mirror of
https://github.com/rcourtman/Pulse.git
synced 2026-09-10 02:25:56 +00:00
Richard Courtman
2749 lines
116 KiB
Go
2749 lines
116 KiB
Go
//go:build !windows
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package installtests
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// TestSecureRuntimeSystemdLab is intentionally excluded from ordinary test
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// runs. It installs services and users into a disposable Linux systemd host.
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// Build the release-shaped inputs on the host, then copy or mount them into a
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// dedicated Colima profile before opting in:
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//
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// mkdir -p .lab-artifacts
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// update_seed="$(openssl rand -base64 32)"
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// update_public_key="$(go run ./scripts/release_update_key.go public-key --private-key "$update_seed")"
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// v1_ldflags="$(./scripts/release_ldflags.sh agent --version 6.2.0-lab.1 --update-public-keys "$update_public_key")"
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// v2_ldflags="$(./scripts/release_ldflags.sh agent --version 6.2.0-lab.2 --update-public-keys "$update_public_key")"
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// v3_ldflags="$(./scripts/release_ldflags.sh agent --version 6.2.0-lab.3 --update-public-keys "$update_public_key")"
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// v4_ldflags="$(./scripts/release_ldflags.sh agent --version 6.2.0-lab.4 --update-public-keys "$update_public_key")"
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// CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags "$v1_ldflags" -o .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v1 ./cmd/pulse-agent
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// CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags "$v2_ldflags" -o .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v2 ./cmd/pulse-agent
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// CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags "$v3_ldflags" -o .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v3 ./cmd/pulse-agent
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// CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags "$v4_ldflags" -o .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v4 ./cmd/pulse-agent
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// CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags "$v4_ldflags" -o .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-helper ./cmd/pulse-agent-helper
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// CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go build -o .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-runner ./cmd/pulse-agent-runner
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// go run ./scripts/release_update_key.go sign --private-key "$update_seed" --file .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v1 > .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v1.sig
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// go run ./scripts/release_update_key.go sign --private-key "$update_seed" --file .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v2 > .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v2.sig
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// go run ./scripts/release_update_key.go sign --private-key "$update_seed" --file .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v3 > .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v3.sig
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// go run ./scripts/release_update_key.go sign --private-key "$update_seed" --file .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v4 > .lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v4.sig
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// unset update_seed
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// CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go test -c -o .lab-artifacts/installtests-linux-arm64.test ./scripts/installtests
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// colima start pulse-agent-qual --activate=false --mount "$PWD:w"
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// colima ssh -p pulse-agent-qual -- sudo sh -c \
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// 'printf "%s\n" "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_SYSTEMD_LAB=disposable-v1" > /etc/pulse-secure-runtime-lab'
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// repo="$PWD"
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// colima ssh -p pulse-agent-qual -- sudo env \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_SYSTEMD_LAB=1 \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V1="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v1" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V1_SIGNATURE="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v1.sig" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V2="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v2" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V2_SIGNATURE="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v2.sig" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V3="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v3" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V3_SIGNATURE="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v3.sig" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V4="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v4" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V4_SIGNATURE="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-v4.sig" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_HELPER="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-helper" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_RUNNER="$repo/.lab-artifacts/pulse-agent-runner" \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_RECEIPT=/tmp/secure-runtime-receipt.json \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_RECEIPT_RECORD_PATH=docs/release-control/v6/internal/records/secure-agent-runtime-systemd-receipt-v6.json \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_TRANSCRIPT=/tmp/secure-runtime-transcript.jsonl \
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// PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_TRANSCRIPT_RECORD_PATH=docs/release-control/v6/internal/records/secure-agent-runtime-systemd-transcript-v6.jsonl \
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// sh -c 'cd "$1/scripts/installtests" && exec "$1/.lab-artifacts/installtests-linux-arm64.test" -test.run "^TestSecureRuntimeSystemdLab$" -test.count=1 -test.v' sh "$repo"
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//
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// Use the VM's GOARCH in place of arm64 when qualifying another architecture.
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// The test never creates or deletes a VM; lifecycle remains a host-side choice.
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import (
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"bytes"
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"compress/gzip"
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/binary"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"io/fs"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"syscall"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/actionrunner"
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"github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"
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"github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/operationreceipt"
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)
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const (
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secureRuntimeLabOptIn = "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_SYSTEMD_LAB"
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secureRuntimeLabMarkerPath = "/etc/pulse-secure-runtime-lab"
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secureRuntimeLabMarkerValue = "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_SYSTEMD_LAB=disposable-v1"
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secureRuntimeLabToken = "8fa728ed4cbfa7466947e747627b51e2464ed3f69966ed6394e36a82d85d7d31"
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secureRuntimeLabAgentID = "secure-runtime-systemd-lab"
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secureRuntimeLabHostname = "pulse-secure-runtime-lab"
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secureRuntimeLabOrgID = "secure-runtime-lab-org"
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secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1 = "3c896fe99e29384a293def92f23c1709fbf429773e0a20ac5d930f2aab62f839"
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secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV2 = "d7f6f2550788213e0595f276b62b1df290f7e018ba74c03068c4afbe6efd7601"
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secureRuntimeRunnerBindingV1 = "secure-runtime-runner-binding-v1"
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secureRuntimeRunnerBindingV2 = "secure-runtime-runner-binding-v2"
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secureRuntimeUpdateStatePath = "/var/lib/pulse-agent-helper/update-activation.json"
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secureRuntimeUpdateHandoff = "/var/lib/pulse-agent/.pulse-agent-update-pending.json"
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secureRuntimeUpdateLKGPath = "/usr/local/bin/pulse-agent.last-known-good"
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)
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var secureRuntimeInstalledPaths = []string{
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"/usr/local/bin/pulse-agent",
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"/usr/local/lib/pulse-agent/pulse-agent-helper",
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"/usr/local/lib/pulse-agent/pulse-agent-runner",
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"/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent.service",
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"/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent.service.d",
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"/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent-helper.service",
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"/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent-helper.socket",
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"/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent-runner.service",
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"/etc/pulse-agent-runner",
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"/var/lib/pulse-agent",
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"/var/lib/pulse-agent-helper",
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"/var/lib/pulse-agent-runner",
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"/var/lib/pulse-agent-profile",
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}
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var secureRuntimeForbiddenReceiptKeys = map[string]struct{}{
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"api_key": {},
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"authorization": {},
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"bearer": {},
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"password": {},
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"refresh_token": {},
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"secret": {},
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"token": {},
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}
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var secureRuntimeScenarioClaims = map[string][]string{
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"legacy_root_command_capable_install": {"legacy_root_command_authority_observed"},
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"read_only_inspect": {"inspection_left_stable_files_unchanged"},
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"drop_in_fail_closed_rehearsal": {"drop_in_rejected_before_mutation"},
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"helper_service_override_rejection": {"helper_service_effective_override_detected"},
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"helper_resource_limit_override_rejection": {
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"helper_resource_limits_enforced",
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"helper_resource_limit_override_detected",
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},
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"helper_socket_override_rejection": {"helper_socket_effective_override_detected"},
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"safe_profile_apply": {
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"collector_non_root",
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"collector_monitoring_only",
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"helper_protocol_healthy",
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"collector_authority_reduction_observed",
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},
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"explicit_safe_profile_rollback": {"explicit_rollback_preserved_reduced_authority"},
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"automatic_failure_rollback": {"failed_activation_restored_prior_runtime"},
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"ordinary_update_non_migration": {"ordinary_update_preserved_selected_profile"},
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"final_safe_profile_apply": {"collector_reporting_continued_after_migration"},
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"helper_update_authoritative_commit": {
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"signed_helper_activation_observed",
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"activated_process_digest_bound",
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"accepted_primary_report_gated_commit",
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"update_handoff_cleared_after_commit",
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},
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"helper_update_watchdog_rollback": {
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"helper_watchdog_rollback_observed",
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"prior_active_binary_restored_from_rollback_slot",
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"collector_reporting_resumed_after_watchdog_rollback",
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},
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"helper_update_interrupted_recovery": {
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"helper_restart_recovered_pending_activation",
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"prior_active_binary_restored_from_rollback_slot",
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"collector_reporting_resumed_after_helper_recovery",
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},
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"separate_action_runner_install": {"action_runner_registered_separately"},
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"action_runner_override_rejection": {"action_runner_effective_override_detected"},
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"helper_network_namespace_isolation": {
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"helper_host_interface_tcp_denied",
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"helper_network_namespace_isolated",
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},
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"typed_action_receipt": {
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"typed_mutation_verified",
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"terminal_receipt_replayed",
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"stale_precondition_refused",
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"generic_command_denied",
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},
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"action_runner_credential_rotation": {"fixture_credential_replacement_observed"},
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"action_runner_self_revoke": {"exact_runner_binding_revoked"},
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}
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type secureRuntimeLabReport struct {
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ReceivedAt time.Time
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AgentID string
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AgentVersion string
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UpdatedFrom string
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Hostname string
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RunningAsRoot bool
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ServiceUser string
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Authority string
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TypedHelper bool
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CommandsEnabled bool
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}
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type secureRuntimeLabFixture struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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collector []byte
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collectorSignature string
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helper []byte
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runner []byte
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serverVersion string
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reports []secureRuntimeLabReport
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reportAttempts []secureRuntimeLabReport
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rejectedVersions map[string]bool
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lastSeen time.Time
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freezeLastSeen bool
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authFailures int
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requestFailures []string
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actionServer *agentexec.Server
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actionSecret string
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actionBindingID string
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actionPending bool
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actionRevoked bool
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actionRevokes int
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actionActivations int
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authorityReductions int
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}
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func newSecureRuntimeLabFixture(collector []byte, collectorSignature string, helper, runner []byte, version string) *secureRuntimeLabFixture {
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fixture := &secureRuntimeLabFixture{
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collector: collector, collectorSignature: collectorSignature, helper: helper, runner: runner, serverVersion: version,
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rejectedVersions: make(map[string]bool),
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actionSecret: secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1, actionBindingID: secureRuntimeRunnerBindingV1, actionPending: true,
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}
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fixture.actionServer = agentexec.NewServerWithAdmissionValidator(fixture.admitCommandSession, fixture.validateCommandSession)
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return fixture
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) admitCommandSession(secret, agentID, hostname string) (agentexec.AgentAdmission, bool) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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if strings.TrimSpace(agentID) != secureRuntimeLabAgentID || !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(hostname), secureRuntimeLabHostname) {
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return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
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}
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if secret == secureRuntimeLabToken {
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return f.collectorAdmissionLocked(), true
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}
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if f.actionRevoked || secret != f.actionSecret {
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return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
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}
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return f.actionAdmissionLocked(), true
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) validateCommandSession(admission agentexec.AgentAdmission) bool {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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if admission.RuntimeRole != agentexec.RuntimeRoleActionRunner {
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return admission == f.collectorAdmissionLocked()
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}
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expected := f.actionAdmissionLocked()
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return !f.actionRevoked &&
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admission.OrganizationID == expected.OrganizationID &&
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admission.TokenID == expected.TokenID &&
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admission.AgentID == expected.AgentID &&
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admission.Hostname == expected.Hostname &&
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admission.RuntimeRole == expected.RuntimeRole &&
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admission.ActionCapability == expected.ActionCapability
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) collectorAdmissionLocked() agentexec.AgentAdmission {
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return agentexec.AgentAdmission{
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OrganizationID: secureRuntimeLabOrgID,
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TokenID: "secure-runtime-collector-binding-v1",
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AgentID: secureRuntimeLabAgentID,
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Hostname: secureRuntimeLabHostname,
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}
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) actionAdmissionLocked() agentexec.AgentAdmission {
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return agentexec.AgentAdmission{
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OrganizationID: secureRuntimeLabOrgID, TokenID: f.actionBindingID,
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AgentID: secureRuntimeLabAgentID, Hostname: secureRuntimeLabHostname,
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RuntimeRole: agentexec.RuntimeRoleActionRunner, ActionCapability: agentexec.ActionCapabilityTypedV1,
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ActivationPending: f.actionPending,
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}
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) replaceActionCredential(secret, bindingID string) agentexec.AgentAdmission {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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previous := f.actionAdmissionLocked()
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f.actionSecret = secret
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f.actionBindingID = bindingID
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f.actionPending = true
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f.actionRevoked = false
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return previous
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) actionSnapshot() (agentexec.AgentAdmission, bool, int) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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return f.actionAdmissionLocked(), f.actionRevoked, f.actionRevokes
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) actionActivationCount() int {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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return f.actionActivations
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) authorityReductionCount() int {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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return f.authorityReductions
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) setCollector(artifact []byte, signature string) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.collector = append([]byte(nil), artifact...)
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f.collectorSignature = strings.TrimSpace(signature)
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) setServerVersion(version string) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.serverVersion = version
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) setFrozen(frozen bool) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.freezeLastSeen = frozen
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) setVersionReportsAccepted(version string, accepted bool) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.rejectedVersions[strings.TrimSpace(version)] = !accepted
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) snapshot() ([]secureRuntimeLabReport, time.Time, int, []string) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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return append([]secureRuntimeLabReport(nil), f.reports...), f.lastSeen, f.authFailures, append([]string(nil), f.requestFailures...)
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) attemptSnapshot() []secureRuntimeLabReport {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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return append([]secureRuntimeLabReport(nil), f.reportAttempts...)
