diff --git a/docs/AGENT_SECURITY.md b/docs/AGENT_SECURITY.md
index 656aa2a18..593ee829a 100644
--- a/docs/AGENT_SECURITY.md
+++ b/docs/AGENT_SECURITY.md
@@ -146,7 +146,11 @@ dropping the LXC-attach ambient capability grant entirely.
 Two optional flags restore the collectors that genuinely need elevation, each
 through an exact-command sudoers grant validated with `visudo` and a
 root-owned wrapper the agent is pointed at via an absolute-path-only
-environment override:
+environment override. Because `NoNewPrivileges` blocks `sudo` entirely, a
+unit with an active grant sets `NoNewPrivileges=false` while keeping the
+remaining hardening; a grantless least-privilege install keeps
+`NoNewPrivileges=true`. Choose grants deliberately: each one is a scoped,
+auditable widening of the profile.
 
 - `--grant-smart` allows exactly `smartctl`, restoring SMART disk health.
 - `--grant-pct` allows exactly `pct list` and `pct df`, restoring Proxmox LXC
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
index 22df34881..d6c47b1bd 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
@@ -6419,7 +6419,10 @@ installed unit rather than requiring the flags to be repeated. Optional
 need elevation through visudo-validated, exact-command sudoers rules and
 root-owned wrapper helpers the agent reaches only via the absolute-path-only
 `PULSE_SMARTCTL_PATH` / `PULSE_PCT_PATH` overrides; the pct grant covers
-`pct list` and `pct df` only and can never widen into `pct exec`. The agent
+`pct list` and `pct df` only and can never widen into `pct exec`. An active
+grant sets `NoNewPrivileges=false` because NNP blocks sudo outright (proven
+on a live systemd host); a grantless profile keeps `NoNewPrivileges=true`.
+The agent
 authors a `privilege` block in its report (`pkg/agents/host/report.go`
 `PrivilegeStatus`: effective root, service user, active helpers) so the
 server can present the profile descriptively. Uninstall removes the sudoers
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md
index 6dea3283e..ac792be7a 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md
@@ -3474,6 +3474,8 @@ exact-command sudoers rules with root-owned wrapper helpers wired through
 flag is refused (never silently downgraded to root) on appliance platforms
 and non-systemd init systems, is mutually exclusive with
 `--enable-commands`, and `--update` preserves an installed profile and its
-grants by reading the existing unit. Uninstall removes the sudoers file and
-helper directory. `scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go`
+grants by reading the existing unit. A unit with an active grant sets
+`NoNewPrivileges=false` because NNP blocks sudo (proven on a live systemd
+host); a grantless profile keeps `NoNewPrivileges=true`. Uninstall removes
+the sudoers file and helper directory. `scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go`
 (`TestInstallSHLeastPrivilegeProfile`) pins these invariants.
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md
index e12a3bd7e..147d9bf9d 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md
@@ -2287,6 +2287,8 @@ non-root with a nologin shell, keep every sudoers grant exact-command and
 visudo-validated with the pct grant excluding `pct exec`/`start`/`stop`/
 `enter`, refuse `--enable-commands` under the profile, refuse unsupported
 platforms instead of silently reverting to root, and drop the LXC-attach
-ambient capability grant. The agent-reported privilege profile is
+ambient capability grant. `NoNewPrivileges` stays enabled on a grantless
+profile and is relaxed only when a sudo grant is active, because NNP blocks
+sudo outright; that relaxation is part of the grant's declared cost. The agent-reported privilege profile is
 informational: the fleet doctor presents it descriptively and must not treat
 a non-root agent as unhealthy on that evidence alone.
diff --git a/scripts/install.sh b/scripts/install.sh
index 89b60a8a6..0c82e6453 100755
--- a/scripts/install.sh
+++ b/scripts/install.sh
@@ -1034,6 +1034,14 @@ render_systemd_agent_unit() {
 		no_new_privileges="false"
 		restrict_suidsgid="false"
 	fi
+	if [[ "$LEAST_PRIVILEGE" == "true" ]] && [[ "$GRANT_SMART" == "true" || "$GRANT_PCT" == "true" ]]; then
+		# The scoped sudo helpers are the profile's only privilege path, and
+		# NoNewPrivileges blocks sudo outright ("no new privileges flag is
+		# set"). Proven on a live systemd host: with NNP on, every helper call
+		# fails and SMART/pct silently disappear. A grant therefore relaxes
+		# NNP; a grantless least-privilege install keeps it.
+		no_new_privileges="false"
+	fi
 	if systemd_agent_may_attach_lxc; then
 		# lxc-attach into an unprivileged guest writes /proc/<pid>/uid_map,
 		# which needs CAP_SETUID in the parent user namespace. NoNewPrivileges
diff --git a/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go b/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go
index 1c5d6f033..d9b18656a 100644
--- a/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go
+++ b/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go
@@ -5564,6 +5564,9 @@ func TestInstallSHLeastPrivilegeProfile(t *testing.T) {
 		`"network-online.target" "$SERVICE_USER" ""`,
 		"# The least-privilege profile never attaches into guests",
 		`rm -f "$PRIVILEGE_SUDOERS_FILE"`,
+		// NoNewPrivileges blocks sudo, so an active grant must relax it or
+		// the helpers silently fail inside the service (proven live).
+		`if [[ "$LEAST_PRIVILEGE" == "true" ]] && [[ "$GRANT_SMART" == "true" || "$GRANT_PCT" == "true" ]]; then`,
 	}
 	for _, needle := range required {
 		if !strings.Contains(script, needle) {