diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
index d7d9f033fb..6fb3b0261e 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
@@ -3423,6 +3423,10 @@ merged `Fingerprint`, so a pin still verifies the peer. Regression tests
 and `TestHandleUpdateNodePreservesDisabledVerifySSLThroughConsolidation` cover
 the merge and save paths.
 
+The persisted `VerifySSLExplicit` marker is internal node configuration. It is
+not added to the auto-register request or response, nor to the node API
+response, so existing clients see no payload change.
+
 ### Manual update freshness
 
 Server update-check freshness is owned by internal/updates and its API adapter.
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md
index e5fd6fe223..327a84dd83 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md
@@ -4550,6 +4550,13 @@ replaced by the registration's capture state. New nodes continue to take the
 captured value. This is a behavioural clarification of the existing endpoint,
 not a new field or contract delta.
 
+The node add and update payloads keep `verifySSL` as an optional pointer, so an
+explicit `false` remains distinguishable from an omitted field. An explicit
+choice is recorded as operator-owned and is not overridden by automatic PVE
+consolidation, which runs on save, load and monitor reconciliation. The response
+shape is unchanged: the persisted explicit marker is internal and is not exposed
+through the node API.
+
 ### Manual update freshness
 
 GET /api/updates/check accepts an optional boolean force query alongside the
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md
index 512b7b5501..edd92e93d8 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md
@@ -951,6 +951,20 @@ tokens, and path-normalization variants.
 
 ## Current State
 
+### Node TLS verification preference is operator-owned
+
+A PVE connection's `VerifySSL` value is security-relevant, so the stored
+operator choice must not be changed by automatic reconciliation. The persisted
+`VerifySSLExplicit` field records that a caller supplied `verifySSL` through the
+node add or update API, distinguishing a deliberate opt-out from the zero
+value. Automatic PVE consolidation (`ConsolidatePVEInstances`) and canonical
+auto-registration never override an explicit choice; the historical promotion
+is retained only when neither side recorded one, and a merged certificate
+fingerprint still pins the peer. A record written before the field existed
+loads as non-explicit and is unchanged until the operator saves a choice.
+`TestPVEInstanceVerifySSLExplicitRoundTrips` in
+`internal/config/config_load_test.go` pins the persisted default and round-trip.
+
 ### Manual update availability feedback
 
 The settings state owner has a dedicated proof route to
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md
index 69a99cd6bf..ee92aea499 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md
@@ -2618,8 +2618,11 @@ preference when the host agent re-registers the node after a disconnect,
 including when the stored fingerprint was cleared. This prevents a rotating or
 self-signed certificate from silently re-enabling verification and breaking the
 monitoring path used for backup and recovery evidence. New nodes still take the
-captured registration value. See the agent-lifecycle contract for the runtime
-mechanism.
+captured registration value. The same preference is preserved when automatic
+PVE consolidation folds a duplicate cluster or an overlapping standalone into
+the canonical connection on save, load or monitor reconciliation; a merged
+certificate fingerprint still pins the peer. See the agent-lifecycle contract
+for the runtime mechanism.
 
 ### Manual update freshness
 
diff --git a/internal/api/contract_test.go b/internal/api/contract_test.go
index 87f851bca0..d293e613c1 100644
--- a/internal/api/contract_test.go
+++ b/internal/api/contract_test.go
@@ -1616,6 +1616,32 @@ func TestContract_NodeConfigUpdateTracksOptionalConnectionFieldsAndRedactedSecre
 	}
 }
 
+// TestContract_NodeConfigUpdateVerifySSLIsOptionalExplicitField pins the node
+// config update payload contract the TLS-preference fix relies on: verifySSL is
+// an optional pointer, so an explicit false is distinguishable from an omitted
+// value. The update handler records an explicit choice from the non-nil pointer
+// and must never treat an omitted field as an opt-out (#2140).
+func TestContract_NodeConfigUpdateVerifySSLIsOptionalExplicitField(t *testing.T) {
+	var disabled NodeConfigRequest
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(`{"verifySSL":false}`), &disabled); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode explicit disable request: %v", err)
+	}
+	if disabled.VerifySSL == nil {
+		t.Fatal("explicit verifySSL:false must decode to a non-nil pointer")
+	}
+	if *disabled.VerifySSL {
+		t.Fatal("explicit verifySSL:false must decode to false")
+	}
+
+	var omitted NodeConfigRequest
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(`{"name":"cluster"}`), &omitted); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode request without verifySSL: %v", err)
+	}
+	if omitted.VerifySSL != nil {
+		t.Fatal("omitted verifySSL must stay nil so an existing TLS choice is preserved")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestContract_HostedMagicLinkStablePrincipalProof(t *testing.T) {
 	source, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Clean("magic_link_handlers.go"))
 	if err != nil {
diff --git a/internal/config/config_load_test.go b/internal/config/config_load_test.go
index 33ccf9f310..f2b8c53cae 100644
--- a/internal/config/config_load_test.go
+++ b/internal/config/config_load_test.go
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package config
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -663,3 +664,29 @@ func TestLoadSystemSettingsWithRetry(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, 1, calls)
 	})
 }
+
+// TestPVEInstanceVerifySSLExplicitRoundTrips pins the persisted TLS-choice
+// field: an operator's explicit selection must survive serialization so
+// automatic consolidation can distinguish it from the zero value, while a
+// record written before the field existed loads as the non-explicit default
+// (#2140).
+func TestPVEInstanceVerifySSLExplicitRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
+	original := PVEInstance{
+		Name:              "homelab",
+		Host:              "https://pve.local:8006",
+		VerifySSL:         false,
+		VerifySSLExplicit: true,
+	}
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(original)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var decoded PVEInstance
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(encoded, &decoded))
+	assert.False(t, decoded.VerifySSL)
+	assert.True(t, decoded.VerifySSLExplicit, "an explicit TLS choice must survive persistence")
+
+	var legacy PVEInstance
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(`{"Name":"legacy","Host":"https://pve.local:8006"}`), &legacy))
+	assert.False(t, legacy.VerifySSL)
+	assert.False(t, legacy.VerifySSLExplicit, "a record without the field is not an explicit choice")
+}