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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switch {
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/version" || r.URL.Path == "/api/agent/version":
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f.mu.Lock()
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version := f.serverVersion
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f.mu.Unlock()
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writeSecureRuntimeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"version": version})
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case r.URL.Path == "/download/pulse-agent":
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f.serveArtifact(w, r, "collector")
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case r.URL.Path == "/download/pulse-agent-helper":
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f.serveArtifact(w, r, "helper")
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case r.URL.Path == "/download/pulse-agent-runner":
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f.serveArtifact(w, r, "runner")
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/agent/ws":
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f.actionServer.HandleWebSocket(w, r)
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/agents/action-runner/credential":
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f.handleActionRunnerCredential(w, r)
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/agents/collector/reduce-authority":
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f.handleCollectorAuthorityReduction(w, r)
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/health":
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writeSecureRuntimeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"status": "ok"})
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/agents/agent/report":
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f.handleReport(w, r)
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/agents/docker/report":
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if !f.authorized(r) {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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writeSecureRuntimeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"success": true})
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case r.URL.Path == "/api/agents/agent/lookup":
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f.handleLookup(w, r)
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case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/agents/agent/") && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/config"):
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if !f.authorized(r) {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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writeSecureRuntimeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
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"success": true,
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"agentId": secureRuntimeLabAgentID,
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"config": map[string]any{"settings": map[string]any{}},
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})
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default:
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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}
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}
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func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) handleCollectorAuthorityReduction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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return
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}
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var request struct {
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AgentID string `json:"agentId"`
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Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
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}
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if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 4096)).Decode(&request); err != nil {
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|
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
valid := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Authorization")) == "Bearer "+secureRuntimeLabToken &&
|
|
strings.TrimSpace(request.AgentID) == secureRuntimeLabAgentID &&
|
|
strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(request.Hostname), secureRuntimeLabHostname)
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
f.authorityReductions++
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) authorized(r *http.Request) bool {
|
|
bearer := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
|
|
valid := r.Header.Get("X-API-Token") == secureRuntimeLabToken &&
|
|
(bearer == "" || bearer == "Bearer "+secureRuntimeLabToken) &&
|
|
r.URL.Query().Get("token") == ""
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
f.authFailures++
|
|
f.requestFailures = append(f.requestFailures, r.Method+" "+r.URL.Path+": invalid credential transport")
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
return valid
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) collectorLifecycleAuthorized(r *http.Request) bool {
|
|
bearer := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
|
|
legacyHeader := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-API-Token"))
|
|
valid := bearer == "Bearer "+secureRuntimeLabToken &&
|
|
(legacyHeader == "" || legacyHeader == secureRuntimeLabToken) &&
|
|
r.URL.Query().Get("token") == ""
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
f.authFailures++
|
|
f.requestFailures = append(f.requestFailures, r.Method+" "+r.URL.Path+": invalid collector lifecycle credential transport")
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
return valid
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) serveArtifact(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, artifactKind string) {
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Method != http.MethodHead {
|
|
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
artifact := append([]byte(nil), f.collector...)
|
|
signature := f.collectorSignature
|
|
switch artifactKind {
|
|
case "helper":
|
|
artifact = append([]byte(nil), f.helper...)
|
|
signature = ""
|
|
case "runner":
|
|
artifact = append([]byte(nil), f.runner...)
|
|
signature = ""
|
|
}
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
sum := sha256.Sum256(artifact)
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
|
|
w.Header().Set("X-Checksum-Sha256", hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]))
|
|
if signature != "" {
|
|
w.Header().Set("X-Signature-Ed25519", signature)
|
|
}
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(artifact)))
|
|
if r.Method == http.MethodGet {
|
|
_, _ = w.Write(artifact)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) handleActionRunnerCredential(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
switch r.Method {
|
|
case http.MethodPatch:
|
|
f.handleActionRunnerActivation(w, r)
|
|
case http.MethodDelete:
|
|
f.handleActionRunnerSelfRevoke(w, r)
|
|
default:
|
|
w.Header().Set("Allow", http.MethodPatch+", "+http.MethodDelete)
|
|
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) handleActionRunnerActivation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
var request struct {
|
|
AgentID string `json:"agentId"`
|
|
Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 4096)).Decode(&request); err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
bearer := strings.TrimPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Authorization")), "Bearer ")
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
admission := f.actionAdmissionLocked()
|
|
valid := !f.actionRevoked && bearer == f.actionSecret && strings.TrimSpace(request.AgentID) == admission.AgentID && strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(request.Hostname), admission.Hostname)
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !f.actionServer.HasActionRunnerSession(admission) {
|
|
http.Error(w, "exact action runner session is not registered", http.StatusConflict)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if admission.ActivationPending {
|
|
if !f.actionServer.PromoteActionRunnerSession(admission) {
|
|
http.Error(w, "action runner session promotion failed", http.StatusConflict)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
if f.actionBindingID != admission.TokenID || f.actionSecret != bearer || f.actionRevoked {
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
http.Error(w, "action runner credential changed during activation", http.StatusConflict)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
f.actionPending = false
|
|
f.actionActivations++
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) handleActionRunnerSelfRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodDelete {
|
|
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
var request struct {
|
|
AgentID string `json:"agentId"`
|
|
Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 4096)).Decode(&request); err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
bearer := strings.TrimPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Authorization")), "Bearer ")
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
admission := f.actionAdmissionLocked()
|
|
valid := !f.actionRevoked && bearer == f.actionSecret && strings.TrimSpace(request.AgentID) == admission.AgentID && strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(request.Hostname), admission.Hostname)
|
|
if valid {
|
|
f.actionRevoked = true
|
|
f.actionRevokes++
|
|
}
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
f.actionServer.InvalidateActionRunnerSession(admission)
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) handleReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
|
|
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !f.authorized(r) {
|
|
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
body := io.Reader(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 32<<20))
|
|
if r.Header.Get("Content-Encoding") == "gzip" {
|
|
compressed, err := gzip.NewReader(body)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "invalid compressed report", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer compressed.Close()
|
|
body = compressed
|
|
}
|
|
var payload struct {
|
|
Agent struct {
|
|
ID string `json:"id"`
|
|
Version string `json:"version"`
|
|
UpdatedFrom string `json:"updatedFrom"`
|
|
Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
|
|
CommandsEnabled bool `json:"commandsEnabled"`
|
|
Privilege *struct {
|
|
RunningAsRoot bool `json:"runningAsRoot"`
|
|
ServiceUser string `json:"serviceUser"`
|
|
Authority string `json:"commandAuthority"`
|
|
TypedHelper bool `json:"typedHelper"`
|
|
} `json:"privilege"`
|
|
} `json:"agent"`
|
|
Host struct {
|
|
Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
|
|
} `json:"host"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(body).Decode(&payload); err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "invalid report", http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
report := secureRuntimeLabReport{
|
|
ReceivedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
|
|
AgentID: strings.TrimSpace(payload.Agent.ID),
|
|
AgentVersion: strings.TrimSpace(payload.Agent.Version),
|
|
UpdatedFrom: strings.TrimSpace(payload.Agent.UpdatedFrom),
|
|
Hostname: strings.TrimSpace(payload.Agent.Hostname),
|
|
CommandsEnabled: payload.Agent.CommandsEnabled,
|
|
}
|
|
if report.Hostname == "" {
|
|
report.Hostname = strings.TrimSpace(payload.Host.Hostname)
|
|
}
|
|
if payload.Agent.Privilege != nil {
|
|
report.RunningAsRoot = payload.Agent.Privilege.RunningAsRoot
|
|
report.ServiceUser = payload.Agent.Privilege.ServiceUser
|
|
report.Authority = payload.Agent.Privilege.Authority
|
|
report.TypedHelper = payload.Agent.Privilege.TypedHelper
|
|
}
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
f.reportAttempts = append(f.reportAttempts, report)
|
|
rejected := f.rejectedVersions[report.AgentVersion]
|
|
serverVersion := f.serverVersion
|
|
if rejected {
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
http.Error(w, "report version temporarily rejected by qualification gate", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
f.reports = append(f.reports, report)
|
|
if !f.freezeLastSeen {
|
|
f.lastSeen = report.ReceivedAt
|
|
}
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
writeSecureRuntimeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
|
|
"success": true,
|
|
"agentId": secureRuntimeLabAgentID,
|
|
"serverVersion": serverVersion,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *secureRuntimeLabFixture) handleLookup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if !f.collectorLifecycleAuthorized(r) {
|
|
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
lastSeen := f.lastSeen
|
|
f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if lastSeen.IsZero() {
|
|
writeSecureRuntimeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]any{"success": false})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeSecureRuntimeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
|
|
"success": true,
|
|
"agent": map[string]any{
|
|
"id": secureRuntimeLabAgentID,
|
|
"hostname": secureRuntimeLabHostname,
|
|
"lastSeen": lastSeen.Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func writeSecureRuntimeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, value any) {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
w.WriteHeader(status)
|
|
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(value)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeFileIdentity struct {
|
|
Present bool
|
|
Mode os.FileMode
|
|
UID uint32
|
|
GID uint32
|
|
Hash string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeStableIdentity map[string]secureRuntimeFileIdentity
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeStableSnapshot(t *testing.T) secureRuntimeStableIdentity {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
paths := []string{
|
|
"/usr/local/bin/pulse-agent",
|
|
"/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent.service",
|
|
"/var/lib/pulse-agent/agent-id",
|
|
"/var/lib/pulse-agent/connection.env",
|
|
"/var/lib/pulse-agent/token",
|
|
"/var/lib/pulse-agent/runtime.token",
|
|
}
|
|
result := make(secureRuntimeStableIdentity, len(paths))
|
|
for _, path := range paths {
|
|
info, err := os.Lstat(path)
|
|
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
|
|
result[path] = secureRuntimeFileIdentity{}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("inspect stable identity %s: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
|
|
t.Fatalf("stable identity path is not a regular file: %s (%s)", path, info.Mode())
|
|
}
|
|
content, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("read stable identity %s: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
t.Fatalf("read ownership for %s", path)
|
|
}
|
|
sum := sha256.Sum256(content)
|
|
result[path] = secureRuntimeFileIdentity{
|
|
Present: true,
|
|
Mode: info.Mode().Perm(),
|
|
UID: stat.Uid,
|
|
GID: stat.Gid,
|
|
Hash: hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeSeedAPTPackageCache(t *testing.T) (string, string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
const cacheDir = "/var/cache/apt/archives"
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(cacheDir, 0o755); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create disposable apt package cache: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
path := filepath.Join(cacheDir, "pulse-secure-runtime-qualification.deb")
|
|
content := bytes.Repeat([]byte("pulse-secure-runtime\n"), 4096)
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(path, content, 0o600); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("seed disposable apt package cache: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Remove(path) })
|
|
hasher := sha256.New()
|
|
err := filepath.WalkDir(cacheDir, func(entryPath string, entry fs.DirEntry, walkErr error) error {
|
|
if walkErr != nil {
|
|
return walkErr
|
|
}
|
|
if entry.IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(entry.Name()), ".deb") {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
info, infoErr := entry.Info()
|
|
if infoErr != nil {
|
|
return infoErr
|
|
}
|
|
if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
relative, relativeErr := filepath.Rel(cacheDir, entryPath)
|
|
if relativeErr != nil {
|
|
return relativeErr
|
|
}
|
|
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(hasher, "%s\x00%d\x00%d\n", filepath.ToSlash(relative), info.Size(), info.ModTime().UnixNano())
|
|
return nil
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("fingerprint disposable apt package cache: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return path, "sha256:" + hex.EncodeToString(hasher.Sum(nil))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeScenarioResult struct {
|
|
Sequence int `json:"sequence"`
|
|
Name string `json:"name"`
|
|
Passed bool `json:"passed"`
|
|
StartedAt string `json:"started_at"`
|
|
CompletedAt string `json:"completed_at"`
|
|
Evidence secureRuntimeScenarioEvidence `json:"evidence"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeScenarioEvidence struct {
|
|
Kind string `json:"kind"`
|
|
Summary string `json:"summary"`
|
|
Claims []string `json:"claims"`
|
|
Observations map[string]any `json:"observations"`
|
|
TranscriptEventIDs []string `json:"transcript_event_ids"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent struct {
|
|
Sequence int `json:"sequence"`
|
|
EventID string `json:"event_id"`
|
|
ObservedAt string `json:"observed_at"`
|
|
Kind string `json:"kind"`
|
|
Scenario string `json:"scenario,omitempty"`
|
|
Claims []string `json:"claims,omitempty"`
|
|
Observations map[string]any `json:"observations,omitempty"`
|
|
Summary string `json:"summary,omitempty"`
|
|
Operation string `json:"operation,omitempty"`
|
|
Output string `json:"output"`
|
|
OutputSHA256 string `json:"output_sha256,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeSourceManifestBinding struct {
|
|
SchemaVersion int `json:"schema_version"`
|
|
ManifestID string `json:"manifest_id"`
|
|
Path string `json:"path"`
|
|
SHA256 string `json:"sha256"`
|
|
TargetOS string `json:"target_os"`
|
|
TargetArch string `json:"target_arch"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeTranscriptBinding struct {
|
|
Format string `json:"format"`
|
|
RecordPath string `json:"record_path"`
|
|
SHA256 string `json:"sha256"`
|
|
EventCount int `json:"event_count"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeSourceManifest struct {
|
|
SchemaVersion int `json:"schema_version"`
|
|
ManifestID string `json:"manifest_id"`
|
|
TargetOS string `json:"target_os"`
|
|
ExactPaths []string `json:"exact_paths"`
|
|
RecursiveRoots []string `json:"recursive_roots"`
|
|
IncludeSuffixes []string `json:"include_suffixes"`
|
|
ExcludeSuffixes []string `json:"exclude_suffixes"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeLabReceipt struct {
|
|
SchemaVersion int `json:"schema_version"`
|
|
RecordPath string `json:"record_path"`
|
|
StartedAt string `json:"started_at"`
|
|
