Renovate deployments that are deployed across multiple organisations may
take advantage of Inherited Config as a means to decentralise some
decisions and/or preferences that their organisations would like to use
for some self-hosted configuration.
Similarly, the decision of which hosts to allowlist may be something
that a self-hosted administrator /may/ want to allow their organisation
admins to decide.
We can make this an opt-in capability to indicate that the self-hosted
administrator trusts the Inherited Config moreso, and allows someone who
can write to it the ability to allowlist access to internal hosts that
may not be intended.
If a self-hosted administrator sets `allowInternal: false`, this takes
precedence, allowing a "veto", and a self-hosted admin's `headers` are
still preferred, too.
It's not possible for Inherited Config to set grants for `extends`, as
config resolution has already occurred, so this still needs to be
performed at the self-hosted config level.
This trust is transitive: `hostRules` defined in presets the
inherited config `extends` are registered at the same inherited
tier once resolved, so this option must only be enabled when those
preset sources are trusted too.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
To harden Renovate from being able to access internal hosts, we can add
a level of enforcement on all outgoing requests.
We can split this into two types of traffic:
- where the response becomes configuration (i.e. `extends`)
- where the response does not become configuration (i.e.
`customDatasources`)
To harden this, we enforce on every outbound HTTP request:
- check the resolved URL before anything, including cache lookups, can
proceed
- catching IP-literal hosts in every spelling the WHATWG URL parser normalizes
- blocking known Cloud metadata IPs, too
- a `dnsLookup` wrapper validates every address a hostname resolves to,
on every new connection, which also defeats DNS rebinding
- a `beforeRedirect` hook re-runs the URL check on each redirect
target, with the new host getting its own grant lookup rather than
inheriting the original host's verdict
We default this enforcement to `warn`, to not break existing deployments
and instead give them visibility into required configuration before a
future major version (major+1) enables `block` by default.
We'll also remove allow in a future major version (major+2), to give
time for admins to migrate over.
When a request is blocked, this degrades like an unreachable registry,
so a Renovate run isn't aborted by a blocked request.
As part of this, we can also provide a worked example of the different
cases that do/do not need allowing via `hostRules`.
Requests through an admin-configured proxy resolve DNS at the proxy, so
`dnsLookup` never runs for them, so we can resolve the hostname locally
and validate every address before the request instead.
This doesn't catch everything, especially as the proxy may resolve the
name to a different result, and if we can't resolve the name - possible
in locked-down corporate environments - we fail open.
Child processes aren't currently able to route traffic through
Renovate's HTTP layer, so are unrestricted.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
As part of follow-up changes, we're looking to tighten the way that
Renovate handles outgoing HTTP traffic.
Before we do this, we can introduce a new config option,
`hostRules[].allowInternal`, that allows a self-hosted administrator to
mark an internal host as "trusted" for access.
This wires in the new global-only config option, `allowInternal`, which
implies a new internal field `internalHostGrant`.
We'll add full documentation in a future commit, when the full
enforcement is in place, as there are some wider changes to enforce it
fully.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
* feat(config): add experimental exitCodeForErrors option
* feat(config): give unknown-error its own exit code
* docs: restore exit codes 1 and 2 to the table
* feat(manager): share OCI Helm chart resolution across managers
Add getOciChartDep() to helmv3/oci.ts and use it in argocd, fleet, flux,
helmfile, helmsman, helmv3, kustomize, sveltos, terraform and vendir.
- set pinDigests: false for OCI charts in all of them
- apply registryAliases to OCI charts in argocd, helmfile and helmsman
- keep the registry port in terraform helm_release repositories
- skip fleet OCI charts without a version instead of using 'undefined'
* docs(manager/helmv3): correct the OCI chart pinDigests rationale
* refactor(manager/helmfile): drop redundant OCI repository url guard
The repository schema already requires url to be a string, so the falsy
branch could not be reached by parsed input and left the patch partially
covered.
For organisations who wish to ensure that their repositories have no
configuration validation warnings (by forcing them to be errors), we can
make this inherited configuration that can run separate to a global
self-hosted administrator's choice.
For some time, admin configuration for `hostRules[].headers` was
enforced through `allowedHeaders`, but no validation feedback was given
to administrators, as it was silently ignored when `applyHostRule` runs.
To provide visibility to administrators who were setting headers that
were silently being ignored, we can instead provide validation at the
time we set our global host rules.
In a future change, we'll align the behaviour of `allowedHeaders` and
`allowedEnv` to make it so admin-controlled `hostRules` aren't bound by
the `allowedHeaders` flag.
We can also make it clear in the documentation that this is the
behaviour.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
As an additional defence-in-depth, we can make sure that when applying
the `headers` configuration (from repo config, or presets) we
re-validate it.
We allow any admin-supplied configuration regardless, and then any
user-supplied settings are re-filtered according to `allowedHeaders`.
Due to the existing way that header merging incorrectly merges the repo
(or preset) `headers` over the admin config, we don't currently handle
this explicitly, unlike `filterAllowedEnv`.
If a user-supplied setting is filtered, we log a WARN message to inform
the user - and the admin - that this is ignored.
At this point, we don't try and explain which preset(s) this may have
come from, only that there is an issue.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
As an additional defence-in-depth, we can make sure that when applying
the `env` configuration (from repo config, or presets) we re-validate
it.
We allow any admin-supplied configuration regardless, and then any
user-supplied settings are re-filtered according to `allowedEnv`.
If a user-supplied setting is filtered, we log a WARN message to inform
the user - and the admin - that this is ignored.
At this point, we don't try and explain which preset(s) this may have
come from, only that there is an issue.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
We dropped the "bot" from our terminology long ago, but it looks like
we've got some outdated docs + code that reference it.
We should remove this to keep things consistent.
A `fix`, as we're changing the commit author's name, and log lines.
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <jamie.tanna+claude-code@mend.io>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
renovate[bot]