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ignacionelson
97596da7d0
Found reviewing the delivery work. The path is written into
X-Accel-Redirect or X-Sendfile, and a CR or LF in a header value is
header injection. PHP's header() refuses to emit one, so the real effect
is a 500 on every download, preview and thumbnail of that file rather
than a split response -- a file permanently broken by its own name.
Paths are generated here as Y/m/{uuid}.{ext}, so this should be
unreachable. The extension is not generated: it comes from the
uploader's filename, and on a migrated installation from a v1 database.
The upload routes all check the extension against an allowlist, which no
control character can match -- but upload_type_restriction can be set to
none, and the importer does not consult that policy at all.
assertRelative() was documented as the backstop for what a path may be
and only covered traversal, which is the half that cannot happen here.
Low severity, and the guard should have covered it either way.