test(kms): add an end-to-end negative authorization matrix

Covers the admin and SSE-KMS planes for a wrong identity, a wrong key, a
wrong action and an explicit Deny, each preceded by a positive control so a
denial cannot be an unpropagated policy. SSE-S3 and unencrypted objects are
asserted to stay exempt.
This commit is contained in:
overtrue
2026-08-02 02:46:47 +08:00
parent 0c409e306f
commit 1a598ae7c0
3 changed files with 487 additions and 1 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Negative authorization matrix for per-key KMS access control.
//!
//! Every case here is an end-to-end denial that the pre-`kms` resource server
//! allowed, so a regression that reopens one of them fails this file rather than
//! only a unit test. The matrix varies one dimension at a time:
//!
//! - **wrong identity**: a caller holding S3 rights but no `kms` grant at all
//! - **wrong key**: a caller scoped to key A naming key B
//! - **wrong action**: a caller holding `kms:GenerateDataKey` but not `kms:Decrypt`
//! (and, on the admin plane, `kms:DisableKey` but not `kms:RotateKey`)
//! - **wrong context**: an explicit `Deny` beating a wildcard `Allow`, and SSE-S3
//! staying exempt from `kms` authorization
//!
//! Each matrix opens with a positive control. Without it a denial proves nothing:
//! an identity whose policy has not propagated yet is denied everything.
use super::common::{LocalKMSTestEnvironment, create_key_with_specific_id};
use crate::common::{admin_ok, admin_request, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Config, Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::ServerSideEncryption;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::time::Duration;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
const ALLOWED_KEY: &str = "kms-matrix-allowed-key";
const OTHER_KEY: &str = "kms-matrix-other-key";
const BUCKET: &str = "kms-authz-matrix";
const SECRET: &str = "kms-matrix-secret";
const PAYLOAD: &[u8] = b"kms authorization matrix payload";
/// How long an identity change may take to reach the request path.
const IAM_PROPAGATION: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
fn s3_client(url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> Client {
let config = Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(Credentials::new(access_key, secret_key, None, None, "kms-authz-matrix"))
.region(Region::new("us-east-1"))
.endpoint_url(url)
.force_path_style(true)
.behavior_version_latest()
.build();
Client::from_conf(config)
}
/// Start a server whose SSE-KMS data path authorizes against the named key.
///
/// The enforcement switch defaults to off for compatibility, so it has to be set
/// explicitly; without it every negative case below would silently pass as an allow.
async fn start_enforcing_server(env: &mut LocalKMSTestEnvironment, extra_env: &[(&str, &str)]) -> TestResult {
create_key_with_specific_id(&env.kms_keys_dir, ALLOWED_KEY).await?;
create_key_with_specific_id(&env.kms_keys_dir, OTHER_KEY).await?;
let key_dir = env.kms_keys_dir.clone();
let args = vec![
"--kms-enable",
"--kms-backend",
"local",
"--kms-key-dir",
key_dir.as_str(),
"--kms-default-key-id",
ALLOWED_KEY,
];
let mut envs = vec![("RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS", "true")];
envs.extend_from_slice(extra_env);
env.base_env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(args, &envs).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Create `user` with `policy_document` attached under a canned policy of the same name.
async fn provision_user(env: &LocalKMSTestEnvironment, user: &str, policy_document: &str) -> TestResult {
admin_ok(
&env.base_env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={user}"),
Some(policy_document.to_string()),
)
.await?;
provision_user_with_policy(env, user, user).await
}
/// Create `user` and attach an existing policy (built-in or canned) by name.
async fn provision_user_with_policy(env: &LocalKMSTestEnvironment, user: &str, policy_name: &str) -> TestResult {
admin_ok(
&env.base_env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": SECRET, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env.base_env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={user}&isGroup=false"),
None,
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// The S3 half of every data-path policy below: full object access, no KMS grant.
fn s3_full_access_statement() -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
})
}
fn policy_document(statements: Vec<serde_json::Value>) -> String {
serde_json::json!({ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": statements }).to_string()
}
async fn put_sse_kms(client: &Client, key: &str, kms_key_id: &str) -> Result<(), aws_sdk_s3::Error> {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(PAYLOAD))
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::AwsKms)
.ssekms_key_id(kms_key_id)
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from)
}
/// Assert the operation failed with `AccessDenied` rather than any other error.
