fix(kms): unify persisted SSE data key envelopes (#5343)

* feat(kms): implement secure handling of static KMS secret keys and enhance encryption context validation

* feat: enhance local SSE DEK handling with JSON envelope format and versioning
This commit is contained in:
唐小鸭
2026-07-28 17:02:18 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent fd2a87d47e
commit 2216f00cfd
14 changed files with 499 additions and 79 deletions
+57 -7
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@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ use md5::{Digest, Md5};
use rustfs_kms::{KmsUnavailableError, is_data_key_envelope, types::ObjectEncryptionContext};
use rustfs_utils::http::{SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER};
use rustfs_utils::path::path_join_buf;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
use serde::Deserialize;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
use sha2::Sha256;
@@ -44,6 +43,7 @@ const INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-encryption-iv";
const INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-encryption-original-size";
const SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER: &str = "x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-original-size";
const DEFAULT_SSE_ALGORITHM: &str = "AES256";
const LOCAL_SSE_DEK_FORMAT_VERSION: u8 = 1;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
const DARE_PAYLOAD_SIZE: i64 = 64 * 1024;
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
@@ -1716,16 +1716,39 @@ fn decrypt_local_sse_dek(encrypted_dek: &[u8], _kms_key_id: &str, object_context
fn decrypt_rustfs_local_sse_dek(encrypted_dek: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
let encrypted_dek = std::str::from_utf8(encrypted_dek).map_err(|_| Error::other("managed DEK is not valid UTF-8"))?;
let parts: Vec<&str> = encrypted_dek.split(':').collect();
if parts.len() != 2 {
return Err(Error::other("invalid managed DEK format"));
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct LocalSseDekEnvelope<'a> {
version: u8,
nonce: &'a str,
ciphertext: &'a str,
}
let (nonce, ciphertext) = match serde_json::from_str::<LocalSseDekEnvelope<'_>>(encrypted_dek) {
Ok(envelope) => {
if envelope.version != LOCAL_SSE_DEK_FORMAT_VERSION {
return Err(Error::other(format!("unsupported managed DEK format version: {}", envelope.version)));
}
(envelope.nonce, envelope.ciphertext)
}
Err(_) => {
// DEPRECATED: read-only compatibility for persisted colon-delimited DEKs.
// RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(sse-local-dek-json-v1): Remove after all supported upgrades have rewritten legacy DEKs.
let Some((nonce, ciphertext)) = encrypted_dek.split_once(':') else {
return Err(Error::other("invalid managed DEK format"));
};
if ciphertext.contains(':') {
return Err(Error::other("invalid managed DEK format"));
}
(nonce, ciphertext)
}
};
let nonce_vec = BASE64_STANDARD
.decode(parts[0])
.decode(nonce)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid managed DEK nonce"))?;
let ciphertext = BASE64_STANDARD
.decode(parts[1])
.decode(ciphertext)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid managed DEK ciphertext"))?;
let nonce_array: [u8; 12] = nonce_vec
@@ -2324,9 +2347,36 @@ mod tests {
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(&key);
let nonce = Nonce::from([0u8; 12]);
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(&nonce, dek.as_slice()).expect("encrypt managed dek");
serde_json::json!({
"version": LOCAL_SSE_DEK_FORMAT_VERSION,
"nonce": BASE64_STANDARD.encode(nonce),
"ciphertext": BASE64_STANDARD.encode(ciphertext),
})
.to_string()
}
fn encrypt_legacy_managed_dek_for_test(dek: [u8; 32], master_key: [u8; 32]) -> String {
let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from(master_key);
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(&key);
let nonce = Nonce::from([0u8; 12]);
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(&nonce, dek.as_slice()).expect("encrypt legacy managed dek");
format!("{}:{}", BASE64_STANDARD.encode(nonce), BASE64_STANDARD.encode(ciphertext))
}
#[test]
fn decrypt_rustfs_local_sse_dek_rejects_unknown_json_version() {
let envelope = serde_json::json!({
"version": LOCAL_SSE_DEK_FORMAT_VERSION + 1,
"nonce": BASE64_STANDARD.encode([0u8; 12]),
"ciphertext": BASE64_STANDARD.encode([0u8; 48]),
})
.to_string();
let error =
