Files
pulse/internal/api/agent_exec_token_binding.go
2026-08-31 00:06:24 +01:00

426 lines
16 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"
"github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/api/agentbinding"
"github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/api/agenttokens"
"github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/config"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
const (
agentInstallIssuedViaConfig = "config_agent_install_command"
agentInstallIssuedViaHosted = "hosted_agent_install_command"
agentExecBindingVersionKey = "agent_exec_binding_version"
agentExecBindingVersion = "2"
)
type agentExecMetadataValue struct {
value string
present bool
}
func snapshotAgentExecMetadata(metadata map[string]string, keys ...string) map[string]agentExecMetadataValue {
snapshot := make(map[string]agentExecMetadataValue, len(keys))
for _, key := range keys {
value, present := metadata[key]
snapshot[key] = agentExecMetadataValue{value: value, present: present}
}
return snapshot
}
func restoreAgentExecMetadata(metadata map[string]string, snapshot map[string]agentExecMetadataValue) {
for key, previous := range snapshot {
if previous.present {
metadata[key] = previous.value
} else {
delete(metadata, key)
}
}
}
func (r *Router) validateAgentExecToken(token string, agentID string, hostname string) bool {
_, ok := r.admitAgentExecToken(token, agentID, hostname)
return ok
}
// agentExecHostnamesMatch compares a bound hostname against the hostname an
// agent reports. Short-name vs fully-qualified variants of the same host must
// compare equal here the same way they do everywhere else in the system
// (unifiedresources.HostnamesEquivalent); the case-insensitive exact branch
// keeps IP-literal hostnames comparable, which HostnamesEquivalent rejects.
func agentExecHostnamesMatch(bound, requested string) bool {
return agentbinding.HostnamesMatch(bound, requested)
}
// agentExecBindingDecision is the single source of truth for whether an
// already-issued agent exec token accepts a registering agent identity, and
// which metadata repair the admission path must persist when it does.
type agentExecBindingDecision struct {
admit bool
firstBind bool
legacyMigrate bool
rebindHostname bool
backfillID bool
backfillHost bool
}
// evaluateAgentExecBinding computes the admission decision for a token record
// and a requesting agent identity without mutating the record. Both the
// command-channel admission (admitAgentExecToken) and the agent config gate
// (commandConfigAllowedForToken) consume this decision: v6.1.2 shipped them as
// two divergent policies, so an agent could be told commands were enabled
// while its command channel was rejected, leaving the host permanently on
// "Remote control blocked" with reinstall as the only recourse.
func evaluateAgentExecBinding(record *config.APITokenRecord, requestedID, requestedHost string) agentExecBindingDecision {
decision := agentbinding.Evaluate(record, requestedID, requestedHost)
return agentExecBindingDecision{
admit: decision.Admit,
firstBind: decision.FirstBind,
legacyMigrate: decision.LegacyMigrate,
rebindHostname: decision.RebindHostname,
backfillID: decision.BackfillID,
backfillHost: decision.BackfillHost,
}
}
func (r *Router) admitAgentExecToken(token string, agentID string, hostname string) (agentexec.AgentAdmission, bool) {
if r == nil || r.config == nil {
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
requestedID := strings.TrimSpace(agentID)
requestedHost := strings.TrimSpace(hostname)
config.Mu.Lock()
record, ok := r.config.ValidateAPIToken(token)
if !ok {
config.Mu.Unlock()
// This is the branch a stale-enrollment agent hits: it holds a token
// from a prior install that this server no longer recognises. It was
// previously the only rejection path with no log, which made a looping
// "Invalid token" agent impossible to diagnose without reading source.
log.Warn().
Str("agent_id", requestedID).
Str("hostname", requestedHost).
Msg("Agent exec token not recognized by this server — re-run the agent installer to re-enroll this agent")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
tokenID := record.ID
if !record.HasScope(config.ScopeAgentExec) {
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Warn().
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Msg("Agent exec token missing required scope: agent:exec")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
orgs := record.GetBoundOrgs()
if len(orgs) > 1 {
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Warn().
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Strs("organization_ids", orgs).