CompletedAt string `json:"completed_at"`
|
|
SourceManifest secureRuntimeSourceManifestBinding `json:"source_manifest"`
|
|
SourceHashes map[string]string `json:"source_hashes"`
|
|
ArtifactHashes map[string]string `json:"artifact_hashes"`
|
|
ArtifactVersions map[string]string `json:"artifact_versions"`
|
|
DisposableVMGuardHash string `json:"disposable_vm_guard_sha256"`
|
|
OSRelease string `json:"os_release"`
|
|
Kernel string `json:"kernel"`
|
|
SystemdVersion string `json:"systemd_version"`
|
|
Architecture string `json:"architecture"`
|
|
CollectorServiceUser string `json:"collector_service_user"`
|
|
CollectorProcessUID int `json:"collector_process_uid"`
|
|
CollectorAuthority string `json:"collector_authority"`
|
|
AmbientCapabilitiesNone bool `json:"ambient_capabilities_none"`
|
|
HelperProtocolHealthy bool `json:"helper_protocol_healthy"`
|
|
StateIdentityPreserved bool `json:"state_identity_preserved"`
|
|
DockerDegraded bool `json:"docker_degraded"`
|
|
ActionRunnerQualified bool `json:"action_runner_qualified"`
|
|
ActionMutationVerified bool `json:"action_mutation_verified"`
|
|
CollectorAuthorityReductionRequestObserved bool `json:"collector_authority_reduction_request_observed"`
|
|
ActionReceiptKind string `json:"action_receipt_kind,omitempty"`
|
|
CredentialRotated bool `json:"credential_rotated"`
|
|
SelfRevokeObserved bool `json:"self_revoke_observed"`
|
|
CollectorContinuity bool `json:"collector_continuity"`
|
|
ReportCount int `json:"report_count"`
|
|
FirstReportAt string `json:"first_report_at"`
|
|
LastReportAt string `json:"last_report_at"`
|
|
Transcript secureRuntimeTranscriptBinding `json:"transcript"`
|
|
Scenarios []secureRuntimeScenarioResult `json:"scenarios"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder struct {
|
|
sync.Mutex
|
|
enabled bool
|
|
events []secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeResetTranscript(enabled bool) {
|
|
secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.Lock()
|
|
defer secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.Unlock()
|
|
secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.enabled = enabled
|
|
secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.events = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRecordTranscriptEvent(event secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent) secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent {
|
|
secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.Lock()
|
|
defer secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.Unlock()
|
|
if !secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.enabled {
|
|
return event
|
|
}
|
|
event.Sequence = len(secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.events) + 1
|
|
event.EventID = fmt.Sprintf("event-%04d", event.Sequence)
|
|
if event.ObservedAt == "" {
|
|
event.ObservedAt = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.events = append(secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.events, event)
|
|
return event
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRecordCommandOutput(operation string, output []byte) {
|
|
secureRuntimeRecordTranscriptEvent(secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent{
|
|
Kind: "command_output", Operation: operation, Output: string(output),
|
|
OutputSHA256: secureRuntimeHash(output),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeTranscriptSnapshot() []secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent {
|
|
secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.Lock()
|
|
defer secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.Unlock()
|
|
return append([]secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent(nil), secureRuntimeTranscriptRecorder.events...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeFinalizeTranscript(receipt *secureRuntimeLabReceipt) []secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent {
|
|
events := secureRuntimeTranscriptSnapshot()
|
|
receipt.CompletedAt = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
|
|
return events
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeReceiptCredentialDetection(t *testing.T) {
|
|
safe, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
|
|
"source_hashes": map[string]string{
|
|
"internal/api/agenttokens/install.go": strings.Repeat("a", 64),
|
|
"internal/api/agent_exec_token_binding.go": strings.Repeat("b", 64),
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("marshal safe receipt fixture: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if secureRuntimeReceiptContainsCredential(safe) {
|
|
t.Fatal("public boundary source paths were misclassified as credential material")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, unsafe := range [][]byte{
|
|
[]byte(`{"token":"redacted"}`),
|
|
[]byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{"detail":%q}`, secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1)),
|
|
} {
|
|
if !secureRuntimeReceiptContainsCredential(unsafe) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("credential-bearing receipt was accepted: %s", unsafe)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeTranscriptPreservesEmptyCommandOutput(t *testing.T) {
|
|
event := secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent{
|
|
Sequence: 1, EventID: "event-0001", ObservedAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
|
|
Kind: "command_output", Operation: "systemctl", OutputSHA256: secureRuntimeHash(nil),
|
|
}
|
|
encoded, err := json.Marshal(event)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
var payload map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &payload); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
output, present := payload["output"]
|
|
if !present || output != "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("empty command output was not represented explicitly: %s", encoded)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeReceiptCompletionEnclosesFinalTranscriptEvent(t *testing.T) {
|
|
secureRuntimeResetTranscript(true)
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { secureRuntimeResetTranscript(false) })
|
|
event := secureRuntimeRecordTranscriptEvent(secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent{
|
|
Kind: "command_output", Operation: "systemctl", OutputSHA256: secureRuntimeHash(nil),
|
|
})
|
|
receipt := secureRuntimeLabReceipt{}
|
|
events := secureRuntimeFinalizeTranscript(&receipt)
|
|
if len(events) != 1 || events[0].EventID != event.EventID {
|
|
t.Fatalf("final transcript snapshot = %+v", events)
|
|
}
|
|
observedAt, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, event.ObservedAt)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
completedAt, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, receipt.CompletedAt)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
if observedAt.After(completedAt) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("final event %s falls after receipt completion %s", event.ObservedAt, receipt.CompletedAt)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeSourceManifestCoversTransitiveProviders(t *testing.T) {
|
|
_, hashes := secureRuntimeLoadSourceBoundary(t, runtime.GOARCH)
|
|
for _, required := range []string{
|
|
"internal/agenthelper/providers.go",
|
|
"internal/agenthelper/container_inventory.go",
|
|
"internal/agenttls/config.go",
|
|
"internal/hostagent/action_runner_client.go",
|
|
"internal/hostagent/action_runner_health_persistence_unix.go",
|
|
"internal/hostagent/package_updates.go",
|
|
"internal/api/action_runner_credentials.go",
|
|
"internal/api/router_routes_registration.go",
|
|
"internal/agentexec/server.go",
|
|
"internal/securityutil/secure_storage_dir.go",
|
|
"pkg/auth/scopes.go",
|
|
"pkg/securityutil/httpurl.go",
|
|
"scripts/release_control/secure_runtime_attestation.py",
|
|
"scripts/release_control/secure_runtime_attestation_v6.py",
|
|
".github/workflows/build-release-candidate.yml",
|
|
".github/workflows/compile-release-payload.yml",
|
|
".github/workflows/create-release.yml",
|
|
"scripts/build-release-binaries.sh",
|
|
"scripts/build-release.sh",
|
|
"scripts/release_asset_common.sh",
|
|
"scripts/release_build_targets.sh",
|
|
"scripts/release_candidate_manifest.py",
|
|
"scripts/release_ldflags.sh",
|
|
"scripts/release_update_key.go",
|
|
"scripts/require-safe-gh-attestation.sh",
|
|
"scripts/validate-release.sh",
|
|
"scripts/verify-github-release-integrity.sh",
|
|
} {
|
|
if _, ok := hashes[required]; !ok {
|
|
t.Fatalf("secure-runtime source manifest omitted transitive boundary source %s", required)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for sourcePath := range hashes {
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(sourcePath, "_test.go") && sourcePath != "scripts/installtests/secure_runtime_systemd_lab_test.go" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("secure-runtime production source manifest included test source %s", sourcePath)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeFixturePromotesPendingRunner(t *testing.T) {
|
|
fixture := newSecureRuntimeLabFixture(nil, "", nil, nil, "fixture")
|
|
defer fixture.actionServer.Shutdown()
|
|
server := httptest.NewServer(fixture)
|
|
defer server.Close()
|
|
|
|
stateDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
healthPath := filepath.Join(stateDir, "health.json")
|
|
client := actionrunner.NewClient(actionrunner.TransportConfig{
|
|
PulseURL: server.URL, APIToken: secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1,
|
|
StateDir: stateDir, HealthPath: healthPath, InsecureSkipVerify: true,
|
|
ActivationNonce: strings.Repeat("a", 64),
|
|
}, secureRuntimeLabAgentID, secureRuntimeLabHostname, "fixture")
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
|
|
done := make(chan error, 1)
|
|
go func() { done <- client.Run(ctx) }()
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
cancel()
|
|
_ = client.Close()
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-done:
|
|
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
|
|
t.Error("timed out stopping fixture action runner")
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForActionRunner(t, fixture, true, 10*time.Second)
|
|
admission, revoked, _ := fixture.actionSnapshot()
|
|
if revoked || admission.ActivationPending || fixture.actionActivationCount() != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("fixture activation state = admission:%+v revoked:%t activations:%d", admission, revoked, fixture.actionActivationCount())
|
|
}
|
|
var health struct {
|
|
Registered bool `json:"registered"`
|
|
Activated bool `json:"activated"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, healthPath), &health); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode fixture action-runner health: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !health.Registered || !health.Activated {
|
|
t.Fatalf("fixture action-runner health = %+v", health)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeFixtureAdmitsCollectorAndRunnerCredentialsSeparately(t *testing.T) {
|
|
fixture := newSecureRuntimeLabFixture(nil, "", nil, nil, "fixture")
|
|
defer fixture.actionServer.Shutdown()
|
|
|
|
collector, admitted := fixture.admitCommandSession(secureRuntimeLabToken, secureRuntimeLabAgentID, secureRuntimeLabHostname)
|
|
if !admitted || collector.RuntimeRole == agentexec.RuntimeRoleActionRunner || !fixture.validateCommandSession(collector) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("collector admission = %+v, admitted=%t", collector, admitted)
|
|
}
|
|
actionRunner, admitted := fixture.admitCommandSession(secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1, secureRuntimeLabAgentID, secureRuntimeLabHostname)
|
|
if !admitted || actionRunner.RuntimeRole != agentexec.RuntimeRoleActionRunner || !fixture.validateCommandSession(actionRunner) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("action-runner admission = %+v, admitted=%t", actionRunner, admitted)
|
|
}
|
|
if collector.TokenID == actionRunner.TokenID {
|
|
t.Fatal("collector and action runner shared a fixture token identity")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, admitted := fixture.admitCommandSession("wrong-secret", secureRuntimeLabAgentID, secureRuntimeLabHostname); admitted {
|
|
t.Fatal("fixture admitted an unknown command credential")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeFixtureAcceptsBearerOnlyCollectorLifecycleLookup(t *testing.T) {
|
|
fixture := newSecureRuntimeLabFixture(nil, "", nil, nil, "fixture")
|
|
defer fixture.actionServer.Shutdown()
|
|
fixture.mu.Lock()
|
|
fixture.lastSeen = time.Now().UTC()
|
|
fixture.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/agents/agent/lookup?agentId="+secureRuntimeLabAgentID, nil)
|
|
request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+secureRuntimeLabToken)
|
|
recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
fixture.ServeHTTP(recorder, request)
|
|
if recorder.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("bearer-only lifecycle lookup status = %d, body=%s", recorder.Code, recorder.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
request = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/agents/agent/lookup?agentId="+secureRuntimeLabAgentID, nil)
|
|
recorder = httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
fixture.ServeHTTP(recorder, request)
|
|
if recorder.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
|
t.Fatalf("unauthenticated lifecycle lookup status = %d, want %d", recorder.Code, http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeFixtureSelfRevokeUsesBodylessNoContentResponse(t *testing.T) {
|
|
fixture := newSecureRuntimeLabFixture(nil, "", nil, nil, "fixture")
|
|
defer fixture.actionServer.Shutdown()
|
|
body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"agentId":%q,"hostname":%q}`, secureRuntimeLabAgentID, secureRuntimeLabHostname)
|
|
request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/agents/action-runner/credential", strings.NewReader(body))
|
|
request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1)
|
|
recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
fixture.ServeHTTP(recorder, request)
|
|
if recorder.Code != http.StatusNoContent || recorder.Body.Len() != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("self-revoke response = status %d body %q, want bodyless 204", recorder.Code, recorder.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
_, revoked, revokeCount := fixture.actionSnapshot()
|
|
if !revoked || revokeCount != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("self-revoke state = revoked:%t count:%d", revoked, revokeCount)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSecureRuntimeSystemdLab(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if os.Getenv(secureRuntimeLabOptIn) != "1" {
|
|
t.Skip("set PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_SYSTEMD_LAB=1 only inside a disposable systemd VM")
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeRequireDisposableHost(t)
|
|
|
|
collectorV1 := secureRuntimeReadArtifact(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V1")
|
|
collectorV1Signature := secureRuntimeReadSignature(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V1_SIGNATURE")
|
|
collectorV2 := secureRuntimeReadArtifact(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V2")
|
|
collectorV2Signature := secureRuntimeReadSignature(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V2_SIGNATURE")
|
|
collectorV3 := secureRuntimeReadArtifact(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V3")
|
|
collectorV3Signature := secureRuntimeReadSignature(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V3_SIGNATURE")
|
|
collectorV4 := secureRuntimeReadArtifact(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V4")
|
|
collectorV4Signature := secureRuntimeReadSignature(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V4_SIGNATURE")
|
|
helper := secureRuntimeReadArtifact(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_HELPER")
|
|
runner := secureRuntimeReadArtifact(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_RUNNER")
|
|
collectorV1Version := secureRuntimeArtifactVersion(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V1")
|
|
collectorV2Version := secureRuntimeArtifactVersion(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V2")
|
|
collectorV3Version := secureRuntimeArtifactVersion(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V3")
|
|
collectorV4Version := secureRuntimeArtifactVersion(t, "PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_COLLECTOR_V4")
|
|
if collectorV1Version == collectorV2Version {
|
|
t.Fatalf("collector V1 and V2 must have distinct --version output, both reported %q", collectorV1Version)
|
|
}
|
|
installerPath, err := filepath.Abs(repoFile("scripts", "install.sh"))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("resolve installer path: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fixture := newSecureRuntimeLabFixture(collectorV1, collectorV1Signature, helper, runner, collectorV1Version)
|
|
defer fixture.actionServer.Shutdown()
|
|
server := httptest.NewServer(fixture)
|
|
defer server.Close()
|
|
|
|
recordPath := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_RECEIPT_RECORD_PATH"))
|
|
if recordPath == "" || filepath.IsAbs(recordPath) || filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(recordPath)) != recordPath || strings.Contains(recordPath, "..") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_RECEIPT_RECORD_PATH must be a canonical repository-relative path: %q", recordPath)
|
|
}
|
|
startedAt := time.Now().UTC()
|
|
sourceManifest, sourceHashes := secureRuntimeLoadSourceBoundary(t, runtime.GOARCH)
|
|
receipt := secureRuntimeLabReceipt{
|
|
SchemaVersion: 6,
|
|
RecordPath: recordPath,
|
|
StartedAt: startedAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
|
|
SourceManifest: sourceManifest,
|
|
SourceHashes: sourceHashes,
|
|
ArtifactHashes: map[string]string{"collector_v1": secureRuntimeHash(collectorV1), "collector_v2": secureRuntimeHash(collectorV2), "collector_v3": secureRuntimeHash(collectorV3), "collector_v4": secureRuntimeHash(collectorV4), "helper": secureRuntimeHash(helper), "runner": secureRuntimeHash(runner)},
|
|
ArtifactVersions: map[string]string{"collector_v1": collectorV1Version, "collector_v2": collectorV2Version, "collector_v3": collectorV3Version, "collector_v4": collectorV4Version},
|
|
DisposableVMGuardHash: secureRuntimeHash([]byte(secureRuntimeLabMarkerValue + "\n")),
|
|
Architecture: runtime.GOARCH,
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeResetTranscript(true)
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { secureRuntimeResetTranscript(false) })
|
|
receipt.OSRelease = strings.TrimSpace(string(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, "/etc/os-release")))
|
|
receipt.Kernel = secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "uname", "-srvmo")
|
|
receipt.SystemdVersion = strings.SplitN(secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "--version"), "\n", 2)[0]
|
|
scenarioStartedAt := startedAt
|
|
pass := func(name, detail string, observations map[string]any) {
|
|
claims, ok := secureRuntimeScenarioClaims[name]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
t.Fatalf("scenario %q has no governed causal claims", name)
|
|
}
|
|
completedAt := time.Now().UTC()
|
|
sequence := len(receipt.Scenarios) + 1
|
|
claims = append([]string(nil), claims...)
