feat(kms): introduce KMS unavailability error and enhance data key handling (#5184)

This commit is contained in:
唐小鸭
2026-07-26 04:04:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent c5eb1c69ba
commit 233865d172
12 changed files with 726 additions and 81 deletions
Generated
+1
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@@ -9459,6 +9459,7 @@ dependencies = [
"rustfs-utils",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"sha2 0.11.0",
"temp-env",
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
+72 -2
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ use chacha20poly1305::ChaCha20Poly1305;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use md5::{Digest, Md5};
use rustfs_kms::types::ObjectEncryptionContext;
use rustfs_kms::{KmsUnavailableError, is_data_key_envelope, types::ObjectEncryptionContext};
use rustfs_utils::http::{SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER};
use rustfs_utils::path::path_join_buf;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
@@ -1604,7 +1604,13 @@ async fn resolve_managed_material(bucket: &str, object: &str, metadata: &HashMap
let kms_context: Option<HashMap<String, String>> = None;
let object_context = build_object_encryption_context(bucket, object, kms_context.as_ref());
let decrypted_key = if let Some(service) = crate::runtime::sources::object_encryption_service().await {
// Persisted wrapping format is the read-side source of truth. The
// advertised SSE scheme and current KMS availability are write policy
// and runtime state, neither of which identifies the historical provider.
let decrypted_key = if is_data_key_envelope(&encrypted_dek) {
let service = crate::runtime::sources::object_encryption_service()
.await
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other(KmsUnavailableError))?;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
let data_key = if is_legacy_rustfs_managed_metadata(&normalized_metadata) {
service.decrypt_legacy_data_key(&encrypted_dek).await
@@ -2412,6 +2418,70 @@ mod tests {
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_managed_material_selects_provider_from_persisted_dek() {
use rustfs_kms::KmsConfig;
use tempfile::TempDir;
let key_dir = TempDir::new().expect("create KMS key directory");
let manager = rustfs_kms::init_global_kms_service_manager();
manager
.reconfigure(KmsConfig::local(key_dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults())
.await
.expect("start test KMS service");
async_with_vars([("__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK", Some(BASE64_STANDARD.encode([7u8; 32])))], async {
let data_key = [0x24; 32];
let base_nonce = [0x14; 12];
let encrypted_dek = encrypt_managed_dek_for_test(data_key, [7u8; 32]);
let metadata = HashMap::from([
(
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(),
BASE64_STANDARD.encode(encrypted_dek.as_bytes()),
),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode(base_nonce)),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER.to_string(), "legacy-local-key".to_string()),
]);
let material = resolve_managed_material("bucket", "object", &metadata)
.await
.expect("legacy local DEK should not be routed to the running KMS");
assert_eq!(material.key_bytes, data_key);
assert_eq!(material.base_nonce, base_nonce);
})
.await;
manager.stop().await.expect("stop test KMS service");
let kms_envelope = br#"{
"key_id": "test-key-id",
"master_key_id": "master-key-id",
"key_spec": "AES_256",
"encrypted_key": [1, 2, 3, 4],
"nonce": [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16],
"encryption_context": {},
"created_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
}"#;
let metadata = HashMap::from([
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode(kms_envelope)),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode([0x14; 12])),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER.to_string(), "test-key-id".to_string()),
]);
let error = match resolve_managed_material("bucket", "object", &metadata).await {
Ok(_) => panic!("KMS envelope must not fall back to the local provider"),
Err(error) => error,
};
let Error::Io(io_error) = error else {
panic!("KMS absence should retain its typed source");
};
assert!(
io_error
.get_ref()
.and_then(|source| source.downcast_ref::<KmsUnavailableError>())
.is_some()
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_managed_material_accepts_chacha20_poly1305_header_variant() {
+1
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@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ argon2 = { workspace = true }
chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true }
rand = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
base64 = { workspace = true }
sha2 = { workspace = true }
zeroize = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
# Configuration and storage
+99 -5
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@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64};
use jiff::Zoned;
use rand::RngExt;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::Duration;
@@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ pub struct LocalKmsClient {
key_cache: RwLock<HashMap<String, MasterKeyInfo>>,
/// Master encryption key for encrypting stored keys
master_cipher: Option<Aes256Gcm>,
/// Legacy pre-beta.9 master cipher for reading pre-Argon2 key files
legacy_master_cipher: Option<Aes256Gcm>,
/// DEK encryption implementation
dek_crypto: AesDekCrypto,
}
@@ -97,19 +100,21 @@ impl LocalKmsClient {
}
// Initialize master cipher if master key is provided
let master_cipher = if let Some(ref master_key) = config.master_key {
let (master_cipher, legacy_master_cipher) = if let Some(ref master_key) = config.master_key {
let salt = Self::load_or_create_master_key_salt(&config).await?;
let key = Self::derive_master_key(master_key, &salt)?;
Some(Aes256Gcm::new(&key))
let legacy_key = Self::derive_legacy_master_key(master_key)?;
(Some(Aes256Gcm::new(&key)), Some(Aes256Gcm::new(&legacy_key)))
} else {
warn!("No master key provided - local KMS key material will use explicit plaintext-dev-only storage");
None
(None, None)
};
Ok(Self {
config,
key_cache: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
master_cipher,
legacy_master_cipher,
dek_crypto: AesDekCrypto::new(),
})
}
@@ -132,6 +137,14 @@ impl LocalKmsClient {
Ok(key)
}
fn derive_legacy_master_key(master_key: &str) -> Result<Key<Aes256Gcm>> {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(master_key.as_bytes());
hasher.update(b"rustfs-kms-local");
Key::<Aes256Gcm>::try_from(hasher.finalize().as_slice())
.map_err(|_| KmsError::cryptographic_error("legacy_key", "Invalid key length"))
}
fn master_key_salt_path(config: &LocalConfig) -> PathBuf {
config.key_dir.join(LOCAL_KMS_MASTER_KEY_SALT_FILE)
}
@@ -206,6 +219,9 @@ impl LocalKmsClient {
// Decrypt key material if master cipher is available.
let key_material = match effective_protection {
StoredKeyProtection::EncryptedMasterKey => {
// RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(rustfs-5063): Remove after upgrades rewrite all pre-beta.9 key files.
