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3af8235729
StaffAccounts opens with the rule for roles: "Nobody hands out authority they do not hold … that turns one permission into every permission and makes the rest of the matrix decorative." mayGrant enforces it, and guardTarget applies the same test to an existing account. The client roster never got the same treatment. `assigned_clients` was validated as `exists:users,id where type = client` and passed straight to syncAssignedClients, with nothing anywhere asking whether the actor holds the clients they are handing out. Assigning a client is not a label: it is that client's whole library, given to whoever is on the other end. The case that matters is the actor's own account. guardTarget returns immediately when the target is the actor — editing your own name and email is not a question of authority — so a client-scoped staff member with edit_users could PATCH their own id with every client on the installation and read the whole library from then on. assignableClientIds() answers the roster question the way assignableRoleIds() answers the role one, and the five places that accept `assigned_clients` — users store and update on both surfaces, and the account conversion — validate against it. It returns the full roster for an unrestricted actor, so every caller validates against one list instead of composing a conditional rule; that list is already client-typed, which is why one rule replaces the exists() and the type filter together. The two pickers that offer the roster are narrowed to the same list, so a form no longer offers a client the request behind it will refuse. syncAssignedClients is untouched: which ids stick to which role is its decision and it was never the problem.
283 lines
11 KiB
PHP
283 lines
11 KiB
PHP
<?php
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declare(strict_types=1);
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namespace App\Modules\Identity\Http\Controllers\Api;
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use App\Http\Controllers\Controller;
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use App\Models\User;
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use App\Modules\Api\Support\PollingQuery;
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use App\Modules\Files\DeletedAccountContent;
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use App\Modules\Identity\AccountContentDeletion;
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use App\Modules\Identity\Http\Resources\Api\StaffUserResource;
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use App\Modules\Identity\StaffAccounts;
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use App\Modules\Identity\TwoFactor\TwoFactorAdministration;
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use App\Modules\Identity\UserType;
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use Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Builder;
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use Illuminate\Http\JsonResponse;
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use Illuminate\Http\Request;
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use Illuminate\Http\Resources\Json\AnonymousResourceCollection;
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use Illuminate\Validation\Rule;
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use Illuminate\Validation\Rules\Password;
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use Illuminate\Validation\ValidationException;
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/**
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* Staff accounts over the API — the API twin of the /users screens.
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*
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* **Community only.** Every route is behind `capability:users.manage`, so
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* a cloud install answers 403 `capability_unavailable`: managed
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* installations create staff accounts outside the application, and an API
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* that could mint them there would be a second, unmanaged door into the
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* same thing.
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* The routes are still registered in every edition so the committed
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* OpenAPI document is identical everywhere — the middleware refuses, the
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* route table does not lie.
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*
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* The rules this enforces are not restated here. Who may be granted which
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* role, who may edit whom, and never leaving the installation without an
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* active administrator all live in StaffAccounts, which the web
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* controller calls too. That sharing is the point: these are invariants
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* about authority, and an invariant implemented twice is an invariant
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* that will eventually hold once.
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*
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* `abort_unless($user->isStaff(), 404)` on each single-account route
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* mirrors the web controller: a client is not addressable through this
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* surface even by id, and has its own endpoints under /clients.
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*/
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class UsersController extends Controller
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{
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public function __construct(
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private readonly PollingQuery $polling,
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private readonly StaffAccounts $accounts,
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private readonly DeletedAccountContent $accountContent,
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private readonly AccountContentDeletion $accountDeletion,
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) {}
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/**
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* List staff accounts.
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*
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* Clients never appear here — they are a different population with
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* their own endpoints under `/clients`.
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*/
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public function index(Request $request): AnonymousResourceCollection
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{
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$filters = $request->validate($this->polling->rules() + [
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'search' => ['nullable', 'string', 'max:255'],
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'role_id' => ['nullable', 'integer'],
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'status' => ['nullable', Rule::in(['active', 'inactive'])],
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]);
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$query = User::query()->where('type', UserType::Staff)->with('role');
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if (($filters['search'] ?? null) !== null) {
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$search = $filters['search'];
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$query->where(fn (Builder $inner) => $inner
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->where('name', 'like', "%{$search}%")
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->orWhere('email', 'like', "%{$search}%"));
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}
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if (($filters['role_id'] ?? null) !== null) {
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$query->where('role_id', (int) $filters['role_id']);
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}
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if (($filters['status'] ?? null) !== null) {
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$query->where('active', $filters['status'] === 'active');
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}
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return StaffUserResource::collection($this->polling->paginate($request, $query, 'users'));
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}
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/**
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* Get one staff account.
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*
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* Adds `assigned_client_ids` and the `content` counts that `DELETE`
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* needs, neither of which the listing carries.
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*/
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public function show(Request $request, User $user): StaffUserResource
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{
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abort_unless($user->isStaff(), 404);
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$this->accounts->guardTarget($this->actor($request), $user);
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return $this->resourceFor($user);
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}
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/**
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* Create a staff account.
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*
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* `role_id` must name a role the calling token's owner could grant.
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* You cannot hand out authority you do not hold: a caller who is not
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* an administrator may not create one, nor assign any role carrying a
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* permission they lack. `GET /roles` lists what is available to you.
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*
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* The account is created active and with its email already verified —
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* an administrator vouched for the address by sending it.
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*/
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public function store(Request $request): JsonResponse
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{
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$actor = $this->actor($request);
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$validated = $request->validate([
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'name' => ['required', 'string', 'max:255'],
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'email' => ['required', 'string', 'lowercase', 'email', 'max:255', 'unique:users,email'],
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'role_id' => ['required', 'integer', Rule::in($this->accounts->assignableRoleIds($actor))],
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// No `confirmed`: repeating a password defends against a human
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// mistyping into a form, and an API caller has no second field
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// to mistype. Password::defaults() still applies.