Msg("Agent exec token rejected because command sessions require one organization binding")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
organizationID := "default"
if len(orgs) == 1 && strings.TrimSpace(orgs[0]) != "" {
organizationID = strings.TrimSpace(orgs[0])
}
runtimeRole := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata[agenttokens.RuntimeRoleMetadataKey])
if runtimeRole == agenttokens.CredentialKindMonitoringCollector {
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Warn().Str("token_id", tokenID).Msg("Monitoring collector credential rejected by action listener")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
if runtimeRole == agenttokens.CredentialKindActionRunner {
if len(orgs) != 1 {
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Warn().Str("token_id", tokenID).Msg("Action runner credential requires one explicit organization binding")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
decision := agentbinding.EvaluateActionRunner(record, requestedID, requestedHost)
if !decision.Admit {
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Warn().Str("token_id", tokenID).Msg("Action runner credential binding or capability mismatch")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
capability := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata[agenttokens.ActionCapabilityMetadataKey])
canonicalHostname := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata["bound_hostname"])
activationPending := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata[agenttokens.ActionRunnerActivationPendingMetadataKey]) == "true"
config.Mu.Unlock()
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{
OrganizationID: organizationID,
TokenID: tokenID,
AgentID: requestedID,
Hostname: canonicalHostname,
RuntimeRole: agentexec.RuntimeRoleActionRunner,
ActionCapability: capability,
ActivationPending: activationPending,
}, true
}
if runtimeRole != "" && runtimeRole != agenttokens.CredentialKindLegacyFullTrust {
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Warn().Str("token_id", tokenID).Str("runtime_role", runtimeRole).Msg("Agent exec token has unsupported runtime role")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
boundID := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata["bound_agent_id"])
boundHost := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata["bound_hostname"])
decision := evaluateAgentExecBinding(record, requestedID, requestedHost)
switch {
case decision.firstBind:
issuedVia := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata["issued_via"])
installType := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata["install_type"])
if record.Metadata == nil {
record.Metadata = make(map[string]string)
}
previousMetadata := snapshotAgentExecMetadata(
record.Metadata,
"bound_agent_id",
"bound_hostname",
"bound_at",
agentExecBindingVersionKey,
agenttokens.RuntimeRoleMetadataKey,
)
record.Metadata["bound_agent_id"] = requestedID
// A bound_hostname already written by the Proxmox auto-register
// bootstrap is authoritative: it is what the still-unconsumed install
// grant compares against, so an equivalent-but-different spelling
// reported by the agent must not overwrite it.
if strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata["bound_hostname"]) == "" {
record.Metadata["bound_hostname"] = requestedHost
}
record.Metadata["bound_at"] = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
record.Metadata[agentExecBindingVersionKey] = agentExecBindingVersion
record.Metadata[agenttokens.RuntimeRoleMetadataKey] = agenttokens.CredentialKindLegacyFullTrust
if r.persistence != nil {
if err := r.persistence.SaveAPITokens(r.config.APITokens); err != nil {
restoreAgentExecMetadata(record.Metadata, previousMetadata)
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Error().
Err(err).
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Str("hostname", requestedHost).
Msg("Failed to persist first-use agent exec token binding; command registration denied")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
}
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Info().
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Str("hostname", requestedHost).
Str("issued_via", issuedVia).
Str("install_type", installType).
Msg("Bound agent install token to first command agent registration")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{
OrganizationID: organizationID,
TokenID: tokenID,
AgentID: requestedID,
Hostname: requestedHost,
RuntimeRole: agentexec.RuntimeRoleLegacyFullTrust,
}, true
case decision.legacyMigrate:
previousID := boundID
previousMetadata := snapshotAgentExecMetadata(
record.Metadata,
"bound_agent_id",
"bound_at",
agentExecBindingVersionKey,
agenttokens.RuntimeRoleMetadataKey,
)
record.Metadata["bound_agent_id"] = requestedID
record.Metadata["bound_at"] = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
record.Metadata[agentExecBindingVersionKey] = agentExecBindingVersion
record.Metadata[agenttokens.RuntimeRoleMetadataKey] = agenttokens.CredentialKindLegacyFullTrust
if r.persistence != nil {
if err := r.persistence.SaveAPITokens(r.config.APITokens); err != nil {
restoreAgentExecMetadata(record.Metadata, previousMetadata)
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Error().
Err(err).
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Msg("Failed to persist legacy agent exec identity migration; command registration denied")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
}
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Info().
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Str("previous_agent_id", previousID).
Str("agent_id", requestedID).
Str("hostname", requestedHost).
Msg("Migrated legacy hostname-bound agent exec token to immutable runtime identity")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{
OrganizationID: organizationID,
TokenID: tokenID,
AgentID: requestedID,
Hostname: requestedHost,
RuntimeRole: agentexec.RuntimeRoleLegacyFullTrust,
}, true
case decision.admit:
previousHost := boundHost
previousMetadata := snapshotAgentExecMetadata(
record.Metadata,
"bound_agent_id",
"bound_hostname",
"bound_at",
agentExecBindingVersionKey,
agenttokens.RuntimeRoleMetadataKey,
)
metadataChanged := runtimeRole == ""
if runtimeRole == "" {
record.Metadata[agenttokens.RuntimeRoleMetadataKey] = agenttokens.CredentialKindLegacyFullTrust
}
if decision.backfillID {
record.Metadata["bound_agent_id"] = requestedID
boundID = requestedID
metadataChanged = true
}
if decision.backfillHost || decision.rebindHostname {
record.Metadata["bound_hostname"] = requestedHost
boundHost = requestedHost
metadataChanged = true
}
if metadataChanged {
record.Metadata["bound_at"] = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
record.Metadata[agentExecBindingVersionKey] = agentExecBindingVersion
}
if metadataChanged && r.persistence != nil {
if err := r.persistence.SaveAPITokens(r.config.APITokens); err != nil {
restoreAgentExecMetadata(record.Metadata, previousMetadata)
config.Mu.Unlock()
log.Error().