// Pre-beta.9 files have no protection marker and use the legacy
// SHA-256 KDF, while later pre-marker files use Argon2.
let cipher = self.master_cipher.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
"Local KMS key {key_id} is encrypted at rest and requires a configured master key"
@@ -219,9 +235,20 @@ impl LocalKmsClient {
nonce_array.copy_from_slice(&stored_key.nonce);
let nonce = Nonce::from(nonce_array);
cipher
match cipher.decrypt(&nonce, encrypted_bytes.as_ref()) {
Ok(key_material) => key_material,
Err(current_error) if stored_key.at_rest_protection == StoredKeyProtection::LegacyUnspecified => {
let legacy_cipher = self.legacy_master_cipher.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
KmsError::configuration_error(format!(
"Local KMS key {key_id} is encrypted at rest and requires a configured master key"
))
})?;
legacy_cipher
.decrypt(&nonce, encrypted_bytes.as_ref())
.map_err(|e| KmsError::cryptographic_error("decrypt", e.to_string()))?
.map_err(|_| KmsError::cryptographic_error("decrypt", current_error.to_string()))?
}
Err(error) => return Err(KmsError::cryptographic_error("decrypt", error.to_string())),
}
}
StoredKeyProtection::PlaintextDevOnly | StoredKeyProtection::LegacyUnspecified => {
if self.master_cipher.is_some() && stored_key.at_rest_protection == StoredKeyProtection::PlaintextDevOnly {
@@ -1226,4 +1253,71 @@ mod tests {
.expect("legacy encrypted record should remain readable");
assert_eq!(key_info.key_id, "legacy-encrypted-key");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_load_master_key_accepts_beta5_sha256_encrypted_record() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("create beta.5 fixture directory");
let stored_key = serde_json::json!({
"key_id": "beta5-key",
"version": 1u32,
"algorithm": "AES_256",
"usage": "EncryptDecrypt",
"status": "Active",
"description": serde_json::Value::Null,
"metadata": HashMap::<String, String>::new(),
"created_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"rotated_at": serde_json::Value::Null,
"created_by": "beta5-fixture",
"encrypted_key_material": "xjwGa4Lj4qzKg6XQl8s2btyFkPHPChMAkjqs268TFGyvFUv8WjDD5HQCUDLViZmt",
"nonce": [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]
});
fs::write(
temp_dir.path().join("beta5-key.key"),
serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&stored_key).expect("serialize beta.5 fixture"),
)
.await
.expect("write beta.5 fixture");
let mut explicit_protection = stored_key.clone();
let explicit_object = explicit_protection.as_object_mut().expect("beta.5 fixture is a JSON object");
explicit_object.insert("key_id".to_string(), serde_json::json!("beta5-explicit-key"));
explicit_object.insert("at_rest_protection".to_string(), serde_json::json!("encrypted-master-key"));
fs::write(
temp_dir.path().join("beta5-explicit-key.key"),
serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&explicit_protection).expect("serialize explicit-protection fixture"),
)
.await
.expect("write explicit-protection fixture");
let client = LocalKmsClient::new(LocalConfig {
key_dir: temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
master_key: Some("beta5-test-master-key".to_string()),
file_permissions: Some(0o600),
})
.await
.expect("initialize local KMS for beta.5 fixture");
let material = client
.get_key_material("beta5-key")
.await
.expect("decrypt beta.5 SHA-256 protected key");
assert_eq!(material, vec![0x42; 32]);
let explicit_error = client
.get_key_material("beta5-explicit-key")
.await
.expect_err("explicit current protection must not fall back to the beta.5 KDF");
assert!(matches!(explicit_error, KmsError::CryptographicError { .. }));
let wrong_key_client = LocalKmsClient::new(LocalConfig {
key_dir: temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
master_key: Some("wrong-beta5-master-key".to_string()),
file_permissions: Some(0o600),
})
.await
.expect("initialize local KMS with wrong beta.5 master key");
let error = wrong_key_client
.get_key_material("beta5-key")
.await
.expect_err("wrong beta.5 master key must not decrypt the fixture");
assert!(matches!(error, KmsError::CryptographicError { .. }));
}
}
+67
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ use crate::error::{KmsError, Result};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use jiff::Zoned;
use rand::Rng;
use serde::de::IgnoredAny;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -44,6 +45,30 @@ pub struct DataKeyEnvelope {
pub created_at: Zoned,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct DataKeyEnvelopeMarker {
#[serde(rename = "key_id")]
_key_id: IgnoredAny,
#[serde(rename = "master_key_id")]
_master_key_id: IgnoredAny,
#[serde(rename = "key_spec")]
_key_spec: IgnoredAny,
#[serde(rename = "encrypted_key")]
_encrypted_key: IgnoredAny,
#[serde(rename = "nonce")]
_nonce: IgnoredAny,
#[serde(rename = "encryption_context")]
_encryption_context: IgnoredAny,
#[serde(rename = "created_at")]
_created_at: IgnoredAny,
}
/// Returns whether ciphertext is a RustFS KMS data-key envelope.