|
|
event := secureRuntimeRecordTranscriptEvent(secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent{
|
|
ObservedAt: completedAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano), Kind: "scenario_result",
|
|
Scenario: name, Claims: claims, Observations: observations, Summary: detail,
|
|
})
|
|
receipt.Scenarios = append(receipt.Scenarios, secureRuntimeScenarioResult{
|
|
Sequence: sequence, Name: name, Passed: true,
|
|
StartedAt: scenarioStartedAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano), CompletedAt: completedAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
|
|
Evidence: secureRuntimeScenarioEvidence{
|
|
Kind: "runtime-observation-v1", Summary: detail, Claims: claims,
|
|
Observations: observations,
|
|
TranscriptEventIDs: []string{event.EventID},
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
scenarioStartedAt = completedAt
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
initialArgs := []string{"--enable-commands", "--command-authority", "command-capable"}
|
|
dockerInitiallyAvailable := secureRuntimeRootfulDockerAvailable()
|
|
if dockerInitiallyAvailable {
|
|
initialArgs = append(initialArgs, "--enable-docker")
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeRunInstaller(t, installerPath, server.URL, initialArgs...)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t, fixture, 1, 45*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertRootCommandProfile(t)
|
|
dockerInitiallyEnabled := secureRuntimeCollectorHasArgument("--enable-docker")
|
|
if dockerInitiallyAvailable && !dockerInitiallyEnabled {
|
|
t.Fatal("rootful Docker was available but the requested legacy profile did not enable Docker monitoring")
|
|
}
|
|
pass("legacy_root_command_capable_install", fmt.Sprintf("root collector installed; docker_enabled=%t", dockerInitiallyEnabled), map[string]any{"collector_process_uid": 0, "commands_enabled": true})
|
|
|
|
beforeInspect := secureRuntimeStableSnapshot(t)
|
|
inspectOutput := secureRuntimeRunInstaller(t, installerPath, server.URL, "--safe-profile-inspect")
|
|
if !strings.Contains(inspectOutput, "current_profile=legacy-root-command-capable") ||
|
|
!strings.Contains(inspectOutput, "target_profile=typed-helper-monitoring-only") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("read-only inspection did not describe legacy and target profiles:\n%s", inspectOutput)
|
|
}
|
|
if afterInspect := secureRuntimeStableSnapshot(t); !secureRuntimeIdentitiesEqual(beforeInspect, afterInspect) {
|
|
t.Fatal("--safe-profile-inspect mutated installer-owned stable files")
|
|
}
|
|
pass("read_only_inspect", "stable installer-owned files unchanged", map[string]any{"stable_files_unchanged": true})
|
|
|
|
dropInDir := "/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent.service.d"
|
|
dropInPath := filepath.Join(dropInDir, "secure-runtime-lab.conf")
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(dropInDir, 0o755); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create systemd drop-in directory: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(dropInPath, []byte("[Service]\nUser=root\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("write systemd drop-in: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
dropInPresent := true
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
if dropInPresent {
|
|
_ = os.Remove(dropInPath)
|
|
_ = os.Remove(dropInDir)
|
|
_ = exec.Command("systemctl", "daemon-reload").Run()
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 20*time.Second, "systemctl", "daemon-reload")
|
|
beforeDropIn := secureRuntimeStableSnapshot(t)
|
|
failedOutput, failedErr := secureRuntimeRunInstallerError(t, installerPath, server.URL, "--safe-profile-apply")
|
|
if failedErr == nil || !strings.Contains(failedOutput, "systemd drop-in override") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("safe apply did not fail closed on a systemd drop-in: err=%v\n%s", failedErr, failedOutput)
|
|
}
|
|
if afterDropIn := secureRuntimeStableSnapshot(t); !secureRuntimeIdentitiesEqual(beforeDropIn, afterDropIn) {
|
|
t.Fatal("drop-in rejection mutated installer-owned stable files")
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.Remove(dropInPath); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("remove systemd drop-in: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
_ = os.Remove(dropInDir)
|
|
dropInPresent = false
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 20*time.Second, "systemctl", "daemon-reload")
|
|
pass("drop_in_fail_closed_rehearsal", "migration rejected before stable installer-owned files changed", map[string]any{"rejected_before_mutation": true})
|
|
|
|
legacyBaseline := secureRuntimeStableSnapshot(t)
|
|
reportsBeforeApply, preApplyLastSeen, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
fixture.setCollector(collectorV2, collectorV2Signature)
|
|
applyOutput := secureRuntimeRunInstaller(t, installerPath, server.URL, "--safe-profile-apply")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t, fixture, len(reportsBeforeApply)+1, 45*time.Second)
|
|
_, postApplyLastSeen, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
if !postApplyLastSeen.After(preApplyLastSeen) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("safe apply committed without fresh server registration: before=%s after=%s", preApplyLastSeen, postApplyLastSeen)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfile(t)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertHelperProtocol(t)
|
|
if fixture.authorityReductionCount() < 1 {
|
|
t.Fatal("safe apply did not durably reduce the collector credential authority")
|
|
}
|
|
dockerDegraded := dockerInitiallyEnabled && !secureRuntimeCollectorHasArgument("--enable-docker")
|
|
if dockerInitiallyEnabled && !secureRuntimeCollectorOwnedRootlessAvailable(t) {
|
|
if dockerDegraded || !strings.Contains(applyOutput, "typed helper in summary-only mode") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("safe migration did not preserve explicitly reduced helper inventory:\n%s", applyOutput)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
pass("safe_profile_apply", "fresh server lastSeen, least-privilege identity, typed helper health", map[string]any{"collector_service_user": "pulse-agent", "collector_authority": "monitoring-only", "helper_status": "ok"})
|
|
|
|
reportsBeforeRollback, _, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
secureRuntimeRunInstaller(t, installerPath, server.URL, "--safe-profile-rollback")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t, fixture, len(reportsBeforeRollback)+1, 45*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertRootMonitoringProfile(t)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForStableIdentity(t, secureRuntimeWithoutCollectorUnit(legacyBaseline), 10*time.Second, "explicit rollback")
|
|
pass("explicit_safe_profile_rollback", "legacy binary and service identity restored without resurrecting collector command authority", map[string]any{"restored_profile": "root-monitoring", "commands_enabled": false})
|
|
|
|
automaticRollbackBaseline := secureRuntimeStableSnapshot(t)
|
|
fixture.setFrozen(true)
|
|
failedOutput, failedErr = secureRuntimeRunInstallerError(t, installerPath, server.URL, "--safe-profile-apply")
|
|
fixture.setFrozen(false)
|
|
if failedErr == nil || !strings.Contains(failedOutput, "restoring the previous profile") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("stale lastSeen safe apply unexpectedly succeeded: err=%v\n%s", failedErr, failedOutput)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForStableIdentity(t, secureRuntimeWithoutCollectorUnit(automaticRollbackBaseline), 10*time.Second, "automatic failure rollback")
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertRootMonitoringProfile(t)
|
|
pass("automatic_failure_rollback", "frozen lastSeen prevented commit and restored binary/state identity without command authority", map[string]any{"activation_committed": false, "restored_profile": "root-monitoring"})
|
|
|
|
fixture.setCollector(collectorV2, collectorV2Signature)
|
|
reportsBeforeUpdate, _, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
secureRuntimeRunInstaller(t, installerPath, server.URL, "--update")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t, fixture, len(reportsBeforeUpdate)+1, 45*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertRootMonitoringProfile(t)
|
|
if got := secureRuntimeHash(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, "/usr/local/bin/pulse-agent")); got != secureRuntimeHash(collectorV2) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ordinary update collector hash = %s, want v2 hash", got)
|
|
}
|
|
pass("ordinary_update_non_migration", "binary updated while the downgraded root monitoring profile remained unchanged", map[string]any{"collector_v2_installed": true, "selected_profile": "root-monitoring"})
|
|
|
|
fixture.setServerVersion(collectorV2Version)
|
|
reportsBeforeFinalApply, preFinalLastSeen, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
secureRuntimeRunInstaller(t, installerPath, server.URL, "--safe-profile-apply")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t, fixture, len(reportsBeforeFinalApply)+1, 45*time.Second)
|
|
_, finalLastSeen, authFailures, requestFailures := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
if !finalLastSeen.After(preFinalLastSeen) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("final safe apply did not advance server lastSeen: before=%s after=%s", preFinalLastSeen, finalLastSeen)
|
|
}
|
|
if authFailures != 0 || len(requestFailures) != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("fixture observed credential/request failures: auth=%d failures=%v", authFailures, requestFailures)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfile(t)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertHelperProtocol(t)
|
|
reportsBeforeContinuity, _, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t, fixture, len(reportsBeforeContinuity)+1, 20*time.Second)
|
|
pass("final_safe_profile_apply", "collector continued reporting after committed migration", map[string]any{"collector_service_user": "pulse-agent", "continuity_report_observed": true})
|
|
|
|
helperServiceRejection := secureRuntimeExerciseUnitOverrideDetection(t,
|
|
"pulse-agent-helper.service", "Service", "PrivateNetwork=false", false)
|
|
pass("helper_service_override_rejection", "effective helper service validation rejected an existing systemd drop-in", map[string]any{
|
|
"override_directive": "PrivateNetwork=false",
|
|
"validation_error": helperServiceRejection,
|
|
})
|
|
helperResourceRejection := secureRuntimeExerciseUnitOverrideDetection(t,
|
|
"pulse-agent-helper.service", "Service", "TasksMax=infinity", false)
|
|
pass("helper_resource_limit_override_rejection", "effective helper service validation enforced bounded task, descriptor, and memory resources and rejected an unbounded task override", map[string]any{
|
|
"override_directive": "TasksMax=infinity",
|
|
"tasks_max": "64",
|
|
"limit_nofile": "256",
|
|
"memory_max_bytes": "268435456",
|
|
"validation_error": helperResourceRejection,
|
|
})
|
|
helperSocketRejection := secureRuntimeExerciseUnitOverrideDetection(t,
|
|
"pulse-agent-helper.socket", "Socket", "SocketMode=0666", false)
|
|
pass("helper_socket_override_rejection", "effective helper socket validation rejected an existing systemd drop-in", map[string]any{
|
|
"override_directive": "SocketMode=0666",
|
|
"validation_error": helperSocketRejection,
|
|
})
|
|
helperNetworkObservations := secureRuntimeAssertHelperOutboundNetworkDenied(t)
|
|
pass("helper_network_namespace_isolation", "the helper network namespace could not establish TCP to a host-interface canary that was reachable from the host namespace", helperNetworkObservations)
|
|
|
|
collectorV2SHA256 := secureRuntimeHash(collectorV2)
|
|
collectorV3SHA256 := secureRuntimeHash(collectorV3)
|
|
collectorV4SHA256 := secureRuntimeHash(collectorV4)
|
|
preUpdatePID := secureRuntimeCollectorMainPID(t)
|
|
fixture.setVersionReportsAccepted(collectorV3Version, false)
|
|
fixture.setCollector(collectorV3, collectorV3Signature)
|
|
fixture.setServerVersion(collectorV3Version)
|
|
pendingV3 := secureRuntimeWaitForUpdateState(t, "pending", collectorV3SHA256, collectorV2SHA256, 45*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReportAttempt(t, fixture, collectorV3Version, collectorV2Version, 45*time.Second)
|
|
if pendingV3.ActivatorPID != preUpdatePID {
|
|
t.Fatalf("V3 activation peer PID = %d, want pre-exec collector PID %d", pendingV3.ActivatorPID, preUpdatePID)
|
|
}
|
|
postExecPID := secureRuntimeCollectorMainPID(t)
|
|
if postExecPID != preUpdatePID {
|
|
t.Fatalf("helper-backed exec changed systemd MainPID from %d to %d", preUpdatePID, postExecPID)
|
|
}
|
|
if got := secureRuntimeProcessExecutableHash(t, postExecPID); got != collectorV3SHA256 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("/proc/%d/exe digest = %s, want V3 %s", postExecPID, got, collectorV3SHA256)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertUpdateBinaryIdentities(t, collectorV3SHA256, collectorV2SHA256)
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(secureRuntimeUpdateHandoff); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("pending helper update handoff unavailable: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
fixture.setVersionReportsAccepted(collectorV3Version, true)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForAcceptedVersion(t, fixture, collectorV3Version, 1, 30*time.Second)
|
|
committedV3 := secureRuntimeWaitForUpdateState(t, "committed", collectorV3SHA256, collectorV2SHA256, 30*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForFileAbsent(t, secureRuntimeUpdateHandoff, 15*time.Second)
|
|
if committedV3.ActivatorPID != postExecPID {
|
|
t.Fatalf("committed V3 activator PID = %d, want current collector PID %d", committedV3.ActivatorPID, postExecPID)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertUpdateBinaryIdentities(t, collectorV3SHA256, collectorV2SHA256)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfile(t)
|
|
pass("helper_update_authoritative_commit", "signed helper activation retained the systemd process identity and committed only after a freshly accepted primary report", map[string]any{
|
|
"signature_verified": true,
|
|
"candidate_sha256": collectorV3SHA256,
|
|
"prior_sha256": collectorV2SHA256,
|
|
"target_sha256": collectorV3SHA256,
|
|
"last_known_good_sha256": collectorV2SHA256,
|
|
"activator_pid": pendingV3.ActivatorPID,
|
|
"committer_pid": committedV3.ActivatorPID,
|
|
"accepted_primary_report": true,
|
|
"update_action": "committed",
|
|
"handoff_cleared": true,
|
|
"reporting_continuity": true,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
fixture.setVersionReportsAccepted(collectorV4Version, false)
|
|
fixture.setCollector(collectorV4, collectorV4Signature)
|
|