///
/// A bare `is_err` would also accept `KMSKeyDisabled` or an internal error, which
/// would hide both a leak of key state and an outage masquerading as a denial.
fn assert_access_denied<T: std::fmt::Debug>(result: Result<T, aws_sdk_s3::Error>, what: &str) {
let error = result.expect_err(&format!("{what} must be denied"));
assert_eq!(error.code(), Some("AccessDenied"), "{what} must fail with AccessDenied: {error:?}");
}
/// Retry an SSE-KMS write until the identity's policy has reached the request path.
async fn wait_for_sse_kms_write(client: &Client, key: &str, kms_key_id: &str) -> TestResult {
let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + IAM_PROPAGATION;
loop {
match put_sse_kms(client, key, kms_key_id).await {
Ok(()) => return Ok(()),
Err(error) if tokio::time::Instant::now() >= deadline => {
return Err(format!("positive control never became authorized: {error:?}").into());
}
Err(_) => tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await,
}
}
}
/// Retry an admin call until it stops returning 403, i.e. the policy is live.
async fn wait_for_admin_success(
env: &LocalKMSTestEnvironment,
user: &str,
method: http::Method,
path: &str,
body: Option<String>,
) -> TestResult {
let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + IAM_PROPAGATION;
loop {
let (status, response) = admin_request(&env.base_env.url, method.clone(), path, body.clone(), user, SECRET).await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok(());
}
if tokio::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
return Err(format!("positive control never became authorized: {method} {path} -> {status} {response}").into());
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await;
}
}
async fn assert_admin_denied(
env: &LocalKMSTestEnvironment,
user: &str,
method: http::Method,
path: &str,
body: Option<String>,
what: &str,
) -> TestResult {
let (status, response) = admin_request(&env.base_env.url, method, path, body, user, SECRET).await?;
assert_eq!(status.as_u16(), 403, "{what} must be denied, got {status}: {response}");
assert!(response.contains("AccessDenied"), "{what} must carry AccessDenied: {response}");
Ok(())
}
fn disable_body(key_id: &str) -> String {
serde_json::json!({ "key_id": key_id }).to_string()
}
/// Data-path matrix: SSE-KMS writes and reads are authorized against the resolved key.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn sse_kms_per_key_authorization_negative_matrix() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
start_enforcing_server(&mut env, &[("RUSTFS_KMS_ENFORCE_SSE_KEY_POLICY", "true")]).await?;
env.base_env.create_test_bucket(BUCKET).await?;
// Scoped to ALLOWED_KEY only.
provision_user(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscoped",
&policy_document(vec![
s3_full_access_statement(),
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["kms:GenerateDataKey", "kms:Decrypt"],
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{ALLOWED_KEY}")]
}),
]),
)
.await?;
// S3 rights only: the identity shape that existed before per-key authorization.
provision_user(&env, "kmsmatrixs3only", &policy_document(vec![s3_full_access_statement()])).await?;
// May wrap a data key but may never unwrap one.
provision_user(
&env,
"kmsmatrixwriter",
&policy_document(vec![
s3_full_access_statement(),
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["kms:GenerateDataKey"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:kms:::*"]
}),
]),
)
.await?;
// Wildcard allow, explicit deny on one key.
provision_user(
&env,
"kmsmatrixdenied",
&policy_document(vec![
s3_full_access_statement(),
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["kms:*"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:kms:::*"]
}),
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["kms:*"],
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{OTHER_KEY}")]
}),
]),
)
.await?;
let scoped = s3_client(&env.base_env.url, "kmsmatrixscoped", SECRET);
let s3_only = s3_client(&env.base_env.url, "kmsmatrixs3only", SECRET);
let writer = s3_client(&env.base_env.url, "kmsmatrixwriter", SECRET);
let denied = s3_client(&env.base_env.url, "kmsmatrixdenied", SECRET);
// --- positive control -----------------------------------------------------
wait_for_sse_kms_write(&scoped, "scoped/allowed", ALLOWED_KEY).await?;
let read = scoped.get_object().bucket(BUCKET).key("scoped/allowed").send().await?;
assert_eq!(read.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), PAYLOAD);
info!("positive control: scoped identity may write and read under its own key");
// --- wrong key ------------------------------------------------------------
assert_access_denied(
put_sse_kms(&scoped, "scoped/other", OTHER_KEY).await,
"SSE-KMS write under a key outside the identity's scope",
);
// --- wrong identity -------------------------------------------------------
assert_access_denied(
put_sse_kms(&s3_only, "s3only/allowed", ALLOWED_KEY).await,
"SSE-KMS write by an identity holding no kms grant",
);
// The object the scoped identity wrote is readable by its owner only.