pub fn is_data_key_envelope(ciphertext: &[u8]) -> bool {
ciphertext.iter().copied().find(|byte| !byte.is_ascii_whitespace()) == Some(b'{')
&& serde_json::from_slice::<DataKeyEnvelopeMarker>(ciphertext).is_ok()
}
/// Trait for encrypting and decrypting data encryption keys (DEK)
///
/// This trait abstracts the encryption operations used to protect
@@ -329,4 +354,46 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(deserialized.key_id, "test-key-id");
assert_eq!(deserialized.master_key_id, "master-key-id");
}
#[test]
fn test_data_key_envelope_discriminator_rejects_local_formats() {
let kms_envelope = br#"{
"key_id": "test-key-id",
"master_key_id": "master-key-id",
"key_spec": "AES_256",
"encrypted_key": [1, 2, 3, 4],
"nonce": [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16],
"encryption_context": {},
"created_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
}"#;
let minio_legacy = br#"{"aead":"AES-256-GCM-HMAC-SHA-256","iv":[1],"nonce":[2],"bytes":[3]}"#;
let duplicate_key_id = [b"{\"key_id\":\"duplicate\",".as_slice(), &kms_envelope[1..]].concat();
assert!(is_data_key_envelope(kms_envelope));
assert!(is_data_key_envelope(&[b" \n".as_slice(), kms_envelope].concat()));
assert!(!is_data_key_envelope(&duplicate_key_id));
assert!(!is_data_key_envelope(b"bm9uY2U=:Y2lwaGVydGV4dA=="));
assert!(!is_data_key_envelope(minio_legacy));
let envelope_value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(kms_envelope).expect("parse KMS envelope fixture");
for required_field in [
"key_id",
"master_key_id",
"key_spec",
"encrypted_key",
"nonce",
"encryption_context",
"created_at",
] {
let mut incomplete = envelope_value.clone();
incomplete
.as_object_mut()
.expect("KMS envelope fixture is an object")
.remove(required_field);
assert!(
!is_data_key_envelope(&serde_json::to_vec(&incomplete).expect("serialize incomplete envelope")),
"missing {required_field} must not classify as a KMS envelope"
);
}
}
}
+1 -1
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@@ -17,4 +17,4 @@
pub mod ciphers;
pub mod dek;
pub use dek::{AesDekCrypto, DataKeyEnvelope, DekCrypto, generate_key_material};
pub use dek::{AesDekCrypto, DataKeyEnvelope, DekCrypto, generate_key_material, is_data_key_envelope};
+5
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@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ use thiserror::Error;
/// Result type for KMS operations
pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, KmsError>;
/// KMS runtime is unavailable for an encryption operation.
#[derive(Error, Debug, Clone, Copy)]
#[error("KMS encryption service is unavailable")]
pub struct KmsUnavailableError;
/// KMS error types covering all possible failure scenarios
#[derive(Error, Debug, Clone)]
pub enum KmsError {
+2 -1
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@@ -83,7 +83,8 @@ pub use api_types::{
TagKeyRequest, TagKeyResponse, UntagKeyRequest, UntagKeyResponse, UpdateKeyDescriptionRequest, UpdateKeyDescriptionResponse,
};
pub use config::*;
pub use error::{KmsError, Result};
pub use encryption::is_data_key_envelope;
pub use error::{KmsError, KmsUnavailableError, Result};
pub use manager::KmsManager;
pub use service::{DataKey, ObjectEncryptionService};
pub use service_manager::{
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ for later deletion.
- `disk-mutation-body-digest` internode mutating disk RPCs: servers temporarily accept mutating disk RPCs (RenameData, DeleteVersion, DeleteVersions, WriteMetadata, UpdateMetadata, WriteAll, Delete, DeletePaths, RenameFile, RenamePart, DeleteVolume, MakeVolume, MakeVolumes) that carry no signature-bound canonical body digest, so peers from releases that predate body-digest signing remain available during rolling upgrades. Accepted digestless mutations increment the internode body-digest fallback counter; that counter must read zero fleet-wide across a release window before RUSTFS_INTERNODE_RPC_BODY_DIGEST_STRICT is enabled. Because body-bound requests now consume replay-cache nonces on the receiver, deploy the raised RUSTFS_INTERNODE_RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPACITY default fleet-wide before enabling strict mode, and watch the internode replay-cache overflow counter for undersized capacity during the rollout. Remove the digestless fallback after the minimum supported RustFS peer version body-binds every mutating disk RPC.
- `heal-status-rpc-v1` node heal status capability: new peers treat an unimplemented BackgroundHealStatus RPC as an explicitly incomplete rolling-upgrade response. Remove the fallback after the minimum supported RustFS peer version implements BackgroundHealStatus.
- `backlog-1316` legacy encrypted multipart range seek: the feature remains opt-in until every server that can initiate, write, or complete multipart uploads supports the candidate-to-final marker protocol and uploadId commit lock, and pre-upgrade multipart uploads have drained. Remove the RUSTFS_ENCRYPTED_RANGE_SEEK switch after the minimum supported release does so; keep the quorum marker and malformed-layout full-read guards permanently.
- `rustfs-5063` pre-beta.9 Local KMS recovery: persisted Local KMS configs from beta.8 and earlier predate the explicit insecure-development flag, and encrypted key files use the legacy SHA-256 KDF. Remove the config fallback after supported upgrades have rewritten or explicitly resaved all pre-beta.9 configs with the development-default field, and remove the legacy KDF after supported upgrades have rewritten all pre-beta.9 Local KMS key files with explicit at-rest protection.
## Review Checklist
+103 -3
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@@ -128,6 +128,32 @@ async fn save_kms_config(config: &KmsConfig) -> Result<(), String> {
Ok(())
}
fn decode_persisted_kms_config(data: &[u8]) -> serde_json::Result<(KmsConfig, bool)> {
let mut config: KmsConfig = serde_json::from_slice(data)?;
let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(data)?;
let is_missing_development_flag = value
.as_object()
.is_some_and(|object| !object.contains_key("allow_insecure_dev_defaults"));
let mut uses_legacy_local_defaults = false;
if is_missing_development_flag
&& matches!(&config.backend_config, rustfs_kms::BackendConfig::Local(_))
&& config.validate().is_err()
{
// RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(rustfs-5063): Remove after pre-beta.9 configurations are rewritten with this field.