decrypt_rustfs_local_sse_dek(envelope.as_bytes()).expect_err("unknown local SSE DEK versions must fail closed");
assert!(error.to_string().contains("unsupported managed DEK format version"));
}
#[cfg(feature = "rio-v2")]
fn seal_managed_s3_object_key_for_test(
bucket: &str,
@@ -2433,7 +2483,7 @@ mod tests {
async_with_vars([("__RUSTFS_SSE_SIMPLE_CMK", Some(BASE64_STANDARD.encode([7u8; 32])))], async {
let data_key = [0x24; 32];
let base_nonce = [0x14; 12];
let encrypted_dek = encrypt_managed_dek_for_test(data_key, [7u8; 32]);
let encrypted_dek = encrypt_legacy_managed_dek_for_test(data_key, [7u8; 32]);
let metadata = HashMap::from([
(
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(),
+8
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@@ -161,6 +161,14 @@ pub struct ConfigureStaticKmsRequest {
pub allow_insecure_dev_defaults: Option<bool>,
}
impl Drop for ConfigureStaticKmsRequest {
fn drop(&mut self) {
use zeroize::Zeroize;
self.secret_key.zeroize();
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for ConfigureStaticKmsRequest {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("ConfigureStaticKmsRequest")
+156 -24
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@@ -23,16 +23,17 @@
use crate::backends::{BackendInfo, KmsBackend, KmsClient};
use crate::config::{BackendConfig, KmsConfig};
use crate::encryption::DataKeyEnvelope;
use crate::error::{KmsError, Result};
use crate::types::*;
use aes_gcm::{
Aes256Gcm, Key, Nonce,
aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
aead::{Aead, KeyInit, Payload},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use jiff::Zoned;
use rand::RngExt;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, HashMap};
use tracing::debug;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
@@ -41,6 +42,11 @@ const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 12;
/// AES-256 key size in bytes.
const KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
fn context_aad(context: &HashMap<String, String>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let canonical: BTreeMap<&str, &str> = context.iter().map(|(key, value)| (key.as_str(), value.as_str())).collect();
serde_json::to_vec(&canonical).map_err(Into::into)
}
/// Static single-key KMS backend.
///
/// Uses a pre-configured AES-256 key to derive data encryption keys. This is a
@@ -111,21 +117,35 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from(*self.key);
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(&key);
let nonce = Nonce::from(nonce_bytes);
let aad = context_aad(&request.encryption_context)?;
let encrypted = cipher
.encrypt(&nonce, plaintext.as_ref())
.encrypt(
&nonce,
Payload {
msg: plaintext.as_ref(),
aad: &aad,
},
)
.map_err(|e| KmsError::cryptographic_error("AES-256-GCM encrypt", e.to_string()))?;
// Ciphertext format: encrypted_dek || nonce
let mut ciphertext = encrypted;
ciphertext.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let envelope = DataKeyEnvelope {
key_id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
master_key_id: request.master_key_id.clone(),
key_spec: request.key_spec.clone(),
encrypted_key: encrypted,
nonce: nonce_bytes.to_vec(),
encryption_context: request.encryption_context.clone(),
created_at: Zoned::now(),
};
let ciphertext = serde_json::to_vec(&envelope)?;
Ok(DataKeyInfo::new(
self.key_id.clone(),
0, // version is always 0 for static KMS
0,
Some(plaintext.to_vec()),
ciphertext,
"AES_256".to_string(),
request.key_spec.clone(),
))
}
@@ -141,14 +161,28 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from(*self.key);
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(&key);
let nonce = Nonce::from(nonce_bytes);
let aad = context_aad(&request.encryption_context)?;
let encrypted = cipher
.encrypt(&nonce, request.plaintext.as_ref())
.encrypt(
&nonce,
Payload {
msg: request.plaintext.as_ref(),
aad: &aad,
},
)
.map_err(|e| KmsError::cryptographic_error("AES-256-GCM encrypt", e.to_string()))?;
// Ciphertext format: encrypted_data || nonce
let mut ciphertext = encrypted;
ciphertext.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let envelope = DataKeyEnvelope {
key_id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
master_key_id: request.key_id.clone(),
key_spec: "AES_256".to_string(),
encrypted_key: encrypted,
nonce: nonce_bytes.to_vec(),
encryption_context: request.encryption_context.clone(),