fixture.setServerVersion(collectorV4Version)
|
|
pendingV4Watchdog := secureRuntimeWaitForUpdateState(t, "pending", collectorV4SHA256, collectorV3SHA256, 45*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReportAttempt(t, fixture, collectorV4Version, collectorV3Version, 45*time.Second)
|
|
watchdogPID := secureRuntimeCollectorMainPID(t)
|
|
if pendingV4Watchdog.ActivatorPID != watchdogPID || secureRuntimeProcessExecutableHash(t, watchdogPID) != collectorV4SHA256 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("watchdog candidate identity mismatch: state=%+v pid=%d", pendingV4Watchdog, watchdogPID)
|
|
}
|
|
acceptedV3BeforeWatchdog := len(secureRuntimeWaitForAcceptedVersion(t, fixture, collectorV3Version, 1, 5*time.Second))
|
|
fixture.setServerVersion(collectorV3Version)
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "kill", "--kill-who=main", "--signal=STOP", "pulse-agent.service")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForUpdateState(t, "rolled_back", collectorV3SHA256, collectorV4SHA256, 150*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertUpdateBinaryIdentities(t, collectorV3SHA256, collectorV4SHA256)
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "kill", "--kill-who=main", "--signal=KILL", "pulse-agent.service")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForAcceptedVersion(t, fixture, collectorV3Version, acceptedV3BeforeWatchdog+1, 45*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForFileAbsent(t, secureRuntimeUpdateHandoff, 30*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfile(t)
|
|
pass("helper_update_watchdog_rollback", "the independent helper watchdog restored V3 after the unresponsive V4 collector missed its production rollback deadline", map[string]any{
|
|
"candidate_sha256": collectorV4SHA256,
|
|
"prior_sha256": collectorV3SHA256,
|
|
"target_sha256": collectorV3SHA256,
|
|
"last_known_good_sha256": collectorV4SHA256,
|
|
"update_action": "rolled_back",
|
|
"rollback_trigger": "watchdog",
|
|
"reporting_continuity": true,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
fixture.setServerVersion(collectorV4Version)
|
|
pendingV4Recovery := secureRuntimeWaitForUpdateState(t, "pending", collectorV4SHA256, collectorV3SHA256, 45*time.Second)
|
|
recoveryPID := secureRuntimeCollectorMainPID(t)
|
|
if pendingV4Recovery.ActivatorPID != recoveryPID || secureRuntimeProcessExecutableHash(t, recoveryPID) != collectorV4SHA256 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("interrupted-recovery candidate identity mismatch: state=%+v pid=%d", pendingV4Recovery, recoveryPID)
|
|
}
|
|
fixture.setServerVersion(collectorV3Version)
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "kill", "--kill-who=main", "--signal=STOP", "pulse-agent.service")
|
|
acceptedV3BeforeRecovery := len(secureRuntimeWaitForAcceptedVersion(t, fixture, collectorV3Version, acceptedV3BeforeWatchdog+1, 5*time.Second))
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 20*time.Second, "systemctl", "restart", "pulse-agent-helper.service")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForUpdateState(t, "rolled_back", collectorV3SHA256, collectorV4SHA256, 20*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertUpdateBinaryIdentities(t, collectorV3SHA256, collectorV4SHA256)
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "kill", "--kill-who=main", "--signal=KILL", "pulse-agent.service")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForAcceptedVersion(t, fixture, collectorV3Version, acceptedV3BeforeRecovery+1, 45*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForFileAbsent(t, secureRuntimeUpdateHandoff, 30*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfile(t)
|
|
pass("helper_update_interrupted_recovery", "restarting only the helper recovered the durable pending activation before the stopped collector could participate", map[string]any{
|
|
"candidate_sha256": collectorV4SHA256,
|
|
"prior_sha256": collectorV3SHA256,
|
|
"target_sha256": collectorV3SHA256,
|
|
"last_known_good_sha256": collectorV4SHA256,
|
|
"update_action": "rolled_back",
|
|
"rollback_trigger": "helper-restart",
|
|
"reporting_continuity": true,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
fixture.setCollector(collectorV3, collectorV3Signature)
|
|
reportsBeforeRunner, _, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
secureRuntimeRunInstallerWithActionCredential(t, installerPath, server.URL, secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1,
|
|
"--least-privilege", "--enable-privileged-helper", "--enable-action-runner")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForActionRunner(t, fixture, true, 30*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertActionRunnerInstalled(t)
|
|
if activations := fixture.actionActivationCount(); activations != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("initial action-runner activation requests = %d, want 1", activations)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t, fixture, len(reportsBeforeRunner)+1, 20*time.Second)
|
|
pass("separate_action_runner_install", "root action runner registered and activated independently while the collector remained non-root and reporting", map[string]any{"runner_service_user": "root", "collector_service_user": "pulse-agent", "fixture_activation_requests": 1})
|
|
runnerOverrideRejection := secureRuntimeExerciseUnitOverrideDetection(t,
|
|
"pulse-agent-runner.service", "Service", "EnvironmentFile=-/tmp/unsafe-runner.env", true)
|
|
pass("action_runner_override_rejection", "effective action-runner validation rejected an existing systemd drop-in", map[string]any{
|
|
"override_directive": "EnvironmentFile=-/tmp/unsafe-runner.env",
|
|
"validation_error": runnerOverrideRejection,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
actionContext, cancelAction := context.WithTimeout(agentexec.WithOrganizationID(context.Background(), secureRuntimeLabOrgID), 30*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancelAction()
|
|
cachePath, cacheFingerprint := secureRuntimeSeedAPTPackageCache(t)
|
|
cleanupRequest := agentexec.HostStorageCleanupPayload{
|
|
RequestID: "secure-runtime.receipt.1", ActionID: "secure-runtime-receipt",
|
|
Operation: agentexec.HostStorageCleanupOperationPackageCache,
|
|
ExpectedFingerprint: cacheFingerprint, Timeout: 15,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := agentexec.BindHostStorageCleanupPayload(&cleanupRequest); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("bind typed receipt qualification request: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
cleanupResult, err := fixture.actionServer.ExecuteHostStorageCleanup(actionContext, secureRuntimeLabAgentID, cleanupRequest)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("execute typed receipt qualification request: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if cleanupResult == nil || !cleanupResult.Success || !cleanupResult.MutationStarted ||
|
|
cleanupResult.Verification != agentexec.HostStorageCleanupVerificationVerified || cleanupResult.ReclaimedBytes <= 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("typed receipt qualification did not complete a verified host mutation: %+v", cleanupResult)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(cachePath); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("typed package-cache cleanup did not remove seeded archive: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
receiptIdentity := agentexec.HostStorageCleanupOperationIdentity(secureRuntimeLabAgentID, cleanupRequest)
|
|
query, err := fixture.actionServer.QueryAgentOperation(actionContext, secureRuntimeLabAgentID, receiptIdentity)
|
|
if err != nil || query.Status != operationreceipt.QueryFoundTerminal || query.Record == nil || query.Record.ResultKind != agentexec.HostStorageCleanupReceiptKind {
|
|
t.Fatalf("durable typed receipt query = %+v, err=%v", query, err)
|
|
}
|
|
refusalRequest := agentexec.HostStorageCleanupPayload{
|
|
RequestID: "secure-runtime.receipt.2", ActionID: "secure-runtime-refusal",
|
|
Operation: agentexec.HostStorageCleanupOperationPackageCache,
|
|
ExpectedFingerprint: "sha256:" + strings.Repeat("f", 64), Timeout: 15,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := agentexec.BindHostStorageCleanupPayload(&refusalRequest); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("bind typed refusal qualification request: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
refusalResult, err := fixture.actionServer.ExecuteHostStorageCleanup(actionContext, secureRuntimeLabAgentID, refusalRequest)
|
|
if err != nil || refusalResult == nil || refusalResult.MutationStarted {
|
|
t.Fatalf("typed refusal request was not rejected before mutation: result=%+v err=%v", refusalResult, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := fixture.actionServer.ExecuteCommand(actionContext, secureRuntimeLabAgentID, agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{
|
|
RequestID: "secure-runtime-shell-denial", Command: "true", TargetType: "agent", Trusted: true,
|
|
}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "typed action-runner") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("action runner did not reject generic command dispatch: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
pass("typed_action_receipt", "verified apt cache mutation and durable terminal receipt; stale fingerprint refused before mutation; generic command dispatch denied", map[string]any{"action_receipt_kind": agentexec.HostStorageCleanupReceiptKind, "mutation_started": true, "verification": "verified", "stale_precondition_mutation_started": false, "generic_command_denied": true})
|
|
|
|
currentAdmission, _, _ := fixture.actionSnapshot()
|
|
wrongAdmission := currentAdmission
|
|
wrongAdmission.TokenID = secureRuntimeRunnerBindingV2
|
|
if fixture.actionServer.InvalidateActionRunnerSession(wrongAdmission) {
|
|
t.Fatal("mismatched replacement binding evicted the current action-runner session")
|
|
}
|
|
previousAdmission := fixture.replaceActionCredential(secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV2, secureRuntimeRunnerBindingV2)
|
|
if previousAdmission != currentAdmission || !fixture.actionServer.InvalidateActionRunnerSession(previousAdmission) {
|
|
t.Fatal("credential rotation did not invalidate the exact superseded action-runner session")
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForActionRunner(t, fixture, false, 10*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeRunInstallerWithActionCredential(t, installerPath, server.URL, secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV2,
|
|
"--least-privilege", "--enable-privileged-helper", "--enable-action-runner")
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForActionRunner(t, fixture, true, 30*time.Second)
|
|
rotatedAdmission, revoked, _ := fixture.actionSnapshot()
|
|
if revoked || rotatedAdmission.TokenID != secureRuntimeRunnerBindingV2 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("rotated action-runner admission = %+v revoked=%t", rotatedAdmission, revoked)
|
|
}
|
|
if activations := fixture.actionActivationCount(); activations != 2 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("action-runner activation requests after rotation = %d, want 2", activations)
|
|
}
|
|
pass("action_runner_credential_rotation", "mismatched invalidation was rejected, exact superseded session closed, replacement credential registered and activated", map[string]any{"proof_scope": "in-memory-fixture", "superseded_session_invalidated": true, "replacement_registered": true, "fixture_activation_requests": 2})
|
|
|
|
reportsBeforeRemoval, _, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
uninstallOutput := secureRuntimeRunStandaloneInstaller(t, installerPath, "--uninstall-action-runner")
|
|
if !strings.Contains(uninstallOutput, "Revoked the action-runner credential") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("runner uninstall did not confirm self-revocation:\n%s", uninstallOutput)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForActionRunner(t, fixture, false, 10*time.Second)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertActionRunnerRemoved(t)
|
|
_, revoked, revokeCount := fixture.actionSnapshot()
|
|
if !revoked || revokeCount != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("runner self-revoke state: revoked=%t count=%d", revoked, revokeCount)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfile(t)
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertHelperProtocol(t)
|
|
secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t, fixture, len(reportsBeforeRemoval)+1, 20*time.Second)
|
|
pass("action_runner_self_revoke", "uninstall revoked the exact host binding and removed only runner state; collector/helper continuity remained healthy", map[string]any{"revocation_count": revokeCount, "collector_continuity": true})
|
|
|
|
reports, _, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
if len(reports) == 0 {
|
|
t.Fatal("no reports recorded")
|
|
}
|
|
for i, report := range reports {
|
|
if report.AgentID != secureRuntimeLabAgentID {
|
|
t.Fatalf("report %d changed collector identity: %q", i, report.AgentID)
|
|
}
|
|
if report.Hostname != secureRuntimeLabHostname {
|
|
t.Fatalf("report %d changed collector hostname: %q", i, report.Hostname)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
latest := reports[len(reports)-1]
|
|
if latest.RunningAsRoot || latest.ServiceUser != "pulse-agent" || latest.Authority != "monitoring-only" || !latest.TypedHelper || latest.CommandsEnabled {
|
|
t.Fatalf("final report privilege posture = %+v", latest)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
receipt.CollectorServiceUser = secureRuntimeSystemdProperty(t, "User")
|
|
receipt.CollectorProcessUID = secureRuntimeCollectorProcessUID(t)
|
|
receipt.CollectorAuthority = latest.Authority
|
|
receipt.AmbientCapabilitiesNone = strings.TrimSpace(secureRuntimeSystemdProperty(t, "AmbientCapabilities")) == ""
|
|
receipt.HelperProtocolHealthy = true
|
|
receipt.StateIdentityPreserved = true
|
|
receipt.DockerDegraded = dockerDegraded
|
|
receipt.ActionRunnerQualified = true
|
|
receipt.ActionMutationVerified = true
|
|
receipt.CollectorAuthorityReductionRequestObserved = fixture.authorityReductionCount() > 0
|
|
receipt.ActionReceiptKind = agentexec.HostStorageCleanupReceiptKind
|
|
receipt.CredentialRotated = true
|
|
receipt.SelfRevokeObserved = true
|
|
receipt.CollectorContinuity = true
|
|
receipt.ReportCount = len(reports)
|
|
receipt.FirstReportAt = reports[0].ReceivedAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
|
|
receipt.LastReportAt = reports[len(reports)-1].ReceivedAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
|
|
secureRuntimeWriteEvidence(t, &receipt, secureRuntimeFinalizeTranscript(&receipt))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type secureRuntimeUpdateState struct {
|
|
Action string `json:"action"`