Err(err).
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Msg("Failed to persist migrated agent exec token binding; command registration denied")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
}
config.Mu.Unlock()
if decision.rebindHostname {
log.Info().
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Str("agent_id", requestedID).
Str("previous_hostname", previousHost).
Str("hostname", requestedHost).
Msg("Re-bound agent exec token hostname for matching immutable agent identity")
}
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{
OrganizationID: organizationID,
TokenID: tokenID,
AgentID: requestedID,
Hostname: requestedHost,
RuntimeRole: agentexec.RuntimeRoleLegacyFullTrust,
}, true
}
config.Mu.Unlock()
if boundID == "" && boundHost == "" {
log.Warn().
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Msg("Agent exec token missing binding metadata")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
log.Warn().
Str("token_id", tokenID).
Str("bound_id", boundID).
Str("bound_hostname", boundHost).
Str("requested_id", requestedID).
Str("requested_hostname", requestedHost).
Msg("Agent token mismatch: token is not bound to the registering agent")
return agentexec.AgentAdmission{}, false
}
func (r *Router) validateAgentExecSession(admission agentexec.AgentAdmission) bool {
if r == nil || r.config == nil {
return false
}
tokenID := strings.TrimSpace(admission.TokenID)
requestedID := strings.TrimSpace(admission.AgentID)
requestedHost := strings.TrimSpace(admission.Hostname)
if tokenID == "" || requestedID == "" || requestedHost == "" {
return false
}
config.Mu.Lock()
defer config.Mu.Unlock()
for index := range r.config.APITokens {
record := &r.config.APITokens[index]
if record.ID != tokenID || record.IsExpired() || !record.HasScope(config.ScopeAgentExec) {
continue
}
orgs := record.GetBoundOrgs()
organizationID := "default"
if len(orgs) > 1 {
return false
}
if len(orgs) == 1 && strings.TrimSpace(orgs[0]) != "" {
organizationID = strings.TrimSpace(orgs[0])
}
runtimeRole := strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata[agenttokens.RuntimeRoleMetadataKey])
if runtimeRole == agenttokens.CredentialKindActionRunner {
return len(orgs) == 1 &&
strings.TrimSpace(admission.RuntimeRole) == agentexec.RuntimeRoleActionRunner &&
strings.TrimSpace(admission.ActionCapability) == agentexec.ActionCapabilityTypedV1 &&
organizationID == strings.TrimSpace(admission.OrganizationID) &&
agentbinding.EvaluateActionRunner(record, requestedID, requestedHost).Admit
}
if runtimeRole != agenttokens.CredentialKindLegacyFullTrust {
return false
}
return strings.TrimSpace(admission.RuntimeRole) == agentexec.RuntimeRoleLegacyFullTrust &&
organizationID == strings.TrimSpace(admission.OrganizationID) &&
strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata["bound_agent_id"]) == requestedID &&
agentExecHostnamesMatch(strings.TrimSpace(record.Metadata["bound_hostname"]), requestedHost)
}
return false
}
// agentCommandSessionConnected reports whether a live command channel exists
// for a telemetry host. host.TokenID is sticky across token revocation and
// rotation (monitoring keeps the last-seen token on the host record), so a
// token-scoped miss must not be authoritative: fall through to the agent-ID
// and hostname lookups before declaring the channel disconnected. The
// token-first order still lets the canonical enrollment token win when its
// session is live.
func (r *Router) agentCommandSessionConnected(organizationID, tokenID, agentID, hostname string) bool {
if r == nil || r.agentExecServer == nil {
return false
}
if strings.TrimSpace(tokenID) != "" {
if _, connected := r.agentExecServer.GetAgentForTokenForOrganization(organizationID, tokenID); connected {
return true
}
}
if strings.TrimSpace(agentID) != "" && r.agentExecServer.IsAgentConnectedForOrganization(organizationID, agentID) {
return true
}
_, connected := r.agentExecServer.GetAgentForHostForOrganization(organizationID, hostname)
return connected
}
func canBindAgentInstallExecToken(record *config.APITokenRecord, agentID string, hostname string) bool {
return agentbinding.CanBindInstallToken(record, agentID, hostname)
}
// canBindAutoRegisteredAgentInstallExecToken reports whether an install token
// whose bound_hostname was populated by the Proxmox auto-register bootstrap may
// take the clean first-use exec bind. The registration path writes
// bound_hostname without bound_agent_id or a binding version, so the record
// looks identical to a pre-v6.1.1 deploy token; without this the first command
// enrollment of a freshly installed Proxmox host is admitted by the
// legacy-migration branch, which exists to repair old records and is not the
// contract this flow should depend on. Hostname equivalence is still required.
func canBindAutoRegisteredAgentInstallExecToken(record *config.APITokenRecord, agentID string, hostname string) bool {
return agentbinding.CanBindAutoRegisteredInstallToken(record, agentID, hostname)
}