// Pre-beta.9 persisted Local KMS configurations predate the explicit
// development-default flag.
config.allow_insecure_dev_defaults = true;
if config.validate().is_ok() {
uses_legacy_local_defaults = true;
} else {
config.allow_insecure_dev_defaults = false;
}
}
Ok((config, uses_legacy_local_defaults))
}
/// Load KMS configuration from cluster storage
#[instrument]
pub async fn load_kms_config() -> Option<KmsConfig> {
@@ -145,8 +171,18 @@ pub async fn load_kms_config() -> Option<KmsConfig> {
};
match read_admin_config(store, KMS_CONFIG_PATH).await {
Ok(data) => match serde_json::from_slice::<KmsConfig>(&data) {
Ok(config) => {
Ok(data) => match decode_persisted_kms_config(&data) {
Ok((config, is_legacy_local)) => {
if is_legacy_local {
warn!(
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ADMIN,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_KMS,
event = "kms_legacy_local_config_loaded",
storage_path = KMS_CONFIG_PATH,
state = "legacy_config_accepted",
"admin kms dynamic state"
);
}
info!(
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ADMIN,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_KMS,
@@ -921,8 +957,9 @@ impl Operation for ReconfigureKmsHandler {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{kms_configure_actions, kms_service_control_actions};
use super::{decode_persisted_kms_config, kms_configure_actions, kms_service_control_actions};
use rustfs_policy::policy::action::{Action, AdminAction, KmsAction};
use tempfile::TempDir;
fn assert_has_action(actions: &[Action], action: Action) {
assert!(actions.contains(&action), "expected action list to contain {action:?}");
@@ -943,4 +980,67 @@ mod tests {
assert_lacks_action(&kms_configure_actions(), Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::ServerInfoAdminAction));
assert_lacks_action(&kms_service_control_actions(), Action::AdminAction(AdminAction::ServerInfoAdminAction));
}
#[test]
fn persisted_beta5_local_config_retains_legacy_development_mode() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("create legacy local KMS directory");
let config = rustfs_kms::KmsConfig::local(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf());
let mut value = serde_json::to_value(config).expect("serialize local KMS config");
value
.as_object_mut()
.expect("KMS config is a JSON object")
.remove("allow_insecure_dev_defaults");
let (config, migrated) = decode_persisted_kms_config(&serde_json::to_vec(&value).expect("serialize beta.5 config"))
.expect("decode beta.5 persisted config");
assert!(migrated);
assert!(config.allow_insecure_dev_defaults);
assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn persisted_local_config_with_explicit_secure_mode_stays_secure() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("create secure local KMS directory");
let config = rustfs_kms::KmsConfig::local(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf());
let (config, migrated) = decode_persisted_kms_config(&serde_json::to_vec(&config).expect("serialize current config"))
.expect("decode current persisted config");
assert!(!migrated);
assert!(!config.allow_insecure_dev_defaults);
assert!(config.validate().is_err());
}
#[test]
fn persisted_config_rejects_duplicate_security_field() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("create local KMS directory");
let config = rustfs_kms::KmsConfig::local(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf());
let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&config).expect("serialize current config");
let duplicate = serialized.replacen('{', r#"{"allow_insecure_dev_defaults":true,"#, 1);
assert!(decode_persisted_kms_config(duplicate.as_bytes()).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn persisted_secure_local_config_without_legacy_field_stays_secure() {
#[cfg(unix)]
let key_dir = std::path::PathBuf::from("/var/lib/rustfs/kms");
#[cfg(windows)]
let key_dir = std::path::PathBuf::from(r"C:\rustfs-kms");
let mut config = rustfs_kms::KmsConfig::local(key_dir);
let rustfs_kms::BackendConfig::Local(local) = &mut config.backend_config else {
panic!("local constructor must create local backend config");
};
local.master_key = Some("configured-master-key".to_string());
let mut value = serde_json::to_value(config).expect("serialize secure local KMS config");
value
.as_object_mut()
.expect("KMS config is a JSON object")
.remove("allow_insecure_dev_defaults");
let (config, migrated) = decode_persisted_kms_config(&serde_json::to_vec(&value).expect("serialize old config"))
.expect("decode secure persisted config");
assert!(!migrated);
assert!(!config.allow_insecure_dev_defaults);
assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
}
}
+22
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@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
use crate::storage_api::error::contract::range::HTTPRangeError;
use crate::storage_api::error::{QuotaError, StorageError};
use rustfs_kms::KmsUnavailableError;
use s3s::{S3Error, S3ErrorCode};
#[derive(Debug)]
@@ -231,6 +232,19 @@ impl From<StorageError> for ApiError {
};
}
if let StorageError::Io(ref io_err) = err
&& io_err
.get_ref()
.and_then(|inner| inner.downcast_ref::<KmsUnavailableError>())
.is_some()
{
return ApiError {
code: S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable,
message: ApiError::error_code_to_message(&S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable),
source: Some(Box::new(err)),
};
}
let code = match &err {
StorageError::NotImplemented => S3ErrorCode::NotImplemented,
StorageError::InvalidArgument(_, _, _) => S3ErrorCode::InvalidArgument,
@@ -464,6 +478,14 @@ mod tests {
assert!(downcast_storage_error.is_some());
}
#[test]
fn test_kms_service_unavailable_maps_to_retryable_error() {
let api_error = ApiError::from(StorageError::other(KmsUnavailableError));
assert_eq!(api_error.code, S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable);
assert_eq!(api_error.message, "The service is unavailable. Please retry.");
}
#[test]
fn test_api_error_from_storage_error_mappings() {
let test_cases = vec![
+350 -67
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue};
use rand::Rng;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
use rand::RngExt;
use rustfs_kms::{DataKey, types::ObjectEncryptionContext};
use rustfs_kms::{DataKey, KmsUnavailableError, is_data_key_envelope, types::ObjectEncryptionContext};
use rustfs_utils::get_env_opt_str;
use s3s::S3ErrorCode;
use s3s::dto::ServerSideEncryption;
@@ -1618,10 +1618,7 @@ async fn apply_managed_encryption_material(
let provider = get_sse_dek_provider().await?;
let object_context = build_object_encryption_context(bucket, key, ssekms_context.as_ref());
let (data_key, encrypted_data_key) = provider
.generate_sse_dek(&object_context, &kms_key_to_use)
.await
.map_err(|e| ApiError::from(StorageError::other(format!("Failed to create data key: {e}"))))?;
let (data_key, encrypted_data_key) = provider.generate_sse_dek(&object_context, &kms_key_to_use).await?;
let algorithm = server_side_encryption.as_str().to_string();
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
@@ -1744,8 +1741,25 @@ async fn apply_managed_decryption_material(
};
let object_context = build_object_encryption_context(bucket, key, kms_context.as_ref());
// Use factory pattern to get provider (test or production mode)
let provider = get_sse_dek_provider().await?;
// Persisted wrapping format is the read-side source of truth. The
// advertised SSE scheme and current KMS availability are write policy
// and runtime state, neither of which identifies the historical provider.
