Commit Graph

22 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Pulse Test d607d5cf46 Separate agent remediation runtime 2026-08-29 23:48:28 +01:00
rcourtman a9076de15a fix(patrol): require Docker health recovery 2026-08-27 20:43:54 +01:00
rcourtman 6163a2a564 feat(patrol): verify Docker actions independently 2026-08-27 20:14:38 +01:00
rcourtman 4c7b1a2434 Fix Docker-in-LXC probe storm against slow Proxmox hosts
The guest Docker socket probe hung minipc hard enough to need a power
cycle (2026-08-20): ~100 orphaned pct exec children, load 133, sshd and
pveproxy starved. Three bugs chained, each fixed here:

1. Dispatcher re-issued a probe while the previous one was still
   executing. The poll cycle's enrichment context had expired, so
   ExecuteCommand dispatched, returned the context error 50ms later,
   and the next 3s cycle sent the identical command again — unbounded
   concurrency against a host that was slow to begin with. The
   monitoring dispatcher now takes a per-guest in-flight claim before
   dispatching probe or inventory commands (completed probes release
   it; abandoned ones hold it for a 2-minute window), and both dispatch
   paths bail out under a dead context.

2. The host agent never got the July process-leak fix: 45480a5cc
   landed only on pulse/v6-release, so main-line agents killed just the
   direct shell on timeout, orphaning pct exec → lxc-attach children
   and blocking Wait on their inherited pipes (10s timeouts reported as
   300s+ durations). Port it: run each command in its own process
   group, SIGKILL the group on cancel, bound Wait with WaitDelay, and
   treat ErrWaitDelay after a clean exit as success.

3. Server-side abandonment never reached the agent. ExecuteCommand and
   ReadFile now refuse to dispatch under an already-expired context,
   and send a best-effort cancel_command when they stop waiting; the
   agent cancels the in-flight execution (killing its process group)
   and reports "command canceled". Older agents ignore the unknown
   message type.

Also add a per-node circuit breaker: three consecutive command failures
on one node suspend all Docker probe/inventory dispatch to it on the
existing 1m→30m backoff schedule, so a host-level stall (NFS flapping)
stops the probing entirely instead of failing guest by guest.

Regression tests simulate the storm without hardware: a never-returning
executor is not re-issued across poll cycles, an expired context
dispatches nothing and records no failure, abandoned probes hold their
claim, the breaker blocks new guests on a failing node, and the agent
kills the whole process group on timeout and on server-issued cancel.

Contract-Neutral: monitor.go delta is three private struct fields holding Docker probe dispatch state; host-agent deletion/re-enrollment lifecycle untouched — contracts and all other proofs are staged
2026-08-20 23:33:36 +01:00
rcourtman e31fc37983 Gate Patrol actions on agent preflight 2026-08-14 01:12:49 +01:00
rcourtman a7646e5f86 Fix Patrol autonomy and refusal reporting 2026-08-13 23:26:08 +01:00
rcourtman c41edb65a0 Fix agent command channel admission 2026-07-24 13:00:03 +01:00
rcourtman 3c778e2b26 Restore one-click Docker container updates through the typed action plane
v6.1.0-rc.1 retired the legacy update endpoints before a replacement
existed, so the UI's Update button failed with an internal-jargon 410
(issue #1564). This lands the replacement end to end: update_container
is a typed agentexec operation with its own strict codec, durable
receipts, and a request digest bound to the image digest the plan
observed; the unified agent bridges execution to the Docker module's
existing pull/backup/recreate/verify/rollback implementation (which now
reports rollback attempt and outcome); and the container action
executor plans, dispatches, and reconciles the operation with declared
backup/rollback compensation truth. Containers advertise an
admin-approval update capability while an image update with a stated
current digest is detected. The legacy endpoints stay retired but
return actionable copy.

Proven live against a Colima daemon: single-container update, the
issue-1564 shared-network-namespace update, and the full UI journey
(Update button, governed review, approve, run) all completed with the
namespace preserved and the backup retained.
2026-07-14 12:19:04 +01:00
rcourtman 0062128414 Add durable Docker restart lifecycle proof 2026-07-12 12:11:16 +01:00
rcourtman d6838d3a25 Complete durable APT workflow continuity 2026-07-12 05:23:02 +01:00
rcourtman 4aac79dc72 Add durable agent operation receipts 2026-07-12 04:16:22 +01:00
rcourtman e77ab9518d Add safe APT workflow foundations 2026-07-12 02:53:01 +01:00
rcourtman 4edf5f8265 fix: close chat command authority boundary 2026-07-11 11:54:56 +01:00
rcourtman eb9954618a Add governed storage pressure cleanup 2026-07-11 10:11:35 +01:00
rcourtman 1312da3acb Add governed host update autonomy 2026-07-11 01:25:14 +01:00
rcourtman 042e7ef966 Harden remaining CodeQL security boundaries 2026-07-09 19:46:40 +01:00
rcourtman 06fd4fc89e Bypass approval gate for trusted internal Discovery commands
Discovery wraps every probe in `docker exec <container> sh -c '...'`.
The agentexec command policy lists `^docker\s+exec\s` as RequireApproval
(a sound default for user-driven docker exec) and Discovery has no path
to mint or supply an ApprovalID. Result: every probe was rejected, the
scanner returned empty CommandOutputs, and the AI fell back to
"Unknown Infrastructure Resource" at confidence 0. The Discovery sub-tab
rendered empty after a "successful" run.

Add a Trusted bool to ExecuteCommandPayload on both the server-facing
agentexec type and the agent's wire struct. When set, the approval gate
is skipped on both ends and the server does not attempt to auto-mint an
approval grant (which would fail with "approval id is required").
PolicyBlock still applies; this is not a way to run arbitrary commands.

Only the discoveryCommandAdapter sets Trusted=true. The flag is never
populated from a deserialised HTTP body or any user-driven path. Patrol
fixes, Assistant remediation, and AI tool calls continue to flow through
the governed approval-record path with a real ApprovalID.

Contracts: amend agent-lifecycle Completion Obligations and Current
State to document the lone exception to the on-agent approval rail, and
amend ai-runtime to fence the Trusted flag to the discovery adapter
only.
2026-05-17 21:59:39 +01:00
rcourtman 9bada35337 Harden unified agent runtime and installer 2026-04-23 23:04:18 +01:00
rcourtman 3ec2c0779e Harden agent command and deploy trust boundaries 2026-04-21 23:50:34 +01:00
rcourtman 778a2577b6 feat: Pulse v6 release 2026-03-18 16:06:30 +00:00
rcourtman 3fdf753a5b Enhance devcontainer and CI workflows
- Add persistent volume mounts for Go/npm caches (faster rebuilds)
- Add shell config with helpful aliases and custom prompt
- Add comprehensive devcontainer documentation
- Add pre-commit hooks for Go formatting and linting
- Use go-version-file in CI workflows instead of hardcoded versions
- Simplify docker compose commands with --wait flag
- Add gitignore entries for devcontainer auth files

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-01 22:29:15 +00:00
rcourtman 53d7776d6b wip: AI chat integration with multi-provider support
- Add AI service with Anthropic, OpenAI, and Ollama providers
- Add AI chat UI component with streaming responses
- Add AI settings page for configuration
- Add agent exec framework for command execution
- Add API endpoints for AI chat and configuration
2025-12-04 20:16:53 +00:00