Files
pulse/docs
rcourtman 7432995fe8 Stop websocket upgrade headers exempting demo-mode writes (#2666)
`DemoModeMiddleware` let any request carrying `Upgrade: websocket`
through, whatever its method or path. On a `DEMO_MODE` instance a
`POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE` with that header reached its handler, and
the read-only guard did nothing.

## How exposed the public demo was

- The public demo (`demo.pulserelay.pro`, v6.5.0) runs `DEMO_MODE=true`
with `PULSE_AUTH_USER=demo`, and its login page signs visitors in as
demo/demo. No proxy auth is configured. Caddy is a plain `reverse_proxy`
with no method filtering, and it forwards `Connection: Upgrade` and
`Upgrade: websocket` unchanged.
- That session is the configured admin.
`sessionUserHasSettingsAdminPrivileges` matches `cfg.AuthUser`, so
`RequireAdmin` accepts it, and session requests skip token scope checks.
Nothing in the handlers checks demo mode on its own, so this middleware
was the only write guard.
- Anyone using the public credentials could therefore make any admin
write by adding the two headers. That covers switching the demo out of
mock mode (`POST /api/system/mock-mode`), changing system settings,
creating organisations, importing config, changing the password and
adding notification targets. A CSRF token was needed, but the attacker
gets one from their own login.
- On the old code, the new contract test reproduces this end to end. A
demo/demo session's mock-mode POST with upgrade headers returned 200 and
turned mock mode off.
- I found no sign it was used. Over the last 30 days the demo journal
shows every "mock mode disabled" line paired with a process restart (new
PID). Config file mtimes match deploys. 5,782 ordinary writes were
blocked over the same period. Caddy keeps no access log for the demo, so
this is the absence of evidence, not proof.

## Change

The exemption is deleted rather than narrowed. RFC 6455 handshakes are
`GET` requests, gorilla's `Upgrader` refuses any other method, and `GET`
already passes the read-only branch above it. A narrowed `GET`-only
exemption would never run. `/ws` and `/api/agent/ws` keep connecting,
and the request method alone decides.

## Tests

- `TestContract_DemoModeUpgradeHeadersDoNotExemptWrites` (registered
api-contracts proof) runs against the full router. It signs in as the
configured demo admin and checks that the session passes `RequireAdmin`
for a read. A mock-mode POST carrying `Connection: Upgrade` and
`Upgrade: websocket` now gets the demo 403 and leaves mock mode on, and
a real `/ws` handshake from the same session still upgrades.
- `demo_middleware_test.go`: the table row that asserted the bypass now
expects 403. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE with handshake headers to mock-mode,
settings, orgs, `/ws` and `/api/agent/ws` all get 403. Real gorilla
handshakes to `/ws` and `/api/agent/ws` through the middleware still
upgrade and echo.
- Negative control: run against the old middleware via `go test
-overlay`, the new contract test and the upgrade-header test fail, and
the handshake test passes on both versions.

## Not changed here

- `auth.go` `isWebSocketUpgrade` and `configapi`
`explicitAPITokenFromRequest` still accept a `?token=` query credential
on any request with `Upgrade: websocket`. A valid, scoped token is still
required, so no access is gained, but the credential can travel in a
URL. The `ErrorHandler` skip in `middleware.go` only bypasses recovery
and metrics.
- Older and separate:
`/api/ai/sessions/{id}/{abort,summarize,fork,undo,redo}` change state on
`GET`, which the demo guard admits as reads. Tracked separately.
2026-10-07 15:49:33 +01:00
..
2026-10-05 21:53:41 +01:00
…
2026-10-05 21:53:41 +01:00
2026-10-05 21:53:41 +01:00

Pulse documentation

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