let provider: Arc<dyn SseDekProvider> = if is_data_key_envelope(&encrypted_data_key) {
// When a test-injected provider is registered via set_sse_dek_provider_for_test,
// use it instead of creating a fresh KmsSseDekProvider which cannot resolve
// a KMS service without an AppContext.
//
// Reads GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER (populated only by set_sse_dek_provider_for_test),
// never GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER, so a local provider cached by a prior
// get_local_sse_dek_provider call cannot be selected to unwrap a KMS envelope.
if let Some(cached) = GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER.read().ok().and_then(|guard| guard.as_ref().cloned()) {
cached
} else {
Arc::new(KmsSseDekProvider::new().await?)
}
} else {
get_local_sse_dek_provider().await?
};
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
let decrypted_data_key = if is_legacy_rustfs_managed_metadata(&normalized_metadata) {
provider
@@ -1760,8 +1774,7 @@ async fn apply_managed_decryption_material(
let decrypted_data_key = provider
.decrypt_sse_dek(&encrypted_data_key, &kms_key_id, &object_context)
.await;
let decrypted_data_key =
decrypted_data_key.map_err(|e| ApiError::from(StorageError::other(format!("Failed to decrypt data key: {e}"))))?;
let decrypted_data_key = decrypted_data_key?;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
let (key_bytes, base_nonce, key_kind) = if let Some(sealed_key) = minio_sealed_key {
(
@@ -1873,7 +1886,7 @@ impl KmsSseDekProvider {
provider
.current_service()
.await
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other("KMS encryption service is not initialized")))?;
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other(KmsUnavailableError)))?;
Ok(provider)
}
@@ -1885,7 +1898,7 @@ impl KmsSseDekProvider {
provider
.current_service()
.await
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other("KMS encryption service is not initialized")))?;
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other(KmsUnavailableError)))?;
Ok(provider)
}
@@ -1910,7 +1923,7 @@ impl SseDekProvider for KmsSseDekProvider {
let service = self
.current_service()
.await
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other("KMS encryption service is not initialized")))?;
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other(KmsUnavailableError)))?;
let (data_key, encrypted_data_key) = service
.create_data_key(&kms_key_option, context)
.await
@@ -1928,7 +1941,7 @@ impl SseDekProvider for KmsSseDekProvider {
let service = self
.current_service()
.await
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other("KMS encryption service is not initialized")))?;
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other(KmsUnavailableError)))?;
let data_key = service
.decrypt_data_key(encrypted_dek, context)
.await
@@ -1947,7 +1960,7 @@ impl SseDekProvider for KmsSseDekProvider {
let service = self
.current_service()
.await
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other("KMS encryption service is not initialized")))?;
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::from(StorageError::other(KmsUnavailableError)))?;
let data_key = service
.decrypt_legacy_data_key(encrypted_dek)
.await
@@ -1961,41 +1974,33 @@ impl SseDekProvider for KmsSseDekProvider {
// Test/Simple DEK Provider
// ============================================================================
/// Simple SSE DEK provider for testing purposes
/// Local SSE DEK provider for deployments without a KMS.
///
/// This provider reads a single 32-byte customer master key (CMK) from the
/// `__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK` environment variable. The key must be base64-encoded.
/// Uses `RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY` (base64-encoded 32-byte key) to wrap
/// data-encryption keys with AES-256-GCM. This is the production fallback
/// when no KMS service is configured.
///
/// # Environment Variable Format
/// # Environment Variable
///
/// ```text
/// __RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK=<base64_encoded_32_byte_key>
/// RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY=<base64_encoded_32_byte_key>
/// ```
///
/// Example:
/// ```bash
/// export __RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK="AKHul86TBMMJ3+VrGlh9X3dHJsOtSXOXHOODPwmAnOo="
/// ```
///
/// # Key Generation
///
/// Use the provided script to generate a valid key:
/// ```bash
/// # Windows
/// .\scripts\generate-sse-keys.ps1
///
/// # Linux/Unix/macOS
/// ./scripts/generate-sse-keys.sh
/// ```
pub(crate) struct TestSseDekProvider {
pub(crate) struct LocalSseDekProvider {
master_key: [u8; 32],
}
/// Test-only alias so existing test code that references `TestSseDekProvider`
/// continues to compile without changes.
#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
pub(crate) type TestSseDekProvider = LocalSseDekProvider;
/// Parse the base64-encoded 32-byte master key from `__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK`.
///
/// Returns an error (never crashes) for a missing, non-base64, wrong-length, or
/// all-zero key so callers on the request path can fail the request instead of
/// taking the whole server down (backlog#806).