created_at: Zoned::now(),
};
let ciphertext = serde_json::to_vec(&envelope)?;
Ok(EncryptResponse {
ciphertext,
@@ -159,21 +193,39 @@ impl KmsClient for StaticKmsBackend {
}
async fn decrypt(&self, request: &DecryptRequest, _context: Option<&OperationContext>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
if request.ciphertext.len() < NONCE_SIZE + 1 {
return Err(KmsError::cryptographic_error("decrypt", "Ciphertext too short for static KMS format"));
let envelope: DataKeyEnvelope = serde_json::from_slice(&request.ciphertext)
.map_err(|error| KmsError::cryptographic_error("parse", format!("Failed to parse data key envelope: {error}")))?;
if envelope.master_key_id != self.key_id {
return Err(KmsError::key_not_found(&envelope.master_key_id));
}
// Split ciphertext: encrypted_data || nonce(12)
let split_at = request.ciphertext.len() - NONCE_SIZE;
let encrypted = &request.ciphertext[..split_at];
let nonce_slice = &request.ciphertext[split_at..];
for (key, expected_value) in &envelope.encryption_context {
match request.encryption_context.get(key) {
Some(actual_value) if actual_value == expected_value => {}
Some(actual_value) => {
return Err(KmsError::context_mismatch(format!(
"Context mismatch for key '{key}': expected '{expected_value}', got '{actual_value}'"
)));
}
None if request.encryption_context.is_empty() => {}
None => return Err(KmsError::context_mismatch(format!("Missing context key '{key}'"))),
}
}
let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from(*self.key);
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(&key);
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(nonce_slice).map_err(|_| KmsError::cryptographic_error("nonce", "invalid nonce length"))?;
let nonce = Nonce::try_from(envelope.nonce.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| KmsError::cryptographic_error("nonce", "invalid nonce length"))?;
let aad = context_aad(&envelope.encryption_context)?;
let plaintext = cipher
.decrypt(&nonce, encrypted)
.decrypt(
&nonce,
Payload {
msg: envelope.encrypted_key.as_ref(),
aad: &aad,
},
)
.map_err(|e| KmsError::cryptographic_error("AES-256-GCM decrypt", e.to_string()))?;
Ok(plaintext)
@@ -317,7 +369,13 @@ impl KmsBackend for StaticKmsBackend {
}
async fn generate_data_key(&self, request: GenerateDataKeyRequest) -> Result<GenerateDataKeyResponse> {
let gen_req = GenerateKeyRequest::new(request.key_id.clone(), request.key_spec.as_str().to_string());
let gen_req = GenerateKeyRequest {
master_key_id: request.key_id.clone(),
key_spec: request.key_spec.as_str().to_string(),
key_length: None,
encryption_context: request.encryption_context,
grant_tokens: Vec::new(),
};
let data_key = <Self as KmsClient>::generate_data_key(self, &gen_req, None).await?;
let plaintext_key = data_key
@@ -378,8 +436,9 @@ impl KmsBackend for StaticKmsBackend {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::backends::KmsClient;
use crate::backends::{KmsBackend as KmsBackendTrait, KmsClient};
use crate::config::{BackendConfig, KmsBackend, StaticConfig};
use crate::encryption::is_data_key_envelope;
use base64::Engine as _;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
@@ -430,8 +489,12 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(data_key.version, 0);
assert!(data_key.plaintext.is_some());
assert_eq!(data_key.plaintext.as_ref().expect("plaintext should be set").len(), 32);
// Ciphertext should be: encrypted(32) + tag(16) + nonce(12)
assert_eq!(data_key.ciphertext.len(), 32 + 16 + NONCE_SIZE);
let envelope: DataKeyEnvelope =
serde_json::from_slice(&data_key.ciphertext).expect("static data key should use a KMS envelope");
assert_eq!(envelope.master_key_id, key_id);
assert_eq!(envelope.encrypted_key.len(), 32 + 16);
assert_eq!(envelope.nonce.len(), NONCE_SIZE);
assert_eq!(envelope.encryption_context.get("bucket").map(String::as_str), Some("test-bucket"));
// Decrypt the data key
let decrypt_request =
@@ -443,6 +506,75 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(decrypted.as_slice(), data_key.plaintext.as_deref().expect("plaintext should exist"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn generated_data_key_uses_kms_envelope_for_sse_read_routing() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let request = GenerateKeyRequest::new(key_id, "AES_256".to_string())
.with_context("bucket".to_string(), "source-bucket".to_string())
