs (#7097)

* fix(replication): send an integrity header on Object Lock replication PUTs

AWS S3, MinIO and most compatible targets reject a PutObject that carries
x-amz-object-lock-* headers unless it also carries Content-MD5 or an
x-amz-checksum-* header. Since rustfs#6895 the replication client sends
plain signed payloads with no SDK checksum, so every replicated object
with a retention period or legal hold failed against such targets.

TargetClient::put_object now decides per request through the pure
rustfs_replication::object_lock_put_integrity: a plaintext single-part
object whose source ETag is its MD5 gets Content-MD5 derived from the
ETag (no body pass, framing unchanged); a multipart-layout ETag, managed
SSE or SSE-C passthrough falls back to an SDK CRC32; a forwarded source
checksum or an unlocked PUT is left alone.

The outbound target matrix flips its two KnownFailing(rustfs#7082) cells
to Completed and every Completed cell now asserts that a locked
PutObject carried an integrity header.

Fixes rustfs#7082.

* test(e2e): keep the matrix expectation table clippy-clean under -D warnings

The CI lint runs cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings. With every cell
green the single-arm match tripped match_single_binding and the unused
KnownFailing variant tripped dead_code, and the target-client tests tripped
field_reassign_with_default. Drive the expectation table from a
KNOWN_FAILING_CELLS constant (so the variant stays live and adding a red
cell is a one-line entry), build the test options as struct literals, and
refresh the e2e-repl-nightly selection digest for the renamed table test.
This commit is contained in:
唐小鸭
2026-09-03 20:26:44 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 0f272ddb14
commit 53cabe9274
9 changed files with 321 additions and 38 deletions
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ The same thing was missing at every layer: an inventory of what remote targets m
| Compatibility lens gains an outbound target section. | `.agents/skills/adversarial-validation/references/compatibility.md` |
| `AGENTS.md` names outbound client defaults as high risk and requires the matrix plus documented escape hatches. | `AGENTS.md`, Adversarial Validation |
| The two escape hatches from rustfs#6895 are documented. | `docs/operations/replication-outbound-transport.md` |
| Product fix for rustfs#7082: derive `Content-MD5` from the source ETag on locked PUTs. | tracked in rustfs#7082 |
| `replication-check` probe PUT carries retention headers when the target bucket has Object Lock. | tracked in rustfs#7082 |
| Product fix for rustfs#7082: a locked PUT carries `Content-MD5` derived from the source ETag when that ETag is the MD5 of the wire bytes, and an SDK CRC32 checksum otherwise; the two matrix cells flipped to `Completed` in the same change. | `crates/ecstore/src/bucket/bucket_target_sys.rs` (`object_lock_put_integrity_for`), `crates/replication/src/object.rs` (`object_lock_put_integrity`) |
| `replication-check` probe PUT with retention headers: deliberately not done. A retained probe object cannot be cleaned up on targets that deny `s3:BypassGovernanceRetention`, leaving locked residue; the matrix pins the contract instead. | `crates/e2e_test/src/replication_target_matrix_test.rs` |
## SOP: changing an outbound client default