#[cfg(test)]
fn parse_simple_sse_cmk(cmk_value: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> {
let trimmed = cmk_value.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
@@ -2018,21 +2023,23 @@ fn parse_simple_sse_cmk(cmk_value: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> {
Ok(master_key)
}
impl TestSseDekProvider {
/// Create a SimpleSseDekProvider with a predefined key (for testing)
impl LocalSseDekProvider {
/// Create a LocalSseDekProvider with a predefined key (for testing)
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn new_with_key(master_key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self { master_key }
}
/// Create a TestSseDekProvider from `__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK` (test-only).
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn new() -> Result<Self, ApiError> {
let cmk_value = std::env::var("__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK").unwrap_or_default();
// A missing/invalid key must surface as a request error, never crash the
// whole server: `TestSseDekProvider::new` is reached from the SSE request
// whole server: `LocalSseDekProvider::new` is reached from the SSE request
// path (get_sse_dek_provider), so `process::exit(1)` here turned a bad
// `__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK` into a process crash-loop DoS (backlog#806).
let master_key = parse_simple_sse_cmk(&cmk_value)?;
tracing::info!("Successfully loaded SSE master key (32 bytes)");
tracing::info!("Successfully loaded SSE master key (32 bytes) from __RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK");
Ok(Self { master_key })
}
@@ -2042,7 +2049,7 @@ impl TestSseDekProvider {
/// The failures here are server configuration problems, not internal
/// faults: surface them as `InvalidRequest` (HTTP 400) so a managed-SSE
/// request against an unconfigured server does not report 500 (rustfs#4844).
pub fn new_for_local_sse() -> Result<Self, ApiError> {
pub fn new_from_env() -> Result<Self, ApiError> {
fn sse_not_configured(message: impl Into<String>) -> ApiError {
ApiError {
code: S3ErrorCode::InvalidRequest,
@@ -2122,7 +2129,7 @@ impl TestSseDekProvider {
}
#[async_trait]
impl SseDekProvider for TestSseDekProvider {
impl SseDekProvider for LocalSseDekProvider {
async fn generate_sse_dek(
&self,
_context: &ObjectEncryptionContext,
@@ -2167,9 +2174,22 @@ impl SseDekProvider for TestSseDekProvider {
// Factory Function for SSE DEK Provider
// ============================================================================
/// Global SSE DEK provider cache
/// Global SSE DEK provider cache for local / test providers.
///
/// Populated by `get_local_sse_dek_provider` and (for backward-compat in tests)
/// `set_sse_dek_provider_for_test`. Read by `get_local_sse_dek_provider` only —
/// the KMS-envelope decrypt path uses `GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER` so that a cached
/// local provider can never be selected for a KMS-wrapped data-key.
static GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER: LazyLock<RwLock<Option<Arc<dyn SseDekProvider>>>> = LazyLock::new(|| RwLock::new(None));
/// Global KMS DEK provider cache for test-injected KMS providers.
///
/// Populated **only** by `set_sse_dek_provider_for_test` (test-only).
/// Read **only** by the KMS-envelope branch of `apply_managed_decryption_material`.
/// Separation from `GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER` prevents a previously-cached local
/// provider from being selected to unwrap a KMS data-key envelope.
static GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER: LazyLock<RwLock<Option<Arc<dyn SseDekProvider>>>> = LazyLock::new(|| RwLock::new(None));
/// Get or initialize the global SSE DEK provider
///
/// Factory function that automatically selects the appropriate provider:
@@ -2192,6 +2212,17 @@ pub async fn get_sse_dek_provider() -> Result<Arc<dyn SseDekProvider>, ApiError>
return Ok(Arc::new(KmsSseDekProvider::new().await?));
}
get_local_sse_dek_provider().await
}
async fn get_local_sse_dek_provider() -> Result<Arc<dyn SseDekProvider>, ApiError> {
// An explicitly injected test provider overrides both the cache and the
// environment-based selection below.
#[cfg(test)]
if let Some(injected) = test_injected_sse_dek_provider() {
return Ok(injected);
}
// Check if already initialized
if let Some(provider) = GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER
.read()
@@ -2202,14 +2233,26 @@ pub async fn get_sse_dek_provider() -> Result<Arc<dyn SseDekProvider>, ApiError>
return Ok(provider);
}
// Determine provider: KMS when available, else test env, else local SSE-S3 fallback (no KMS)
let provider: Arc<dyn SseDekProvider> = if std::env::var("__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK").is_ok() {
debug!("Using SimpleSseDekProvider (test mode) based on __RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK");
Arc::new(TestSseDekProvider::new()?)
} else {
// In test mode, prefer the simple CMK provider when the env var is set.
#[cfg(test)]
{
if std::env::var("__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK").is_ok() {
debug!("Using LocalSseDekProvider (test mode) based on __RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK");
let provider: Arc<dyn SseDekProvider> = Arc::new(LocalSseDekProvider::new()?);
let mut slot = GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER
.write()
.map_err(|_| ApiError::from(StorageError::other("Failed to update global SSE DEK provider cache")))?;
if let Some(existing) = slot.as_ref() {
return Ok(existing.clone());
}
*slot = Some(provider.clone());
return Ok(provider);
}
}
// Production fallback: local SSE-S3 provider (no KMS configured).
debug!("Using local SSE-S3 provider (KMS not configured)");
Arc::new(TestSseDekProvider::new_for_local_sse()?)
};
let provider: Arc<dyn SseDekProvider> = Arc::new(LocalSseDekProvider::new_from_env()?);
let mut slot = GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER
.write()
@@ -2222,26 +2265,41 @@ pub async fn get_sse_dek_provider() -> Result<Arc<dyn SseDekProvider>, ApiError>
Ok(provider)
}
/// Reset the global SSE DEK provider (for testing only)
/// Reset both global SSE DEK provider caches (for testing only)
///
/// Note: OnceLock doesn't support reset in stable Rust.
/// Tests should set environment variables before first call to `get_sse_dek_provider()`.
