Execution posture is now profile-owned through the core-only,
never-serialized tools.ExecutionProfile. Both Patrol profiles are
non-interactive, deny infrastructure mutations, and clear any inherited
autonomous mode. Detection restricts pulse-state mutations to an
explicit allowlist of the finding lifecycle tools - a blanket
pulse-state allowance would also permit alert dismissal and knowledge
writes - while investigation denies all pulse-state mutations, keeping
it structurally read-only. InvocationPolicy gains the allowlist and
Allows() is now tool-name-aware.
Chat turns build ONE effective request executor (control level,
autonomy, profile, resolved context) BEFORE provider projection and
clone that executor per provider attempt, reversing the previous
project-from-base-then-clone order so the offered schema and the
runtime boundary always agree. Scheduled Patrol (ExecutePatrolStream)
now runs under the detection profile instead of autonomous mode -
closing its direct view of Docker/Kubernetes mutation subactions - and
ListAvailableTools projects through the identical path.
toolsForExecutionMode's mode booleans are replaced by the profile on
the executor itself.
Non-interactive profiles independently hide pulse_question from the
manifest AND runtime-block it before the interactive-call-set special
case: a fabricated question call returns a non-interactive error
without emitting a waiting event, and sibling tool calls from the same
provider turn keep processing. Approval waits never block for
non-interactive profiles (they queue), and the tool-only-turn wrap-up
guardrail is interactive-profile-owned instead of keyed on autonomy.
The system prompt describes detection and investigation modes directly
rather than claiming controlled or autonomous execution; the
investigation prompt directs the model toward typed action proposals.
Proofs: detection allowlist enforcement (alerts resolve and knowledge
remember blocked, finding tools allowed, projection agrees),
investigation structural read-only (patrol mutation tools dropped from
the manifest and blocked at runtime), profile clone isolation, profile
prompt modes, and question-tool hiding across profiles.
Every registered Pulse tool now carries a canonical invocation
descriptor (internal/agentcapabilities/invocation.go): static or
discriminator-based, classifying each invocation with a workflow kind
plus a mutation target (none / pulse_state / infrastructure). Mixed
descriptors must exactly cover their schema enum and registration
panics otherwise, so an unclassifiable tool cannot exist. Missing,
malformed, unknown, or fabricated discriminator values classify
fail-closed as infrastructure writes.
Provider projection and runtime enforcement consume the same
descriptor under one InvocationPolicy (control level plus the
request-local, non-serializable deny_infrastructure_mutations
restriction, isolated across executor clones): ListTools and
ListToolGovernance remove forbidden enum values, drop empty tools, and
recompute the offered action mode, while ToolRegistry.Execute blocks
forbidden invocations before the handler runs. This closes the mixed
tool control-level bypass, most seriously Docker action:update, which
previously fell through to direct execution at read-only, and fixes
the Kubernetes misclassification: the retired switch read the action
argument while the schema discriminator is type, so type:scale
classified as read.
pulse_file_edit is now write-only (append/write); file inspection
routes through pulse_read action=file, whose exec path keeps its
structural read-only execution-intent enforcement. ClassifyToolCall
consults the descriptor table first and retains only genuinely
non-registry compatibility cases. The deny restriction is deliberately
separate from autonomous mode, which only suppresses interactive
questions and grants no mutation authority.
Proofs: descriptor validation and fail-closed classification unit
tests, plus the invocation-policy regression suite (scale classifies
write and never invokes at read-only or under deny; Docker update
queues nothing at read-only; autonomous plus deny cannot mutate;
fabricated enum values fail at runtime; filtered projection and
runtime enforcement agree; executor clones keep request policies
isolated). Contracts and registry ownership updated for the new
shared invocation descriptor boundary.
Slice 3a of the typed-lifecycle ratchet; the patrol_investigation
execution profile and patrol_propose_action tool build on this
substrate next.
Manifest-backed MCP tools, prompts, and resources with surface affordance contracts; agent capability manifest and governance projection; API contract tests and capability route projection; operations-loop and intelligence-funnel telemetry; release-control subsystem documentation, registry, and tooling; licensing and configuration.
rcourtman