|
|
ActivationID string `json:"activationId"`
|
|
ActiveSHA256 string `json:"activeSha256"`
|
|
RollbackSHA256 string `json:"rollbackSha256"`
|
|
RollbackDeadline time.Time `json:"rollbackDeadline"`
|
|
ActivatorPID int `json:"activatorPid"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWaitForUpdateState(t *testing.T, action, activeSHA256, rollbackSHA256 string, timeout time.Duration) secureRuntimeUpdateState {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
|
|
var (
|
|
state secureRuntimeUpdateState
|
|
lastErr error
|
|
)
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
raw, err := os.ReadFile(secureRuntimeUpdateStatePath)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
err = json.Unmarshal(raw, &state)
|
|
}
|
|
lastErr = err
|
|
if err == nil && state.Action == action && strings.EqualFold(state.ActiveSHA256, activeSHA256) && strings.EqualFold(state.RollbackSHA256, rollbackSHA256) {
|
|
return state
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for helper update state action=%s active=%s rollback=%s; got=%+v err=%v", action, activeSHA256, rollbackSHA256, state, lastErr)
|
|
return secureRuntimeUpdateState{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWaitForFileAbsent(t *testing.T, path string, timeout time.Duration) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
if _, err := os.Lstat(path); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := os.Lstat(path); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for %s to be removed", path)
|
|
} else {
|
|
t.Fatalf("inspect %s while waiting for removal: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWaitForReportAttempt(t *testing.T, fixture *secureRuntimeLabFixture, version, updatedFrom string, timeout time.Duration) secureRuntimeLabReport {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
for _, report := range fixture.attemptSnapshot() {
|
|
if report.AgentVersion == version && report.UpdatedFrom == updatedFrom {
|
|
return report
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for report attempt version=%q updatedFrom=%q", version, updatedFrom)
|
|
return secureRuntimeLabReport{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWaitForAcceptedVersion(t *testing.T, fixture *secureRuntimeLabFixture, version string, minimumCount int, timeout time.Duration) []secureRuntimeLabReport {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
|
|
var matched []secureRuntimeLabReport
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
reports, _, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
matched = matched[:0]
|
|
for _, report := range reports {
|
|
if report.AgentVersion == version {
|
|
matched = append(matched, report)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(matched) >= minimumCount {
|
|
return append([]secureRuntimeLabReport(nil), matched...)
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for %d accepted reports from version %q; got %d", minimumCount, version, len(matched))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCollectorMainPID(t *testing.T) int {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(15 * time.Second)
|
|
stablePID := 0
|
|
stableSince := time.Time{}
|
|
lastPIDText := ""
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
out, err := exec.Command("systemctl", "show", "pulse-agent.service", "--property=MainPID", "--value").Output()
|
|
lastPIDText = strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
|
|
pid, parseErr := strconv.Atoi(lastPIDText)
|
|
if err == nil && parseErr == nil && pid > 1 {
|
|
if _, statErr := os.Stat(fmt.Sprintf("/proc/%d/status", pid)); statErr == nil {
|
|
if pid != stablePID {
|
|
stablePID = pid
|
|
stableSince = time.Now()
|
|
} else if time.Since(stableSince) >= time.Second {
|
|
return pid
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
stablePID = 0
|
|
stableSince = time.Time{}
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("pulse-agent MainPID did not remain positive and stable: last=%q", lastPIDText)
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeProcessExecutableHash(t *testing.T, pid int) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
return secureRuntimeHash(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, fmt.Sprintf("/proc/%d/exe", pid)))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertUpdateBinaryIdentities(t *testing.T, targetSHA256, lastKnownGoodSHA256 string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
if got := secureRuntimeHash(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, "/usr/local/bin/pulse-agent")); !strings.EqualFold(got, targetSHA256) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("installed collector hash = %s, want %s", got, targetSHA256)
|
|
}
|
|
if got := secureRuntimeHash(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, secureRuntimeUpdateLKGPath)); !strings.EqualFold(got, lastKnownGoodSHA256) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("last-known-good collector hash = %s, want %s", got, lastKnownGoodSHA256)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRequireDisposableHost(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("destructive secure-runtime lab requires Linux, got %s", runtime.GOOS)
|
|
}
|
|
if os.Geteuid() != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatal("destructive secure-runtime lab requires EUID 0")
|
|
}
|
|
comm, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/1/comm")
|
|
if err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(string(comm)) != "systemd" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("destructive secure-runtime lab requires systemd as PID 1: comm=%q err=%v", strings.TrimSpace(string(comm)), err)
|
|
}
|
|
marker, err := os.ReadFile(secureRuntimeLabMarkerPath)
|
|
if err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(string(marker)) != secureRuntimeLabMarkerValue {
|
|
t.Fatalf("refusing host mutation: %s must contain exactly %q", secureRuntimeLabMarkerPath, secureRuntimeLabMarkerValue)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, path := range secureRuntimeInstalledPaths {
|
|
if _, err := os.Lstat(path); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("refusing already-installed host: %s exists", path)
|
|
} else if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("inspect existing Pulse path %s: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if out, err := exec.Command("systemctl", "show", "pulse-agent.service", "--property=LoadState", "--value").CombinedOutput(); err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(string(out)) != "not-found" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("refusing host with loaded pulse-agent.service: %s", strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeReadArtifact(t *testing.T, envName string) []byte {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
path := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(envName))
|
|
if path == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(path) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s must name an absolute caller-built artifact path", envName)
|
|
}
|
|
info, err := os.Lstat(path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("inspect %s: %v", envName, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !info.Mode().IsRegular() || info.Mode()&0o111 == 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s must be a regular executable file: %s (%s)", envName, path, info.Mode())
|
|
}
|
|
artifact := secureRuntimeReadFile(t, path)
|
|
if len(artifact) < 4 || !bytes.Equal(artifact[:4], []byte{0x7f, 'E', 'L', 'F'}) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s is not an ELF executable: %s", envName, path)
|
|
}
|
|
return artifact
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeArtifactVersion(t *testing.T, envName string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
path := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(envName))
|
|
if path == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(path) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s must name an absolute caller-built artifact path", envName)
|
|
}
|
|
version := secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, path, "--version")
|
|
version = strings.TrimSpace(strings.SplitN(version, "\n", 2)[0])
|
|
if version == "" || version == "unknown" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s returned unusable --version output %q", envName, version)
|
|
}
|
|
return version
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeReadSignature(t *testing.T, envName string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
path := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(envName))
|
|
if path == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(path) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s must name an absolute caller-built signature path", envName)
|
|
}
|
|
info, err := os.Lstat(path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("inspect %s: %v", envName, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s must be a regular signature file: %s (%s)", envName, path, info.Mode())
|
|
}
|
|
signature := strings.TrimSpace(string(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, path)))
|
|
if signature == "" || len(signature) > 4096 || strings.ContainsAny(signature, "\x00\r\n") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s contains an invalid detached signature", envName)
|
|
}
|
|
return signature
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeReadFile(t *testing.T, path string) []byte {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
return data
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeHash(data []byte) string {
|
|
sum := sha256.Sum256(data)
|
|
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeLoadSourceBoundary(t *testing.T, targetArch string) (secureRuntimeSourceManifestBinding, map[string]string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
repoRoot, err := filepath.Abs(repoFile())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("resolve repository root: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
manifestRelative := "scripts/release_control/secure_runtime_source_manifest_v6.json"
|
|
manifestRaw := secureRuntimeReadFile(t, filepath.Join(repoRoot, filepath.FromSlash(manifestRelative)))
|
|
var manifest secureRuntimeSourceManifest
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(manifestRaw, &manifest); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode secure-runtime source manifest: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if manifest.SchemaVersion != 1 || manifest.ManifestID != "secure-runtime-linux-v6" || manifest.TargetOS != "linux" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("unsupported secure-runtime source manifest: %+v", manifest)
|
|
}
|
|
sourceHashes := make(map[string]string)
|
|
addSource := func(relative string) {
|
|
if relative == "" || filepath.IsAbs(relative) || strings.Contains(relative, "..") || filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(relative)) != relative {
|
|
t.Fatalf("source manifest contains non-canonical path %q", relative)
|
|
}
|
|
sourceHashes[relative] = secureRuntimeHash(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, filepath.Join(repoRoot, filepath.FromSlash(relative))))
|
|
}
|
|
for _, relative := range manifest.ExactPaths {
|
|
addSource(relative)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := sourceHashes[manifestRelative]; !ok {
|
|
t.Fatal("secure-runtime source manifest does not include itself")
|
|
}
|
|
for _, relativeRoot := range manifest.RecursiveRoots {
|
|
root := filepath.Join(repoRoot, filepath.FromSlash(relativeRoot))
|
|
matched := 0
|
|
err := filepath.WalkDir(root, func(path string, entry fs.DirEntry, walkErr error) error {
|
|
if walkErr != nil {
|
|
return walkErr
|
|
}
|
|
if entry.IsDir() {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
relative, err := filepath.Rel(repoRoot, path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
relative = filepath.ToSlash(relative)
|
|
included := false
|
|
for _, suffix := range manifest.IncludeSuffixes {
|
|
included = included || strings.HasSuffix(relative, suffix)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, suffix := range manifest.ExcludeSuffixes {
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(relative, suffix) {
|
|
included = false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if included {
|
|
addSource(relative)
|
|
matched++
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expand secure-runtime source root %s: %v", relativeRoot, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if matched == 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("secure-runtime source root %s matched no production source", relativeRoot)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return secureRuntimeSourceManifestBinding{
|
|
SchemaVersion: manifest.SchemaVersion,
|
|
ManifestID: manifest.ManifestID,
|
|
Path: manifestRelative,
|
|
SHA256: secureRuntimeHash(manifestRaw),
|
|
TargetOS: manifest.TargetOS,
|
|
TargetArch: targetArch,
|
|
}, sourceHashes
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRunInstaller(t *testing.T, installerPath, fixtureURL string, scenarioArgs ...string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
out, err := secureRuntimeRunInstallerErrorWithActionCredential(t, installerPath, fixtureURL, "", scenarioArgs...)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("installer %s failed: %v\n%s", strings.Join(scenarioArgs, " "), err, out)
|
|
}
|
|
return out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRunInstallerWithActionCredential(t *testing.T, installerPath, fixtureURL, actionCredential string, scenarioArgs ...string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
out, err := secureRuntimeRunInstallerErrorWithActionCredential(t, installerPath, fixtureURL, actionCredential, scenarioArgs...)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("installer %s failed: %v\n%s", strings.Join(scenarioArgs, " "), err, out)
|
|
}
|
|
return out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRunInstallerError(t *testing.T, installerPath, fixtureURL string, scenarioArgs ...string) (string, error) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
return secureRuntimeRunInstallerErrorWithActionCredential(t, installerPath, fixtureURL, "", scenarioArgs...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRunInstallerErrorWithActionCredential(t *testing.T, installerPath, fixtureURL, actionCredential string, scenarioArgs ...string) (string, error) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
args := []string{installerPath}
|
|
switch {
|
|
case len(scenarioArgs) == 1 && scenarioArgs[0] == "--safe-profile-inspect":
|
|
args = append(args, scenarioArgs...)
|
|
case len(scenarioArgs) == 1 && scenarioArgs[0] == "--safe-profile-rollback":
|
|
args = append(args, scenarioArgs...)
