Files
pulse/internal/updates
rcourtman 2f0468a87b Verify SSHSIG on in-app update artifacts
The unattended timer (scripts/pulse-auto-update.sh) and the public bootstrap
(scripts/install.sh, /install.sh) all verify the .sshsig sidecar against the
pinned pulse-installer ed25519 key before trusting a release artifact. The
in-app updater verified SHA256 only — same artifact, same root execution
context, lower trust bar. Closing the asymmetry: the in-app tarball download
in ApplyUpdate, adapter_installsh.go's install.sh download (piped into bash
as root), and the rollback binary download now fetch and verify the .sshsig
sidecar against the same pinned key, fail-closed.

The signing infrastructure (release_asset_common.sh, validate-release.sh,
backfill-release-assets.sh) already produces and validates these signatures
for every release; this teaches the Go updater to honor what the shell paths
have always required. ssh-keygen is shelled out to so the in-app updater
shares the exact trust path used by the unattended path, with a package-level
function variable for test injection so unit tests don't require ssh-keygen
on the build host.

Extends the deployment-installability contract's release-trust-fail-closed
invariant to cover the in-app updater paths.
2026-05-09 23:14:07 +01:00
..
2026-03-25 11:25:41 +00:00
2026-03-18 16:06:30 +00:00
2026-03-18 16:06:30 +00:00
2026-03-18 16:06:30 +00:00
2026-03-18 16:06:30 +00:00
2026-03-18 16:06:30 +00:00
2026-03-18 16:06:30 +00:00