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'password' => ['required', Password::defaults()],
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'assigned_clients' => ['array'],
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// Only clients you can reach yourself: an unrestricted account may
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// assign any client, a client-scoped one only the clients already
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// assigned to it. Assigning a client hands over everything that
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// client can see, so it follows the same rule as role_id above.
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'assigned_clients.*' => ['integer', Rule::in($this->accounts->assignableClientIds($actor))],
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]);
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$user = $this->accounts->create([
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'name' => $validated['name'],
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'email' => $validated['email'],
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'role_id' => (int) $validated['role_id'],
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'password' => $validated['password'],
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], array_values($validated['assigned_clients'] ?? []));
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return $this->resourceFor($user->refresh())->response()->setStatusCode(201);
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}
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/**
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* Update a staff account, including the role assigned to it.
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*
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* PATCH semantics: an absent key means "leave alone", not "clear".
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* Sending `assigned_clients` replaces the whole list; omitting it
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* leaves it, except that moving to a role which is not client-scoped
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* clears it either way.
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*
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* Refused with a 422 if the change would leave the installation with
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* no active administrator, or if you would be deactivating yourself.
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*/
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public function update(Request $request, User $user): StaffUserResource
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{
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abort_unless($user->isStaff(), 404);
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$actor = $this->actor($request);
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$this->accounts->guardTarget($actor, $user);
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$validated = $request->validate([
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'name' => ['sometimes', 'string', 'max:255'],
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'email' => ['sometimes', 'string', 'lowercase', 'email', 'max:255', Rule::unique('users', 'email')->ignore($user->id)],
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'role_id' => ['sometimes', 'integer', Rule::in($this->accounts->assignableRoleIds($actor))],
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'active' => ['sometimes', 'boolean'],
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'password' => ['sometimes', 'nullable', Password::defaults()],
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'assigned_clients' => ['sometimes', 'array'],
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// Only clients you can reach yourself: an unrestricted account may
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// assign any client, a client-scoped one only the clients already
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// assigned to it. Assigning a client hands over everything that
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// client can see, so it follows the same rule as role_id above.
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'assigned_clients.*' => ['integer', Rule::in($this->accounts->assignableClientIds($actor))],
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]);
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// The same refusal the web screen makes, and for the same reason:
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// locking yourself out is never what was meant.
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if ($user->is($actor) && ($validated['active'] ?? true) === false) {
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throw ValidationException::withMessages([
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'active' => __('You cannot deactivate your own account.'),
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]);
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}
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$attributes = array_intersect_key($validated, array_flip(['name', 'email', 'active', 'password']));
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if (array_key_exists('role_id', $validated)) {
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$attributes['role_id'] = (int) $validated['role_id'];
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}
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$this->accounts->update(
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$user,
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$attributes,
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array_key_exists('assigned_clients', $validated)
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? array_values($validated['assigned_clients'])
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: null,
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);
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return $this->resourceFor($user->refresh());
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}
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/**
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* Delete a staff account.
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*
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* If the account owns no files or folders, no body is needed.
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*
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* If it does, you must say what happens to that content: send
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* `content_action` as either `cascade_delete` (delete it along with
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* the account) or `reassign`, and in the latter case a
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* `reassign_to_id` naming the active account that inherits it.
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* Omitting the choice is a 422 — there is no default, because one
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* would silently destroy files and the other would silently hand them
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* to somebody else. `GET /users/{user}` reports the counts.
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*
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* You cannot delete your own account, and you cannot delete the last
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* active administrator.
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*/
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public function destroy(Request $request, User $user): JsonResponse
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{
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abort_unless($user->isStaff(), 404);
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$this->accounts->guardDeletable($this->actor($request), $user);
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$validated = $this->accountDeletion->validate($request, $user);
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$name = $this->accounts->delete($user);
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$this->accountDeletion->apply($validated, $user, $name);
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return response()->json(status: 204);
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}
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/**
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* Remove a staff account's two-factor authentication.
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*
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* The remedy for a locked-out account: somebody whose authenticator
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* app and recovery codes are both gone cannot sign in, and nobody else
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* can open the account for them either. Afterwards the account signs
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* in with its password alone, and — if this installation enforces
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* two-factor authentication for staff — is asked to enrol again on its
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* next request.
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*
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* The account holder is emailed that this happened, and the action is
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* recorded in the activity log against the caller. Answers 204 whether
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* or not a second factor was actually in force.
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*/
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public function destroyTwoFactor(Request $request, User $user, TwoFactorAdministration $twoFactor): JsonResponse
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{
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abort_unless($user->isStaff(), 404);
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$this->accounts->guardTarget($this->actor($request), $user);
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$twoFactor->reset($user);
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return response()->json(status: 204);
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}
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private function resourceFor(User $user): StaffUserResource
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{
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return StaffUserResource::detailed(
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$user->load('role'),
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content: $this->accountContent->summarize($user),
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assignedClientIds: array_values(
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$user->assignedClients()->pluck('users.id')->map(fn ($id): int => (int) $id)->all()
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),
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);
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}
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/**
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* The token's owner. Every guard in StaffAccounts is asked on their
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* behalf, never on the token's — a token cannot exceed its owner's
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* permissions (EnsureTokenCan re-checks that on every request), so the
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* owner is the right subject for "may they grant this role".
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*/
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private function actor(Request $request): User
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{
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$actor = $request->user();
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assert($actor instanceof User);
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return $actor;
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}
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}
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