.with_context("object".to_string(), "source-object".to_string());
let data_key = KmsClient::generate_data_key(&backend, &request, None)
.await
.expect("generate static KMS data key");
assert!(
is_data_key_envelope(&data_key.ciphertext),
"static KMS ciphertext must use the KMS envelope recognized by the SSE read path"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn generated_data_key_rejects_a_different_encryption_context() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let generate_request = GenerateDataKeyRequest {
key_id,
key_spec: KeySpec::Aes256,
encryption_context: HashMap::from([
("bucket".to_string(), "source-bucket".to_string()),
("object".to_string(), "source-object".to_string()),
]),
};
let generated = KmsBackendTrait::generate_data_key(&backend, generate_request)
.await
.expect("generate context-bound static KMS data key");
let decrypt_request = DecryptRequest {
ciphertext: generated.ciphertext_blob,
encryption_context: HashMap::from([
("bucket".to_string(), "different-bucket".to_string()),
("object".to_string(), "different-object".to_string()),
]),
grant_tokens: Vec::new(),
};
let error = KmsBackendTrait::decrypt(&backend, decrypt_request)
.await
.expect_err("a static KMS data key must not decrypt under a different object context");
assert!(matches!(error, KmsError::ContextMismatch { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn generated_data_key_rejects_tampered_envelope_context() {
let (backend, key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
let request = GenerateKeyRequest::new(key_id, "AES_256".to_string())
.with_context("bucket".to_string(), "source-bucket".to_string());
let generated = KmsClient::generate_data_key(&backend, &request, None)
.await
.expect("generate context-bound data key");
let mut envelope: DataKeyEnvelope = serde_json::from_slice(&generated.ciphertext).expect("parse static KMS envelope");
envelope
.encryption_context
.insert("bucket".to_string(), "different-bucket".to_string());
let decrypt_request = DecryptRequest::new(serde_json::to_vec(&envelope).expect("serialize tampered envelope"))
.with_context("bucket".to_string(), "different-bucket".to_string());
let error = KmsClient::decrypt(&backend, &decrypt_request, None)
.await
.expect_err("tampering with authenticated envelope context must fail");
assert!(matches!(error, KmsError::CryptographicError { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_generate_data_key_wrong_key_id() {
let (backend, _key_id, _key) = create_test_backend().await;
+24
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@@ -214,9 +214,18 @@ pub struct StaticConfig {
/// Key identifier (name) for the single configured key
pub key_id: String,
/// Base64-encoded 32-byte AES-256 key material (zeroed on drop)
#[serde(skip_serializing, default)]
pub secret_key: String,
}
impl Drop for StaticConfig {
fn drop(&mut self) {
use zeroize::Zeroize;
self.secret_key.zeroize();
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for StaticConfig {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("StaticConfig")
@@ -1054,6 +1063,21 @@ mod tests {
assert!(serialized.contains("persisted-token-secret"));
}
#[test]
fn static_kms_config_serialization_does_not_expose_key_material() {
use base64::Engine as _;
let encoded_key = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0x5au8; 32]);
let config = KmsConfig::static_kms("static-key".to_string(), encoded_key.clone());
let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&config).expect("static KMS config should serialize");
assert!(
!serialized.contains(&encoded_key),
"persisted static KMS configuration must not contain plaintext key material"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_config_validation() {
let mut config = KmsConfig {
+16 -10
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@@ -31,19 +31,25 @@ use tokio::sync::RwLock;
pub struct KmsManager {
backend: Arc<dyn KmsBackend>,
cache: Arc<RwLock<KmsCache>>,
config: KmsConfig,
default_key_id: Option<String>,
enable_cache: bool,
}
impl KmsManager {
/// Create a new KMS manager with the given backend and config
pub fn new(backend: Arc<dyn KmsBackend>, config: KmsConfig) -> Self {
let cache = Arc::new(RwLock::new(KmsCache::new(config.cache_config.max_keys as u64)));
Self { backend, cache, config }
Self {
backend,
cache,
default_key_id: config.default_key_id,
enable_cache: config.enable_cache,
}
}
