An agent enrolled for metrics but whose token the server doesn't recognise (or
that lacks the agent:exec scope, or is bound to a different agent) was rejected
on the command-exec WebSocket with a bare 'Invalid token' and — for the
token-not-found case — no server log at all. The agent then retried forever,
logging only 'Invalid token', so the operator had no signal that discovery
deep-scan was failing or why. (Confirmed live: delly/minipc agents pointed at a
backend that didn't recognise their token retried thousands of times; discovery
abstained for every guest as a result.)
- agentexec/server.go: the registration-rejection message the agent logs
verbatim now says 'agent token not authorized for command execution — re-run
the agent installer to enroll an agent:exec-scoped token'.
- api/agent_exec_token_binding.go: the previously-silent token-not-recognised
branch now logs the specific reason with the agent hostname.
Contract-neutral: same rejection behaviour, just legible. Regression test:
TestHandleWebSocket_RejectionMessageIsActionable. Verified live end-to-end.
Dead-code sweep. Functions flagged unreachable by golang.org/x/tools/cmd/deadcode
and confirmed unused across pulse, pulse-enterprise, pulse-pro and pulse-mobile by
adversarial cross-repo verification. Cross-module reachability was checked
explicitly (only pkg/ exported symbols are importable by other modules; internal/
packages and _test.go files are not). go build, go vet and test-compile all pass.
Discovery wraps every probe in `docker exec <container> sh -c '...'`.
The agentexec command policy lists `^docker\s+exec\s` as RequireApproval
(a sound default for user-driven docker exec) and Discovery has no path
to mint or supply an ApprovalID. Result: every probe was rejected, the
scanner returned empty CommandOutputs, and the AI fell back to
"Unknown Infrastructure Resource" at confidence 0. The Discovery sub-tab
rendered empty after a "successful" run.
Add a Trusted bool to ExecuteCommandPayload on both the server-facing
agentexec type and the agent's wire struct. When set, the approval gate
is skipped on both ends and the server does not attempt to auto-mint an
approval grant (which would fail with "approval id is required").
PolicyBlock still applies; this is not a way to run arbitrary commands.
Only the discoveryCommandAdapter sets Trusted=true. The flag is never
populated from a deserialised HTTP body or any user-driven path. Patrol
fixes, Assistant remediation, and AI tool calls continue to flow through
the governed approval-record path with a real ApprovalID.
Contracts: amend agent-lifecycle Completion Obligations and Current
State to document the lone exception to the on-agent approval rail, and
amend ai-runtime to fence the Trusted flag to the discovery adapter
only.
CommandPolicy gains a VerifyWindow (Go duration) bounded to
[(0,], 15m] with a 2m default. NormalizeVerifyWindow and the policy
Normalize() method enforce the bounds; DefaultPolicy() populates the
default. JSON marshaling now goes through a shadow struct so the wire
form serializes as a duration string (e.g. "2m0s") rather than the raw
nanosecond integer.
Tests cover the default, the bounds (clamp to max, fall through to
default for zero/negative), the JSON roundtrip, the unmarshal-applies-
bounds contract, and rejection of unparseable duration strings.
ActionAuditRecord gains a VerificationOutcome{status, evidenceSummary}
field with a closed enum (unknown/verified/unverified/failed). Existing
records read back as unknown by default via the normalizer and a new
SQLite column verification_outcome_json. The redaction pass scrubs the
evidence summary alongside other operator-authored text.
A new agentexec/verifier_postconditions.go registers postconditions for
qm.start, pct.start, docker.restart, systemctl.restart, and
kubectl.rollout, each parsed by verifier_postconditions_test.go.
Three pre-existing action JSON snapshot tests
(TestContract_ActionDecisionJSONSnapshot,
TestContract_ActionExecutionJSONSnapshot,
TestContract_UnifiedActionAuditsJSONSnapshot) now include the new
verificationOutcome field. The two flagged failing contract tests on
this branch
(TestContract_ActionDryRunOnlyExecutionErrorJSONSnapshot,
TestContract_RouterBridgesVerificationOntoActionCompleted) are
unrelated to this change and were left alone per lane D-002 scope.
1. Enforce monitoring:read scope on WebSocket upgrades
- Prevents low-privilege tokens (e.g. host-agent:report) from accessing
full infra state via requestData on the main WebSocket.
2. Enforce agent token binding to prevent impersonation
- Added Metadata field to APITokenRecord to support bound_agent_id
- Updated agentexec server to validate token-to-agent binding if present
- Prevents agent:exec tokens from registering as arbitrary agent IDs
The blocked patterns for 'reboot' and 'shutdown' were too broad,
matching anywhere in the command string. This caused legitimate
Proxmox VM control commands like 'qm reboot 201' to be blocked
instead of requiring approval.
Fix by anchoring these patterns to only match bare system commands
(^reboot, ^shutdown, etc.) while allowing qm/pct variants through
the RequireApproval path.
Related to #1024
- Add persistent volume mounts for Go/npm caches (faster rebuilds)
- Add shell config with helpful aliases and custom prompt
- Add comprehensive devcontainer documentation
- Add pre-commit hooks for Go formatting and linting
- Use go-version-file in CI workflows instead of hardcoded versions
- Simplify docker compose commands with --wait flag
- Add gitignore entries for devcontainer auth files
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Move deadline/pong handler setup BEFORE registering agent in map
- Use writeMu mutex consistently for all WebSocket writes
- Prevents race between registration response and ExecuteCommand calls
- Fixes flaky TestExecuteCommand_RoundTripViaWebSocket in CI
- Add DOMPurify sanitization for AI chat markdown rendering (XSS fix)
- Configure DOMPurify to add target=_blank and rel=noopener to links
- Update system prompt to align with command approval policy
- Clarify safe vs destructive commands in prompt
- Improve patrol auto-fix mode guidance with safe operation list
- Add verification requirements for auto-fix actions
- Update observe-only mode to be clearer about read-only restrictions
Keep only the simple AI-powered approach:
- set_resource_url tool lets AI save discovered URLs
- Users ask AI directly: 'Find URLs for my containers'
- AI uses its intelligence to discover and set URLs
Removed:
- URLDiscoveryService (rigid port scanning)
- Bulk discovery API endpoints
- Frontend discovery button
The AI itself is smart enough to iterate through resources
and discover URLs when asked.
- Add AI service with Anthropic, OpenAI, and Ollama providers
- Add AI chat UI component with streaming responses
- Add AI settings page for configuration
- Add agent exec framework for command execution
- Add API endpoints for AI chat and configuration
rcourtman