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Jamie Tanna
7386ea49c4
As part of looking to allow Inherit Config to manage Host Rules' grants, we need to perform a prefactor to create an additional trust tier between the global self-hosted administrator's config, and presets/repo config. The `find()` method already resolves sensitive fields - `headers`, `enabled`, and the computed internal-host grant - a "trust tier" at a time, so that the outcome cannot depend on how specific a rule from a less trusted tier makes itself. The new `inherit` tier slots in between the two we had: - `headers` are applied untrusted first, then inherited, then the administrator's, so theirs still win outright - `enabled` is taken from the administrator's rules, falling back to inherited config's, then a repository's - an administrator's `allowInternal: false` acts as a veto: it is resolved before inherited config's rules, and clears the scoped and implicit grants too, so inherited config cannot re-grant the host in any shape by out-scoping it. Meanwhile any inherited rule naming a host in its `matchHost` - credentialed or not - now implicitly permits it, like the admin's own rules do We introduce a separate field than `trusted` to avoid Inherit Config gaining the same precedence as the admin themselves. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
73 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
73 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
export interface HostRule {
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authType?: string;
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token?: string;
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username?: string;
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password?: string;
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insecureRegistry?: boolean;
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timeout?: number;
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abortOnError?: boolean;
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abortIgnoreStatusCodes?: number[];
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/**
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* Whether requests to this host may reach internal addresses.
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*
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* As they have been marked as trusted by the administrator:
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*
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* - when `internalHostAccess=block`, these are not blocked
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* - when `internalHostAccess=warn`, no warning occurs
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*
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* This is only allowed in global self-hosted configuration, and if found in repository or preset config, it is stripped.
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*/
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allowInternal?: boolean;
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enabled?: boolean;
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enableHttp2?: boolean;
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concurrentRequestLimit?: number;
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maxRequestsPerSecond?: number;
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headers?: Record<string, string>;
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maxRetryAfter?: number;
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keepAlive?: boolean;
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artifactAuth?: string[] | null;
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httpsCertificateAuthority?: string;
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httpsPrivateKey?: string;
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httpsCertificate?: string;
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encrypted?: HostRule;
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hostType?: string;
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matchHost?: string;
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resolvedHost?: string;
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readOnly?: boolean;
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}
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/**
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* How the trusted host rules treat internal-host access for a request, computed by `find()`. Never settable through configuration: only rules from the administrator's own config, and from organization-inherited config the administrator has opted into trusting through `inheritConfigTrusted`, contribute to it.
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*
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* The administrator's own rules are resolved first, and an `allowInternal: false` of theirs vetoes every field below: inherited config can never re-grant a host the administrator refused, in any grant shape.
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*/
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export interface InternalHostGrant {
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/**
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* The `allowInternal` value of the matching trusted rules, with the most specific rule winning, and the administrator's own rules winning over inherited config's. `undefined` when none of them set it.
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*/
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explicit?: boolean;
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/**
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* As `explicit`, but counting only rules deliberately scoped by a `hostType` or by a URL-prefix `matchHost`. Surfaces where a grant must be deliberate - such as HTTP presets, whose responses become config - check this value instead of `explicit`.
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*/
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scoped?: boolean;
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/**
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* Whether any trusted rule naming a host (`matchHost`) matched the request: hosts named in configuration the administrator trusts are implicitly permitted. Always `false` under an administrator's veto.
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*/
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implicit: boolean;
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}
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export type CombinedHostRule = Omit<
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HostRule,
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| 'encrypted'
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| 'hostType'
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| 'matchHost'
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| 'resolvedHost'
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| 'readOnly'
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| 'allowInternal'
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> & {
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/** computed by `find()` - see {@link InternalHostGrant} */
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internalHostGrant?: InternalHostGrant;
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};
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