/// Clears GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER (local/test providers) and
/// GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER (test-injected KMS providers).
#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn reset_sse_dek_provider() {
if let Ok(mut slot) = GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER.write() {
*slot = None;
}
if let Ok(mut slot) = GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER.write() {
*slot = None;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn set_sse_dek_provider_for_test(provider: Arc<dyn SseDekProvider>) {
if let Ok(mut slot) = GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER.write() {
*slot = Some(provider.clone());
}
if let Ok(mut slot) = GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER.write() {
*slot = Some(provider);
}
}
/// Provider explicitly injected via `set_sse_dek_provider_for_test`, if any.
///
/// Reads `GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER` because that slot is populated *only* by the
/// test setter, so a hit here always means an explicit test injection.
#[cfg(test)]
fn test_injected_sse_dek_provider() -> Option<Arc<dyn SseDekProvider>> {
GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER.read().ok().and_then(|guard| guard.as_ref().cloned())
}
// ============================================================================
// Legacy Functions (SSE-S3 / SSE-KMS)
// ============================================================================
@@ -2518,26 +2576,27 @@ fn ssec_invalid_request(message: &str) -> ApiError {
#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(unused_imports)]
mod tests {
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
use super::{
DARE_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, DARE_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SEAL_ALGORITHM, SEALED_KEY_IV_SIZE,
SEALED_KEY_SIZE, is_legacy_rustfs_managed_metadata, is_supported_sealed_object_key_cipher,
};
use super::{
DecryptionRequest, EncryptionKeyKind, EncryptionMaterial, EncryptionRequest, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER,
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER, KmsSseDekProvider,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_KEY_ID_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_SEALED_KEY_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_MULTIPART_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_S3_SEALED_KEY_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
PrepareEncryptionRequest, SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER, SSEType, SseDekProvider, SsecParams, StorageError,
TestSseDekProvider, encryption_material_to_metadata, extract_server_side_encryption_from_headers,
ApiError, DataKey, DecryptionRequest, EncryptionKeyKind, EncryptionMaterial, EncryptionRequest,
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER,
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER, KmsSseDekProvider, KmsUnavailableError, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_KEY_ID_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_MULTIPART_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_S3_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER, PrepareEncryptionRequest, SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER, SSEType,
SseDekProvider, SsecParams, StorageError, TestSseDekProvider, apply_managed_decryption_material,
apply_managed_encryption_material, encryption_material_to_metadata, extract_server_side_encryption_from_headers,
extract_ssec_params_from_headers, extract_ssekms_context_from_headers, generate_ssec_nonce, is_managed_sse,
map_get_object_reader_error, mark_encrypted_multipart_metadata, normalize_managed_metadata, reset_sse_dek_provider,
resolve_effective_kms_key_id, sse_decryption, sse_encryption, sse_prepare_encryption, strip_managed_encryption_metadata,
validate_sse_headers_for_read, validate_sse_headers_for_write, validate_ssec_for_read, validate_ssec_params,
verify_ssec_key_match,
};
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
use super::{
DARE_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, DARE_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SEAL_ALGORITHM, SEALED_KEY_IV_SIZE,
SEALED_KEY_SIZE, is_legacy_rustfs_managed_metadata, is_supported_sealed_object_key_cipher,
};
#[test]
fn parse_simple_sse_cmk_rejects_bad_keys_without_crashing() {
@@ -2582,6 +2641,28 @@ mod tests {
SSE_TEST_LOCK.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(())).lock().await
}
struct UnavailableSseDekProvider;
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl SseDekProvider for UnavailableSseDekProvider {
async fn generate_sse_dek(
&self,
_context: &ObjectEncryptionContext,
_kms_key_id: &str,
) -> Result<(DataKey, Vec<u8>), ApiError> {
Err(ApiError::from(StorageError::other(KmsUnavailableError)))
}
async fn decrypt_sse_dek(
&self,
_encrypted_dek: &[u8],
_kms_key_id: &str,
_context: &ObjectEncryptionContext,
) -> Result<[u8; 32], ApiError> {
Err(ApiError::from(StorageError::other(KmsUnavailableError)))
}
}
fn local_sse_master_key_b64() -> String {
BASE64_STANDARD.encode([0x24u8; 32])
}
@@ -4095,6 +4176,190 @@ mod tests {
println!("✅ Full cycle (generate -> encrypt DEK -> decrypt DEK -> decrypt data) test passed!");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_managed_decryption_selects_provider_from_persisted_dek() {
use rustfs_kms::config::KmsConfig;
use tempfile::TempDir;
let _guard = lock_sse_test_state().await;
reset_sse_dek_provider();
let manager = rustfs_kms::init_global_kms_service_manager();
let key_dir = TempDir::new().expect("create KMS key directory");
manager
.reconfigure(KmsConfig::local(key_dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults())
.await
.expect("start test KMS service");
let local_master_key = [7u8; 32];
let local_provider = TestSseDekProvider::new_with_key(local_master_key);
let context = ObjectEncryptionContext::new("bucket".to_string(), "object".to_string());
let (data_key, encrypted_dek) = local_provider
.generate_sse_dek(&context, "legacy-local-key")
.await
.expect("generate beta.5 local DEK");
async_with_vars(
[
("__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK", None::<String>),
("RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY", Some(BASE64_STANDARD.encode(local_master_key))),
],
async {
let metadata = HashMap::from([
("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), ServerSideEncryption::AWS_KMS.to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode(encrypted_dek)),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode(data_key.nonce)),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER.to_string(), "legacy-local-key".to_string()),
]);
let material = apply_managed_decryption_material("bucket", "object", &metadata)
.await
.expect("legacy local DEK should not be routed to the running KMS")
.expect("managed metadata should produce decryption material");
assert_eq!(material.key_bytes, data_key.plaintext_key);
assert_eq!(material.sse_type, SSEType::SseKms);
},
)
.await;
manager.stop().await.expect("stop test KMS service");
reset_sse_dek_provider();
let kms_envelope = br#"{
"key_id": "test-key-id",
"master_key_id": "master-key-id",
"key_spec": "AES_256",
"encrypted_key": [1, 2, 3, 4],
"nonce": [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16],
"encryption_context": {},
"created_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
}"#;
let metadata = HashMap::from([
("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), ServerSideEncryption::AES256.to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode(kms_envelope)),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode([0x14; 12])),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER.to_string(), "test-key-id".to_string()),
]);
let error = match apply_managed_decryption_material("bucket", "object", &metadata).await {
Ok(_) => panic!("KMS envelope must not fall back to the local provider"),
Err(error) => error,
};
assert_eq!(error.code, S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable);
reset_sse_dek_provider();
}
/// Regression test for "local provider cached → dynamically enable KMS → decrypt KMS envelope".