/// Get the default key ID if configured
pub fn get_default_key_id(&self) -> Option<&String> {
self.config.default_key_id.as_ref()
self.default_key_id.as_ref()
}
/// Create a new master key
@@ -51,7 +57,7 @@ impl KmsManager {
let response = self.backend.create_key(request).await?;
// Cache the key metadata if enabled
if self.config.enable_cache {
if self.enable_cache {
let mut cache = self.cache.write().await;
cache.put_key_metadata(&response.key_id, &response.key_metadata).await;
}
@@ -77,7 +83,7 @@ impl KmsManager {
/// Describe a key
pub async fn describe_key(&self, request: DescribeKeyRequest) -> Result<DescribeKeyResponse> {
// Check cache first if enabled
if self.config.enable_cache {
if self.enable_cache {
let cache = self.cache.read().await;
if let Some(cached_metadata) = cache.get_key_metadata(&request.key_id).await {
return Ok(DescribeKeyResponse {
@@ -89,7 +95,7 @@ impl KmsManager {
// Get from backend and cache
let response = self.backend.describe_key(request).await?;
if self.config.enable_cache {
if self.enable_cache {
let mut cache = self.cache.write().await;
cache
.put_key_metadata(&response.key_metadata.key_id, &response.key_metadata)
@@ -106,7 +112,7 @@ impl KmsManager {
/// Get cache statistics
pub async fn cache_stats(&self) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
if self.config.enable_cache {
if self.enable_cache {
let cache = self.cache.read().await;
Some(cache.stats())
} else {
@@ -116,7 +122,7 @@ impl KmsManager {
/// Clear the cache
pub async fn clear_cache(&self) -> Result<()> {
if self.config.enable_cache {
if self.enable_cache {
let mut cache = self.cache.write().await;
cache.clear().await;
}
@@ -128,7 +134,7 @@ impl KmsManager {
let response = self.backend.delete_key(request).await?;
// Remove from cache if enabled and key is being deleted
if self.config.enable_cache {
if self.enable_cache {
let mut cache = self.cache.write().await;
cache.remove_key_metadata(&response.key_id).await;
}
@@ -141,7 +147,7 @@ impl KmsManager {
let response = self.backend.cancel_key_deletion(request).await?;
// Update cache if enabled
if self.config.enable_cache {
if self.enable_cache {
let mut cache = self.cache.write().await;
cache.put_key_metadata(&response.key_id, &response.key_metadata).await;
}
+2 -10
View File
@@ -350,11 +350,7 @@ impl ObjectEncryptionService {
encryption_context: context.clone(),
};
let data_key = self
.kms_manager
.generate_data_key(request)
.await
.map_err(|e| KmsError::backend_error(format!("Failed to generate data key: {e}")))?;
let data_key = self.kms_manager.generate_data_key(request).await?;
let plaintext_key = data_key.plaintext_key;
@@ -431,11 +427,7 @@ impl ObjectEncryptionService {
grant_tokens: Vec::new(),
};
let decrypt_response = self
.kms_manager
.decrypt(decrypt_request)
.await
.map_err(|e| KmsError::backend_error(format!("Failed to decrypt data key: {e}")))?;
let decrypt_response = self.kms_manager.decrypt(decrypt_request).await?;
// Create cipher
let cipher = create_cipher(&algorithm, &decrypt_response.plaintext)?;
+28
View File
@@ -94,6 +94,16 @@ impl KmsServiceManager {
self.config.read().await.clone()
}
/// Get configuration for status and management responses without static key material.
pub async fn get_redacted_config(&self) -> Option<KmsConfig> {
let mut config = self.config.read().await.clone()?;
if let BackendConfig::Static(static_config) = &mut config.backend_config {
use zeroize::Zeroize;
static_config.secret_key.zeroize();
}
Some(config)
}
/// Configure KMS with new configuration
pub async fn configure(&self, new_config: KmsConfig) -> Result<()> {
new_config.validate()?;
@@ -449,4 +459,22 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(manager.get_status().await, KmsServiceStatus::NotConfigured);
assert!(manager.get_config().await.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn redacted_config_omits_static_key_material() {
use base64::Engine as _;
let manager = KmsServiceManager::new();
let encoded_key = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0x5au8; 32]);
manager
.configure(KmsConfig::static_kms("static-key".to_string(), encoded_key))
.await
.expect("configure static KMS");
let config = manager.get_redacted_config().await.expect("redacted config");
let BackendConfig::Static(static_config) = config.backend_config else {
panic!("expected static config");
};
assert!(static_config.secret_key.is_empty());
}
}