|
|
default:
|
|
tokenFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "monitoring-token")
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(tokenFile, []byte(secureRuntimeLabToken+"\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("write private fixture token: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
args = append(args,
|
|
"--url", fixtureURL,
|
|
"--token-file", tokenFile,
|
|
"--interval", "2s",
|
|
"--agent-id", secureRuntimeLabAgentID,
|
|
"--hostname", secureRuntimeLabHostname,
|
|
"--state-dir", "/var/lib/pulse-agent",
|
|
"--insecure",
|
|
"--non-interactive",
|
|
)
|
|
if actionCredential != "" {
|
|
actionCredentialFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "action-credential")
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(actionCredentialFile, []byte(actionCredential+"\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("write private action-runner credential: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
args = append(args, "--action-token-file", actionCredentialFile)
|
|
}
|
|
args = append(args, scenarioArgs...)
|
|
}
|
|
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "bash", args...)
|
|
cmd.Env = os.Environ()
|
|
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
|
|
if ctx.Err() != nil {
|
|
return string(out), fmt.Errorf("installer timed out: %w", ctx.Err())
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertNoCredentialExposure(t, out)
|
|
secureRuntimeRecordCommandOutput("installer "+strings.Join(scenarioArgs, " "), out)
|
|
return string(out), err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRunStandaloneInstaller(t *testing.T, installerPath string, scenarioArgs ...string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "bash", append([]string{installerPath}, scenarioArgs...)...)
|
|
cmd.Env = os.Environ()
|
|
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
|
|
if ctx.Err() != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("standalone installer timed out: %v\n%s", ctx.Err(), out)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertNoCredentialExposure(t, out)
|
|
secureRuntimeRecordCommandOutput("standalone installer "+strings.Join(scenarioArgs, " "), out)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("standalone installer %s failed: %v\n%s", strings.Join(scenarioArgs, " "), err, out)
|
|
}
|
|
return string(out)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertNoCredentialExposure(t *testing.T, output []byte) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for _, credential := range []string{secureRuntimeLabToken, secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1, secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV2} {
|
|
if bytes.Contains(output, []byte(credential)) {
|
|
t.Fatal("installer output exposed a runtime credential")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWaitForReports(t *testing.T, fixture *secureRuntimeLabFixture, count int, timeout time.Duration) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
reports, _, _, _ := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
if len(reports) >= count {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
reports, _, _, failures := fixture.snapshot()
|
|
t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for %d reports; got %d (fixture failures: %v)", count, len(reports), failures)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWaitForActionRunner(t *testing.T, fixture *secureRuntimeLabFixture, connected bool, timeout time.Duration) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
if fixture.actionServer.IsAgentConnectedForOrganization(secureRuntimeLabOrgID, secureRuntimeLabAgentID) == connected {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for action-runner connected=%t", connected)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCommand(t *testing.T, timeout time.Duration, name string, args ...string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, name, args...).CombinedOutput()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s %s: %v\n%s", name, strings.Join(args, " "), err, out)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertNoCredentialExposure(t, out)
|
|
secureRuntimeRecordCommandOutput(name, out)
|
|
return strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeSystemdProperty(t *testing.T, property string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
return secureRuntimeUnitProperty(t, "pulse-agent.service", property)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeActionRunnerSystemdProperty(t *testing.T, property string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
return secureRuntimeUnitProperty(t, "pulse-agent-runner.service", property)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeUnitProperty(t *testing.T, unit, property string) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
return secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "show", unit, "--property="+property, "--value")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty(unit, property string) (string, error) {
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "systemctl", "show", unit, "--property="+property, "--value").CombinedOutput()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("systemctl show %s %s: %w: %s", unit, property, err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCheckUnitProperty(unit, property, expected string) error {
|
|
actual, err := secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty(unit, property)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if actual != expected {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("%s effective %s = %q, want %q", unit, property, actual, expected)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCheckUnitWordSet(unit, property string, expected ...string) error {
|
|
actual, err := secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty(unit, property)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
actualWords := strings.Fields(actual)
|
|
expectedWords := append([]string(nil), expected...)
|
|
sort.Strings(actualWords)
|
|
sort.Strings(expectedWords)
|
|
if strings.Join(actualWords, "\x00") != strings.Join(expectedWords, "\x00") {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("%s effective %s words = %q, want %q", unit, property, actualWords, expectedWords)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeExecStartArgv(value string) []string {
|
|
const marker = "argv[]="
|
|
start := strings.Index(value, marker)
|
|
if start < 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
value = value[start+len(marker):]
|
|
if end := strings.Index(value, " ;"); end >= 0 {
|
|
value = value[:end]
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.Fields(strings.TrimSpace(value))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCheckExactExecStart(unit, expectedBinary string) error {
|
|
actual, err := secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty(unit, "ExecStart")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
argv := secureRuntimeExecStartArgv(actual)
|
|
if len(argv) != 1 || argv[0] != expectedBinary {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("%s effective ExecStart argv = %q, want only %q", unit, argv, expectedBinary)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCheckInstallerUnitBoundary(unit, expectedFragment string) error {
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeCheckUnitProperty(unit, "FragmentPath", expectedFragment); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return secureRuntimeCheckUnitProperty(unit, "DropInPaths", "")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCheckSafeProfileSystemd(includeRunner bool) error {
|
|
for _, check := range []struct {
|
|
unit, property, expected string
|
|
}{
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "FragmentPath", "/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent.service"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "DropInPaths", ""},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "User", "pulse-agent"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "AmbientCapabilities", ""},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "UMask", "0077"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "NoNewPrivileges", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "PrivateTmp", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "PrivateDevices", "no"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "ProtectKernelTunables", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "ProtectKernelModules", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "ProtectControlGroups", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "LockPersonality", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "RestrictSUIDSGID", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent.service", "SystemCallArchitectures", "native"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "FragmentPath", "/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent-helper.service"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "DropInPaths", ""},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "User", "root"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "Group", "root"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "AmbientCapabilities", ""},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "UMask", "0077"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "NoNewPrivileges", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "PrivateTmp", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "PrivateDevices", "no"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "PrivateNetwork", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "ProtectSystem", "strict"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "ProtectHome", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "ProtectKernelTunables", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "ProtectKernelModules", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "ProtectControlGroups", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "LockPersonality", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "RestrictSUIDSGID", "yes"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "SystemCallArchitectures", "native"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "TasksMax", "64"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "LimitNOFILE", "256"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.service", "MemoryMax", "268435456"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.socket", "FragmentPath", "/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent-helper.socket"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.socket", "DropInPaths", ""},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.socket", "SocketUser", "root"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.socket", "SocketGroup", "pulse-agent"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.socket", "SocketMode", "0660"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.socket", "DirectoryMode", "0755"},
|
|
{"pulse-agent-helper.socket", "RemoveOnStop", "yes"},
|
|
} {
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeCheckUnitProperty(check.unit, check.property, check.expected); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
collectorExec, err := secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty("pulse-agent.service", "ExecStart")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
collectorArgv := secureRuntimeExecStartArgv(collectorExec)
|
|
if len(collectorArgv) == 0 || collectorArgv[0] != "/usr/local/bin/pulse-agent" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("pulse-agent.service effective ExecStart argv = %q", collectorArgv)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, argument := range collectorArgv[1:] {
|
|
if argument == "--enable-commands" {
|
|
return errors.New("pulse-agent.service effective ExecStart retained --enable-commands")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
collectorEnvironment, err := secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty("pulse-agent.service", "Environment")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(collectorEnvironment, "PULSE_AGENT_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/pulse-agent/helper.sock") {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("pulse-agent.service effective Environment lacks the typed-helper socket: %q", collectorEnvironment)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeCheckExactExecStart("pulse-agent-helper.service", "/usr/local/lib/pulse-agent/pulse-agent-helper"); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeCheckUnitWordSet("pulse-agent-helper.service", "RestrictAddressFamilies", "AF_UNIX"); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
listen, err := secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty("pulse-agent-helper.socket", "Listen")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(listen, "/run/pulse-agent/helper.sock") || !strings.Contains(listen, "Stream") {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("pulse-agent-helper.socket effective Listen = %q", listen)
|
|
}
|
|
if !includeRunner {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
for _, check := range []struct {
|
|
property, expected string
|
|
}{
|
|
{"FragmentPath", "/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent-runner.service"},
|
|
{"DropInPaths", ""},
|
|
{"User", "root"},
|
|
{"Group", "root"},
|
|
{"AmbientCapabilities", ""},
|
|
{"UMask", "0077"},
|
|
{"NoNewPrivileges", "yes"},
|
|
{"PrivateTmp", "yes"},
|
|
{"PrivateDevices", "no"},
|
|
{"PrivateNetwork", "no"},
|
|
{"ProtectHome", "yes"},
|
|
{"ProtectSystem", "no"},
|
|
{"ProtectKernelTunables", "yes"},
|
|
{"ProtectKernelModules", "yes"},
|
|
{"ProtectControlGroups", "yes"},
|
|
{"LockPersonality", "yes"},
|
|
{"RestrictSUIDSGID", "yes"},
|
|
{"SystemCallArchitectures", "native"},
|
|
} {
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeCheckUnitProperty("pulse-agent-runner.service", check.property, check.expected); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeCheckExactExecStart("pulse-agent-runner.service", "/usr/local/lib/pulse-agent/pulse-agent-runner"); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeCheckUnitWordSet("pulse-agent-runner.service", "RestrictAddressFamilies", "AF_UNIX", "AF_INET", "AF_INET6"); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
environmentFiles, err := secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty("pulse-agent-runner.service", "EnvironmentFiles")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if environmentFiles != "/etc/pulse-agent-runner/runner.env (ignore_errors=no)" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("pulse-agent-runner.service effective EnvironmentFiles = %q", environmentFiles)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfileSystemd(t *testing.T, includeRunner bool) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeCheckSafeProfileSystemd(includeRunner); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertActionRunnerInstalled(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "is-active", "pulse-agent-runner.service")
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfileSystemd(t, true)
|
|
if user := secureRuntimeActionRunnerSystemdProperty(t, "User"); user != "root" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("action-runner systemd User = %q, want root", user)
|
|
}
|
|
if ambient := strings.TrimSpace(secureRuntimeActionRunnerSystemdProperty(t, "AmbientCapabilities")); ambient != "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("action-runner AmbientCapabilities = %q, want none", ambient)
|
|
}
|
|
for path, mode := range map[string]os.FileMode{
|
|
"/usr/local/lib/pulse-agent/pulse-agent-runner": 0o755,
|
|
"/etc/pulse-agent-runner/runner.env": 0o600,
|
|
"/etc/pulse-agent-runner/token": 0o600,
|
|
"/var/lib/pulse-agent-runner/health.json": 0o600,
|
|
} {
|
|
identity := secureRuntimeStableFileIdentity(t, path)
|
|
if identity.UID != 0 || identity.GID != 0 || identity.Mode != mode {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s identity = uid:%d gid:%d mode:%#o, want root:root %#o", path, identity.UID, identity.GID, identity.Mode, mode)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfile(t)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertActionRunnerRemoved(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for _, path := range []string{
|
|
"/usr/local/lib/pulse-agent/pulse-agent-runner",
|
|
"/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent-runner.service",
|
|
"/etc/pulse-agent-runner",
|
|
"/var/lib/pulse-agent-runner",
|
|
} {
|
|
if _, err := os.Lstat(path); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("runner-only uninstall left %s", path)
|
|
} else if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("inspect removed action-runner path %s: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if loadState := secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "show", "pulse-agent-runner.service", "--property=LoadState", "--value"); loadState != "not-found" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("removed action-runner unit LoadState = %q, want not-found", loadState)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCollectorHasArgument(argument string) bool {
|
|
out, err := exec.Command("systemctl", "show", "pulse-agent.service", "--property=ExecStart", "--value").Output()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for _, field := range strings.Fields(string(out)) {
|
|
if strings.Trim(field, `{ };"`) == argument {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCollectorProcessUID(t *testing.T) int {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
pid := secureRuntimeCollectorMainPID(t)
|
|
status := string(secureRuntimeReadFile(t, fmt.Sprintf("/proc/%d/status", pid)))
|
|
for _, line := range strings.Split(status, "\n") {
|
|
fields := strings.Fields(line)
|
|
if len(fields) >= 2 && fields[0] == "Uid:" {
|
|
uid, err := strconv.Atoi(fields[1])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse collector UID from %q: %v", line, err)
|
|
}
|
|
return uid
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("collector process status omitted UID: %s", status)
|
|
return -1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertRootCommandProfile(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
if user := secureRuntimeSystemdProperty(t, "User"); user != "root" && user != "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("legacy collector systemd User = %q, want root", user)
|
|
}
|
|
if !secureRuntimeCollectorHasArgument("--enable-commands") {
|
|
t.Fatal("legacy collector is not command-capable")
|
|
}
|
|
if uid := secureRuntimeCollectorProcessUID(t); uid != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("legacy collector process UID = %d, want 0", uid)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "is-active", "pulse-agent.service")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertRootMonitoringProfile(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