assert_access_denied(
s3_only
.get_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key("scoped/allowed")
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from),
"SSE-KMS read by an identity holding no kms grant",
);
// --- wrong action ---------------------------------------------------------
wait_for_sse_kms_write(&writer, "writer/allowed", ALLOWED_KEY).await?;
assert_access_denied(
writer
.get_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key("writer/allowed")
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from),
"SSE-KMS read by an identity holding kms:GenerateDataKey but not kms:Decrypt",
);
// --- wrong context: explicit Deny beats a wildcard Allow -------------------
wait_for_sse_kms_write(&denied, "denied/allowed", ALLOWED_KEY).await?;
assert_access_denied(
put_sse_kms(&denied, "denied/other", OTHER_KEY).await,
"SSE-KMS write under a key covered by an explicit Deny",
);
// --- wrong context: SSE-S3 is out of scope --------------------------------
// SSE-S3 wraps its data key with a server-owned key the caller never names, so
// it must stay reachable for an identity with no kms grant at all.
s3_only
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key("s3only/sse-s3")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(PAYLOAD))
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.send()
.await?;
let sse_s3_read = s3_only.get_object().bucket(BUCKET).key("s3only/sse-s3").send().await?;
assert_eq!(sse_s3_read.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), PAYLOAD);
// ... and so must an unencrypted object.
s3_only
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key("s3only/plain")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(PAYLOAD))
.send()
.await?;
s3_only.get_object().bucket(BUCKET).key("s3only/plain").send().await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Admin-plane matrix: KMS key endpoints are authorized against the key they name.
///
/// Runs without the SSE enforcement switch: admin scoping is unconditional, and
/// leaving the switch off proves the two planes are independent.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn kms_admin_per_key_authorization_negative_matrix() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
start_enforcing_server(&mut env, &[]).await?;
// Built-in role templates, attached by name.
provision_user_with_policy(&env, "kmsmatrixkeyadmin", "KMSKeyAdministrator").await?;
provision_user_with_policy(&env, "kmsmatrixauditor", "KMSAuditor").await?;
// A narrowed copy of the administrator template, scoped to one key.
provision_user(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscopedadmin",
&policy_document(vec![serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["kms:DisableKey", "kms:EnableKey"],
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{ALLOWED_KEY}")]
})]),
)
.await?;
// --- positive control -----------------------------------------------------
wait_for_admin_success(
&env,
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(OTHER_KEY)),
)
.await?;
admin_request(
&env.base_env.url,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/enable",
Some(disable_body(OTHER_KEY)),
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
SECRET,
)
.await?;
// --- wrong action: the administrator template withholds service-wide powers -
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
http::Method::GET,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/config",
None,
"KMSKeyAdministrator reading the KMS backend configuration (kms:Configure)",
)
.await?;
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
http::Method::GET,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/backup",
None,
"KMSKeyAdministrator exporting a backup bundle (kms:Backup)",
)
.await?;
// Separation of duties: managing a key never implies using it.
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/generate-data-key",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "key_id": ALLOWED_KEY }).to_string()),
"KMSKeyAdministrator generating a data key (kms:GenerateDataKey)",
)
.await?;
// --- wrong action: the auditor template is read-only ----------------------
wait_for_admin_success(&env, "kmsmatrixauditor", http::Method::GET, "/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys", None).await?;
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixauditor",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(ALLOWED_KEY)),
"KMSAuditor disabling a key (kms:DisableKey)",
)
.await?;
// --- wrong key ------------------------------------------------------------
wait_for_admin_success(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscopedadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(ALLOWED_KEY)),
)
.await?;
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscopedadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(OTHER_KEY)),
"key-scoped administrator disabling a key outside its scope",
)
.await?;
// --- wrong action, same key ----------------------------------------------
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscopedadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/rotate",
Some(disable_body(ALLOWED_KEY)),
"key-scoped administrator rotating a key it may only enable and disable",
)
.await?;
// --- wrong identity -------------------------------------------------------
provision_user(&env, "kmsmatrixnokms", &policy_document(vec![s3_full_access_statement()])).await?;
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixnokms",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(ALLOWED_KEY)),
"identity holding no kms grant disabling a key",
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
+3
View File
@@ -53,3 +53,6 @@ mod copy_object_version_restore_sse_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod configured_roundtrip_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod kms_authorization_negative_matrix_test;