///
/// Verifies that a `TestSseDekProvider` previously cached in `GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER`
/// is NEVER selected to unwrap a KMS data-key envelope. The KMS-envelope branch must
/// read `GLOBAL_KMS_DEK_PROVIDER` (or fall back to `KmsSseDekProvider::new()`), not
/// the local-provider cache.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_kms_envelope_never_routes_to_cached_local_provider() {
use rustfs_kms::config::KmsConfig;
use tempfile::TempDir;
let _guard = lock_sse_test_state().await;
reset_sse_dek_provider();
// 1. Populate GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER with a local provider — the kind
// that `get_local_sse_dek_provider` would cache when KMS is absent.
let local_master_key = [0xAAu8; 32];
*super::GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER
.write()
.expect("write local provider into local cache") = Some(Arc::new(TestSseDekProvider::new_with_key(local_master_key)));
// 2. Start a KMS service (dynamic enable).
let manager = rustfs_kms::init_global_kms_service_manager();
let key_dir = TempDir::new().expect("create KMS key directory");
manager
.reconfigure(KmsConfig::local(key_dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults())
.await
.expect("start test KMS service");
// 3. Construct a KMS JSON envelope — the persisted format of a KMS-wrapped DEK.
// is_data_key_envelope() will return true for this payload.
let kms_envelope = br#"{
"key_id": "envelope-key",
"master_key_id": "master-key-id",
"key_spec": "AES_256",
"encrypted_key": [10, 20, 30, 40],
"nonce": [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12],
"encryption_context": {},
"created_at": "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
}"#;
let metadata = HashMap::from([
("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), ServerSideEncryption::AES256.to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode(kms_envelope)),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode([0x14; 12])),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER.to_string(), "envelope-key".to_string()),
]);
// 4. Decrypt the KMS envelope. Before the fix, this would pick up the cached
// TestSseDekProvider from GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER and either panic (wrong
// format) or produce garbage. After the fix, it routes to KmsSseDekProvider,
// which fails because the envelope contains dummy encrypted bytes that the
// test KMS cannot decrypt — but crucially the error code is NOT a local-
// provider error.
let error = match apply_managed_decryption_material("bucket", "object", &metadata).await {
Ok(_) => panic!("dummy KMS envelope must not produce valid decryption material"),
Err(error) => error,
};
// The KMS service was reached (ServiceUnavailable or the KMS's own decrypt
// failure), not a local-provider format error.
assert!(
error.code == S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable || error.code == S3ErrorCode::InternalError,
"KMS envelope must be routed to KMS provider, not local; got code {:?} msg '{}'",
error.code,
error.message,
);
manager.stop().await.expect("stop test KMS service");
reset_sse_dek_provider();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_managed_encryption_preserves_provider_unavailable_error() {
let _guard = lock_sse_test_state().await;
let manager = rustfs_kms::init_global_kms_service_manager();
manager.stop().await.expect("stop global KMS service");
reset_sse_dek_provider();
*super::GLOBAL_SSE_DEK_PROVIDER.write().expect("update SSE DEK provider cache") =
Some(Arc::new(UnavailableSseDekProvider));
let error = match apply_managed_encryption_material(
"bucket",
"object",
ServerSideEncryption::from_static(ServerSideEncryption::AES256),
None,
None,
0,
)
.await
{
Ok(_) => panic!("provider unavailability must fail managed encryption"),
Err(error) => error,
};
assert_eq!(error.code, S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable);
let metadata = HashMap::from([
("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), ServerSideEncryption::AES256.to_string()),
(
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(),
BASE64_STANDARD.encode(b"local-provider-format"),
),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), BASE64_STANDARD.encode([0x14; 12])),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER.to_string(), "test-key-id".to_string()),
]);
let error = match apply_managed_decryption_material("bucket", "object", &metadata).await {
Ok(_) => panic!("provider unavailability must fail managed decryption"),
Err(error) => error,
};
assert_eq!(error.code, S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable);
reset_sse_dek_provider();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_kms_sse_dek_provider_uses_latest_reconfigured_service() {
use rustfs_kms::config::KmsConfig;
@@ -4159,6 +4424,24 @@ mod tests {
.expect("provider should resolve the latest reconfigured service");
manager.stop().await.expect("kms service should stop cleanly");
let generate_error = provider
.generate_sse_dek(&context, "second-key")
.await
.expect_err("stopped KMS must reject data-key generation");
assert_eq!(generate_error.code, S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable);
let decrypt_error = provider
.decrypt_sse_dek(b"{}", "second-key", &context)
.await
.expect_err("stopped KMS must reject data-key decryption");
assert_eq!(decrypt_error.code, S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable);
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
{
let legacy_error = provider
.decrypt_legacy_sse_dek(b"{}", "second-key", &context)
.await
.expect_err("stopped KMS must reject legacy data-key decryption");
assert_eq!(legacy_error.code, S3ErrorCode::ServiceUnavailable);
}
}
#[test]