if user := secureRuntimeSystemdProperty(t, "User"); user != "root" && user != "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("rolled-back collector systemd User = %q, want root", user)
|
|
}
|
|
if secureRuntimeCollectorHasArgument("--enable-commands") {
|
|
t.Fatal("rolled-back collector resurrected --enable-commands after irreversible credential downgrade")
|
|
}
|
|
if uid := secureRuntimeCollectorProcessUID(t); uid != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("rolled-back collector process UID = %d, want 0", uid)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "is-active", "pulse-agent.service")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfile(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfileSystemd(t, false)
|
|
if user := secureRuntimeSystemdProperty(t, "User"); user != "pulse-agent" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("safe collector systemd User = %q, want pulse-agent", user)
|
|
}
|
|
if ambient := strings.TrimSpace(secureRuntimeSystemdProperty(t, "AmbientCapabilities")); ambient != "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("safe collector AmbientCapabilities = %q, want none", ambient)
|
|
}
|
|
if secureRuntimeCollectorHasArgument("--enable-commands") {
|
|
t.Fatal("safe collector retained --enable-commands")
|
|
}
|
|
if environment := secureRuntimeSystemdProperty(t, "Environment"); !strings.Contains(environment, "PULSE_AGENT_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/pulse-agent/helper.sock") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("safe collector lacks typed-helper environment: %s", environment)
|
|
}
|
|
uidText := secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "id", "-u", "pulse-agent")
|
|
wantUID, err := strconv.Atoi(uidText)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse pulse-agent UID %q: %v", uidText, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if uid := secureRuntimeCollectorProcessUID(t); uid != wantUID {
|
|
t.Fatalf("safe collector process UID = %d, want %d", uid, wantUID)
|
|
}
|
|
groups := strings.Fields(secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "id", "-nG", "pulse-agent"))
|
|
for _, group := range groups {
|
|
if group == "docker" {
|
|
t.Fatal("safe collector retained rootful docker group membership")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, path := range []string{"/usr/local/bin/pulse-agent", "/usr/local/lib/pulse-agent/pulse-agent-helper"} {
|
|
identity := secureRuntimeStableFileIdentity(t, path)
|
|
if identity.UID != 0 || identity.GID != 0 || identity.Mode != 0o755 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s identity = uid:%d gid:%d mode:%#o, want root:root 0755", path, identity.UID, identity.GID, identity.Mode)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "is-active", "pulse-agent.service")
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "is-active", "pulse-agent-helper.socket")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeExerciseUnitOverrideDetection(t *testing.T, unit, section, directive string, includeRunner bool) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
dropInDir := filepath.Join("/etc/systemd/system", unit+".d")
|
|
dropInPath := filepath.Join(dropInDir, "secure-runtime-adversarial.conf")
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(dropInDir, 0o755); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create %s drop-in directory: %v", unit, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(dropInPath, []byte("["+section+"]\n"+directive+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("write %s adversarial drop-in: %v", unit, err)
|
|
}
|
|
removed := false
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
if !removed {
|
|
_ = os.Remove(dropInPath)
|
|
_ = os.Remove(dropInDir)
|
|
_ = exec.Command("systemctl", "daemon-reload").Run()
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 20*time.Second, "systemctl", "daemon-reload")
|
|
err := secureRuntimeCheckSafeProfileSystemd(includeRunner)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("effective systemd validation accepted %s drop-in %q", unit, directive)
|
|
}
|
|
dropIns, propertyErr := secureRuntimeReadUnitProperty(unit, "DropInPaths")
|
|
if propertyErr != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(propertyErr)
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(dropIns, dropInPath) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s effective DropInPaths = %q, want %s", unit, dropIns, dropInPath)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.Remove(dropInPath); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("remove %s adversarial drop-in: %v", unit, err)
|
|
}
|
|
_ = os.Remove(dropInDir)
|
|
removed = true
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 20*time.Second, "systemctl", "daemon-reload")
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertSafeProfileSystemd(t, includeRunner)
|
|
return err.Error()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeNonLoopbackIPv4(t *testing.T) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
interfaces, err := net.Interfaces()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("list host interfaces: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, networkInterface := range interfaces {
|
|
if networkInterface.Flags&net.FlagUp == 0 || networkInterface.Flags&net.FlagLoopback != 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
addresses, err := networkInterface.Addrs()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
for _, address := range addresses {
|
|
var ip net.IP
|
|
switch typed := address.(type) {
|
|
case *net.IPNet:
|
|
ip = typed.IP
|
|
case *net.IPAddr:
|
|
ip = typed.IP
|
|
}
|
|
if ipv4 := ip.To4(); ipv4 != nil && !ipv4.IsLoopback() {
|
|
return ipv4.String()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatal("disposable systemd host has no non-loopback IPv4 address for the helper network canary")
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertHelperOutboundNetworkDenied(t *testing.T) map[string]any {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertHelperProtocol(t)
|
|
hostIP := secureRuntimeNonLoopbackIPv4(t)
|
|
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp4", "0.0.0.0:0")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("listen for helper network-isolation canary: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
server := &http.Server{Handler: http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
})}
|
|
serveDone := make(chan error, 1)
|
|
go func() { serveDone <- server.Serve(listener) }()
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
_ = server.Shutdown(ctx)
|
|
<-serveDone
|
|
})
|
|
port := listener.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port
|
|
canaryURL := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/secure-runtime-network-canary", net.JoinHostPort(hostIP, strconv.Itoa(port)))
|
|
hostClient := &http.Client{
|
|
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
|
|
Transport: &http.Transport{
|
|
Proxy: nil,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
response, err := hostClient.Get(canaryURL)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("host network could not reach its canary %s: %v", canaryURL, err)
|
|
}
|
|
_ = response.Body.Close()
|
|
if response.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
|
|
t.Fatalf("host network canary status = %s", response.Status)
|
|
}
|
|
mainPID := secureRuntimeUnitProperty(t, "pulse-agent-helper.service", "MainPID")
|
|
if mainPID == "" || mainPID == "0" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("typed helper has no live MainPID: %q", mainPID)
|
|
}
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 8*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx,
|
|
"nsenter", "--target", mainPID, "--net", "--",
|
|
"curl", "--noproxy", "*", "-fsS", "--connect-timeout", "2", "--max-time", "3", canaryURL,
|
|
).CombinedOutput()
|
|
secureRuntimeAssertNoCredentialExposure(t, out)
|
|
secureRuntimeRecordCommandOutput("helper namespace outbound TCP canary", out)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("helper network namespace reached host-interface canary %s", canaryURL)
|
|
}
|
|
return map[string]any{
|
|
"canary_scope": "host-interface-tcp",
|
|
"host_canary_reachable": true,
|
|
"helper_namespace_connection": "denied",
|
|
"helper_main_pid": mainPID,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeStableFileIdentity(t *testing.T, path string) secureRuntimeFileIdentity {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
info, err := os.Stat(path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("stat %s: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
t.Fatalf("read ownership for %s", path)
|
|
}
|
|
return secureRuntimeFileIdentity{Present: true, Mode: info.Mode().Perm(), UID: stat.Uid, GID: stat.Gid}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeAssertHelperProtocol(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
requestID := "secure-runtime-lab-health"
|
|
request, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
|
|
"protocolVersion": 1,
|
|
"requestId": requestID,
|
|
"operation": "helper.health",
|
|
"operationVersion": 1,
|
|
"deadlineMillis": 2000,
|
|
"payload": map[string]any{},
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("marshal helper health request: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
frame := make([]byte, 4+len(request))
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(frame[:4], uint32(len(request)))
|
|
copy(frame[4:], request)
|
|
requestHandle, err := os.CreateTemp("/tmp", "pulse-helper-health-*.frame")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create helper health frame: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
requestFile := requestHandle.Name()
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Remove(requestFile) })
|
|
if _, err := requestHandle.Write(frame); err != nil {
|
|
_ = requestHandle.Close()
|
|
t.Fatalf("write helper health frame: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := requestHandle.Chmod(0o644); err != nil {
|
|
_ = requestHandle.Close()
|
|
t.Fatalf("make helper health frame collector-readable: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := requestHandle.Close(); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("close helper health frame: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
output, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "runuser", "-u", "pulse-agent", "--", "curl", "-sS", "--max-time", "5", "--unix-socket", "/run/pulse-agent/helper.sock", "--upload-file", requestFile, "telnet://localhost").Output()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("typed helper protocol health: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(output) < 5 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("typed helper returned short frame: %d bytes", len(output))
|
|
}
|
|
length := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(output[:4]))
|
|
if length != len(output)-4 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("typed helper frame length = %d, payload bytes = %d", length, len(output)-4)
|
|
}
|
|
var response struct {
|
|
ProtocolVersion int `json:"protocolVersion"`
|
|
RequestID string `json:"requestId"`
|
|
Operation string `json:"operation"`
|
|
OperationVersion int `json:"operationVersion"`
|
|
Success bool `json:"success"`
|
|
Result struct {
|
|
Status string `json:"status"`
|
|
} `json:"result"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(output[4:], &response); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode typed helper health: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if response.ProtocolVersion != 1 || response.RequestID != requestID || response.Operation != "helper.health" || response.OperationVersion != 1 || !response.Success || response.Result.Status != "ok" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("typed helper health response failed correlation/health: %+v", response)
|
|
}
|
|
secureRuntimeCommand(t, 10*time.Second, "systemctl", "is-active", "pulse-agent-helper.service")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeIdentitiesEqual(left, right secureRuntimeStableIdentity) bool {
|
|
if len(left) != len(right) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for path, identity := range left {
|
|
if right[path] != identity {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWithoutCollectorUnit(identity secureRuntimeStableIdentity) secureRuntimeStableIdentity {
|
|
result := make(secureRuntimeStableIdentity, len(identity)-1)
|
|
for path, value := range identity {
|
|
if path != "/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent.service" {
|
|
result[path] = value
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWaitForStableIdentity(t *testing.T, want secureRuntimeStableIdentity, timeout time.Duration, scenario string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
|
|
var got secureRuntimeStableIdentity
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
got = secureRuntimeStableSnapshot(t)
|
|
if _, compareUnit := want["/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent.service"]; !compareUnit {
|
|
delete(got, "/etc/systemd/system/pulse-agent.service")
|
|
}
|
|
if secureRuntimeIdentitiesEqual(want, got) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s did not converge to the pre-migration binary/unit/state identity: want=%#v got=%#v", scenario, want, got)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeRootfulDockerAvailable() bool {
|
|
if info, err := os.Stat("/var/run/docker.sock"); err != nil || info.Mode()&os.ModeSocket == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
transport := &http.Transport{
|
|
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
|
|
return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, "unix", "/var/run/docker.sock")
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
|
|
client := &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: 2 * time.Second}
|
|
response, err := client.Get("http://docker/_ping")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
defer response.Body.Close()
|
|
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, 16))
|
|
return err == nil && response.StatusCode == http.StatusOK && strings.TrimSpace(string(body)) == "OK"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeCollectorOwnedRootlessAvailable(t *testing.T) bool {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
uidText, err := exec.Command("id", "-u", "pulse-agent").Output()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
uid := strings.TrimSpace(string(uidText))
|
|
for _, path := range []string{filepath.Join("/run/user", uid, "docker.sock"), filepath.Join("/run/user", uid, "podman", "podman.sock")} {
|
|
if info, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil && info.Mode()&os.ModeSocket != 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWriteEvidence(t *testing.T, receipt *secureRuntimeLabReceipt, events []secureRuntimeTranscriptEvent) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
path := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_RECEIPT"))
|
|
if path == "" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !filepath.IsAbs(path) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_RECEIPT must be an absolute path: %s", path)
|
|
}
|
|
transcriptPath := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_TRANSCRIPT"))
|
|
if transcriptPath == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(transcriptPath) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_TRANSCRIPT must be an absolute path: %s", transcriptPath)
|
|
}
|
|
transcriptRecordPath := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_TRANSCRIPT_RECORD_PATH"))
|
|
if transcriptRecordPath == "" || filepath.IsAbs(transcriptRecordPath) || filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(transcriptRecordPath)) != transcriptRecordPath || strings.Contains(transcriptRecordPath, "..") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("PULSE_SECURE_RUNTIME_TRANSCRIPT_RECORD_PATH must be a canonical repository-relative path: %q", transcriptRecordPath)
|
|
}
|
|
var transcript bytes.Buffer
|
|
for _, event := range events {
|
|
encodedEvent, err := json.Marshal(event)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("marshal secure-runtime transcript event: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if secureRuntimeReceiptContainsCredential(encodedEvent) {
|
|
t.Fatal("refusing to write a transcript containing credential material or token-labelled fields")
|
|
}
|
|
transcript.Write(encodedEvent)
|
|
transcript.WriteByte('\n')
|
|
}
|
|
transcriptBytes := transcript.Bytes()
|
|
receipt.Transcript = secureRuntimeTranscriptBinding{
|
|
Format: "jsonl-v1", RecordPath: transcriptRecordPath,
|
|
SHA256: secureRuntimeHash(transcriptBytes), EventCount: len(events),
|
|
}
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeWritePrivateAtomic(transcriptPath, transcriptBytes); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("publish secure-runtime transcript: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encoded, err := json.MarshalIndent(receipt, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("marshal secure-runtime receipt: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if secureRuntimeReceiptContainsCredential(encoded) {
|
|
t.Fatal("refusing to write a receipt containing credential material or token-labelled fields")
|
|
}
|
|
encoded = append(encoded, '\n')
|
|
if err := secureRuntimeWritePrivateAtomic(path, encoded); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("publish receipt: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeWritePrivateAtomic(path string, data []byte) error {
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
temporary := path + ".tmp"
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(temporary, data, 0o600); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return os.Rename(temporary, path)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeReceiptContainsCredential(encoded []byte) bool {
|
|
for _, credential := range [][]byte{
|
|
[]byte(secureRuntimeLabToken),
|
|
[]byte(secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV1),
|
|
[]byte(secureRuntimeRunnerSecretV2),
|
|
} {
|
|
if bytes.Contains(encoded, credential) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
var value any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &value); err != nil {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return secureRuntimeContainsForbiddenReceiptKey(value)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func secureRuntimeContainsForbiddenReceiptKey(value any) bool {
|
|
switch typed := value.(type) {
|
|
case map[string]any:
|
|
for key, child := range typed {
|
|
if _, forbidden := secureRuntimeForbiddenReceiptKeys[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(key))]; forbidden {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if secureRuntimeContainsForbiddenReceiptKey(child) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
case []any:
|
|
for _, child := range typed {
|
|
if secureRuntimeContainsForbiddenReceiptKey(child) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|